Military After Action Review - Essay Example

Military After Action Review Introduction I was deployed as military serviceman to Afghanistan over the period between March and June this year with my main responsibility being to lead the theatre team on behalf project manager. My team comprised thirteen contractors whose work was to ensure that the (COPs) small combat posts within Afghanistan had sustainable power in operations, its distribution as well as general environmental controls. I must admit that the deployment was important in my career as a military servant and especially so with such responsibilities as a leader within combat teams. It therefore exposed me to various aspects of combat missions and on strategic management of operations while on such deployment missions. Among the main areas that the deployment gave me an exposure in are together with the concept of acquisition, concept of command and control, MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) as well as on power efforts within Afghanistan. Besides, I learned a lot on the responsibilities and the main competences that an acquisition officer within such missions is expected to have in order to realize effectiveness in the entire operations. Concept of acquisition First, I must admit that the tour served a great learning experience especially in practice of what military science class had taught me. For instance, unlike what theory supposes, that current field operations influence much the concept of acquisition, the tour taught me that the concept of acquisition is and should be centered on the old (tradition) garrison operations. Concerning the command controls, it is worth noting that as much as a command coronel has the power to command the teams he/she leads, other vested interests in pleasing the project managers and the superiors end up confusing and hence effectiveness is compromised on such missions. This could not be well phrased while in the class context but when one is given such a responsibility in the field as I had, I managed to have the practical aspect in the command and control within military science. Moreover, the field experience showed me that the MTOE does not necessarily support the war that the fighters need. It was also through this trip that I understood that redundant operational energy power efforts within Afghanistan could be blamed on the multiple power providing organizations that were in operation within the country. Among most other things learnt from the places visited and over the tasks assigned were on strategic planning, roles assignment and responding to emergencies whenever need arises. When I went out for the mission, the acquisition concept became very clear through practice as against what I had understood through the military science class attended previously. I was specifically interested in understanding what particular point a product within the military operations would enter sustainment phase. In often times, the theoretical understanding propagates the concept of acquisition to be centered on the austere (current) environment such as is within Afghanistan. However, my exposure showed me that the concept should be centered on old garrison operations. Leadership There was a constant struggle between the deputy and myself with the deputy taking a different stand over the mission while I took a different one. The deputy took it that once we would conduct a new equipment field and train the personnel within the army unit, then they would be well set for serving within the combats. He therefore failed to consider other factors such as we are introducing (fielding) new equipment to the personnel during wartime with no experience tied to that generator. It was also worth considering that soldiers keep rotating to other FOBs (forward operation bases) and small combat posts. Soldiers would therefore get hurt often and such other related emergencies as are common within battle fronts. On the other hand however, I took a different stand in that constant training and frequent orientation tours through which any new development would be communicated for improved efficiency in the combats. This is why I had my contractors provide multiple training classes to the same unit but different personnel. I would stress the importance that we, within the acquisition community, have a responsibility to support the field personnel. I was not concerned with the number of training events we had scheduled for any unit but rather on the effectiveness of such trainings towards the overall mission that was at hand. In fact, my policy was that even when other teams/departments like the army and marines required training on our generators, then we would train them. Command and control As regards the C2 (command and control), the conflict of interest would be on satisfying the interest of the seniors in managerial positions. This however places the whole team under the risk of divided attention and through this; efficiency and effectiveness would not be realized in combat missions. Common interest enable pursuing common goals and this would enhance the overall outcome of an operation such as the one in Afghanistan. For instance, wWhat I encountered too often was that I was asked to execute a duty, which my program manager in the organization differed with. I would therefore be in a dilemma in pleasing the ASA (ALT), deputy GS 15 and a full bird Colonel daily, as well as my Colonel state’s side. Modified table of organization and equipment. Another learning experience from the field was that the MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) does not adequately support the needs of the combat personnel. In any army operation, personnel from the FSC (forward support company) become the support for the operational teams. As such, strategic organization and mobilization of these various teams is not only important but also very critical for the overall performance in the combat mission of the entire team. For instance, FSC only authorized two to three, generator mechanics (91 Delta’s) based on their MTOE. Besides, previous experience in war front (fighting two wars for over 10 years) has showed us that only two soldiers per company may not be enough to sustain operational energy power requirements for several COPs and FOBs. This would therefore explain why I had my contractors within the field provide multiple training classes. I would therefore justifiably conclude that ooperational energy-contingency basing is not tied to budgets solutions but rather on a myriad of factors that would be necessary for effectiveness and efficiency in a combat mission. Energy Finally, I got a great lesson on the redundant operational energy power efforts within Afghanistan. There were several different organizations providing generator power distribution and they included CECOM ESSC, BETTC, AC First, LOGCAP, prime power and rapid equipping force, who all provided power distribution for large power source of between 60kw to 500kw, medium power sources of between five and sixty kilowatts and small power source of up to five kilowatts (Markovitz, 2011). A clear analysis of the situation led to the conclusion that the confusion would arise from improper sizing of power generators, tactics in power distribution, environmental control as well as ineffective trainings on solders and field officers. Someone within contracting command should monitor all open generator contracts in theater in effort to reduce the cost of contractor support for improved efficiency. Conclusion In conclusion, therefore, a systematic review of the lessons learnt through the actions in the combat tour within Afghanistan, various recommendations are fronted below. First, is that the acquisition army personnel should take a keen observation at how all departments work and relate within the combat mission. The acquisition personnel should be more cautious to support contingency basing. Moreover, I would suggest that an extra line on the operational officers’ contract should be included and this would provide all project managers the flexibility necessary to support the combat personnel in the event subsequent conflicts. This can be contrasted in just waiting and watching while demanding for more resources form the executive offices responsible for oversight in such deployments. References Markovitz, D. (2011). After-action reviews-turning problems into GXP learning points. Journal of GXP Compliance, 15(1), 33-35. Read More