Characteristics of Warfare in the 21st Century - Essay Example

?What are the characteristics of warfare in the 21st Century? Conflict and strife are as old as mankind itself though its dimensions have been changing as technological advances have impacted it along with other facets of human life. War has gone from the early days of using battle clubs and axes to today where unmanned aircraft controlled from halfway across the world can shoot down moving ground targets. War has also been modified in many other facets and has added new facets as it has evolved over the years (Katoch, 2005). The current style of warfare is more popularly known as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). One of the most notable things about 4GW is the removal of boundaries between war and the relationship between politics, civilians and soldiers. This kind of warfare more closely resembles the kind of decentralised wars from the earlier periods of human history (Thornton, 2007). The 4GW system indicates that the nation state structure has had to relinquish its monopoly on well defined combat forces as the nature of conflict often forces them to return to modes of conflict displayed in pre-modern times. The warfare displayed in the 21st century clearly demonstrates the presence and eventual dominance of the non-state actors in theatres of war. Often conflict is characterised as violent struggle between at least one non-state actor and other state actors. This is far more similar to pre-modern times such as the slave uprising against the Roman Republic under Spartacus. Certain elements of the 4GW make it far more different than other modes of conflict and are described in detail below. In general terms the conflicts in the 4GW system are complex and based on long term commitment to violence (Hammes, 2006). As an example, the Second World War which claimed the greatest number of lives on the planet continued for a mere six years while conflicts in the 4GW regime can continue for a decade or more such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan etc. Moreover the use of terrorism as a tactic of such prolonged campaigns is a defining feature of 4GW conflicts. Terrorism can be seen continuing even after the expected end of conflicts in the 4GW period and this in turn often sparks the conflict again (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). The presence of terrorist activities makes such conflicts and their ends rather unpredictable. As an example, the rebellion of the Tamils in Sri Lanka continued for decades without respite and the interlaced periods of cease fire between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan military were often disrupted by acts of terrorism that reactivated the state of war. In order to support the activities required to engage in 4GW, it is necessary to use a decentralised presence on the part of the engaged parties. This is often achieved using non-national or trans-national bases that are highly decentralised (Hoffman, 2006). As is often the case in such circumstances, the leadership of the violent non state actor lies in another state while the actual conflict proceeds in another state. The presence and adept handling of communication equipment has enabled the relaying of information over large distances and in such situations with reliability. This ensures that the central leadership can operate from foreign theatres of operation in order to avoid danger near the battlefield. The evolution of recent wars has made this precept of 4GW all the stronger (Juergensmeyer, 2000). More often than not the central leadership is composed of multiple nationalities, ethnic and racial identities working together to achieve common objectives. This enables the leadership to be split up into multiple locations which makes it harder for enemy combatants to close down onto the central leadership and disassemble it (Rodin, 2006). The leadership is often small in size unlike the conventional tactics employed in nation state armies. The leadership is highly varied as mentioned before and so a network of communication must exist in order to manage the theatre of conflict. One important aspect of such warfare is the need to generate funds in order to finance the war effort (Hudson, 2002). Financial generation is carried out by both nation states and by non state actors through manipulation of the masses at large. Nation states carry this process out through elected bodies of legislation that demarcate expenses for war efforts by making people aware and convinced that such expense is required. On the other hand non state actors convince people as to the genuine nature of their cause and thereby extract funds in the form of donations in order to finance their war efforts. The central aspect of the funds generation lies in realising that the masses must support the combatant’s side in order to provide donations and other supplies (Scheider & Davis, 2009). This often involves other aspects of war that were previously never considered such as psychological manipulation of the masses. In order to find ready hand funds and ready recruits for the war effort it is necessary for all sides in a war to convince the masses. Unless the masses are not behind a side in 4GW it is hard for that side to carry on whether a nation state is considered or a non state actor is considered. In order to convince the masses to your side, it is necessary for either combating side to use massive propaganda efforts. Often these forms are multi faceted and involve the use of modern forms of communication such as radio, television and the internet. It is already common to film events such as ransom, butchering and murder of enemy combatants in order to show them as propaganda material and to portray a sense of wining. This is expected to provide more recruits for the war effort on the ground. In addition to these primitive mass media techniques, it is rather common to use more sophisticated psychological warfare techniques as well. This is often carried out through media manipulation and the use of techniques such as the “straw man fallacy”, the “scapegoat” distraction, creating distraction through phenomenon etc. (Shah, 2006) Another major characteristic of the 4GW is low intensity conflict that is militarist engagements do not last long and claim only a few causalities. These low intensity conflicts involve actors from all the major networks involved in the war. The recent fashion in these kinds of engagements is to use hit and run tactics such as those used by the mujahedeen in Afghanistan against Russia and then by the Taliban against the ISAF troops. The objective is to cause tactical damage to the enemy without the commitment of dedicated resources which would cost more. These tactics are used more by the violent non state actors than anyone else as they do not possess the resources required to face a well trained and disciplined force head on. On the other hand, the state actors often resort to using all kinds of pressures in order to damage the non state actor such as political, economic, social as well as military pressure. Non state actors often find their bank accounts frozen and their political representation mauled to suit the designs of the larger state actors. Moreover non state actors lack the kind of hierarchy found in the rank and file of more conventional forces and so they are harder to detect and eliminate. The ability of non state actor forces to disappear into the masses at little notice allows them both mobility and stealth and makes the job of conventional forces much harder (Sageman, 2004). Conventional armies are easily detected by their use of uniforms and other identification while stealth allows guerrillas to pursue their objectives largely undetected till too late. Bibliography Hammes, T.X., 2006. The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul. Hoffman, B., 2006. Inside terrorism. 2nd ed. Columbia University Press. Hudson, R.A., 2002. Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists. Government Investigation. The Lyons Press. Juergensmeyer, M., 2000. Terror in the Mind of God. University of California Press. Katoch, G.S., 2005. Fourth Generation War: Paradigm For Change. Masters Thesis. Monterey, California: Defence Technical Information Center The Naval Postgraduate School. Rodin, D., 2006. Terrorism. In E. Craig, ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Sageman, M., 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Scheider, B. & Davis, J., 2009. Avoiding the abyss: progress, shortfalls and the way ahaed in combatting the WMD threat. Greenwood: Greenwood Publishing Group. Schmid, A. & Jongman, A., 1988. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature. New York: Transaction Books. Shah, A., 2006. Media Manipulation. [Online] Available at: HYPERLINK "http://www.globalissues.org/article/532/media-manipulation" http://www.globalissues.org/article/532/media-manipulation [Accessed 5 November 2011]. Thornton, R., 2007. Asymmetric Warfare. Malden: Polity Press. Read More