Drug Trafficking and Military Support for Interdiction - Essay Example

? Drug Trafficking Military Sciences Drug Trafficking Illicit drugs arriving into the United s coming from South America pass a 42 million square-mile area referred to as the Transit Zone, whose size happens to be approximately twice that of the continental United States and comprises of the Caribbean Sea, the eastern Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Although the U.S. forces tend to patrol this vast area, they rely heavily on international partnerships in closely coordinating enforcement operations along with the interdiction forces of the majority of Western Hemisphere, as well as European nations so as to limit drug traffickers with the utilization of air and maritime routes. This interdiction takes a team effort thereby relying on the successful execution of a number of steps within an interdiction continuum, comprising of the collection, as well as dissemination of exploitable intelligence, the recognition and monitoring of suspicious vessels, along with the tangible interdiction of those vessels.1 The objective of the national interdiction according to the National Drug Control Strategy has succeeded in creating a removal rate of about 40% of the documented cocaine flow whose destination is the United States through FY2015. Although this is a significant development, a lot needs to be done concerning the interdiction of cocaine. Typically, within the eastern Pacific, there are fishing vessels transporting multiton cargos of cocaine leave Colombian, as well as Ecuadorian Pacific coast ports through to the delivery points via the Central American or even the Mexican coast. Within the Caribbean, there are high-speed go-fast vessels, transporting not less than two metric tons of cocaine at a time, depart from the north coast of Colombia headed to delivery points within the eastern Caribbean or enfolded the Central American coastline within their track north to destinations along the Central American, as well as Mexican coastlines. As a result, a fishing vessel operation is capable of lasting nearly six weeks, whereas go-fast operations go on normally for one or two days. Throughout the past few years, there has been a rise in the quantity of go-fast boats engaged in smuggling; such craft happen to be small, very fast, almost invisible to radar, as well as hard to see within daylight. To counteract the go-fast risk, the U.S. Coast Guard has purchased new equipment while developing capabilities in using armed helicopters, over-the-horizon cutter boats, along with non-lethal vessel-stopping technologies. On the other hand, drug traffickers tend to use latest and innovative techniques in transporting drugs to the United States, involving the development, together with an enhancement of low-profile, completely-submersible and totally submersible vessels. The quality of production, together with operational abilities of these vessels gives traffickers the opportunity of moving more products with superior stealth. These vessels are capable of travelling long distances with no support thereby permitting traffickers superior flexibility when planning possible drop locations.2 Interdiction is and must carry on being a vital constituent of the National strategy, as an accompaniment to other approaches in reducing drug supply. As a result, any analysis defining success within the area of interdiction as arresting all, or almost all, smuggled drugs tends to be unrealistic, as well as counter-productive. To the degree that is an exceptionally costly method; additional expenditures should be weighed particularly keenly, especially if they have the impact of reducing funds present for other efforts in reducing supply and demand. Nonetheless, there is the upgrading of the interdiction efforts made devoid of any noteworthy increase in funding. The most significant requirement in the interdiction field happens to be leadership. In order to pursue effective and expeditious innovation, as well as increased commitment, both through foreign governments, together with private agencies, a strong leader must orchestrate a single inclusive plan. These steps comprise of either reordering of precedence or redefining interagency duties, as discussed below.3 Air Interdiction Air interdiction is under the leadership of the United States Customs Service; therefore, in order to combat drug smugglers, the majority of them have the most sophisticated, as well as expensive equipment for communications and navigation available nowadays, Customs has enhanced its airborne abilities considerably in the recent past. Customs' most fundamental requirement, besides supreme aircraft and supreme sophisticated electronics, happen to be the support of other Federal agencies along with related jurisdictions. A good example of this support is on the diplomatic front. For some time now, Customs has become frustrated by its incapability of pursuing suspected smuggler aircraft to Mexican airspace following the detection on the American region of the border. Though this has been the matter of several diplomatic discussions, little progress is achievable to date. Giving this subject an extraordinarily high priority in the bilateral negotiations along with Mexico is the form of help another agency, for instance the state Department, must provide to Customs in recognizing the critical significance of the fight against drug smuggling.4 Another critical need of the Customs Services happens to be intelligence, tactical, as well as strategic. Whereas, the apprehension, of smugglers tends to be a random, uninformed foundation play a significant task to undertake in deterring smugglers through their extremely randomness; thus, intelligence is essential for effectual interdiction. Therefore, this close connection with the host government customs officials, this will be extremely influential in regards to smuggling comprising of containerized, as well as other commercial cargo. With the improvement of interdiction capabilities regarding pleasure craft, along with general aviation, it is almost a guarantee that commercial cargo will end up getting used increasingly for hiding illicit drug shipments. Such a Customs effort could be complemented through the private sector plans brought about by Customs, for instance, it turns out that a dynamic intelligence gathering duty for Customs is currently by the 1973 Reorganization Plan. On the other hand, the present acknowledgement by Customs, as well as DEA of the former's requirement for time-sensitive intelligence happens to be of critical importance; therefore it is necessary to cultivate the two agencies, together with the Policy Board. As a result, this would necessitate modification or elimination of a number of provisions found in the 1973 Reorganization Plan since they tend to be an obstacle.5 The subject of inter-agency support presently needing the most attention turns out to be the relationship linking the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), along with the Customs Service. The latter, whose key jurisdiction is over entry to United States air space, upholds several programs, lending themselves into supporting the operations of Customs. On the other hand, the FAA has lately given tremendous support to Customs in various cases; nonetheless, there is a need for additional efforts. As a result, the Customs Service has lately proposed compilation legislation, presently known as the Customs Enforcement Act of 1985, containing provisions responsible for addressing such sensitive issues like restricted entry points, as well as minimal altitudes for air entry. Amongst other things, this Act requires all vessels, along with aircraft going to the United States to report instantaneously for Customs inspection, thereby increasing the fines for not reporting entry. Apart from that, there would be a substantial increase of fines for smuggling restricted substances with such violations being punishable by imprisonment. Additionally, all assets confiscated by Customs, comprising of planes, cash and vessels, would end up getting subjected to forfeiture. This Act would forbid airdrops to vessels, making it unlawful for operating an aircraft with no lights, and limit the installation of all illegal fuel tanks within planes. Moreover, commercial carriers would end up getting subjected to extremely stringent regulations as per the Act. Whereas this legislation might be unpopular within private aviation, it turns out to be a collection of significant antismuggling measures going directly to several most frequently bumped into drug smuggling methods hence it is worthy of support.6 Other promising sections for Customs/FAA include the FAA embarking on its long-term buildup approach to the radar system; thereby working hand in hand with Customs in accommodating the latter's necessities. This is to be supported, especially by the Policy Board that tends to have both Customs and the FAA within its Coordinating Group. Another legal issue that might be beneficial to the Board from careful analysis is the extent to which the forfeiture of current asset provisions requires revision thereby enabling the seizure of aircraft, as well as other equipment that traffickers rent or lease with the intention of avoiding forfeiture. Finally, the extent whereby Customs air interdiction abilities might be improved by Coast Guard aviation components would be a momentous omission if sizeable Coast Guard aviation assets end up being overlooked, especially at a time when economic considerations pressure the Customs air operations budget.7 Maritime Operations Within maritime interdiction, the lead agency happens to be Coast Guard and its success turns out to be remarkable thereby getting restricted only by shortages in resources. Latest tactics, as well as innovative forms of assistance provided by the Navy, tend to enhance the capabilities of the Coast Guard. Considering that maritime traffickers, along with air smugglers get threatened by the capabilities of seaborne detection of Coast Guard vessels, there is a need for augmentation of the Coast Guard budget thereby permitting extensive participation when interdicting operations since lack of budgeted resources happens to be the most critical hindrance on Coast Guard capabilities. A proposal that surfaces annually but tends to be unsuccessful is the imposition of user fees for a number of Coast Guard services currently presented to the boating community gratis. Similarly to the aviation community regarding the FAA, there is extensive opposition to maritime procedures thereby inconveniencing the user community or costing it money. Nonetheless, considering the inescapable facts about drug invasion experienced by this country, the nominal costs of a number of user fees would appear to be a minimal price for boaters for paying their contribution to what should be perceived as a national effort in defeating a deadly enemy.8 Consolidated Efforts In the recent past, the development of interdiction got directions from the consolidation of intelligence, together with operations. This happens to be a trend feature of antidrug efforts, and it is an appropriate reaction to the breadth of the drug smuggling circumstance. In the subject of interdiction, the most outstanding joint efforts turn out to be the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (the Board), together with the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). In order to realign these organizations, there is a need to recognize the leadership role of the Board. In the Board and as a section of its harmonized program, it is appropriate to combine the duties of EPIC and NNBIS into a sole, all-source intelligence facility. Therefore, in the crucial early stages of designing, as well as implementing an operation like this, it is invaluable to incorporate the leadership of the Vice President. The joint intelligence base will integrate the input of all components of intelligence-gathering at the Federal level comprising of those sources by now are feeding into EPIC together with NNBIS, while, at the same time, new sources still getting advanced. Although there are certain functions undertaken by each of the two actions, which never get replicated by the other, this should not limit effectual integration of their duties. Everywhere within the present Federal response, there is a movement toward consolidation, as well as coordination; therefore, intelligence along with planning should not be exemption.9 A collective all-source intelligence base requires at least two characteristics absent in either NNBIS or EPIC. First is a physically safe headquarters facility; at the moment, the location of EPIC is in a private office building within El Paso. It does not have the space or the essential physical security for accommodating the all-inclusive input advocated here. On the other hand, the location of NNBIS headquarters is within the Old Executive Office Building found in downtown Washington with its regional facilities located in several Federal buildings all over the country. Whereas such quarters might be capable of providing sufficient physical security, they are ill-equipped for the provision of the scope of the anticipated undertaking. A safe facility combined with sufficient physical dimensions tends to be critical similarly to secure communications with partaking agency, as well as military headquarters. The second necessity gets improved intelligence input. Systematic real-time intelligence tends to be extremely y vital to effectual interdiction and happens to be as equally critically significant to other subjects of enforcement operations. Therefore, the design of a modern center should be from the exact outset comprise of the most absolute provisions for the maximum intelligence input allowed by law, physical, as well as technological abilities.10 Military Support for Interdiction In the recent past, the most significant development within the area of interdiction has been the assistance provided by constituents of the Department of Defense. These activities got restrictions from the Posse Comitatus Act till the passing of certain immunity to Act in December 1981. Since then, the assistance provided by the military has outgrown dramatically. In 1984, the military offered assistance to efforts of interdiction efforts amounting to $100 million via Pentagon calculations. This assistance is normally in line with aerial surveillance, equipment and personnel loans and transport of enforcement personnel as authorized by law.11 The role played by the Defense Department has steadily grown active, innovative, more flexible. Nonetheless, the quality, as well as quantity of such assistance keeps on getting limitation from the constraints present in the Posse Comitatus exceptions i.e. military assistance to law enforcement does not comprise of direct partaking by military personnel in arresting or seizure activities and it is presentable only if it has no effect on military preparedness. Moreover, law Economy Act requires the enforcement authorities to compensate the Department of Defense for assistance offered, unless such assistance is either incidental to accessible military operations or offers equivalent training. Compensation may also be relinquished, if such waivers do not negatively affect military preparedness. As a result of this regard, the Department of Defense has turned out to be increasingly flexible. One instance of this is the increasingly positive association role of the Department of Defense Task Force concerning Drug Enforcement.12 There are rising concerns that the role of military remains too narrowly defined. There are fundamental misconceptions at the top of the Department regarding the permissible extent of the role of the military. According to a letter written to the Chairman of House Armed Services Committee in June 1985 by Casper Weinberger who was Secretary of Defense, direct military participation in regards to drug seizures out of the territory of the United States would do violent behavior to the historic division between military, as well as civilian spheres of action, which happens to be one of the most elemental standards of American democracy with the commission being unable of finding the grounds for such an elemental standard of coequal field of activity. Therefore, instead of the military being a parallel entity, it has customarily been subject to the course of the civilian field with the Commander-in-Chief of the military being a civilian. The Posse Comitatus Act is only capable of prohibiting the use of military forces in enforcing civilian laws on the United States territory. The Constitution had been in existence for almost a century before these laws got endorsed by Congress. Although, since then, the Act has only been amended once, there is the opportunity of amending it again if there is a need. Moreover, there is nothing within the United States law that forbids an active enforcement function by the military out of the United States territory, only the necessity of compensation. This in turn centers on defining military preparedness with the definition of the role of the military being left to the military itself, whereby through the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirming that the military is always being prepared in serving national security through the provision of a defense posture with the capability of successfully defending against hostile or destructive activities from within or without, overt or covert.13 Conclusion Drug trafficking through transnational criminal organizations tends to be a tremendous threat to hemispheric security, as well as citizen safety. The present security circumstance within Mexico along with the increasing extent within Central America happens to be the result of continuous transnational criminal organizations efforts of controlling the highly lucrative trade presented by drugs together with other illicit products. An all-inclusive effort is a necessity in addressing this danger. There are ongoing interagency initiatives such as the Merida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, along with the Central American Regional Security Initiative that is helpful in coordinating the entire governmental approach with regional partner nations. As a result, Transit Zone interdiction tends to play a key role in this effort by averting illicit cargo from arriving at the shores of the hemispheric partners, thereby reducing the threat, while, at the same time, helping in stabilizing their security and social systems, and eventually our own, as well.14 Bibliography Bauder, Julia. Drug Trafficking. Pennsylvania: Greenhaven Press, 2007. Brownfield, William R. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control. New York: DIANE Publishing, 2011. Frank Shanty, Patit Paban Mishra. Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism, Volume 1. New York: ABC-CLIO, 2007. Harris, Nathaniel. Drug Trafficking. Illinois: Gareth Stevens Pub, 2009. Levinson, David. Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, Volumes 1-4. Chicago: SAGE, 2002. Ojeda, Auriana. Drug trafficking. Chicago: Greenhaven Press, 2002. Otu, Smart. The Sociology of Drug Trafficking and Drug Traffickers. Cape Town: LAP Lambert Acad. Publ., 2009. Segell, Glen. Essays on Civil-Military Relations, Military-Industrial Relations, Aircraft Weapon Procurement and International Relations. Pretoria: Glen Segell Publishers, 1998, 1998. Shaw, Mark J. Crime and Policing in Post-apartheid South Africa. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2002. Thachuk, Kimberley K. Transnational Threats. Washington: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007. Read More