The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan - Essay Example

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING AND PROSECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGNS WAGED BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL AND THE RELEVANT LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY COMMANDERS Name Course Date Introduction The soviet intervention in Afghanistan contributed to an outbreak of war lasting for nine years, between December 1979 and February 1989. When the soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev deployed troupes in Afghanistan on December 1979, it signified the beginning of the war that ended after the withdrawal of the final troupes from the country on February 1988. The Afghanistan war took place between the soviet-led Afghanistan forces and the Mujahedeen, a multinational insurgent group that sought to protect the interests of the Afghanistan people. Although neither of the fighting sides showed proper planning, the fighting tactics, and the weapons used in the war played a big role in the development and subsequent end of the war. While the United States provided the Afghanistan soldiers with training and logistics of fighting the war, the soviet troupes had little training and haphazardly exercised their strategy. However, the guerrilla war tactics employed by the opponents consequentially led to the end of the war. Fighting guerrilla required similar measures by the soviet soldiers. Thus, planning was an essential tool in winning the war, something that the soviets lacked in their attempts to win against the troops. Initially, the insurgents used traditional weapons in the war. However, with time, they improved their weapons, a factor that accelerated the speed with which they suppressed the soviet soldiers. As the insurgents advanced in the weapons they used during the war, the soviets on the other hand stuck to the weapons they used in the war. The war took toll on the soviets; they could not keep up with the rugged terrain while pursuing the insurgents. Planning, as this essay argues, was one of the major contributing factors to the Soviet Union defeat of the war. After the end of the war, army commanders learnt a number of lessons on war management and winning strategy. Among these lessons, include the evacuation of the wounded soldiers, knowledge of the customs, traditions, and language of the enemy, having knowledge of the factors contributing to the outbreak of wars, the importance of information in the war and the role played by communication in war. This essay will analyse at the operational level the planning and prosecution of the campaigns waged by the principle participants in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Further, it will identify the relevant lessons for contemporary commanders. Background for the outbreak of the war between the Soviets and the Afghans It was possible to predict the outbreak of the Afghanistan war in the Christmas of 19791. Events that took place before the Soviet Union deployed its soldiers in the already warring country could have acted as an indication for the worsening situation. A series of reforms initiated by the Taraki government in 1978, among them the radical modernization of the Islamic civil, especially the marriage law focused on uprooting the feudalism in the afghan society2. The government showed no concern in ending the reforms, instead responding using violence to the unrest created by the unfolding events. Between 1978 and the time when the united soviets invaded the country in 1979, there was a mass execution of thousands of prisoners, among them being village headmen and mullahs in Pul-e-Charkhi prison3. The government argued that only about 11,000 people died during the execution process of the prisoners. As the rebellion spread to various tribes of the Afghanistan, it quickly spread to the cities. Notably, the revolt of the Herat tribe resulted in the death of at least 5000 people. Over 100 soviet families and citizens perished during the revolution4. These activities contributed to the high numbers of Afghanistan soldiers who left the army to join the rebels. The Afghanistan government, following a treaty that allowed the government to call for reinforcements from the united soviets in December 1978 frequently called for the soviet soldiers to join in the fight against the mujahedeen rebels5. Logistically, the Mujahedeen received training in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and China6. Further, they received financial and weaponry supplements from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Saudi Arabian countries. On the other hand, the Shia groups of the Tehran 8 alliance received support from the Islamic republic of Iran. The war had numerous consequences in Afghanistan. While there were numerous deaths, resultant from the bombing of innocent civilians by the rebels, a mass exodus of Afghans from the country to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran marked the height of the war7. Despite the use of tankers and air strikes by the soviet tropes during the war against the Mujahedeen troupes, they lost in the war. Even before the Russian troupes landed in Kabal the capital of Afghanistan in the Christmas of 1979, the country was already in the gleam of a civil war. The then prime minister, Hazifullah Amin in an attempt to introduce western ideologies in the country tried to stamp out the Muslim tradition in the country8. As Islam was a strong religion, and that most of the people believed in the Muslim tradition in the country, the Amin’s move outraged these individuals. His actions of arresting Muslim leaders further worsened the already ugly situation; many Muslims fled to the mountains in a bid to escape Amin’s police. To fight against Amin’s authority, many Muslims joined the Mujahedeen, a group that believed that their war against Amin’s administration was a holy mission for Allah. Reasons why the Soviet Union soldiers lost in the war Lack of planning at the operational level, which led to delays in taking action Having studied the tactics of Soviet leaders well, Amin gave assurances about the cessation of lawlessness and hypocritically stressed his friendly attitude toward the USSR9. Close to 80% of the Afghanistan citizens lived outside the control of the central administration10. This was a poor strategy by the Amin administration in their effort to win the struggle. The mistakes done, among them being criminal actions of several local Soviet bodies drove support of the Muslim population to the Basmachi11. The assumption by the Soviet Union on the possibility of the overthrow of Amin was yet another reason for their loss in the war. The union perceived it impractical for Amin to ascend to power within months. This created a crisis, among them, when their assumption did not happen and Amin remained in office. Information on the contacts between Amin and the United States soon emerged. At the same time, Amin strengthened his policy toward the opposition of the Khalqis, supporters of his predecessor, Talaki. By manipulating socialist slogans and covering himself with democratic phraseology, Amin’s major concern was the establishment of a dictatorial regime12. The radicalism with which leaders of the group trained its members was overwhelming. With the belief that they were in a mission for the sake of Allah contributed to the efforts with which they fought in the war. Training them in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and China enabled the leaders to not only instil the best tactics in the war, but also design strategies of winning in the war. With thousands of Afghanistan Muslims having joined the Mujahedeen, their main intention was overthrowing Amin administration13. Subsequently, they declared a jihad, a holy war von the supporters of Amin administration. According to histo9rians, the mujahedeen proved to be a formidable opponent. Despite being equipped with old riffles ion the war, their knowledge of the mountains around Kabal and their understanding of the conditions in these places acted to their advantage14. The conditions they fought in were hush, intolerable and demanding. Fighting from a rough terrain characterized by mountains and rivers, the Soviet Union soldiers found it increasingly difficult to keep up with the pace of the soldiers. The Soviet Union troupes thus resulted to using napalm, poison gas and the helicopter ships in fighting against the mujahedeen soldiers. Interestingly though, the United Soviet troupes received equal treatment in the war just as the united states received in the Vietnam war15. Their tactics could hardly match the guerrilla tactics employed by the opponent soldiers. Young soldiers thrown into the battlefield without high training The Soviet Union used young soldiers in the fight against the war. Some of the critics of their tactics regarded this as one of the reasons why they never won the war. This coupled with the poor training of their soldiers and the need to control Muslim dominated areas created a crisis in their fighting strategy. Instead of well-orchestrated attacks on their targets, the soldiers, in an effort to control more parts ended up fighting in a haphazard manner16. Their war, characterized by poor planning and increased anxiety, could not match that of the Afghanistan soldiers. By 1982, three years after the outbreak of the war, the mujahedeen soldiers controlled about 75% of Afghanistan17. Fighting against the world’s second most powerful military power then, the mujahedeen tactics proved superior. When the war quickly settled into a stalemate and with more than 100,000 troupes controlling the cities, larger towns and major garrisons, the mujahedeen soldiers moved through the cities and countryside with overwhelming freedom18. Dealing with the enemy in a way traditional war as an Army Instead of adopting counter guerrilla tactics in the war, they relied on methods that had previously failed. This was a problem with the management of the war in the soviet side. They did not anticipate the guerrilla tactic on the ground. When it downed on them that the opponents employed guerrilla tactics, they could hardly change and adopt new fighting methods. The structures within the soviet army were rather too rigid to allow for any changes in the war after the deployment of the war19. However, the felling down of war jets by the guerrilla fighters motivated them more to keep up with the fight. They could tell the sound of a warplane for a far distance and using shoulder rocket launchers, bring down the plane. On the other hand, this weakened the war on the soviet side as the soldiers felt threatened. Poor strategizing by the Soviet Union troops was the main factor contributing to the poor performance throughout the entire war20. Their weaponry was one of the main weaknesses. Before the outbreak of the war, there was little time to prepare. Events that took place during Amin’s regime considerably led to the outbreak of the war. These activities accelerated the outbreak of the war. When the situation became unbearable, and the Muslims declared the Amin was fighting a religious war, they hurriedly grouped spontaneously, joining poorly organized groups that assumed the role of soldiers in the war. There was no adequate time to plan21. Planning in war requires amassing weapons required in the battlefield. It also involves the acquisition of the necessary ammunition required in the war. In a bid to avoid shortages in the course of the war, the soldiers require surplus ammunition. Constrained by time, the insurgents got into the war with poor and traditional weapons. Poorly and inadequately armed, the insurgents opted for the guerrilla warfare that appeared rather easy at their deprived state. On the other hand, the soviet soldiers had modern weapons that they used against the insurgents. They used poisonous gas, grenade launchers, planes, and tankers in the war22. This was an indication that the Soviet Union anticipated for the outbreak of a war, thus armed its soldiers23. The poor armament by the insurgent delayed the end of the war. Were they well equipped, the likelihood of the war ending within its first years after its start were considerably high. The dressing of their soldiers was yet another predicament facing the soviet troupes. In the hush terrain of the mountainous Kabal region, boots lasted less than ten days. Movement in the area became difficult; soldiers felt frustrated, which greatly affected their performance24. Perceiving this as a form of torture and negligence from the side of their government, the Soviet Union faced yet another problem; soldiers started joining the guerrilla fighters. While discipline and loyalty is important in war, these soldiers lacked this important element. The change of loyalty considerably weakened the soviet war. Soldiers started giving information on plans by the soviet soldiers. This acted to the advantaged of the afghan fighters25. They could anticipate the moves, and as such, act before the opponents could take action. Relevant lessons for contemporary commanders The Afghanistan war had a number of lessons for the contemporary army commanders. Learning from the mistakes of both the Soviet Union soldiers and the insurgents, the contemporary soldiers can benefit from these lessons and conduct well-organized war. The lack of planning in the war was one of the main reasons why the Soviet Union faced increased levels of hostility from the poorly armed guerrilla soldiers. The reality is that while neither of the troops had adequate preparations, the Soviet Union soldiers lost the war despite their well-equipped soldiers. Additionally, the united soviet during that time was one of the most powerful alliances in the world, having the second strongest military powers from the United States26. The inability of the commanders to plan, coupled with the poor management of the war led to the casualties reported during the war. However, using the war, the contemporary commanders can avoid such incidences by analysing and coming up with lessons from the war. Medical Evacuation is one of the lessons that the commanders can learn from the war. During war, it is impossible to avoid casualties. Regardless of the level of training and caution that soldiers can exhibit while fighting, casualties are bound. During the Afghanistan war, the Soviet Union soldiers reported numerous casualties27. Factors contributing to the high number of casualties in the region included the use of guerrilla war tactics by the insurgent soldiers, the shooting of the soviet warplanes and the rough terrain that the war took place. As the war intensified, casualties and wounded soldiers increased considerably. There was no system put in place for medical evacuation the casualties or the wounded28. The soldiers had to take care of them, carry them along the journey, considerably weakening their ability to fight. The sight of a wounded soldier affects the soldier psychologically, influencing the performance. Thus, contemporary commanders should adopt the medical evacuation system in an effort to reduce the work of their soldiers and the psychological torture of their soldiers in the field. Knowledge of the customs, traditions, and language of the enemy is yet another important lesson contemporary soldier can learn from the Afghanistan war. When the Soviet Union soldiers invaded Afghanistan, they had little understanding of the background of the insurgent soldiers. While they were prepared to fight a modern war, they had to adopt a different terrain that of the countryside, where the insurgents had sought refuge of the mountainous regions29. The soviet soldiers had no adequate training in such in eventualities. The high frequency with which the boots of their soldiers wore out with was a clear indication of the lack of preparedness of these soldiers. In addition to this, the soldiers had little knowledge of the way of life of the guerrilla fighters. Predicting the war was thus difficult for the soviet soldiers. The civilian population also provided support to the guerrilla soldiers during the war. Even before the soldiers joined in the war, Amin in several occasions ordered attacks on the civilians providing support to the mujahedeen soldiers30. Having a background understanding of the culture of the people would have enabled the soldiers design a different approach to the war. Understanding the language of the enemy would have also helped in extracting information from the people. In case they captured a member of the opponent army, knowledge of the language of the enemy would help in extracting information. Further, communication is essential in the course of war. As the war intensified, and the guerrilla soldiers took control of most of the places in the region, they took control of the communication networks in the region31. By controlling the communication networks in the country, it was possible for them to conduct proper attacks on the soviet soldiers. In addition to this, they managed to tap the communication between the soviet soldiers, giving them an upper hand in the war32. With the help of the information tapped from the commutation between them. Information is essential in any war commanders should understand this. Information simplifies the decision making process. Additionally, the availability of information ensures proper decision-making process by the army commanders. The decision to send troops to the Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was made based on limited information. The soviets entrusted the KGB sources with the military intelligence sources. Experts argue that this was one of the main reasons for the increased influence of the KGB chairperson, Yu V Andropov during the course of the war33. Yu controlled the flow of information to the General Secretary Brezhnev, who was ill for a considerable period of 1979. KGB reports from Afghanistan created a scenario of urgency and the heavily emphasised the increased links between the Amin administration and the United States34. This was however not the case, and as such, the soviets sent troops to a country that was only facing a number of domestic feuds, issues that did not warrant the invasion of the country. Having a background on the factors contributing to the outbreak of the war is yet another lesson that the commanders can learn from the Afghanistan war. There are different factors that contribute to the outbreak of wars. Understanding these factors considerably increases the chances of winning the war by establishing the tactics to employ in fighting the war. There are immediate factors contributing to the outbreak of wars. Various factors contributed to the outbreak of the Afghanistan war. The actions of Taraki and Amin, the treaties between the government and the United States, the disregard of the communist ideology by the government of the day were contributing factors to the outbreak of the war35. However, the immediate cause of the war was the hostility showed by Amin and his administration towards the Muslims in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the mujahedeen soldiers knew that they were fighting a holy war by joining the guerrilla fighters. They even believed that by engaging in the war, they were doing according to the will of the Allah. The actions of Amin in Afghanistan in the year 1978 sparked the belief that the mujahedeen were fighting a holy war against the soldiers and the people in support of the government. This way, they not only fought with determination, but also showed readiness to die for the will of Allah36. Such understanding would verify the actions of the mujahedeen soldiers in the war, and such, would have helped in developing a plan that would help in winning the war. Conclusion Planning is an essential tool in the success of any particular event or activity. A well laid down plan not only gives the direction of the execution of the activity, but also an opportunity for the evaluation of its implementation process. Strategically, leaders ensure that before implementing anything, they lay out a plan for the entire process. Implementing a plan from the operational level increases chances of good results. The Afghanistan war signifies the importance of planning among the military personnel. The Afghanistan war lasted for 9 years since the intervention of the soviet soldiers in the Afghanistan crisis. While the main reason for the involvement of the soviet soldiers in the Afghanistan crisis was finding a solution to the problems affecting the country, the reality is that they never succeeded. Fighting against rebels using guerrilla tactics in an unfamiliar terrain significantly weakened the soldiers. Various factors contributed to the outbreak of the Afghanistan war. Among these factors included the activities of the Taraki government, the abduction of Shan and the modernization of the Islamic law were contributing factors to the outbreak of the war. Immediately, young Islamic rebels referring to themselves as Mujahedeen organized themselves into groups, and assuming guerrilla tactics, sought top end the victimization of the Muslim religion. As the crisis became worse, the Soviet Union soldiers joined in the fight, only to face an extremely challenging situation. They had to fight in rough terrains of the countryside, where the rebels dropped their planes, and their boots lasted for less than 10 days. These challenges reveal the lack of planning in the Soviet Union before engaging in the war. Planning could have revealed the tactics employed by the insurgents, and the methgod to use in fighting them. The insurgents too suffered from poor weapons, using old guns in fighting the well-equipped Soviet Union soldiers. The outcome was a war that lasted for 9 years, leaving Afghanistan in a desolate state. After the end of the war, contemporary soldiers can learn a number of lessons. It is important to plan for war in order to acquire important information such as the evacuation process of the wounded soldiers, knowledge of the customs, traditions, and language of the enemy, acquiring knowledge of the factors contributing to the outbreak of wars, the importance of information in the war and the role played by communication in war. 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