The Concept of Security Sector Reform - Term Paper Example

Topic: What do you understand by the concept of security sector reform? In what ways could it offer a way forward in weak s? Explain with examples Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept that emerged in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It begins where a malfunction security sector is not capable of providing security to the state and its inhabitants efficiently under secular set up. A spoilt and malfunctioning security sector comes in the way of long term development, democracy and peace. SSR is both operational as well as normative in concept. Security Sector Reform, according to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (SSR) is “another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’--which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions--working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework”. This definition of SSR includes basic security actors such as armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), the judiciary, penal systems, human rights commissions, and customary and traditional justice systems. It also includes security and management supervising bodies like the executive, the legislature, ministries of defense and internal affairs, and civil society. Further, in the concept of “security sector”, non-statutory security forces such as liberation armies and private security companies also play their part. Fragile states, according to Eka Ikpe, are those that are threatened by internal and external hostile forces, providing greater risks to regional and global stability. There is another category of weak states that won’t collapse but can’t take guarantee of their peoples’ wellbeing. Basically, fragile states are not stable and don’t respond to human needs of their people. Fragile states are also defined in the context of their relation with the developed world in terms of donor activities. There are Difficult Partnership Countries (DPC), those countries famous for weak capacity and state, as defined by the Overseas Economic Co-operation for Development (OECD). Basically, there are three distinct reform environments. SSR is linked not only with some particular political contexts of a country but contexts could be varied – post-conflict context, transitional context, and in the context of developed countries. In most of the cases, it is SSR in post-conflict context. In post-conflict situations, there is a sense of insecurity; political institutions are ruined or neglected. In such situations, SSR is taken to be Security Sector Reconstruction, as a new effective structure has to be recreated. Security Sector Reforms offer a way to come out of the post conflict situations. Taking the case study of Nepal, where so much activity in political environment has been going on, one such initiative was taken by United States Institute of Peace (USIP). After the signing of peace agreement between the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) in November 2006, there is dire need of SSR by bringing together a wide spectrum of Nepali civil society, including members of human rights organizations, dalit and janjayti rights groups, development agencies, and student, media, and academic communities under one umbrella to discuss how peace and democracy prevails after the violence. The ten year old formal conflict, causing about 13,000 deaths, came to an end by signing of an all inclusive peace agreement between the government and the Maoists on November 21, 2006. The earlier background context was that Nepal King Gyanendra annulled his declaration of February 1, 2005 of straight palace rule by restoring the House of Representatives (HoR). The alliance of seven political parties (SPA), against the king’s rule, jointly formed a cabinet and the Prime Minister. The interim government had promised to hold the assembly election, clearing the way to the formation of a new constitution. The dialogue process between the government and the CPN-M had reached an understanding on 12-points, another 25-point ceasefire code of conduct, and yet another four-point agreement to hold summit talks between the prime minister and Maoist Chairman Prachanda; to create a truce monitoring team (Ceasefire Code of Conduct National Monitoring Committee); to request the UN to help the truce monitoring team and to supervise human rights; and finally, to hold follow-up discussions under observers. SSR needs strategic planning and programmes based on holistic approach adopted by all actors. There is a feeling among the development community that SSR should be led by local community. There is need to bring the community in the consultation process on future threats to SSR strategies. The important role played by the civil society can become an instrument of change. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is an important part of SSR and is generally run as the leading programme of SSR reforms, ending a conflict or the signing of a peace agreement. Disarmament implies the gathering and destroying of weapons. Demobilization implies the abandoning of armed groups for performing administration-oriented jobs like the setting and managing of temporary camps in which ex-insurgents get training for going back to normal life or joining the national security forces. Lastly, Reintegration programmes try to involve ex-insurgents into society through compensation, training programmes, and employment opportunities. As part of reintegration programs, ex-combatants might be given social counseling and motivations for returning to their communities and restarting civilian life. In a weak state like Nepal, which is trying transition into a long-term democratic set-up, requires a long-term development strategy to fight against high unemployment rate, high illiteracy rate, lack of health facilities, and emerging from socio-economic trends, rooted in caste, gender, and ethnic discrimination. Although the peace process is on, there is widespread insecurity because of break-away groups of ex-combatants and criminal gangs. They are providing obstructions in the transition and running of development programmes, pointing to the needs of running an SSR in Nepal. Four areas have been recognized as SSR priorities: Defense Reform; Rule of Law; Good Governance and Democratic Oversight; and DDR. Challenges within each of these priority areas highlight the need for SSR in Nepal. 1. Defense Reform - The Nepal Army, known as the Royal Nepal Army earlier, had been under the command of monarchy for more than 200 years. It had been serving the interests of the king in stead of serving the Nepali people and democracy. In defence reforms, voice is being raised on the army’s human rights record, its role in internal security matters, and accusations of discriminatory practices in its ranks. There is need to look at these concerns raised by the civil society. 2. Rule of Law - Under this category of the “Rule of Law” as the preferential concern for SSR in Nepal, police reform, justice reform, and intelligence reform are the major sectors that need attention. There has been increase in the rate of domestic and cross-border crime after the HoR has been restored and initiation of dialogue between the concerned parties – the government and the Maoists. Organised criminal gangs, break-away groups of the Maoists and other rebel groups are roaming freely in Nepal. The police and the criminal justice system are at the receiving ends to face the threats posed by serious criminals. There has been lack of stern action by the state against such criminals. Adding to this problem has been the prevalence of parallel system of justice, going in Maoist-occupied territory. Outlawed actors are making full the “rule of law vacuum”, which needs to be looked into as top priority. There is need to equip the police force with training and provide necessary resources to face this issue. There is further need to empower the criminal justice system so that rule of law prevails. Corruption and nepotism are other evils that need stern action. There is need to strengthen the criminal justice system so that whosoever violates domestic law, international human rights and humanitarian law, could be brought to books. The Maoists have crossed the line by breaking the signed understandings to indulge in extortion, abduction and admitting under-age population in its force. There has been lack of political will power to do justice to those whose fundamental rights have been violated. 3. Good Governance and Democratic Oversight - Initiatives taken by institutes like USIPs provide a platform in weaker states on how to maintain a close relation between security forces and democratic government. There have been major weak areas that need to be strengthened, like there is need to develop democratic oversight; long-awaited concerns of the security forces in the matter of limited financial outlook require urgent attention, and lack of communication between civilian and military leadership is causing logistic and operational hindrances to carrying out long-term functions. 4. DDR - There is need to understand the vast scope of DDR in rehabilitating the peace environment from the SSR perspective. It must be made a part of the national recovery agenda. Targets should be set in realistic time frame. The root cause of conflicts has been socio-economic discrimination and development tasks. A DDR programme for the Maoists’ Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has to match with simultaneous programmes for bringing changes in state security institutes. The modalities of PLA incorporation in the Nepal military need to be worked out. There is need to see the larger picture of SSR strategy through DDR planning of providing justice through reconstruction, rehabilitation and restoration. Like United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played its role in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, to create better coordination among security, democracy and governance in civil-war afflicted West Africa. It has also been involved in the crisis of Coˆ te d’Ivoire since 2003. These involvements have added new dimensions in inter-African relations. But the crucial issue remains of lack of democracy and good administration. ECOWAS has been trying to shift focus from customary authority-centric security to people-centric attitude. It has laid down rules and principles for member states’ guidance and behaviour. Through such efforts, it hopes to gain political legality and institutional governance in security matters. Except Senegal, all ECOWAS member states are transitional democracies. The domestic problems would be dealt with at the Community Parliament. Political leadership in transitional economies shuns transparency, accountability and scrutiny of security issues. The four-level model suggests total supervision over policy and objectives, inclusion of all stakeholders in operational issues, non-disclosure of top brass identity from public eye and civil society organisations should work to remove doubts between political and security top brass. Nicole Ball has outlined the framework of providing help through SSR in fragile states, offering a way forward through aid agencies that have experience of the line – looking after concerns like justice, human rights, governance and citizen security issues in developing countries. Such welfare agencies the like of USAID, can help in making civil administration effective, strengthening weaker institutions and integrating different departments. General SSR agenda could be same for all states but weaker states require some adjustments. Assistance should be non-stop, sufficient time should be given to do preparatory work besides creating a sense of trust and applying wider reform perspective can be of crucial value. A consensus should be developed on the need and direction of the reform, which helps in creating reform-friendly environment for SSR by external actors. External efforts should be assimilated with local government framework and take local ownership earnestly. In fragile states, different environments of SSR programming, the aid agency’s comparative advantage in providing SSR help, forming important alliances, including the benefits of formulating a programming approach, working collectively with other donors, with cooperation from other agencies in finalizing on policy and legislative reform planning plays a crucial part in bringing them out of the deep pit of problem cycle. It is very important that external agencies, while distributing resources to security sector, keep a check on their desire to dictate terms on how to spend resources. They should in stead offer a review of security needs for public good. Internal security should be separated from external security. Of crucial importance is the dedication to the cause of reforms from national leaders. Weak states like Afghanistan need a contextual approach to external assistance. There is deficiency of human and institutional resource, requiring more time in preparatory work. It should be devoted to creating dialogue process and human resource in government and civil society. Situation in all weak states is not similar, requiring traditional set ups to measure the needs of weaker states. Contextual approach could give better results, which could be political, normative, institutional, social, economic and geo-political in nature. The experiences learnt from Kosovo, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone indicates that all international instruments, including initiation of peace process, should be used. Putting the blame of Afghanistan’s problems on the development community won’t create positive results. Successful SSR ensures that fragile states won’t land again in the turmoil of violence and anarchy. A close contact between the local stakeholders and the international donor community is a pre-condition of success in SSR. In the case of African Armed Forces, according to Schnabel and Ehrhart, externally sponsored reforms have enhanced political stability but in some cases, it has been the opposite. In the European context, experiences of Macedonia, Bosnia, Russia, Georgia and Northern Ireland, particularly in Macedonia have been driven by ethnic-military relations in stead of democracy and civil-military relations. In Bosnia, the American forces worked for peace building not as charitable act but as a strategic necessity. The experiences of Latin American young and fragile democracies including El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia, Chile and Haiti, their relations with the USA in the context of redefined regional security preferences have changed after 11 September 2001. Domestic security sector reforms have regional and international dimensions. There is need to maintain close and interactive dialogue between military and civil society to bring peace and normalcy in post-conflict societies. El Salvador and Guatemala have experienced comparative peace and success in democratization process. Progress in El Salvador has been more positive than Guatemala in SSR. Although Columbia’s experience with democracy has been more enduring, domestic peace has been a far cry. It is clear that current conflicts have to be resolved before working on security sector reforms. Bringing peace and normalcy are essential conditions to secondary important role of military in society. In Chile, civil-military relations and national integration in the aftermath of Pinochet affair, resulting in the arrest of former dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1999, and national reconciliation was an essential condition for political discussions on civil-military reforms. The oppressor regime and armed forces of that time could have been brought to terms had the judiciary and national political elite not protected the armed forces. It has hindered meaningful reconciliation and popular security sector reforms. It is not easy to implement SSR in new democracies. The general perception that Northern models can be applied elsewhere is not practical. Societies coming out of dictatorships find democratic principles quite radical. Developing countries don’t possess organisational capacity, creating difficulties in the formulation and application of policies. Mostly, developed countries themselves pay least regard to such policies and values while supporting rebel movements involved in terrorist activities. Armed sanctions put up by the UN Security Council are openly flouted. The arms supply from the North to the South enables insurgent activities, resulting in long-term enmities and loss of life. References Aning, E K. (2004). Investing in peace and security in Africa: the case of ECOWAS. Conflict, Security & Development, 4(3), Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411970. Ball, Nicole. (2002) Democratic governance in the security sector. UNDP. New York. Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/doc_library/document_detail.php?id=3201. Ball, Nicole. (2005) Promoting security sector reform in fragile states. PPC Issue 11. USAID. Washington DC. Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/doc_library/document_detail.php?id=3200. Budhathoki, K.C. (2006). Security sector reform in Nepal: The role of civil society. Defend Human Rights Movement-Nepal. Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1207_security_sector_nepal.html Ikpe, Eka. (2007). Challenging the discourse on fragile states. Conflict, Security & Development, 7(1) Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411970. Schnabel, A., & Ehrhart, HG. Security sector reforms and post-conflict peace building –United Nations University Press. Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://www.unu.edu/unupress/sample-chapters/SecuritySectorReform.pdf. Wikipedia. (2007). Security sector reform. Retrieved Wednesday, March 28, 2007 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Sector_Reform. Read More