Politics and Religion: the Islamic Republic of Iran - Research Paper Example

Politics and Religion: Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran David Dithmer Submitted to 30 June Politics and Religion: Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran What is the role of religion, particularly Islam, in modern Islamic republics? Do they really control how political leaders decide? To what extent do the religious leaders control the government? What are the implications of the answers to these questions on how the other nations of the world should deal with Islamic Republics? Do the other nations of the world have to deal with the religious leaders and not only with the political leaders? On the other hand, is dealing with Islamic religious leaders as important compared with dealing with the political leaders of Iran? These are the fundamentals questions of this study. In addressing the research questions, we will use the method of case study. The study will focus on the Islamic Republic of Iran because it is currently the most vocal Islamic Republic against the western world. In doing the study, we shall be using the most recent works of authors considered authoritative on the subject. In this study, we shall use peer-reviewed journal articles. We expect that the use of academic journals provide adequate quality control for our sources of insights and data. However, we also use the work of Sial (2006) because even if Sial (2006) is not a journal article, the work can be considered as authoritative because it is a study of the Iranian legal or political system from the point of view of an outstanding lawyer and can be considered as “authoritative”. In this study, the key conclusion we make is that in Islamic Republics, religion plays a very important role in politics. Alamdari (2005, p. 1285) described the earlier political system in Iran as a “religious populist regime, a tyranny of the majority under the charismatic leadership” of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Had Iran’s war with Iraq (1981-1988) did not take place, Alamdari argued that Islamic populism could have ended more quickly after the 1979 Islamic Iranian revolution (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1286). The constitution adopted right after the 1979 Islamic revolution known as the Qanun-e Asasi established the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sial, 2006). The principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) performs a key role in the government structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sial, 2006). According to Sial (2006), a national referendum in December 1979 approved the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 1979 national referendum asked Iranians at least 16 years old whether they want to abolish the monarchy and replace the monarchy with an Islamic Republic (Sial, 2006). The 1979 Islamic revolution began with the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan who had initially advocated a popularly elected assembly but Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that the completion of the constitution should be done by the “experts” (Sial, 2006). The government allowed the selection of an assembly of “experts” but only from a list of individuals approved by government and dominated by the Shia clergy (Sial, 2006). The “Assembly of Experts” finalized the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and submitted the same to the referendum. The Islamic clergy dominated “Assembly of Experts” institutionalized the Office of the Supreme Religious Jurists or faqih thereby laying the foundation for the Islamic theocratic government. The Iran-Iraq war empowered the “populist” Islamic authority to mobilize the masses and suppress opponents under the flag of defending Islam (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1286). Nevertheless, populism in Iran ended with the termination of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and with the death of Khomeini in 1989 (p. 1286). Khomeini was “a religious, political and spiritual leader of millions of people who followed his belief of an ideal society” (p. 1286). With Khomeini’s death, no one was able to replace the Ayatollah’s unique persona (p. 1286). According to Alamdari (2005), the replacement for Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not a marja’a taqlid or the most revered of the grand ayatollahs as argued by Alamdari (2005) to be required by the Iranian constitution (p. 1286). Khamenei’s assumption into leadership was a product of an attempt to overcome factional disputes as well as disillusionments within the Islamic movement of Iran (p. 1286). Alamdari argued that the death of Khomeini ended a unified leadership of a single Islamic leader and paved the way to the “traditional multiple objects of emulation (marja’a taqlid), which is the norm in Shiism”. Shiism refers to a sect of Islam. There were conservatives and radicals in the Islamic leadership immediately after the death of Khomenei and there was a need to consolidate the competing factions under a unified leadership. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran adheres to a Shiite 12-imam leadership (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). Shiite Muslims are free to choose their own learned and upright clerics whose details on the practice of Islam they must follow: in other words, lay Shiite Muslims are free to select their own object of emulation or their own marja’a taqlid (p. 1287). At the same time, Alamdari clarified that a marja’a is independent and can have his own fiqh or code of behavior for his adherents. Marja’a means ulama (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). According to Alamdari, traditionally, ulamas are expected to arrive at their decisions independently and no ulama should follow another ulama (p. 1287). However, in the 19th century, a notion emerged in Iran on a Marja’a taqlid who is an ulama that is so learned and so perfect that other ulamas have to follow the decisions of the Marja’a taqlid (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran established the Marja’a taqlid as a “political fixture” in Iran and the Marja’a taqlid was Ayatollah Khomeini (Aladmari, 2005, p. 1287). At the local level, thousands of appointed city and town imams set the macro and micro policies of the state and they often override the decisions of elected officials (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). At the national level, the Majlis (parliament) has to limit decisions consistent with the religious codes and the laws passed by the parliament have to be approved by the Council of Guardians, a body of appointed clerics and lawyers tasked to ensure that the laws do not contradict the shari’a or Islamic codes or the constitution (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). Even before initiating a bill or proposed law, some lawmakers travel to the holy city of Qom to seek the approval of Maraja’a for their proposed law or bill (Sial, 2006) At the head of the nation’s leadership is the Council of Religious Leaders of Iran headed by the Supreme Leader (Sial, 2006). The Supreme Leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces who also have the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary (Sial, 2006). The Supreme Leader appoints six of twelve members of the Council of Guardians (Sial, 2006). The Supreme Leader and the Council of Religious Leaders are elected by the 86-member Assembly of Experts (Sial, 2006). After the Office of the Leadership that includes the Council of Religious Leaders and the Supreme Leader, the President of Iran is the highest official in the Islamic Republic of Iran but the Iranian President has no control over the armed forces (Sial, 2006). The Assembly of Experts meets only one week in every year and is composed of 86 “virtuous and learned” clerics elected by the public to a term of 8 years (Sial, 2006). The Council of Guardians determines the eligibility of the candidates for the Assembly of Experts in the same manner that it determines the eligibility of all candidates for the parliament and the Office of the President (Sial, 2006). The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians while the other half are recommended by the judiciary subject to the approval of the parliament (Sial, 2006). The Council of Guardians has the authority to interpret the constitution and determine if the laws passed are compatible with Islamic Law or the sharia (Sial, 2006). The Islamic Republic of Iran has a unicameral parliament of 290 legislators elected to a 4-year term by direct vote and secret ballot but it only draft laws, ratifies international treaties, and approves the country’s budget and all laws are first reviewed by the Council of Guardians (Sial, 2006). In addition, the Council of Guardians approves first one’s candidacy for the parliament (Sial, 2006). The parliament or Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly) can initiate laws subject to the approval of the Council of Guardians (Sial, 2006). The parliament can veto a President’s policy, impeach, and veto cabinet appointments (Sial, 2006). Public officials are subject to asset control (Sial, 2006). Sial (2006) described that there are three types of courts in Iran. One type of courts is the public courts that try civil and criminal cases. The second type of courts is the revolutionary courts that try crimes on national security, narcotics, and those that undermine the Islamic Republic. Finally, the third type of courts consists of the special clerical courts that handle crimes supposedly committed by Islamic clerics. Decisions rendered by the revolutionary courts are final and not subject to appeal (Sial, 2006). According to Sial (2006), the entire judicial system of Iran is desecuralized: the chief justice and the attorney general must be mujtahid or muslim scholars qualified to interpret the Islamic laws, judges of all courts must have a deep grasp of Shia jurisprudence, and court independence is interpreted to mean that judges are duty-bound to uphold Islamic laws (Sial, 2006). Based on these accounts, it appears that the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians are the key powers in the Islamic Republic of Iran. For the Supreme Leader and Council of Guardians to be legitimate, however, the Islamic clerics play a decisive role. Earlier, Zonis (1985, p. 85) pointed out that the legitimacy of clerical rule in Iran is founded on an ideology constructed based on Shiite Islamic thought by Ayatolloah Ruhollah Khomeini and his “neofundamentalist” followers. According to Zonis (1985, p. 85), Khomeini claimed leadership based on divine calling and asserted an interpretation of Islam. Zonis argued that the belief system of the Shiite Muslims of Iran is traceable to the cause of the split between Sunnis and Shiites Muslims. According to Zonis, the first and significant split among Muslims took place over the issue of leadership: who should succeed Prophet Muhammad? The Sunnis believe that “any man who could demonstrate that had the moral, ethical, and intellectual qualities” to be the successors of the Prophet Muhammad can claim the leadership (Zonis, 1985, p. 86). In contrast, the Shiites Muslims believe that the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad are blessed with divine power and knowledge (Zonis, 1985, p. 86). The Shiites also acquired the belief that their community draws its lineage to Prophet Muhammad through 12 imams (Zonis, 1985, p. 87). Thus, Shiites Muslims believe that they have a monopoly over the correct comprehension of Islam (Zonis, 1985, p. 87). Shiite Muslims also believe that their 12-imam line of succession is infallible while most men have inherent weaknesses and, because of this, the leading 12 imams can make decisions and rulings for the community (Zonis, 1985, p. 87). The Shiite belief system also holds that the mujtahids or the most learned ulama or Islamic clerics could fulfill the rule of the imams. In time, Shiites came to believe that authority is not associated with divinity but with the knowledge of Quran, examples (sunna) of the Prophet, and traditions (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad and the imams (Zonis, 1985, p. 87). Nevertheless, over time, the Iranian masses accorded infallibility for the mujtahids during the mid-19th century particularly among the leading mujtahids or the marja-i taqlid (Zonis, 1985, p. 88). In the Iranian practice of Shiite Islam, Shiites are to choose a living mujtahid after whom they would pattern their lives and the mujtahid is the “source of imitation” or taqlid (Zonis, 1985, p. 88). The influential position of mujtahid among Shiite Muslims is unavoidably powerful. Sunni Muslims hold that the need for deducing Islamic law from the Qumran and the sunna or examples of the Prophet ended in the 10th century (Zonis, 1985, p. 88). In contrast, Shiite Muslims believe that the process of discovering the complete meaning of the word of God or ijtihad continues and, thus, the important role of mujtahids (Zonis, 1985, p. 88). The notion of the tawhid has become a key theme in the political way of life of the Iranian Islamic Republic (Zonis, 1985, p. 96). Originally, the notion of the tawhid was limited to monotheism or unity under one God but Ayatollah Khomeini expanded the notion to mean that the monotheism encompass not only the oneness of God but also the oneness of the Islamic community and with only one proper way to realize God’s will (Zonis, 1985, p. 96). Shiites tend to see the world in terms of allies and enemies (Zonis, 1985, p. 97). Virtually all other states are considered enemies of the Islamic Republic (Zonis, 1985, p. 97). Shiite clerics see the United States as the enemy of God and that the policies of God’s enemies are designed to disrupt and overthrow the Islamic Republic (Zonis, 1985, p. 97). Alamdari (2005, p. 1287) confirmed that the current power structure in Iran is based on system of multiple objects of emulation and parallel power and this is system is also known as the Shi’a hierarchy. Iran’s Shiite Islamic beliefs promote a power structure in Iran that is founded on a voluntary relationship between an ulama and his adherents (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1287). Tezcur and Azardamaki (2008, p. 212) noted that several survey findings from Muslim-majority countries like Egypt, Kuwait, and Palestine provide empirical evidence that Islamic beliefs do not necessarily lead to hostile attitudes against democracy. They pointed out that survey evidence are also showing that adherence to democracy has been increasing over several years in the Muslim-dominated world. They even pointed out that several studies are also showing neither denomination (Sunnism or Shiitism) nor intensity of Islamic beliefs leads to a negative evaluation of democracy (Tezcur and Azardmaki, 2008, p. 212). Further, they pointed out that the Islamic Republic of Iran is even a unique case notwithstanding the presence of other Muslim-dominated countries because the Islamic Republic Iran is “the only regime in the Muslim world that is directly ruled by the clergy” (Tezcur and Azardmaki, 2008, p. 212). Describing the Iran Islamic Republic, Tezcur and Azardmaki (2008, p. 212) say that it is a rule of the jurist in which ultimate power lies in the faqih who has veto power over all aspects of the political system. There are religious tests for all offices and electoral candidates and the tests have to be approved by the Guardian Council (Tezcur and Azardmaki, 2008, p. 212). Despite our earlier discussion that there are elements of election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tezcur and Azarmaki (2008, p. 212) asserted that neither the faqih nor the Guardian Council are accountable to the public. The authors also asserted that current practice of Islamic rule in Iran deviates from Khomeini’s teachings. The 1989 amendments to Iran’s constitution gave priority to political qualifications of the faqih over his religious knowledge and status in the Islamic clergy (Tezcur and Azardmaki, 2008, p. 213). In contrast, according to the two authors, Khomeini gave more importance to knowledge in Islamic laws (Tezcur and Azardmaki, 2008, p. 213). Thus, according to Tezcur and Azardmaki (2008, p. 213), faqih claims to legitimacy are founded no longer on his deep knowledge of Islam but on his unwavering loyalty to the cause of the Islamic revolution. Besides, Tezcur and Azardmaki justified, Khomeini has declared that state interests or maslahat are more important than the application of religious laws where there are conflicts between the former and the latter (2008, p. 213). According to Tezcur and Azardmaki (2008, p. 213), this “consolidation of clerical power” at the expense of Islamic religiosity generated dissent among the clerics excluded from power. Tezcur and Azardmaki (2008) conducted a survey in Iran’s capital, Tehran, to investigate the connection between Islamic religiosity and political attitudes and found the following (p. 217-219): 60% consider religion as important in their lives. More than 80% consider themselves to be pious or very pious. Less than 10% do not believe in an afterlife. A majority identify themselves as a Shi’a Muslim before anything else. Only 16% attend Friday prayers at least once a month. Nearly 40% have never been to Friday prayers. Men are not more likely than women to attend Friday prayers. Only 8% believe that enforcement of Islamic laws is unimportant. 45% believe that the state is unable to be responsive to their demands. 70% believe that they are occasionally mistreated by the Islamic state. Only around 1/3 believe that democratic principles are implemented in Iran. Majority have a positive evaluation of democratic procedures and ideals. 69% of respondents agree that democracy may have problems but it is better compared to its alternatives. Notwithstanding the adherence to democratic ideals among Iranians and notwithstanding the mistreatments they have received from their governments, the Tezcur and Azardmaki survey indicate that clerical rule continues to have a good political base in Iran. Nevertheless, the data also indicate that there is also a potential for another revolution to emerge in Iran: 45% believe that the Iranian Islamic Republic is unresponsive to their demands and around 70% believe that they have been mistreated by their government. Meanwhile, there is also an emerging power in Iran. According to Alamdari (2005, p. 1291), more than 60% of foreign trade are illegal and takes place in up to 200 illegal ports. The total annual value of the goods smuggled in Iran is over US$9.5 billion and can build a new base of power in Iran (Alamdari, 2005, p. 1291). Further, the multiple centers of leadership are challenging each other and the elected government. Religious authorities rule in Iran but new power centers are emerging and can grow to overcome the religious authorities Thus, based on our foregoing discussion, the appropriate conclusion to make is that religion has a very large role in an Islamic Republic. We make an important qualification however that we based our conclusion on the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran that is considered unique in the world and is believed to be the only republic where the Islamic clergy or jurists directly rule the nation. We also conclude that the rule of the Islamic clergy is pervasive because it controls the laws, the appointments, and the judiciary. However, because the data also indicate that their government occasionally mistreats a significant number of citizens, there is a possibility for regime change in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another conclusion that we can make is that since the Islamic clergy are ruling the Islamic Republic, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is a basis for a diplomacy that recognizes this fact and that diplomacy with Islamic Republics may have to directly deal with the clergy. References Alamdari, K. (2005). The power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from populism to clientelism, and militarization of the government. Third World Quarterly, 26 (8), 1285-1301. Sial, O. (2006). A guide to the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hauser Global Law School: Hasan & Sial, Advocates and Corporate Counselors. Retrieved June 26, 2010 from http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Iran.htm Tezcur, G. & Azadarmaki, T. (2008). Religiosity and Islamic rule in Iran. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47 (2), 211-224. Zonis, M. (1985). The rule of the clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 482, 85-108. Read More