The Democratic Peace Theory and Power Cycle Theory - Essay Example

Student’s Name] [Instructor’s Name] [Course Title] [Date] POWER CYCLE THEORY ABSTRACT In his opening works of the 1960s and early 1970s, Charles Doran establishes the idea of virtual power cycles as the chief engine of systemic transformation. The character of this change throughout certain critical periods is shown to associate with the onset of highly harsh war. In their examination of war initiation by nine major states amid 1816 and 1975, Doran and Parsons (1980) illustrate that large-scale wars are more liable to break out during those times when these states were experiencing critical periods than when they are faced with “customary” circumstances. Furthermore, the more time that passes while a state’s previous passage through a critical period, the fewer extensive are the wars it initiates. BACKGROUND More recent empirical studies have extended the logic of power cycles to address less severe forms of international conflict such as involvement in militarized interstate disputes (Spiezio, 1993) and deterrence encounters (Tessman and Chan, 2004). The restriction of the theory to the rise and decline of only major powers has also been lifted, as power cycles have proven relevant in explaining regional political systems such as the Persian Gulf (Parasiliti, 2003) and South Asia (Kumar, 2003). Power cycle theory has also been enhanced with inferences from outside frame- works such as prospect theory (Hebron and James, 1997), power transition theory (Houweling and Siccama, 1991), alliance portfolios (Chiu,2003), and nuclear strategy (Geller, 2003). The most recent, and perhaps most promising extension of power cycle theory has occurred in the area of international political economy. Relevant work has addressed the role of power cycles in the economic structure of East Asia (Doran, 2003), the European Union (Schmidt, 2003) and the potential Free Trade Area of the Americas (James and Lusztig, 2003). Collectively, these analyses demonstrate the robust empirical connection between the structural presence of critical periods and the foreign policy decision to engage in interstate conflict. Furthermore, these studies have suggested that the explanatory breadth of power cycle theory exceeds the original bounds outlined in the earlier works of Charles Doran. AIM Expanding on this trend in this paper, I examine the interaction between regime type, critical periods, and major power conflict in the form of interstate war and great power deterrence encounters. By incorporating the notion of regime type within the larger context of power cycle theory, I ask the following question: Are democratic states better equipped to deal with the foreign policy challenges that critical periods in their relative capability cycle might present? In short — are critical periods “less critical” for democracies? Establishing the link between critical periods, regime type, and interstate conflict is another important contribution to both the power cycle research program and to the large body of literature that seeks to identify the relationship between democracy and international conflict. THE BASICS OF POWER CYCLE THEORY POWER AND ROLE Power cycle theory offers a framework for understanding the rise and decline of states in the international system. At any given point, the capabilities of these states are expanding and contracting at different rates. When changing national capabilities are compared, each country finds itself to be at any given moment gaining, losing, or maintaining its power position relative to its counterparts. Doran and Parsons(1980) demonstrate that, over time, each state traverses a relative power cycle that includes a period of growth, maturation, decline, and then rebirth. A fundamental argument of power cycle theory is that relative power is but a means for achieving a significant role in the system. “Role” can be thought of in the abstract as international prestige and influence, and more tangibly as cultural influence or clout in various international organizations. Role amounts to more than power position, or place, within the inter- national system, although role encompasses these considerations. Role suggests informally legitimated responsibilities and prerequisites associated with position and place. Role involves the extent of leadership or followership, the capacity to extend security to others or the dependence upon external security; whether a state is an aid-giver or recipient, a lender or a net debtor; whether the state is sought after for counsel or is disregarded; and whether the state is an overachiever or a comparative non-participant in the affairs of the system” (Doran,1991, pp. 30–31). It is important to understand that role is a systemic phenomenon. While governments may announce and plan for a particular declaratory role, the perceptions and expectations of other states in the system are equally vital in ascribing a specific role to any one country (Lahneman,2003). Role is determined not solely by power, or by national capability that underlies power. It is determined also by the tradition of international political involvement and the record concerning how power has been used. And it is determined, in the absence of an actual exercise of power, by how other governments respond to the state because of its power or prestige (Doran, 1991, pp. 30–31). Leaders do not amass huge armies or nuclear arsenals because those acts are satisfying in themselves. Instead, these (and other) forms of power are used as instruments to establish, for a state or an individual, a more prominent position on the global stage. Importantly, role and relative power rarely fluctuate in tandem. For example, a state that is growing quickly in terms of relative power will often find that its role in the system grows at a much slower pace. This is because international role, like relative power, is zero-sum: One country’s relative growth dictates the relative decline of another. Despite a shrinking share of system power, declining states will be reluctant to accept a diminished role in the global community. Client states that depend on the declining power will also resist calls for contraction of that power’s leadership position. This dynamic leads to an extensive gap between the role that a state hopes to achieve or maintaining the international system and the amount of prestige and influence that its relative power substantiates. Growing states typically have a deficit of role in comparison to power, while declining states usually have a surplus of role in comparison of power. This gap between power and role is the primary source of international tension, and is a latent source of conflict between states. Power-role gaps do not, however, typically generate the kind of existential threat that compels leaders to decide upon war as a favor- able policy option. Growing states, though frustrated, count on a brighter future because they assume their relative capability in the sys- tem will continue to expand. Officials in these countries may intention- ally delay any confrontational demands for increased influence and prestige in the system because they believe that their bargaining position vis-à-vis other states will continue to improve over time. As a result, there is usually not a great deal of international pressure on declining powers to take a “backseat” in international politics via a reduced role in the system. As long as countries rise and decline in a predictable manner, the system is able to gradually correct existing gaps between power and role. Outright conflict is constrained, as leaders have utilitarian incentives to seek negotiated outcomes to confrontations that do emerge (Fearon, 1995). How, then, are gaps between power and role crucial for understanding the outbreak of war? The key is to understand the link between patterns of growth and decline in the system, the nature of each country’s position on its relative capability cycle, and impact that this position has on the decision making calculus of that country’s leadership. The theory of power cycles argues that frustrations over power-role gaps are especially acute at certain “critical” locations along each state’s relative power curve. It is vital to remember that, for any country, changes in relative power often differ from fluctuations in absolute power. Even if a state is experiencing growth in absolute terms, it may still be losing power relative to other, faster growing states.8 Thus, a leading state’s relative position in the great power system can be drastically affected by the rise or fall of far lesser states.9 The interdependence of these states often produces unpredictable and drastic changes in their relative power cycle, which are a result of each state’s own growth rate as well as that of its counterparts. These critical periods indicate a sudden and dramatic change in the trajectory of each state’s cycle. This type of change exacerbates frustration and/or anxiety over existing power-role gaps, and may transform the manner in which leaders perceive such gaps. Specifically, the change in attitude is likely to be from benign annoyance toward a perception of existential threat to national security. At the high and low turning points (H and L), a state is poised to enter a phase during which the direction of its capability change will suddenly invert. At the two inflection points (I1 and I2), growth undergoes an inversion in terms of rate. Again, the turning points indicate a reversal in the direction of change, while the inflection points indicate a change in velocity. Each of these four junctures presents a confusing environment for formulating foreign policy. Officials are faced with an unexpected reversal in growth trend that challenges the long-held assumptions that have previously guided their decisions. At the first inflection point, for example, leaders that once viewed the future with unbridled optimism are suddenly forced to reckon with a new reality of lower growth rates and constrained ascendance in the international system. At this point (and at the other critical points), an immediate reconciliation of any existing power-role gaps may suddenly appear as vital to the preservation of national security. Confrontations over power-role gaps that may have been dismissed at other times suddenly boil to the surface and present themselves as paramount threats that may warrant military action. The future is clouded in uncertainty and, for a state experiencing downward mobility (in terms of either direction or rate), fraught with the alarming prospect of a deteriorating bargaining position in relation to other states. In an instant, leaders must cope with the realization that — in terms of maximizing prestige and influence in the system — their “window of opportunity” is closing. POWER CYCLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE STRUCTURAL AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE There is not an existing literature than explicitly links the democratic peace hypothesis with power cycle theory. There are parts of the democratic peace literature, however, that are substantively relevant to the question at hand. Hewitt and Wilkenfeld produce evidence that suggests democracies, regardless of their opponent, are less likely to escalate minor disputes into more large-scale conflict (Hewitt and Wilkenfeld, 1996). Others argue that the responsiveness of democratic leaders to voter backlash creates a situation where democratic states are forced to “win quickly,” withdraw or accept non-victory (Bennett and Stamm, 1998). Dan Reiter and Allan Stamm (1998) illustrate this point by citing U.S. negotiations to end the Vietnam War, which could have conceivably continued, or even escalated further absent the lack of popular support for the war in America. Any of these factors might generate an aversion to major power war for democracies as such conflicts typically include extensive human and material costs. In addition, early “structural” arguments for democratic peace show that institutional constraints in the form of checks and balances result in an overall more dovish attitude for democracies (Starr, 1992; Russett 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993). More recent structural arguments focus on differences in rent seeking, audience costs and size of the selectorate in each regime type (Lake, 1992; Fearon, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1998). Although most of these structural arguments investigate the democratic peace as a dyadic phenomenon, the causal mechanisms they identify are also relevant for the monadic tests that are of interest here. While audience costs, for example, might be lower for a democracy initiating conflict against an autocracy, most structural factors that are hypothesized to constrain belligerence are present in democracies regardless of the potential opponent. Furthermore, the presence or absence of a critical period should not alter the institutionalized constraints that confront a government on the brink of major war. A purely “structural” argument would therefore propose that democracies are: 1) In absolute terms, not much more prone to conflict during critical periods than they are at remaining times, and 2) In relative terms, much less affected by critical periods than are nondemocracies. While this argument is most directly applicable to interstate war, I believe that the same proposition will apply equally to deterrence encounters, as they indicate a serious commitment to escalation, and potentially full-scale war. Another component of the democratic peace argument has been couched in “normative” terms (Russett, 1993). At the simplest level, this position is comprised of two basic assumptions: First, states allegedly externalize the norms they use to resolve conflict domestically. Because democracies are based on the rule of law, they are more likely than nondemocracies to have norms against the use of violence as a tool for domestic conflict resolution. If a democracy finds itself in conflict with another democracy, both sides expect the other to pursue nonviolent means of resolution. Also, leaders will find it more difficult, if not impossible to convince the voting public within their state that violence should be used against their counterparts. Thus, conflict between democracies is both easier to diffuse and harder to escalate. Notably, this “externalization of peaceful norms” only occurs when two democracies are dealing with each other. When a democracy faces off against a nondemocracy, its leaders and public are more apt to feel threatened by such a conflict, as the nondemocratic rival is likely to have more violent and less transparent standards for dealing with unrest within its own borders. Thus, leaders in a democracy may adopt (what they perceive as) the more violent disposition of their non-democratic rival. Based on this logic, normative aspects of the democratic peace hypothesis tend to focus solely on the peaceful nature of dyadic interaction between democracies in the international system.11 Democracies are peaceful when they interact with other democracies, or when, for whatever reason, their perception of threat is very low. When analyzed monadically, however, the normative argument implies that democracies should be just as bellicose as their nondemocratic counterparts when the regime type of their opponents is disregarded, or when the perception of threat is otherwise elevated. Thus, an important implication of this normative argument has to do with the misperception, trauma and increased feeling of threat associated with the nonrationality of critical periods. Given the increased perception of threat during critical periods, a strictly normative argument predicts that democracies will respond by adopting a more violent disposition, thus increasing their willingness to participate in, or initiate conflict more frequently. Thus, the normative component of the democratic peace theory produces different expectations about the impact of critical periods on democracies than does the structural component. Specifically, propositions based on a normative approach suggest that: In an absolute sense, critical periods should affect democracies significantly. Democracies will participate in both interstate war and deterrence encounters much more frequently during critical periods than during remaining times. Interstate wars and deterrence challenges will also be initiated by democratic leaders more often during critical periods than during noncritical periods; distinguishing by regime type, democracies and nondemocracies should both be affected by critical periods in a statistically significant manner (i.e., both regime types will exhibit higher rates of conflict behavior during critical periods). Based on the contrasting logic of the structural and normative arguments, the following propositions emerge when integrating power cycle theory with the democratic peace hypothesis: Proposition 1: If the conflict behavior of democracies is predominantly influenced by structural constraints, democracies will exhibit an overall rate of monadic conflict behavior (as defined by war participation, war initiation, deterrence involvement, and deterrence challenges) that is lower than that of their nondemocratic counterparts. This difference will be statistically significant. Furthermore, the conflict behavior of democratic leaders will not be affected by critical periods in a statistically significant manner. Conversely, nondemocracies will engage in significantly more interstate conflict during critical periods than they will during non- critical periods. Proposition 2: If the conflict behavior of democracies is predominantly influenced by normative factors, democracies will exhibit an overall rate of monadic conflict behavior that is roughly equal to their nondemocratic counterparts. Additionally, the conflict behavior of democratic leaders will be significantly higher during critical periods than it is during noncritical periods. The same principles hold true for leaders in nondemocracies. ANALYZING DETERRENCE ENCOUNTERS Major power conflict in the information age is characterized less and less by battlefield confrontations that generate high casualties. Indeed, most modern conflict may not be best defined as interstate war. Instead, less severe forms of conflict such as militarized interstate disputes, economic warfare and deterrence encounters seem to occupy a larger stage in the global arena. For power cycle theory to be truly relevant as a framework for understanding conflict in the twenty-first century, it will need to extend its empirical domain to include such types of conflict that fall short of outright war. Others (Spiezio, 1993) have already examined the relationship between critical periods and militarized interstate disputes, and there is not yet reliable data to conduct a sound comparison of various types of economic warfare during critical and noncritical periods. Thus, by including an analysis of deterrence encounters, this study fills an important gap in the power cycle research program, and it is able to do so in a methodologically sound manner. Another reason for studying deterrence encounters is to address an endogeneity concern. Extensive wars cause massive changes in national power and the demotion and even elimination of some major powers (e.g., Austria-Hungary, Germany, Japan). Given the importance of the location of critical periods in suggesting causality, one may ask whether national power cycles predict extensive wars or rather, if extensive wars shape national power cycles and “create” critical periods. Studying deterrence encounters helps to alleviate though not eliminate this concern. Because most of these episodes do not produce the kinds of massive capability changes associated with critical periods, it is easier to conclude that deterrence confrontations have their genesis in changing power cycles rather than the other way around. In this study, I analyze 88 cases of immediate (direct or extended) deterrence involving major states as both challenger and defender. The relevant data were originally collected by Huth et al. (1992, 1993). Given some differences in the temporal identification of these major powers, I add the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis to their list.I define a deterrence episode as occurring when a challenger has under- taken some tangible move signifying an inclination to overturn the status quo even though a defender has previously issued a warning that it will oppose this challenge (i.e., in face of an attempt at general deterrence by the defender). The defender in turn reacts to the challenger’s move. In undertaking this action and reaction, respectively, the challenger and defender “select” themselves to bring about the observed cases of deterrence encounters. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS Often, control variables such as number of territorial borders, geo- graphic proximity, physical size, alliance membership, power parity, and the possession of nuclear weapons (for the post-1945 world) are included in analyses of interstate conflict. For this study and in power cycle analyses in general, national capabilities have already been incorporated during the process of determining each state’s relative capability cycle. Doran (1989, p. 388; 1991, pp. 123–124) is successful in demonstrating that it is the experience of critical points rather than the existence of power symmetry or transition among the major states that is associated with the initiation of extensive war. While the identified control variables may be effective for distinguishing major states from minor ones, they are less useful for discriminating among the states in the major power system. They also tend to manifest multicollinearity. Also, in most cases of interstate conflict (be it war or deterrence encounters), I assume that the relevant officials have already accounted for all the publicly available information (such as physical distance, alliance membership, nuclear status) when making their decision to engage in hostilities. This information is likely to have been discounted by these officials, and their decision-making calculus must instead reflect their private information (Fearon, 1995). Mutual awareness of public facts should affect the terms of a potential settlement more than the occurrence or duration of hostilities (Cetinyan, 2002; Wittman, 1979). Given these considerations, the customary variables used for statistical control are neither necessary nor appropriate in this case. FINDINGS Across all four measures, nondemocratic states are found to exhibit higher levels of conflict behavior than are democracies. The differ- ence in means is statistically significant for all measures except that indicating frequency of major power war participation. For this mea- sure, nondemocracies have a mean occurrence rate of 0.0769, com- pared to 0.0683 for democracies. This means that during the 585 country-years coded as “nondemocratic,” there are 45 cases of major power war participation. During the 483 years coded as “democratic,” there are 33 positive observations. This exception noted, when conflict behavior is analyzed without regard to opponent, nondemocracies are found to engage in all forms of confrontation at a much higher frequency than are democracies. For every measure of conflict, critical periods have a significant conflict-intensifying effect on nondemocracies. Nondemocratic leaders are much more likely to engage in, and initiate wars and deterrence encounters during critical periods than they are during noncritical periods. The level of statistical significance ranges from the p < 0.056 level all the way to a quite robust level of p < 0.005. Based on these results, it is clear that nondemocracies are extremely prone to the belligerence-intensifying impact of critical periods. As an extreme example, the rate of war participation for nondemocracies is nearly twice as high during critical periods than during other years. Democracies, on the other hand, are much less prone to the sudden change and rampant uncertainty that are hypothesized to drive conflict behavior during critical periods. The rate of war participation, war initiation, deterrence involvement, and deterrence challenges is consistently higher during critical periods, but this difference is not statistically significant. The largest distinction occurs for deterrence challenges, where the margin (0.0753 for critical periods and 0.0538 for noncritical periods) approaches, but does not reach statistical significance. The results for democracies still suggest that critical periods exert a conflict-intensifying effect on states, regardless of regime type. The fact that nondemocracies are much more affected by the presence of critical periods, however, lends much more support to Proposition 1 than Proposition 2. The idea of a “monadic” democratic peace, along with the immunity (both absolute and relative to nondemocracies) of democracies to the conflict intensifying effect of critical periods, suggests that there are structural elements to democracies that make them more pacific. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS Based on the Polity data used in this study, two of six major powers are considered democratic as of 1860. By 1939, four out of seven major powers are coded as democracies. By the end of the twentieth century, six out of seven are democratic. At the same time, critical periods are found to be “less critical” for democracies than for nondemocracies. If the major power system continues to democratize, will the principles of power cycle theory still be important? The answer is, on the whole, yes. First, it should be noted that this analysis is just a first pass at interacting regime type and critical periods. Moreover, the results here do indicate that democracies are still more likely to participate in, and initiate conflict during critical periods than during noncritical periods. The conflict-intensifying effect is just not statistically significant at this point. Furthermore, it seems premature to accept the spread of democracy to all major powers as a fait accompli. Recent events suggest that the international system is still quite far from the “End of History” (Fukuyama,1989). Indeed, the events of the past four years raise doubt as to whether we are even headed in that direction at all: Russia’s venture into democracy seems to be backsliding, and authoritarianism in China has been slow in its decay. Furthermore, the possible entry of Pakistan, Indonesia, and other quickly growing Islamic states into the major power system casts doubt on the notion that the system will be an entirely democratic one anytime in the near future. Indeed, the increasingly complex set of state and non-state actors (such as al-Qaeda) on the world stage only serves to exacerbate the trauma, misperception, and non-rational decision-making environment of critical periods. A final issue emerges in relation to American foreign policy—specifically our approach to the impending challenge presented by an increasingly powerful, authoritarian China. Other theories of war—such as power transition theory—might emphasize the need to “co-opt” China into becoming a satisfied challenger instead of one that hopes to overturn the American-oriented status quo. This could be encouraged in a number of ways, from facilitating the economic development of the PRC, to nurturing the democratization of the country. To a certain extent, both of those policies are being followed by the United States today. Although these policies are not likely to be deleterious in their own right, the implications of the present analysis suggest that there is a more important strategy to be followed. Critical periods are unavoidable, and the internal composition (political or economic) of states does not entirely mitigate their effect. Thus, the key to avoiding major war is to neutralize the increased perception of threat that is the causal link between the non-rationality that occurs during critical periods and the decision to initiate major power conflict. If Chinese leaders, despite the trauma of a critical period, do not feel like their vital interests are acutely threatened by the United States or any other major power, then peaceful passage through a critical period is all the more likely. Perhaps it is this strategy that the international community had in mind when, despite serious human rights concerns, Beijing was awarded the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Favorable (and perhaps necessary) expansion of China’s leadership role in East Asia is also underscored by the Beijing’s crucial role as the primary mediator in the ongoing crisis involving North Korea’s emerging nuclear weapons capability. Read More