Arguments for and against the Legitimacy of 2003 Invasion of Iraq - Literature review Example

Arguments For and Against the Legitimacy of 2003 Invasion of Iraq: The 2003 invasion of Iraq has given rise to widespread public debate. There were questions raised about its legitimacy. There are advocates for both sides of the issue. This includes public intellectuals, politicians, journalists and activists. The purpose of this essay is to present to the reader arguments for and against the legitimacy of the war. To make the arguments authentic and credible, care has been taken to elicit information from the most reliable of sources – journal articles, op-ed write-ups, government records, etc. The 2003 Allied invasion of Iraq was not an exception. Right through its history, America has not hesitated to use force under the pretexts of principles, sovereignty and justice. American military intervention in world affairs has risen drastically since the end of the Second World War. The period following the Second World War saw America assume the role of a superpower that headed the western coalition in what was a bipolar world. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, America has had at its disposal the most potent military force. Its economic structure complements military spending; leading to a military industrial complex 1 Noted political commentator Ivo Daalder raises some valid questions regarding the legitimacy of the invasion. Daalder argues that the invasion was illegitimate on two counts: 1.there was no provocation from Iraq and 2.the United Nations Security Council did not approve of the war. Military actions of countries such as Iran and North Korea were condemned by the U.N. and the United States alike. If the same standards were to be applied to all participant countries then the United States deserves its condemnation. On the other hand, supporters of the Bush Administration argue that toppling Saddam Hussein was a just act that needs no further legitimacy2. Liberating the country from an oppressive dictatorship is deemed a just act in and of itself. Apart from the geo-political significance of Bush Administration’s militarism, the image of the country is also at stake. Popular opinion in the rest of the world is very unfavourable towards Americans – they don’t seem to make a distinction between the government and its populace. According to Robert Kagan, “To forge a renewed political consensus on the use of force, we first need to recognize that international legitimacy does matter. It matters to Americans, who want to believe they are acting justly and are troubled if others accuse them of selfish, immoral or otherwise illegitimate behaviour. It matters to our democratic friends and allies, whose support may attest to the justness of the cause and whose participation may often be necessary to turn a military victory into a lasting political success.” 3 Although the Iraq war was not sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, there are other parameters for evaluating its legitimacy. There are certain conditions under which an invasion is warranted. But the important question is who decides. In the absence of the Security Council sanction, a consensus among the world’s leading democracies might provide the necessary legitimacy to any military intervention. Recent world history is comprised of several examples of successful application of this method. The latest of them was the war in Kosovo. However, in the case of the Iraq War, there was no unanimity in the decision to invade. France under the leadership of Jacques Chirac was vocal in its opposition to the war, while Germany’s stand was ambiguous. The only ready partner for this venture was the United Kingdom, which is no surprise. In the post World War world, United Kingdom’s role in world politics is one of a junior partner to the dominant military power. Hence, Robert Kagan contends, that the 2003 invasion’s legitimacy is a dubious one. On the eve of the American invasion of Iraq, the German Foreign minister Joschka Fischer openly questioned American intentions behind the intervention. Such doubts were expressed by other members of the European Union as well. The differences were not just at the diplomatic level. A public opinion poll conducted on the eve of the war revealed how an overwhelming majority of people in Europe disagreed with the American official line. More importantly, they believed that the war was illegitimate. The public sentiment in the United States was exactly the opposite. Some analysts point that the divide in public opinion is nothing more than a reflection of the prevailing world order. Nevertheless, such a simplistic reason is insufficient in explaining a pervasive set of beliefs and attitudes4. Joseph Nye elucidates further, “Today, a darker reality looms. A great philosophical schism has opened within the West, and mutual antagonism threatens to debilitate both sides of the transatlantic community. At a time when new dangers and crises are proliferating rapidly, this schism could have serious consequences. For Europe and the United States to come apart strategically is bad enough. But what if their differences over world order infect the rest of what we have known as the liberal West?”5 The United States, by virtue of being the only superpower, has the responsibility to protect and spread democratic values to all parts of the world. Its foreign policy should be much more than “defending and promoting material national interests”. Such was the vision of its founding fathers. In order to maintain the noble traditions of its early years, American policies should avoid making a distinction between foreign and domestic. This way, the standards applied to others will apply to themselves as well, ensuring justice to all6. Much has been made about the Bush Administration and its failings during the course of the last seven years. But the Iraq is not a one-off event. There is no evidence to support theories of Bush Administration’s connivance in the Weapons of Mass Destruction fiasco. Commentators from the liberal end of the political spectrum have been very harsh in their condemnation of George Bush. They’ve also suggested that the intelligence failures pertaining to WMD were his responsibility. Some have even gone to the extent of stating that the Administration has had a hand in the preparation of intelligence reports of WMD. Most of these claims are not substantiated by evidence. Some of them are plain outlandish. The truth most likely to enter history books is that George Bush made an honest mistake and was led astray by flawed intelligence. The Bush Administration went to the war with the conviction that their case was authentic and their motives noble. Even when faced with opposition from their traditional allies, the Administration sincerely believed that the rest of the world could be persuaded once Iraq’s WMD program is exposed. But unfortunately, such a day never came. This might have made the opposition more vociferous. But is not a vindication of their theory of Iraq War. Hence, the legitimacy for the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq comes from the purity of its motives7. For President Bush, the war’s legitimacy was grounded deeply in American values. So much is evident from his words at least. For example, the president explained in his recent State of the Union speech, "America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire, we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom”. Hence, America went to Iraq not as an occupier with territorial or material ambitions, but as a liberator to free the people of Iraq from Saddam’s horrific rule8. But to the disadvantage of the Bush Administration, the unfolding events after the initiation of the war made their original claims more implausible. Much of this initial scepticism and opposition could have been silenced had the war produced the outcome promised by the administration. Unfortunately, that was not the case. First of all, no WMDs were found. On top of that, investigation carried out by neutral agencies found that Saddam Hussein had not pursued any WMD program during the period following the Gulf War of 1991. To add to their declining credibility, the administration kept modifying its rhetoric to suit every new discovery. From a clear and simple claim of “presence of weapons of mass destruction”, the rhetoric evolved to such phrases as “weapons of mass destruction related program activities." Use of such complex and ambiguous language has weakened what little support the administration had at the beginning of the war operation. George Bush’s recent rhetoric also exposes a lack of requisite urgency that underpinned his decision to invade and his determination that America could not wait for the rest of the world to join it in this endeavour9. The Coalition of the Willing’s failure to properly plan and execute its “liberation” of Iraq has led to a complete breakdown of law and order in the country. The insurgency following this collapse has affected the Iraqi civilian population more than the coalition troops. This outcome is in contradiction with the mission of “liberating the people of Iraq”. The setting of the Iraqi Governing Council to restore the situation has proved to be a failure. The exercise of setting up a democratically elected leadership in Iraq is perceived as a sham by neutral observers. So, in essence, the more recent developments undermine whatever little legitimacy America and its allies might have held. On a more technical level, the war in Iraq and the one preceding it in Afghanistan have produced raging debates relating to legal terminology as well as moral, ethical and political issues. When government institutions propagate misinformation as against truthful information, the implications for the common public could be profound. Many political analysts and legal scholars have tried to decipher the prevailing issues of the Iraq war from an analysis of words and language used. In their seminal research on the legitimacy of American military intervention in general, Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson alluded to four fundamental criteria for legitimacy. According to them, The United States must 1. Pledge its actions to international law; 2. Commit itself to a consensual mode of decision-making as opposed to an independent one. 3. Upkeep policies of moderation as against extremism. 4. Successfully preserve harmony and prosperity within the union of democratic nations. The American Society of International Law and the American Branch of the International Law Association performed a case study on the Iraq war. They gave the Bush administration the benefit of doubt wherever possible. Yet, it was concluded that the American invasion of Iraq failed on all four counts mentioned above. This conclusion heavily tilts the debate against America and its allies10. In this context, which was eventually modified, and always subject to criticism, when it became clear toward the end of 2003 that Iraq did not possess WMD, by the 2004 updating of rhetoric to “Iraq had only had the potential to acquire and use them”, and the official line that terrorism was a result of regime change in Iraq (which escalated the activities of guerrillas and insurgents). Just as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have called for an acceptance of law and legitimacy, they have also raised questions regarding the suitability of such terms as “insurgents, guerrillas, rebels, resistance members, terrorists, detainees, prisoners of war, lawful combatants, unlawful combatants, military commissions,  competent tribunals, as well as others expressions.” What is required at present is a critical need to clarify concepts of law and legitimacy in the wake of these invasions11. Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations had displayed tact and skilful diplomacy in all his interactions with the United States government. It is an indication of the gravity of the violation that he openly questioned the legality of the Iraq war. Other notable diplomats too joined Annan in his condemnation of the war. For example, A.M. Slaughter argued that the invasion of Iraq by America and its allies “was categorically illegal under international law”. Richard Falk noted that “the illegality of recourse to war against Iraq in 2003 was clear. It was also clear before and after the war that there was no reasonable basis for invoking the ‘illegal but legitimate’ formula used by the Independent International Commission for Kosovo to deal with an exceptional circumstance of humanitarian emergency.” The academia across the world was also of a similar view. A majority of influential diplomats and political commentators outside of the United States concurred with these views12. The sentiments of people outside of the United States in this debate are understandable. For example, there are widespread concerns regarding American hegemony in general and its foreign policies in particular. The adoption of a philosophy of unilateral action made the concerns all the more real. American policies tended to focus heavily on its security. The rationale was that if the only superpower in the world were to be secure, world security as such will advance. This sounds reasonable at a theoretical level. But the actual results tell a different story. For example, “Although from the perspective of some countries such world security would correspond to and be subject only to American interests and values and, from their point of view, necessarily adverse to theirs. Concerns over such an outcome have been levelled at many of the key foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration.” 13  The meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter is of relevance in determining the legality of the war in Iraq. Most legal professionals and civil law experts agree that the words “armed attack” mentioned in Article 51 of the 1945 edition must be read literally. In other words, there must have been material damages suffered by the affected nation before there can be a legitimate military response against the instigator. But there is a problem with such an interpretation. The weaponry and military systems of now are far more advanced than the ones used in 1945. With the acquisition of nuclear technology, a country can annihilate its target with the push of a button. All it takes is a few seconds and there is virtually no time to defend or respond. The judiciary is now gaining an understanding of this new reality and hence has come to accept “pre-emptive or anticipatory military action” as a lawful one. Without such proactive actions international peace and security will be jeopardized. So, if the U.N. Charter were to be read literally, the Iraq war is illegitimate. But, when it is placed in the context of advances in military technology and interpreted more broadly, the Iraq war may be declared a lawful one14. The U.N. Security Council resolutions have relevance to the recent history of Iraq. During 1991 Saddam Hussein initiated aggression against Kuwait. In the years following his defeat Security Council Resolutions condemned his conduct especially his non-compliance with those Resolutions. In addition to this, he was guilty of other breaches and violations. This led to a unanimous adoption among Security Council members of Resolution 1441 on November, 2002. As per this Resolution the Security Council had “repeatedly” warned Iraq “that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” resulting from  “material breaches” and “non-compliance” with all “relevant” prior resolutions. Subsequent to the adoption of this Resolution the United States pointed out that there was no comprehensive investigations are needed in the future in order to present additional proof of the military status of Iraq15. The rationale for this resolution is understandable - elaborate investigations would delay an offensive by coalition countries, while allowing Iraq more time to organize its military position.  While Resolution 1441 would have given coalition partners more time to determine the military posture of Iraq, there was also the doctrine of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence proposed by the United States and its allies. Thus, a conclusion that the Iraq war of 2003 was illegitimate is unsupported on grounds of Saddam Hussein’s conduct in the period leading up to the war. Justification for the use of military force against Iraq has also been proposed by supporters of the concept of “humanitarian intervention.” In recent years this has come to mean that there is a “duty to engage in humanitarian intervention” especially where repeated violations of basic Human Rights have existed. This argument was not directly drawn in prior to the attack on Baghdad but it might have been and it suggests that such an option may be regarded relevant in the future. By its nature it will basically be concerned with the protection against breaches of basic Human Rights and not seek the broader objective of regime change. To be legitimate, it first would have to meet some basic tests. It would also have to be grounded in ethics and utility as reflected in public opinion across the world, so that criteria for both legality and legitimacy are met. It would have to be the product of and supported by a consensus within the major States comprising the United Nations. But documented evidence suggests that the Bush administration failed in both the areas of legality and legitimacy16. It is an open secret that the middle-east region is of strategic importance. Any country with aspirations to dominate the world will have to have “control” over the region’s resources (read oil) and governments. The United States, the only superpower at the time, was not above this ambition. Noted American intellectual Noam Chomsky points to glaring misinformation released by the White House in his recent scholarship. In Chomsky’s own words, “The US wasnt upholding any high principle in Iraq, nor was any of its allies. The reason for the unprecedented response to Saddam Hussein wasnt his brutal aggression -- it was because he stepped on the wrong toes. Saddam Hussein is a murderous gangster -- exactly as he was before the War. He was even our friend and favoured trading partner at one point in time. His dictatorship of Iraq comprises many atrocious acts, but well within the range of many similar crimes conducted by the US and its allies, and nowhere near as terrible as some.”17 Unfortunately, not many people know this reality. The false propaganda from the government quarters was so grand in scale that it appeared genuine and truthful. If maintaining sovereignty of independent countries is the reason for the war, then why didn’t the U.S. Government interfere with the Chinese annexation of Tibet and other such atrocities across the world? Hence, the real motivations for American intervention were buried under a veil of propaganda. In this sense, the Iraq War, as understood by the general public, is illegitimate18. Another little known reality of the war is its consequences on the Iraqi civilian population. The war is not an event in history, confined to school text-books alone. The aftermath of the Allied bombing of Iraqi landscape has brought about irreparable damages to the innocent civilian population. Neutral observers, including the United Nations agree that the use of heavy artillery has caused irreversible damage to Iraqs people and a general decline of its environment. As a consequence incidences of ailments among Iraqi children have increased sharply. America and its allies though deny these charges; as a result the general public is insulated from these darker realities. There are parallels between the Iraqi invasion and the invasion of Vietnam a few decades earlier. The circumstances and reasons for the Vietnam war were a little different to that of Iraq. The Vietnam war was initiated by the United States government’s Kennan containment policy (NSC 68), based on a trivial idea of cascading dominoes. Other rhetoric of the time condemned communism’s atheistic inclinations. The architects of the Vietnam episode regarded Ho Chi Minh as a subordinate of the Soviet Union and not as a brave nationalist fighting for his state’s independence. It seems then, that Iraq was invaded for reasons other than those stated officially. These include, oil resources, settling scores with a dictator who tried to resist American domination and to gain strategic control of the Middle East region, among other things. The Project for the New American Century, a conservative think tank, supported for war against Iraq as early as 1998, and its advocates later became key members of the Bush administration. Their chief motive was not extending democracy and freedom but “anticipatory-self defence” founded upon the fictitious claim of Iraq’s strategic threat to the United States. At the pinnacle of this disinformation campaign Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations (on February 5, 2003) declaring confidently that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program. He even added, “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What were giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.”19 “Vietnam and Iraq were crusades of exaggerated virtue. In Vietnam, the U.S. declared that its war aims were containing communism and extending freedom to Southeast Asia, yet for much of the war African-Americans could not vote, practice miscegenation in many states, use “white only” drinking fountains or unfetter themselves from Jim Crow cars. America’s war against Islam is buttressed by Judeo-Christian ethnocentrism with its inevitable clash of civilizations. Muslims are construed as backward, non-democratic, anti-modern “Axis of Evil” that should emulate secular-western democracies and adopt Chicago-school free-market capitalism.”20 The Iraq war is carried out with inadequate tactics and unwarranted use of force that can only lead to failure. Already more than 1,500 American soldiers and 100,000 Iraqi civilians have fallen victim to this war. In Iraq, as in Vietnam, America and its allies expected and prepared for a conventional war where their technologically superior military power would “shock and awe” the opponents into submission. But the reality however has proved to be much different. The coalition forces are mired in never-ending cycles of guerrilla warfare. If any lessons were learnt from the Vietnam fiasco, war should be a last resort and backed by significant domestic support. The Vietnam affair also exposed the need for international support. And before starting war operations there must be a clear exit strategy that is basically absent in the present quagmire. Such obstinacy not to learn from the country’s own past experiences depletes any credibility the Bush Administration might have enjoyed otherwise21. The U.S. invaded, captured Saddam and cannot win this war. William Pfaff succinctly observed in the International Herald Tribune (Dec.21, 2004): “Ending the carnage requires renouncing permanent bases and developing a timetable for withdrawal. Iraq will tragically experience continued security challenges but without United States military forces…A successful exit strategy is elusive because wars solve nothing, but the heavy hand of the American occupation must be lifted. From the 1991 Gulf War, the twelve year No-Fly-Zone-War, the crippling sanctions and the current conflict, more Iraqis died, perhaps, than under Saddam Hussein’s autocracy. Greater instability and deprivation exists without adequate electricity for homes, cooking gas for kitchens and even gasoline for cars!”22 Ending the war will have the added advantage of reducing American militarism as well. If photographs of prisoner treatment in Abu Ghraib is anything to go by (the photos showed Iraqi prisoners blinded by hoods and slung over prison railings, tied to leashes as animals and piled naked one upon another in heaps). Susan Sontag poignantly compares them to lynching of black Americans when pictures of corpses decorated postcards and souvenir albums. When defenceless, non-resistant prisoners were mercilessly tortured and killed, the very fundamentals of martial law are being breached. In Vietnam insurgents were named disparagingly as “gooks” and “slants”. In Iraq they are disdainfully termed “terrorists” and “thugs” without paying attention to their genuine grievances and interests. Reverend Jesse Jackson aptly describes this war as “without moral, legal or military legitimacy.” Hopefully, Americans will demand an overhaul of American foreign policy, so that the neoconservative craving for power is not allowed to thrive. Bibliography: GADDIS, J. L. (Jan-Feb 1994). The tragedy of Cold War history: reflections on revisionism, Foreign Affairs, 73, n1. p.142(13). OBORNE, Peter. "The US faces a terrible choice--start killing civilians or hand the initiative to Saddam. (Politics)", Spectator, 291.9112 (March 29, 2003): 10(1). GLOVER, Stephen. "Anti-war journalists hope for the worst--because the worst will prove them right. (Media Studies)." Spectator 291.9112 (March 29, 2003): 27(1).    HAMILL, James. "The United States, Iraq, and international relations; part one: the backdrop to conflict." Contemporary Review, 282.1649 (June 2003): 326(8).    BARR, D.A., and J.J. Miranda., "Iraq: time to focus our response. 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C. (May-June 2006). Middle East - Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East,. Foreign Affairs, 85, 3. p.170. NYE Jr., J S (July-August 2006). Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy., Foreign Affairs, 85, 4. p.139.  GORDON, Philip H. "The End of the Bush Revolution." Foreign Affairs, 85.4 (July-August 2006): 75.    Read More