Operational Factors of Maritime Theater - Essay Example

Operational Factors of Maritime Theater Operational Factors of Maritime Theater Introduction Historically, the United Kingdom engaged in a series of expansionary vision and progress that saw its true reach span the globe. Indeed, the Falkland Islands are one such example. Located at the Southern tip of Argentina, it permitted the United Kingdom at one time to have a tremendous influence throughout the South American region. The dispute of the Falkland Islands today is indicative of a shift in foreign and visionary expansion policy that began, to a great degree, with the Falklands War of 1982. As a result, Britain has pledged to its citizenry that they would never again go on a military offensive abroad without the specific and committed support of its Allies. The fear was that the United Kingdom was fighting a battle too far from home and that its people were the ones that would suffer in the end. In addition, time and space restraints have since resulted in the British resolving to not again enter a situation where their land-based air support was compromised and largely out of range. As a result, the maritime theater expressed by the UK military has greatly shifted as a results of conflict in the Falklands, and this can be reflected by a shift in operational space, force, and time. This discussion will begin with a cursory examination of the situation that resulted in the War in the Falklands. Falkland Conflict Explained As with most wars, two opposing viewpoints certain resulted in the escalation of tensions between Argentina and Great Britain in terms of the Falklands. Argentina, believing that an island that just rested 200 miles from its coast could not possibly be considered a territory of the UK, which was thousands of miles away. For its part, England argued that the Falklands was parts of its long reaching arm of territories that had held for centuries and, as such, Argentina had no claim to it. Interestingly enough, while other countries were will to assist the UK on the diplomatic front, they were not willing to assist England in any type of physical military response. America, for example, use its strong diplomatic relations with Argentina to argue England’s side, but to no avail. For the conflict to be resolved, England was going to have to go to war on its own, and that it did. This lead to a revaluation of military tactics moving forward as it become evident that it was not feasible to fight such a conflict so far from the homeland (Hill, 1988). As the Falklands rests in a remote area of the ocean, with Argentina being the closest land mass to it, England was left with nowhere to launch a true land assault, instead being forced to connects its war operations from the sea. This became impractical from numerous perspectives, which relates well to a discussion of operational space, force, and time. Operational Space From a practical standpoint, Great Britain had a hard time justifying its use of force in maintaining control over the disputed territory of the Falkland Islands, while Argentina likely had the stronger territorial argument. Where the Falklands rests only 950 nautical miles from the capital city of Buenos Aires, it is more than 6,800 nautical miles from Great Britain. To further compound a precarious argument, the Falklands lies thousands of nautical miles from the Ascension island, the closest UK territory, This resulted in the need to take a closer look at the maritime theater as it played out in 1982, as the conflict was nearly impossible to sustain from a logistical standpoint. Consider the reality that Britain had to launch their air offensive from the Ascension Islands, more than 3,750 statue miles away. They were able to procure certain Victor tankers and Vulcan, in addition to submarine force, yet the distance away prohibited them from truly being able to solidify the operational space of the operation. Argentina, on the other hand, was able to quickly assemble multiple sky hawks, daggers, and mirages as their operational space from the Argentinean mainland was only between 440 and 495 statue miles (Stillwell, 2007). Operational Force Naturally, this maritime theater, from an operational force perspective, favored Argentina. It was logically almost impossible for England to maintain a sizable force in the region, while Argentina could quite easily amass the support that they needed. As this episode began to play itself out, it was apparent that Great Britain would need to launch an amphibious assault, and demonstrate considerable force against Argentina, in order to counteract other significant operational difficulties. The initial force that was assembled included a group of Sea Harrier fights under the control of Admiral Fieldhouse. This show of operational force was deemed necessary by the protagonists in this event to deal with the reality of conducting an operation alone more than 8,000 miles from the British coast (Hughes-Wilson, 1999). This assemblage of force continue in earnest to the point that, by mid-April of 1982, a large group of tankers and cargo ships were in the region of the Falklands, readily to supply troops with the necessary resources they would need to win the battle. This, in the end, proved to be decisive as the forces that were assembled enabled the British military to launch an amphibious offensive similar to that of being near its own land. Operational Time Naturally, in this war, time was of the essence. Britain could not feasibly expect to fight a protected war, 8,000 miles from home, largely on the strength of naval vessels alone. Time was critical in play out this theater of war in South American waters. The largely maritime war would move quickly, as Britain overwhelmed Argentinean defenses that had been built up. In order to accomplish this, British forces moved against time to assault the island from various locations. The last area to fall, Port Stanley, was a victory for the British as they worked to conduct several incursions at the same time, providing a virtual blockade and covering all land entry and exit points. While Argentina had amassed nearly 10,000 men by this point, the sheer force and operational maneuvers conducted by Great Britain enabled them to draw the war to a quick close (Reinhardt, 2006). It remains a British territory today, although England exerts very little control over the island itself. For its part, Argentina still considers itself to be the rightful owner of the Falklands, so the end to this story might not yet have been written. Conclusion In reality, the British fought this war on its own, struggle against operational force, space, and time. These three components of war might have resulted in disaster for the British, yet it ended up providing a much needed boost to national pride and morale in so far as their military was concerned, and their international presence as a whole (Royle, 2006). Moving forward, however, it remains to be seen if this type of maritime theater could feasibly play itself out again. Since the war in the Falklands, Great Britain has largely made the promise that it would not go another maritime based war alone again. It would need the support of its allies before making such an incursion. In the case of the Falklands, that appears not be very likely, so it remains to be seen if Argentina will one day try to wrestle the island away from British control and sovereignty. References Hill, C. (1988). Britain and the Falklands war. International Affairs, 65(1), 158-159. Hughes-Wilson, J. (1999). From Stalin to the Falklands war. RUSI Journal, 144(5), 61-64. Reinhardt, W. (2006). The Falklands war. Choice, 43(10), 1878. Royle, S. (2006). The Falklands War. Round Table, 1(383), 157. Stillwell, P. (2007). Falklands war in retrospect. Naval History, 21(4), 2. Read More