Ayatollah versus the Ambassador: The Influence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq - Case Study Example

Ayatollah versus the Ambassador: The Influence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq Ayatollah versus the Ambassador: TheInfluence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq Lieutenant Paul Jerry Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), seemed to bear unmistakable notions about a kind of ideal Iraq after the execution of Saddam in 2003. They were sure that some of the Iraqis, especially the Shia, would support their endeavor and help them achieve their objective. However, the USA faced immense opposition from an individual originating from the Shia community, who utilized both religious influence and appeal to Iraqi nationalism in order to marshal his supporters, proving that organizations and organizational assessment (TSDM 26) is a vital ingredient in achievement of objectives (Naval War Coll Newport RI, 2010). Sayyid Ali al-Husayni was the influential individual who posed a threat to the plans of the USA government on Iraq. Holding a position equivalent to that of the Catholic pope, Sayyid was considered unfailing when it came to the issuing of decrees about morals or faith. He bore the topmost comprehension and interpretation of Islamic dictums especially among the Shia. According to media reports, the British and USA planned on drafting a new constitution for Iraq. The ayatollah, Sayyid, gave a declaration that only elected representatives had that kind of authority. His argument was that if the constitution was to be formulated by other nations, there is no guarantee that its contents would have the best interests of Iraq at heart or express their identity as a nation (Naval War Coll Newport RI, 2010). Formulation of strategies coupled with their execution is crucial when it comes to effective execution of policies (TSDM 24). For efficient leadership, leaders need to be critical thinkers and be able to acknowledge the value of structured organizational analysis. Bremer and his team did not recognize the complications that the decree issued had on their plans. Due to their lack of knowledge about the Iraqi cultural and political background, achieving their objectives became strenuous (Naval War College, U.S., 2002). One of Bremer’s advisors failed to critically analyze the Iraqi political environment. Critical analysis is important since it enhances intellectual skills that are necessary in confronting the obstacles involved in the provision of effective staff. This analysis also plays a vital role in decision support on the crucial decision-making process about policy implementation. Ambassador Horan, an advisor to Bremer dismissed Sistani as ‘shaggy fellows’ and referred to them as detached from current on goings. Another reason as to why the CPA failed was because of the assumption that profane former exiles supported by the American government would back the plan. The isolation of US political officials also made it difficult for them to understand the influence of the statute immediately. The drawback of the pre-invasion assumptions that the CPA had concerning the probable role religion would play in Iraq was based on undependable information. The US government also failed to consider the moderation of the Shia community (Naval War College, U.S., 2002). One socio-economic challenge that made the American plan fail was the lack of proper information about the Shiite religious hierarchy. Attempts to persuade other ayatollahs to go against Sistani proved futile. When this failed, they decided to turn to politicians. This was however also unsuccessful because of the assumption that the Shiite politicians had the ability to influence Sistani to annul his fatwa. They were also under the impression that if Sistani’s persistence continued, the politicians would cross him on the argument that religion must not interfere with politics. It was soon evident that the politicians wished for the blessing of the high-ranking ayatollah as well as his seal of approval. They were therefore in support of his views about the clergy and his right to provide guidance and counseling to political leaders (Naval War College, U.S., 2002). Eventually, the CPA staff also succumbed to the unavoidable and commenced indirect consultations with Sistani about the TAL. In spite of Bremer’s insisting on the installation of the entire array of western liberal rights, the TAL cited religious laws of the Muslims as a legislation source. It also included the provision that no law should go against the primary code of belief of Islam. U. S officials also the tendency to interpret Sistani’s remarks as what they wanted to hear. They made efforts to project their views on the grand ayatollah. The complication in communication between the ayatollah and CPA was the language barrier combined with cultural concerns. It was also not always distinct if Bremer’s messages really got to Sistani through the mediators or if they were even able to mend the folk gap between the two protagonists. An additional concern was that a few of the envois had very little interest in ensuring preciseness in communications. They seemed to be more interested in enhancing their own reputations. Bremer’s plans for political change in Iraq seemed to be running a ground. The only true contact he had was in May 2003 through Sergio Vieira de Mello, the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq. De Mello however died in the August 2003 terrorist attack against the UN mission. Situational awareness is an imperative when it comes to policy implementation in a foreign nation. Most of the members of the Coalition Provisional Authority lacked sufficient knowledge about the Iraqi politics and society. A surprisingly low number of them spoke Arabic hence the few local connoisseurs on board. This only meant that the association was very much unaware of the hazwa or its organization and were hence unable to conjure easier interactions with the Shia clerics. The strategy of separation of politics and religion failed since CPA lost all control of the process. Bremer’s lack of acknowledgement of the great ayatollah was his major flaw. He only realized this at the end of his term in his administrative role in the CPA. By this time it was too late for the CPA to retrace their steps and was forced to forfeit their plans. For successful leadership, one needs to regularly evaluate their organization and analyze such questions as; are goals being reached and mission accomplished? Is the team properly geared up for obstacles in future? Etc. To effectively answer these questions, Bremer and his staff should have come up with a technique of comprehensively and thoughtfully assessing their situation. References Top of Form Naval War Coll Newport Ri, Alvi, Hayat, & Gvosdev, Nikolas K. (2010). Case Studies in Policy Making. Twelfth Edition. Bottom of Form Top of Form Naval War College (U.S.). (2002). Newport papers: National security strategy after 9/11/01. Newport, RI: Naval War College. Bottom of Form Read More