Department of Defense, Security, Transition - Assignment Example

Department of Defense, Security, Transition INTRODUCTION The process for coordinating policy of the state and issues among the different agencies within the executive branch of the U.S. government is not properly designed to handle global change and other international issues that have risen to the top of the policy agenda. These issues involve many facets of both domestic and foreign policy that should be considered together. Yet the interagency process within the executive branch remains compartmentalized between domestic and foreign policy and between economic and foreign policy (Friedman, pg 11-2). In practice, this compartmentalization is partially mitigated by overlapping membership on various interagency groups and by the oversight of the Office of Management and Budget. However, there is still no inter-agency process for developing policy options on these issues that integrates all of the relevant facets and is supported by appropriate quantitative analysis. Any such process should have, at least, a cabinet-level committee that focuses on governmental issues but covers both the domestic and foreign policy aspects of those issues; several sub cabinet-level working groups that are chaired by a senior policy official and supported by a staff located in the White House; access to all of the resources necessary to conduct and comment on quantitative analysis of policy options; and ail avenue for exchanging ideas with industry, the local community, and other outside constituencies on a continuing basis (Friedman, pg 7). Before discussing these elements in greater detail, however, it is useful to look at the emerging international issues, examine existing interagency mechanisms for addressing these issues, and explore the boundary constraints imposed on any interagency mechanism by the United States' system of government, political culture, and personnel selection process. AIM In this paper I aim to describe the inter agency process, provide an overview of the legal framework that created the process and discuss the major players. I will explain with examples the major flaws in the present system and also the key strengths. IAP The Interagency process also known as the IAP was officially recognized in 1947. The current process for expressing national planned policy is untied for explanation by the supervisory division, which has led to fruitless proceedings in the interagency process specially I terms of national security, idleness, and at times contradictory policy.  As the state organizes for the upcoming, it is crucial that the IAP be superior codified and dignified to improve national potency and safety.  Over the history and during many differences, the function of the USA armed forces has altered from being a self-defense power to becoming a comprehensive power paying attention on a obligation to globe peace and democratic system.  The growth of the Services into a combined, amalgamated warfare machine is a enthralling study of beating personalities, roughly fixated parochialism, and to a great extent dispute on what is unsurpassed for the state (Friedman, pg 11-2). The progression of self-governing principals and a universal military occurrence makes it critical that the best of associations caught up in supporting and military contact fully distinguish and appreciate the role of all sections and bureaus of the U.S. Government plus the non-governmental groups and also of international societies (Murdock, 67). Role OF IAP The IAP practically at some point in armed forces emergency actions has been a subject of argument and dispute since its inauguration.  Many studies have conversed the deficits of the IAP, and each organization has resisted identifying and formulating use of lessons from preceding arguments.  The IAP is an intricate method that should be entirely unstated and successfully accomplished to make certain affirmative clash termination and changeover to peace.  The present approach is the accountability of the President of the state and also of the National Security Council; on the other hand, the trail record for running a victorious method has been insignificant at top due chiefly to a lack of answerability.  The IAP organization provides a level of managerial freedom that sets it at a distance on or after the legislative division, but frail or absent responsibility erodes the IAP basis (Nunez, pg 4).  The consequence is repeatedly a process that lacks agreement of domination and destabilizes accord of attempt.  In adding up, the in progress method also lacks a long-standing institute that would smooth the progress of consistency throughout transformations in decision-making administrations.  An amendment in legislation to readdress the IAP, as well as assigning escort agencies for preparation and implementation of detailed phases for the duration of operations, is sought-after for the Government of United States to efficiently achieve its preferred end states in potential procedures (Nunez, pg 13-4). The first element of an improved interagency process is a forum where the president and the heads of all agencies concerned with an issue can discuss options for addressing it. Agencies with a stake in the issue should be represented. The Bush administration has used a more informal, back-channel process for deciding on certain national security policies such as the state of art defense mechanisms. In the long run, agency heads using back-channel processes will find themselves isolated and undercut. It is better to fight the battle in the open and then turn to the president for a decision. In this respect, the Domestic Policy Council process worked quite well in arriving at decisions on the security at local levels. The Domestic Policy Council is not, however, the best forum for these international security issues. Its agenda is crowded with many other domestic issues ranging from drugs and education to national parks (Nunez, pg 20). Moreover, adequately addressing the emerging international national security issues will require a great deal of foreign policy expertise. The secretary of state has been invited to all council meetings at which issues touching on foreign policy have been discussed, but he has frequently declined to attend. The National Security Council is a possible alternative as a forum, but it is fully occupied with foreign crises, arms control, and other traditional national security issues. For the immediate future then, national security issues would best be handled in a separate, cabinet-level National security and Energy Policy Council, which would consider both domestic and foreign aspects of any issue. Energy issues are included because they are central to any strategy for addressing defense change (Nunez, pg 22). The secretaries of state, treasury, interior, commerce, energy, and transportation, the attorney general, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the president's science advisor, the U.S. trade representative, the administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the chairs of the, Council on National security Quality (CEQ) and the Council of Economic Advisors would all be core members. The chief of staff would be an ex-officio member, and others would join as appropriate. Such a National security and defense Policy Council would give national security issues the attention they deserve and integrate their domestic and foreign aspects (Lange, pg 8). The question of who should chair the council in the president's absence must be addressed. The administrator is a logical candidate, particularly if the position is elevated to cabinet rank. Mistrust of this authority by other agencies might, however, make its chairmanship counterproductive. The National security and Energy Policy Council will need sub cabinet-level working groups to develop policy options for the council's consideration, just as the Domestic Policy Council needed the ENRE working group. All of the agencies represented on the National security and Energy Policy Council should be represented in the working group or groups. To minimize turf battles and gridlock, senior policy officials who have sufficient personal authority and knowledge of the issues to move the process forward should chair the working groups (Lange, pg 26). The lack of such leadership was one of the reasons that the Domestic Policy Council's working group on energy, environment, and natural resources, which succeeded the ENRE working group, lost much of its role. Finally, a small staff to draft option papers and maintain communications with member agencies should support the chair. CONCLUSION One of the great weaknesses of the current interagency process on l national security issues is its difficulty in dealing with quantitative analysis. The costs and benefits of national security policy options are inherently difficult to quantify, but the attempt must be made if only to set priorities for committing the nation's limited resources. Consider the problem of reducing U.S. defense expenditures. This situation may be a political inevitability, but at least the relative costs of achieving defense quality standards by different means and the economic penalties paid for current policy should be identified as clearly as possible. WORKS CITED Department of Defense, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.06, 8 June 2004, 7 Friedman, Thomas L.: The World is Flat; A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, (New York,Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 82.18 Lange, David :The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations - Parameters article, Spring 1999. Murdock, Clark A et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols- Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report,(Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 67 Nunez, Joseph R “USA’s Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power”, Parameters 34, (Autumn 2004): 82 Read More