Why Has US Intelligence Struggled with Maintaining an Effective HUMINT Capability and Capacity - Assignment Example

Why has US intelligence struggled with maintaining an effective HUMINT capability and capa Introduction to HUMINT HUMINT is the syllabic abbreviation for HUMan INTelligence and involves all acts of collecting intelligence through human contact. NATO has defined HUMINT as specialised intelligence that is collected through human sources. HUMINT activities typically involve conversations and interrogations with people who have access to relevant information. (Global Security 1987) As with any other intelligence gathering mechanism, the fundamental requirement for intelligence management is determining what needs to be found out. If exacting requirements do not exist, the data gathering will be carried out unsystematically and the piles of data so generated will be of little use to the decision maker. Given the nature of HUMINT based intelligence gathering, there is a high probability that the source may be spewing irrelevant, doubtful or misleading information. This necessitates the utilisation of evaluative measures to ensure that the intelligence gathered is reliable enough. Therefore, the gathered data is ranked as per reliability based on a number of factors. Generally as a large number of intelligence resources confirm a piece of data it is held as being the truth. (Department of the Army 2006) The methodology of HUMINT operations varies widely worldwide. The US military’s strategy is dictated both by official protocol and the nature as well as source of information. Most HUMINT activities conducted by the US military are not composed of clandestine activities. HUMINT Resources There are various kinds of sources that may be utilised for HUMINT intelligence gathering. Information may be obtained from neutral, hostile, friendly or other sources that may not want to express their involvement. Various sources of HUMINT intelligence include (but are not limited to): Advisors and FID (Foreign Internal Defence) personnel working with a HN (host nation); Diplomatic reporting by endorsed diplomats such as military attachés; Clandestine sources such as agents, messengers, cut outs and couriers etc.; NGOs (non-governmental organisations); Detainees or POWs (Prisoners of War); Refugees or otherwise displaced people (political, religious asylum seekers); Routine and specialised reconnaissance personnel. Deficiencies of HUMINT Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community The US Intelligence community has a blemished record of HUMINT capabilities and operations. Two major recent failures are cited as evidence to indicate HUMINT failure. The first is the September 11 attack on the Twin Trade Centre Towers while the second failure is attributed to the absence of WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq as claimed by intelligence reports. (Best 2007) In the US intelligence realm, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is seen as the primary collection source for HUMINT although the Department of Defence has certain responsibilities too. These responsibilities are taken care of by various defence attachés placed in embassies around the world as well as by myriad agents working on behalf of the theatre commanders. The changes in the global power scenario have affected HUMINT capabilities and capacity for various US intelligence agencies. The Cold War saw HUMINT activities directed against government officials and military leaders. Often intelligence agents worked under the guises of diplomats and approached potential contacts at various receptions in context of regular embassy business. However, the present scenario is markedly different. The need of the hour is to extract information from secret terrorist outfits as well as narcotics traffickers. These targets are not available for contact as freely as government or military officials at official gatherings. Another major issue is the limited communication initiated by these groups which affects effective HUMINT activities. Another possible approach for HUMINT is to interact with individuals and groups who may have knowledge of terrorist activities. However, there are significant challenges here too that could not be addressed effectively by US intelligence agencies. US intelligence officials can be placed under cover in foreign nations under NOC (non official cover) through business activities as well as in private capacities. Though this seems possible but placing such individuals is harder because the administrative mechanisms used to place such individuals are far more complicated in comparison to placing intelligence personnel as embassy officials. Specialised arrangements need to be initiated for pays, allowances, health care, insurance and retirement plans. Intelligence officials in NOC need to reconcile responsibilities of private employers with those of the parent intelligence agency. There is a large potential for conflicts under these circumstances. Corruption is another major possibility. Similarly, the involvement of the US government with smugglers, terrorist groups or other mafia is embarrassing and presents immediate physical danger to the involved agents. In the early 1990’s following allegations that CIA agents had been greatly involved with narcotics traffickers and human rights violators the Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch created certain guidelines in 1995 that pertained to recruiting informants with an unsavoury reputation. Though the guidelines have remained well hidden but it is widely presumed that it was proposed to have little to no contact with people with unsavoury backgrounds. This principle is theorised to have applied equally to people who had potentially valuable information at their disposal. This “risk averse” strategy surfaced at a time when information on terrorist plans and activities was crucial. Given the failure of intelligence in the 9/11 episode, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002 directed the DCI to overrule the previous guidelines. Press reports from July 2002 indicated that these guidelines had been replaced. Another large constraint on HUMINT collection is the need for personnel who are well versed in appropriate languages. The Cold War necessitated the use of language experts within a small finite set of languages alone. However, the current situation necessitates a wide variety of different languages for active intelligence use. The situation is further complicated by the presence of myriad languages that possess esoteric dialects which need highly qualified agents to interpret. Moving information from dialect to dialect and language to language poses its own problems and these communication barriers tend to slow down intelligence work while necessitating the utilisation of a large number of lingual experts. This problem is being tackled by utilising civilian contract personnel, using military reservists with lingual backgrounds and issuing large bonuses for agents who can maintain their own lingual proficiency. Moreover, the National Security Education Program which was established in 1991 is providing scholarships and various career training programs for individuals who are interested in working with agencies that deal national security issues and threats. (Kuenzi 2006) The ability to track fixed as well as mobile installations is critical to gathering HUMINT. Certain terrorist organisations use only mobile personal couriers to transmit information. This makes it all the more difficult and clandestine to gather appropriate intelligence against such targets. HUMINT has often been perceived as inadequate especially in connection to terrorist networks. This was reflected in the Intelligence Reform Act when Congress stated that though HUMINT officers had performed well but there was still dire need to applying greater resources so as to enhance the depth and breadth of HUMINT capabilities. Consequently, the National Clandestine Service was created in October 2005 at CIA in order to increase HUMINT operations and to coordinate better with other agencies. (Government Accountability Office 2006) The evolution of contemporary challenges has been unique too for HUMINT operations. Previously, the dependence of intelligence activities was centred on estimating numbers and figures concerning the enemy’s armed forces. These methods were largely based on technical intelligence systems. However, discerning the intentions of a small group of terrorists plotting something is significantly different from estimating statistics. The central role for success of counter terrorism drives is seen to lie with HUMINT but the previous dictums of intelligence gathering prevented the full scale development of HUMINT resources. Traditionally HUMINT has played second fiddle to other forms of intelligence gathering because its need was not immediate in the Cold War era. However, the situation today is altogether different. Efforts are being made in the right directions to ensure that HUMINT operations are capable enough of achieving the right kind of intelligence to deter any foreign attacks on US soil. (US Iraq Study Group 2006) Paramilitary Operations and Defence HUMINT The military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the CIA conducting paramilitary operations both separate from and alongside the Special Forces of the Department of Defence. Myriad observers as well as the 9/11 Commission recommended that the DoD (Department of Defence) take full responsibility for any such operations so as to avoid duplicative efforts. Media reports suggested that the operations of the CIA and DoD were not well coordinated in Afghanistan. This has been denied by DCI Goss in February 2005 with claims that the DoD and CIA conduct such operations after joint reviews but most military observers do not agree. They argue instead that the CIA could well easily hire local paramilitary forces (often ex military personnel) for missions on a limited timeline. Moreover, the military observers also argue that certain operations are more suited to plain clothes personnel. (Best and Feickert 2006) Certain observers have expressed reservations that enhanced efforts by DoD personnel to gather intelligence aboard is interfering with the CIA’s efforts to the same effect. (Cumming 2008) Although intelligence officials maintained that there was no unnecessary duplication of efforts during such operations but analysts remain sceptic. The need to ensure flawless coordination in HUMINT operations was clearly reflected in the appointment of the DCIA as the head of the National Clandestine Services. The exertion of various kinds of efforts on the part of various governmental agencies for HUMINT is commendable but undermining each other’s operations is not. Though official denial has sounded in Pentagon’s corridors as well as in CIA Langley’s hallways but the truth is far removed from official statements. Most of the initial detainees at Guantanamo were low profile foot soldiers or low ranking officials in the Taliban government. Similarly, others were not even connected to the war for other than sentimental reasons and had little intelligence value at all. However, the failure of HUMINT meant that these people were still transported to Guantanamo and investigated for less than credible information. This represented a useless exertion of resources and personnel to achieve no effect. The lack of effective homework such as initiating human networks before the actual military invasion to identify key human targets was apparent. Sadly, this is not the first time such a HUMINT failure was witnessed. The invasion of South Vietnam had proceeded on nearly the same kind of HUMINT background too and this caused difficulties later for both intelligence personnel and ground troops. The Tet offensive was a clear signal that HUMINT had been compromised miserably. The ground intelligence contacts all failed to relate any situation or possibility that the Viet Kong could attack urban centres by luring the ground troops out in the wildernesses. However, the US intelligence mechanism has been slow to learn effective lessons. The failure in Vietnam as per HUMINT stemmed from the disassociated tunnel vision of the bureaucracy running the intelligence show from the US mainland. Hardly anyone in charge of the intelligence operations had sufficient background to proceed with further HUMINT operations. The ultimate results were nothing short of total failure as the farmers and peasants in the countryside refused to cooperate with intelligence officials to the extents that were deemed necessary. Currently the Afghan situation is facing similar circumstances. Farmers in the countryside are forced to grow poppy on massive scale in order to satisfy their fiscal demands. The Taliban are taking advantage of the situation by providing these poppy farmers protection and by trafficking narcotics across borders. It is strange to note that drugs move freely across borders as policies of hot pursuit and border sealing with UAVs are being implemented. The intelligence gathering policy makers from the US fail to look at things with the point of view of the ordinary Afghan. The American military regime has installed people in power who were already despised including famous drug barons and corrupt politicians. This discourages the common people from taking part in US HUMINT operations as the new American backed regime is seen as little else than a change of faces. Effective and sustainable HUMINT depends largely on the capability to convince entire population swathes to side with one party or the other. Until and unless the trust of local population masses is not gained, there is no hope of extracting timely, usable and reliable HUMINT. The situation in the tribal belts of Pakistan reflects this situation more practically than anywhere else. The CIA is able to recruit one or two standalone HUMINT operators in the tribal agencies of Pakistan by providing lucrative fiscal incentives. These agents are often located and murdered within weeks of their recruitment by the belligerent factions. The real cause behind this phenomenon is the distrust of America that is inherently present in the local populace. Sustainable HUMINT can only be ensured if people’s trust can be won over in the longer run. However, the US intelligence agencies and the DoD are not effectively pursuing such means which leads to chequered HUMINT. Conclusion HUMINT is of primal importance in the emerging global scenario as far as intelligence operations are concerned. The Cold War approach to intelligence gathering has given way to new challenges presented by terrorist organisations and outfits. Effective HUMINT is the only real way of penetrating these groups and their domains to inflict lasting damage. However, HUMINT has been traditionally on the back burner in US intelligence gathering activities. Though the situation is improving with newer initiatives but there is a lot more that needs to be done to ensure long term sustainable HUMINT operations. Lingual experts as well as local contacts are needed in order to assure that effective intelligence gathering can be carried out. Bibliography Best, Richard A. Intelligence Issues for Congress. Congregessional Research Services report for presentation to Congress, CRS, 2007. Best, Richard A., and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2006. Cumming, Alfred. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions. Washington D. C.: CRS, 2008. Department of the Army. “Human Intelligence Collector Operations.” FAS. September 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf (accessed August 1, 2011). Global Security. Intelligence Interrogation. 8 May 1987. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/fm34-52/index.html (accessed August 1, 2011). Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: the Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information. Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2006. Kuenzi, Jeffrey J. Requirements for Linguists in Government Agencies. CRS, 2006. US Iraq Study Group. Report of the US Iraq Study Group. Washington D. C.: Vintage Books, 2006. Read More