Role of Intelligence in Vietnam during the War - Essay Example

Role of Intelligence in Vietnam Vietnam is a one party socialist which was formally known as the SocialistRepublic of Vietnam. It is located on the eastern side of Sothern Asia, and is one of the fastest growing economies in southern Asia. Vietnam has had successive royal dynasties for centuries with consequent expansion both politically and geographically over the years. In the mid 19th century, the state was stricken by a series of conflicts that eventually split the country into two. The preceding conflict between the two sides that had split attracted a lot of foreign interest far and wide. Amid foreign intervention, the conflict eventually ended in 1975 with the northern and southern Vietnam states completely separated. After the conflict, however, the separate states were unified again albeit under a communist government. This paper is about the role of intelligence in Vietnam, especially before and during the conflict. In order to understand this, it is important to point out the beginning of American involvement in the region. Well, this was towards the end of the Second World War. During this time, the United States was interested in protecting the state against a communist takeover that was looming. It is widely known that at the time, the U.S attacked Vietnam and other neighboring states like Cambodia and lied about. President Nixon for example ordered the bombing of Cambodia and lied to the American people that he would never do such a thing. In his book The Art of War, Sun Tzu says that all warfare is based on deception1. Well, this stands to be true in regard to Vietnam case. America used deception to foster her activities and interests in the region. The conflict had an undoubtedly huge number of casualties, most of them women and children. The role of intelligence in Vietnam remains a very complex affair to date. In any intelligence community, concerns do not only range within the logistical and military operations but all the way to the forces of the enemy. During this particular time, the intelligence was concerned with the enemy base areas, rivers and other trails in the land. The air space was also a huge concern during this conflict. The apparent conduct of the United States intelligence agencies have been widely criticized because of the way the handled Vietnam conflict. First of all, the intelligence got the scope of Vietnam conflict all wrong. They portrayed fewer margins than the actual situation on the ground was. The intelligence, therefore, failed to give to correct foresight; a very fundamental aspect of war. There was no clear direction given by the intelligence agencies probably because they neglected some important fundamentals. Simply stated, there was intelligence failure. The enemy was underestimated and so was the amount of control that they held, especially in the south. Another important factor that was overlooked was the enemy’s Order of Battle2. This was not looked into until almost two years later after the conflict had began. If the intelligence had given more accurate reports, the United States would probably have sent more troops earlier or maybe not gone ahead with the intervention. The troops sent by the U.S during that time were as much as the reports given recommended. These recommendations were, of course, out of the reality. The United States intelligence neglected the power of the enemy which was well concentrated around the Communist Party3. This party had a collective identity which was called the ‘infrastructure’. The Central Intelligence Agency was not aware of this entity for almost two years into the conflict. This is despite the fact that there was a lot of evidence to identify the infrastructure. The intelligence agencies were also not aware of the Viet Cong Security Service, which is said to be one of its main adversaries. Even to the present day, intelligence personnel are not fully aware of the strength of the enemy in Vietnam. A factor that also led to the failure of intelligence agencies in Vietnam is the imbalance of intelligence personnel. The Viet Cong agents were comparatively large in numbers as compared to those of the United States. The Viet agents were tens of thousands while the U.S had only hundreds. This, as expected has had several consequences. The enemy is, therefore, able to not only control its losses but also to command most the battlefield and ground supplies. The intelligence agencies, therefore, provided more problems in the region than solutions. There are reports of atrocities that were committed by American military4. These range from rape to extermination to massacres of hundreds of people. The theory that was developed by the United States before going into Vietnam conflict was, to say the least, off point. This is because all the projected outcomes did not fall into place. The United States has postulated that the fall of Vietnam state would make the whole of Asia a colony of the soviet. This, however, was not the case. After the conflict, the soviet was gone. The U.S apparently had interfered into an already existing conflict between the people of Vietnam state and the French5. France had failed to honor an agreement it had made with the people of Vietnam that it would recognize their independence. It is during this time of French conflict with Vietnam that the United States invaded. Intelligence works done by American agencies failed to put into consideration the effect that a military action to that particular situation would have on the international policy. The national intelligence is solely charged with the responsibility of providing the president and the Security Council with facts as well as projected consequences that would occur incase the state takes any particular action. Although they do not make the necessary security decisions, the intelligence agencies are supposed to utilize their resources and provide factual information, judgments and recommendations about foreign developments. In more than one occasion, however, the United States has taken military solutions to foreign ground probably with the idea that the American policies always work in any situation. Because of this, the U.S fought an unconventional war in Vietnam without giving it the necessary thought. As the interests of the United States grow wider and wider all over the world, it is important for the intelligence community to also keep in pace so that it can keep up with the demand. During Vietnam, the intelligence community was probably overwhelmed by the availability of resources or personnel because they did not do a proper job. Throughout the conflict, the United States lacked the necessary coordination as well as cohesiveness. The agents in the field did not connect and coordinate well with those in the agency headquarters and, therefore, there lacked a free flow of information. The U.S later found out that they went ahead with Vietnam operation without being well prepared. The intelligence agencies should have been well conversant with the tradition and history of the people of Vietnam6. Apart from ignoring these, the agencies also ignored the national character. This ignorance was costly because they did not get to understand the character of the people of northern Vietnam. More intelligence resources should have been allocated to agencies so that they can conduct a thorough work. According to Summers (1995), Vietnam conflict could have been avoided or done better, if the intelligence reports had been more accurate and on point7. He seeks to explain the reasons why the U.S did not come out victorious in the conflict in Vietnam. During this time, the U.S congress did not formally declare war on Vietnam. This according to Summer’s perspective, an official declaration of war would have caused a consolidation of efforts both in the military and logistically. The author, who was a U.S army colonel during the time, argues that the military was reluctant to use the necessary logic that would have helped them win the conflict. He also says that the military officers on the ground were far too much with capturing control instead of using proper strategies. He also outlines how the intelligence efforts in Vietnam were done in a very ignorant manner. Since the United States intelligence agents did not speak Vietnamese, they had to rely on the local people to translate for them8. This, to some point, made the intelligence efforts weak and disorganized and hence the results given were not accurate at all. The role of the intelligence service is very vital in any domestic or foreign national engagement. Intelligence agencies are charged with the mandate of collecting and verifying information on behalf of the state for the purposes of correct assessment of situations. Reports that are given by these agencies are used in decision making when a country, for example, wants to invade another for either one reason or another. This explains why the United States used intelligence reports available at the time to invade Vietnam. These reports were, however, low on content, skewed on details and wanting on precision. When sending intelligence officials and other personnel into foreign soil, the United States should have ensured that these officials have the necessary training. This is in regard to the fact that the officials sent were not conversant with the Viet Cong organization, which was the main adversary group in Vietnam. These officers also did not have the privilege of familiarizing themselves with the behavior or culture of the subjects. This led to some major loopholes in their study and, consequently, reports9. In the middle of all this, the United States, under the leadership of President Nixon, called on for the end of the conflict. This was after a prolonged period of conflict that saw the United States suffer a higher number of causalities than had been expected. Another reason that led to the end of the conflict was the exposure that the U.S suffered because of its involvement in crimes against humanity, specifically the massacre at My Lai. In the book The Art of War, Sun Tzu says that one should modify plans according to the favorability of the circumstances10. The author also proceeds to quote that there is no country that can ever benefit from a prolonged conflict. This conflict in Vietnam had taken a long time, and since the U.S was not on a winning advantage, probably it was time to pull out. The role of intelligence in the conflict cannot be understated. The U.S was caught up off-guard again because they were not well prepared with a post-conflict strategy. As Sun Tzu explains it, a country does not benefit in any way from a prolonged conflict. The U.S invasion in Vietnam is the longest engagement that the U.S forces have ever been deployed for. This conflict between the two nations continued for a period of 20 years. During this time, the U.S suffered a high number of casualties to the extent that the American citizens started to question the motive of the nation and the stand on the conflict. The conflict was characterized by extensive guerilla warfare that the United States was not prepared for during the initial engagement11. The guerilla tactics was widespread in the region, especially in the southern part of Vietnam. The number of guerilla troops in the region was in higher numbers than the Americans had speculated. Intelligence played a central role both in the attack and retrieval of the United States from Vietnam after almost 20 years of battle. Intelligence reports produced after the conflict had escalated to unexpected heights and lengths recommended for withdrawal of military engagements even though the U.S were not having the higher hand in the conflict. The U.S was not justified to get involved in Vietnam in the first place. This is because the French were already involved with Vietnam; and Vietnamese did not want any more invasions. The authorities used deception and misleading reports to invade Vietnam. The intelligence agencies did a very shallow job back then. As a consequence, the U.S underestimated the enemy leading to many unnecessary casualties. Bibliography Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Clausewitz, Carl, F. N. Maude, and Colone Graham. On War. New York: Wilder Publications, 2008. Hartley, Stephen. Clausewitzs "remarkable Trinity": National Security Strategy and Presidential Command and Control of the Armed Forces. Air War College, Air University, 1994. McMurray, Andrew. The Vietnam War: Attitudinal Dispositions, Professional Assessments, and Content Coverage Among Indiana High School United States History Teachers. Michigan: ProQuest, 2009. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995. Tse-Tung, Mao, Zedong Mao, and Samuel Griffith. On Guerrilla Warfare. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2000. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. eBookEden.com, 2009. Read More