Can Terrorism Be Considered a Legitimate Form of Revolutionary Warfare - Case Study Example

Can terrorism be considered a legitimate form of revolutionary warfare? Recently, the problem of international terrorism increasingly has occupied the center stage. This kind of terrorism is termed international because it meets one or more of the following conditions. To start with, the target of terrorism is selected from a country other than that of the terrorists themselves. Secondly, the commission of terrorism involves crossing national borders, and thirdly participating members and/or sponsors of terrorist activity are from more than one country (Anthony 1963). Terrorism is instilling terror mainly by inflicting force, threats, intimidation, trickery, or some other form of pressure or strength to a certain community. Such events are used to compel the victim to act in a preferred way. Nowadays the communities abroad have not been able to make a law governing the terrorists that is accepted globally, and has legal bindings. Terrorism can be defined as those aggressive or brutal actions meant to instill terror or fear to a certain group of people. The actions are carried out for a certain objective and deliberately aimed at paying no attention to the civilian’s protection. Terrorist organizations Terrorists have evolved new models of organization. Actions of politics have mostly been controlled and hence they require less energy. Terrorist have been careful using group communication while conveying ground breaking information. Terrorists use violence such as bombings, assassinations and kidnappings to evoke fear and terror in their targeted community. To reach their objective, they need very few tasks which are taken care of by very few members (Harry 1964).As a result groups of terrorists have fewer individuals than other organizations. Most terrorists keep undercover and in a minimum number due to their confidentiality. They perform their operations in set ups as they pay attention to their main objectives or their main goal. Terrorist groups are therefore prepared more like prearranged crime families than other innovative organizations. Their members are employed trained to become experts but each of them has their leader who is in charge of each group and its activities. Most leaders in any terrorism group always anticipate the fall of their opponent’s government, the same way criminals look forward to the fall of the law enforcers for them to commit their fraudulent and malicious crimes hopeless and they walk free without any judgment (Karl 1991). The group’s magnitude lies on who their opponents are. When paying attention to the governing authority, they can overshadow the differences between the authority and the illegal inhabitants. If the governing authorities are more cultural, religious and linguistic then it is easy to bump the governments rival and the inhabitants at the same time. On the other hand, terrorists are combating their own way of rule are intentionally busting, abducting and killing citizens like their selves. This leads to the groups of terrorists reducing in percentage to the degree of hatred, which it comes along with. This makes the superior attack their fellow instead of their rival. There are various reasons why terrorism is now being considered as a legitimate form of revolutionary warfare. Firstly, is due it its advancement and hence the repercussions are vivid. To start with, most evidently is the fact that they have become more messy and full of blood, in relation to the actions done and how many sufferers are concerned. The order of scale has aggravated probably every decade. In the 1970s, the bloodiest action caused many deaths. In the 1980s, deaths from the worst incident came in hundreds; by 1990s, the deaths on this measure had become a daily occurrence. On 9th November thousands of deaths were reported, and there were speculations that there were more. This shows real incidents in which tens of thousands may end up dying. According to Shlonzo (1968, p. 183), terrorist had morals, sense of self, operating codes and sensible concerns, they wanted to keep the groups unity and solidarity, avoiding alienate supposed constituents, and avoid initiating public anger, which would have led to crackdowns. However, these limitations paved way to large scale random violence as terrorists engaged in extended, fatal conflicts: as more easily offended pulled put; as terrorism became ordinary while the need for headlines asked for more casualties; and as tribal hatred and religious extremism replaced political issues. Terrorism funding Terrorists have developed new ways of financing their operations. Since terrorists are outlawed, not able to have boundaries and openly collect taxes, their funds are essentially concealed and more often they rely on criminal acts. Terrorist organizations that have survived for long have come up with different sources of funds sources. They obtain their finances through illegal means such as kidnapping, extortion, fraud, says George (1961). Terrorists initially avoided cases such as kidnapping as its illegal connotations would stain a group’s image, however, its use expanded because it brought in millions of dollars. Other groups practiced extortion and protection rackets which steadily added fraud and other unlawful investments. Trafficking of drugs also provided large sums of benefits that helped groups in South America, Central Asia and the Middle East. Tribal difference and contributions were also sources of funding, mostly when the donations were probably done through a religion. Mostly, they were tricked: in some instances, the donations were presumably meant for charitable efforts by the schools, medical supplies, recipients or assistance to windows and orphans. However, some private donators knew that their funding helped terrorists’ operations (Zeev 1988, pp. 129-130). Getting funds form different foreign sources and spending it to spread operating segments and needed concealed transfers of the money. Some terrorist organizations are trained at transferring funds from generous organizations and illegal operations through the use of non-formal banking systems, wire-transfer services and monetary orders. Some people with authority have minimized high amount transactions, however it is not clear that they have strictly hindered cash entrance from the terrorists, which may merely move into fewer regulated area. The sums having been blocked being well known but it is still hard to calculate the amounts coming in without the consent of the government. Terrorists help comes from unequal enforcement. A great deal of financial institutions and some nations remain hesitant to interfere with suspect transactions, not because they support terrorism but because severe controls could hinder the profitable operations coming from evading the tax, political injustices and white collar felonies (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1981). Lately, the terrorists have stopped depending on the nations support. Notably, and gradually states sponsored terrorism has became less of a problem as the terrorists themselves have become less dependent on their states. Nevertheless, states support had provided a way of checking terrorism, and its rejection comprised lesser influence over terrorist activities and a decrease of intelligence sources from them. Many intelligence services including Americans did not get the preparations. They had knowledge of the bits but they did not have the full picture of their operations (Lenin 1968). Terrorist communication Terrorist have successfully derived innovative machinery for communication. Terrorists’ most important technology is not arms but straight communication with their many audiences (David, et.al. 1984). Victims were endangered or murdered to send a point, not only to the terrorists’ target but also to the whole community of the terrorists too. The advancement in technology in 1960s and 1970s, the clarity of television, easy to carry television cameras, use of satellites, connection to news, worldwide news networks, all encouraged the terrorists to communicate with audiences globally instantly. Through the use of striking forms of violence, terrorist nearly guaranteed coverage thus increasing the fear and inflating their own significance. It should be taken into consideration that terrorists always pass their message efficiently. Moreover, terrorists writings have more often been beyond understanding, and some terrorist have provided large volumes of guidelines and planned instructions that many times cannot be read. At times when they do not succeed they use the media logically, like when terrorist have kidnapped a famous personality, they issue an image of the person with a notice on which they write a short message (George 1964, pp. 14-44). Moreover, editors of the news, instead of the terrorists are the ones who decide what will be shown on television. Photos which are shocking may not be displayed; unless the terrorists left out a sound clip. Video recorded tapes allowed the terrorists to change still shots from pictures in motion, so that they and their casualties would communicate straight to the camera. However, access to the media was still under authority of others. The advancement of internet made the terrorists have contact to their hostages without an intermediary. Through the internet, terrorists violence recorded via camera can be broadcast directly without alteration through editing. The internet also permits straight communication among terrorists’ public matters departments and different audiences: sympathizers, recruits, rivalry states and general public who may not agree with the regimes’ policies. According to Lewis (1960, p. 126) a bombing does not need to be followed by a phone call to wired service. Nowadays, terrorists have their own websites, produce online magazines, make clear their causes that define doctrine and issue instructions in manufacturing of the explosives. Effects of terrorism Terrorists have acquired well planned results. Through the use of violence, terrorists have always derived attention, evolved anxiety, caused interruptions, started crisis and have forced governments to change the course of their resources to security and more often make concessions. Deliberately, though, their effectiveness would be less. They could at times upset debate and delay the ruling of conflicts. In delicate democracies they could sometimes aggravate a defeat of a regime by those, usually the armed forces, who were determined to take a stronger line in opposition to their activities. But terrorists seldom formed commanding political movements. They were not able to basically modify national policies, and they brought down no governments in a straight line. Nonetheless, terrorists have steadily developed ways to attain strategic outcome. Terrorist approach is based on attaining an armed forces authority but not on making the life of the enemy intolerable by invading constantly, administering never ending injuries by use of the suicide bombing; also by demolishing tourism, and abolishing investments, and hence putting in economic turmoil. Nevertheless, even though terrorists have raised their brutality, developed new ways of financing their operations, exploited new communications technologies, created new governmental models, and undertaken universal enterprises, they have yet to achieve their own stated long- range goals (Richard 1989, p. 162). Caution ought to be observed to avoid assumption that the act of terrorism is monumental. Terrorism is becoming a generalized construction from our morals, rules, and the laws on war, while real terrorists are moulded by traditions, philosophies, political affairs and ideas that encourage diverse actions. Terrorists are not colossal, neither are they secluded. They come up with new technology, learn form each other, and copy tactics that are successful. They create their own training manuals, have debates regarding strategies to adopt, goals, restrictions on violence and they defend their actions with certain theories and mostly religious doctrines. Conclusion Terrorism has been named the politics of last resort; this obviously applies to the frantic powerlessness felt in the situation of inequalities of riches and power that include a great divide between Third and First Worlds. This division will likely continue to influence ideological views conducive to terrorism. Abu-Nidal and Alexander Berkman, in this respect, are links in a common chain. Moreover, with the collapse of communism and the discrediting of its vision, ultra-left communists are almost sure to become increasingly isolated. Isolation gives rise to powerlessness which in turn leads to terrorism. It is hard to be optimistic that the 1990s will witness a decline in revolutionary terrorism. Variations on the ideological themes surveyed in this paper most likely will continue to emerge in justifications for terrorist acts. It is with no doubt that terrorist activities in many occasions have proved successful. As highlighted in this paper the factors contributing to this fact are the highly developed organization these groups have adopted , better communication channels and constant funding from many of their illegal operations e.g. kidnappings, drug trade and false donations in the name of charity and religion. For the operatives’ activities to be cut short the above factors need to be looked into and more regulations put in place whereby international coordination shall be of essence. References Anthony, S 1963,Communism and the Emergency: Wang Gung-wu, Malaysia, London, pp. 60-149. David, M & Dent, J 1984, Anarchism, London, p. 116. George, L 1961, Marxism, New York, Praeger, p. 122. George, M & James NR, ed. 1964,The International Relations of Internal War, in., International Aspects of Civil Strife Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 14-44. Harry, E 1964, Internal War: Problems and approaches, New York, p. 18. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1981, A typical example of this outlook is in Claire Sterling, The Terror Network. New York. Karl, M 1991, "Critical marginal notes on the article the king of Prussia and social reform, by a Prussian": On Revolution, p. 20. Karl, M 1991, "Moralizing criticism and criticizing morality”, On Revolution, pp. 30-31. Lewis, F 1960, Statistics of deadly quarrels, London, p. 128. Richard, D 1989, The revolutionary mystique and contemporary terrorism in Italy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, p. 162. Rod, N & Ray, W 1991, "Inside Terror Inc": Violence and terrorism. Schecterman & Martin, S 1990, Guilford Connecticut, Dushkin, p. 65. Shlonzo, A 1968, The social and political thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 187. Vladimir NB 1998, Russia after Lenin: Politics, culture and society 1921-1929, Routledge, New York. Zeev, I & David, C 1988, "The terrorist revolution: Roots of modern terrorism," in Inside Terrorist Organizations, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 129-130. . Read More