Maintaining or Strengthening Amphibious Forces in the UK - Term Paper Example

Maintaining or Strengthening Amphibious Forces in the UK I. Introduction: ment of the Problem The need to maintain or strengthen an amphibious force has been receiving increasing attention recently. The case for amphibious armed forces has been articulated for Canada and France (Couturier, 2005: Berard, 2008). In contrast, however, the United Kingdom has been a long-time member of the European Amphibious Initiative together with France, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001, p. 6). An amphibious force is a force capable of conducting a sea-based operation that can involve “landing of a joint force on a hostile, or potentially hostile, coast” (Berard, 2008, p. 1). The Royal Navy describes amphibious operations as the “projection of maritime power from the sea to the shore” (2010a). The amphibious force need not enter the national territorial waters of countries abroad and the force can be constantly in international waters but with a capability to “place troops on hostile shores at a place and time of its choice” (Royal Navy, 2010a). According to the Royal Navy (2010a), “the key to any amphibious operation is the force it deploys.” For the Royal Navy (2010a), this means that it has to be in the form of three Commando Brigade Royal Marines and their associated command units. The armed personnel of the amphibious force must be “able to operate in the frozen wastes of the Arctic or the jungles of the world” (Royal Navy, 2010a). The problem addressed by this work is as follows: “Should UK amphibious forces be at least maintained at their current level for the forseeable future? Support your argument with relevant doctrine, history and discussion of international issues. Focus on the operational and tactical aspect of amphibious operations only in so far as they impact on strategic and political goals. Search for any possible link between military efficiency and political results.” II. The Role of UK Sea Power UK sea power is an integral part of the (Royal) Armed Forces of the UK. Thus, the role of UK sea power implements the role of the Armed Forces of the UK. The Armed Forces of UK’s articulation of its role are as follows (2010): 1. Protect the security of the United Kingdom 2. When necessary, assist the evacuation of British nationals overseas 3. Promote British interests, influence, and standing abroad 4. Contribute forces to support peace and humanitarian operations, including those under the auspices of the United Nations 5. Contribute forces to respond to a regional crisis or conflict that can affect European or NATO security or which can threaten British interest or those involving security concerns under the United Nations The Amphibious Force, being an integral part of UK sea power and the UK armed forces, has the same responsibilities as the UK sea power and armed forces. The UK (Royal) Navy and the marines being the key organization for UK sea power articulates that among its several roles area as follows (UK Navy, 2010): 1. Fight and win combat at sea and from the sea 2. Provide humanitarian aid and relief from the sea It follows therefore that maintaining a navy and especially if we want that navy to be a power worldwide, we will to strengthen that armed force, including its capability to maintain amphibious operations. It is important for the UK Navy to protect global trade in the seas because 80% or $380 billion of annual international trade are conducted through the seas (UK Navy, 2010). Further, protection of global trade is important because around 95% of world trade pass through nine vulnerable choke points (UK Navy, 2010). Trade through the seas because of the choke points are highly vulnerable to political or military disorder as well as piracy. Maintaining order in the land areas that can threaten trade in the sea-lanes, whether the disorder is political or military or comes from sea pirates requires that the UK maintain a strong and credible amphibious force. The theatre for battles can be from land areas to the seas and pirates may be flee from their ships and into the shores where running gunfights may take place. The official website of the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom reported that some of the navy’s peace keeping operations this 2010 included catching drug traffickers in the Caribbean, preventing a gang of suspected pirates from entering the Indian Ocean to attack merchant ships, commando support work for the transfer of authority in Sangin, and the like. All these highlight the need for strong amphibious force within the UK Navy. The fight against criminals like drug traffickers, terrorists, and pirates can move from the sea to the land as well from land to the sea. In shooting battles against criminals, mobility from sea to land and vice-versa are very important. Figure 1 indicates the current deployments of the UK navy. The data reflected on the Figure are presumably only partial, as we cannot expect the military organization to reveal fully its deployments. Nevertheless, Figure 1 suggests that UK sea power is already deployed worldwide, giving the UK navy the option to be in any war theatre worldwide or where it wants to be and where it is needed. However, for that sea power to be effective in realizing effective power, UK’s sea power must have a strong amphibious force: Figure1. Deployment of the UK Navy Worldwide (presumably not a full disclosure) Source: http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/globalops/ III. Defence Doctrine of the UK The salient points of the national security strategy of the United Kingdom (theme: national security in interdependent world) that are most relevant for the case of a strong amphibious force of the UK are as follows (Government of UK, 2008, pp. 3-4, 7-10, 14, 18, 34, 40-44) are as follows: Firstly, the UK is confronted by a diverse set of threats and risks that affects not only the UK but also all countries of the world: international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crimes. “Violent conflicts overseas have implications that are not confined to the area or region in question but can directly affect UK national security.” This is especially true for regions which very important for global security: Middle East and the Pashtun-Belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Secondly, the nature of threats requires the development of capabilities not only at home but also overseas in a manner that would enable the United Kingdom to act early enough to prevent the threat from emerging. This requires a capability for the UK to engage emerging threats. Thirdly, “the most effective way” to reduce the threats posed by failed states is to “support fragile states in strengthening governance, their development and their security capabilities, and to improve the capacity of the international community to act to stop states degenerating, like Afghanistan and Somalia in the 1990s, or Zimbabwe today”. Because of weaknesses, fragile states can lead to the toleration of terrorism and organized crimes: this is the situation of Afghanistan where the Taleban regime sheltered terrorist training camps prior to the September 11 attacks. Fourthly, modern threats have an international nature and working through the United Nations, European Union, and the NATO will remain as the important conduits through which the UK will manage, reduce, and eliminate the threats she faces. For example, the preparations for September 11 attacks involved several continents and the effects also involved several continents such that global GDP was reduced by almost 1%. Many of the threats have the potential to cause mass casualties and can involve the use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Fifthly, in confronting the threats, “the United Kingdom has to take a lead or deal with the problems itself”. Thus, the UK has to invest in strengthening its capabilities to deal with the threat singly or collectively with other nations. Sixth, “climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security”. The rising sea levels can modify borders and widen seas that can generate in turn international disputes. Seventh, global demand for energy will be more than 50% higher in 2030 from the current level as supply becomes concentrated in regions with political instability. This will most likely lead to disputes and conflicts especially as China and Russia are making the control of energy supply a priority. Eight, the UK’s top security priorities are Pakistan and Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Pakistan and Afghanistan are key priorities for preventing regional conflicts as well as advancing domestic counter-terrorism. Africa is priority because of people suffering from conflicts as well as extreme poverty. This is especially true for Darfur and North Africa. Middle East and Iraq are priorities because of its key role in global security and because they have a “totemic” status among violent extremists. Ninth, UK security must cover UK’s ability to respond to various types of emergencies. More important, the UK must have the ability to prevent a situation from developing into a situation of emergency first and foremost. Tenth, flooding will be a continuing feature of the world as the effects of climate change deepen. Eleventh, while there is no state-led threat to UK security, UK must continue to protect itself from the re-emergence of state-led threats to its security. Twelfth, the UK will continue to be committed to maintaining strong conventional forces in a manner that favour quantity over quality such the capability of a craft or military personnel can far outstrip those of 10 years ago. Consistent with the twelve points mention, a strong amphibious force will be important in providing high mobility for UK’s sea power to confront, prevent, and pre-empt all types of security threats and support the fight of the international community against piracy, drug trafficking, and all other forms of criminality. A strong amphibious force will be important in enabling the UK to assist the international community in emergencies, especially given the threats of flooding with global warming. In 2009, the Government of the United Kingdom updated their security but it seems that the 2009 articulation merely stressed the importance of global concerns and the importance of security in protecting economic progress. The 2009 also emphasized on tackling security challenges at the source (Government of UK, 2009, p. 7). In addition, the 2009 update to the 2008 articulation of UK’s security strategy also emphasized on the need to develop capabilities that go beyond the domains of land, sea and air (Government of UK, 2009, p. 7). The 2009 articulation also highlighted the dangers of weapons of mass destruction and cyberspace. Moreover, the 2009 update reemphasized the importance of climate change as the “wide-ranging driver of global insecurity” (Government of the UK, 2009, p. 8). Most important, the 2009 security document re-emphasized “security within an interdependent world,” an underlying theme in its 2008 document, stressing that indeed the operative defence doctrine of UK is that the security of the UK also lie intimately with her ability to make security responses worldwide. This point is well supported in Chapter 7 of the 2009 security document (Government of UK, 2009, pp. 99-101 and 106-100). In Chapter 7 of the 2009 document, the security strategy stressed that UK’s “the maritime domain stretches beyond the UK’s territorial waters, and comprises all of our interests overseas” (Government of UK, 2009, p. 99). IV. Geographic Characteristics of Europe and the UK A strong ground for maintaining an amphibious force within the Royal Navy of the UK lies in the geographical feature of the UK. As shown by Figure 2 next page, the United Kingdom has an extensive coastline. Other than mobility via aircraft and land vehicles, the Royal Navy with a strong amphibious force can provide troop mobility and flexibility for the land forces of the United Kingdom should a fighting war emerge in the heart of the country. Other than through planes and land travel, an amphibious force concentrate and disperse forces at will within the United Kingdom. An amphibious force can also provide back-up support against the possible invasion of the United Kingdom through the seas. Within Europe, as shown by Figure 3 next page, an amphibious force can support its allies within the European Union. In particular, a UK amphibious force can provide immediate military support to Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, the Republic of Ireland, Germany, and Denmark. Traditionally, much of attack scenarios on Europe assume an attack coming from the Russian side of Europe going making its way through France. Kugler (2007) discussed the various possible scenarios of an attack coming from Eastern Europe. In Kugler (2007, pp. ix-xiii and pp. 13, 21, 22, 26-29, 49, 80), the security strategies that the author proposed assumed that that an attack force on Europe would be coming from Berlin, Poland, and the old Czechoslovakia. On the pages mentioned, Kugler made great effort to argue that a new defence concept would have to be developed but maintains at the same time that the attack on Europe would be from the east. Figure 2. Map of the United Kingdom Source: http://www.map-of-uk.com/ Figure 3. Map of Europe Source: http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/statistics.html (accessed 14 October 2010) Figure 4. Map of Member Countries of the NATO Source: http://www.nato.int/icons/map/b-map.jpg Thus, Kugler’s ideas (2007) are probably leftovers from the mind-set of the cold war in which the main enemy is Russia. An expanded Europe of the future need not have Russia for its enemy. However, should Russia become Europe’s enemy, a strong amphibious force for the UK, especially if working within a NATO defence program would provide flexibility additional flexibility for the UK armed forces in deploying its forces not only within UK but also within Europe and worldwide. UK’s armed strength makes it one of those qualified to lead NATO. In order to maintain its standing as a leader of NATO, UK must be capable of assisting NATO countries in their security needs. Figure 4 shows that much of the member nations of NATO have a wide coastline. Thus, this highlights the need for a strong UK amphibious force. V. Conclusion Thus, our foregoing discussion supports the need for strong amphibious force of the UK that works for UK’s interests and that of NATO. Britain’s interests are best defended when it is flexible enough to threaten a nation that seeks to threaten itself. Britain’s interest are to safeguard world peace and keep the maritime safe from disorder, drug traffickers, and piracy. A strong mobile force would put Britain in best position to do all these. A strong UK navy with a strong amphibious force would enhance UK’s leadership in the Europe and in NATO. Given a strong amphibious force, member countries of NATO and the European Union would be able to interpret the enhance efficiency of the UK armed forces and navy as indicative of the UK’s capability to lead Europe and NATO. It will allow UK to achieve greater political results with an enhance amphibious force. A strong amphibious force for the UK will imply that it can influence the political decisions of countries that are subjected to political chaos. A strong mobile force can put the UK to influence states to stabilize itself and deny refuge to terrorists and pirates. In the light of news report that the defence thinktank RUSI considers the Royal Navy to be “dangerously weak” (Defence Management, 2010), it is imperative that the UK act to strengthen the navy and its seapower including her ability to conduct amphibious operations. This implies that UK’s amphibious force will have not only to be maintained but also upgraded and enhanced. Other countries of the world who are in the position to lead the world have upgraded their amphibious forces. It is very important that the UK upgrade hers in order to maintain a position of stature and acquire greater political and economic results. References Berard, M. (2008). French amphibious capability must now exit the shoals. Retrieved 15 October 2010 from http://www.college.interarmees.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Berard-2.pdf Couturier, G. (2005). The need for amphibious force for Canada---an operational requirement. Canadian Forces College. Retrieved 15 October 2010 from http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/amsc/amsc8/couturier.pdf DefenceManagement. (2010). Royal navy is dangerously weak. Retrieved 16 October 2010 form http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=13918 Government of UK. (2008). The national security strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world. Cabinet Office: The Stationery Office. Government of UK (2009). The national security strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 (Security for the next generation). Cabinet Office: The Stationery Office. Kugler, R. (2007). NATO’s future conventional defence strategy in Central Europe. Rand Corporation. Royal Navy. (2010a). Amphibious. 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