USA Drug Policy approach on Colombia and Afghanistan - Essay Example

USA Drug Policy approach on Colombia and Afghanistan Introduction With the end of the Cold War, the US turned increasing attention to the war on drugs. US intelligence and military resources turned its attention away from the Soviet Union and focused more intently on drug production. By the end of the 1980s, the US drug policy moved away from an interdiction policy toward fighting the source.1 To this end the US drug policy toward Colombia, which began in the 1980s, is characterized by supply tactics which involves lending military and financial aid to the Colombian government.2 The US drug policy in Colombia was primarily driven by domestic policies toward, curtailing the supply of drugs to American citizens. The US drug policy toward Afghanistan on the other hand has been ongoing since the 1950s and has been influenced by US foreign policies in the region.3 This paper evaluates the US drug policies in Colombia and Afghanistan and compares and contrasts the two approaches. Ultimately, it will be argued that although influenced by entirely different policy agendas, the US’s primary concern was for safeguarding the safety and security of Americans, both at home and abroad. More importantly, it will be argued that the US approach to the international way on drugs has persistently failed to meet its goals and objective and instead has brought about serious economic, social and political disorder as demonstrated by its drug policies toward Afghanistan and Colombia. The first part of this paper will therefore focus on the US drug policy in Colombia and the second part of this paper will evaluate the US drug policy in Afghanistan. The final part of this paper will provide a comparative analysis of the US drug policy toward the two countries and will offer key findings and explain how these two different policies are designed to achieve the same goal, although influenced by different political considerations. US Drug Policy toward Colombia The US drug policy toward Colombia is facilitated by two underlying polices characterized as policies of control and aid. Control is facilitated Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 which dictates that the US President provide Congress with an annual assessment of anti-narcotic cooperation between the US and major drug-producing nations. If the drug producing nation fails to satisfy the US’s cooperative commands, it may become decertified with the result that the US can reduce aid and ensure that loans to that country are canceled.4 The US’s aid policy with respect to its anti-drug initiatives is manifested by the Andean Trade Preference Act in 1991. This particular act is calculated to provide assistance to Andean states in the implementation of legal alternative to coca production.5 The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 2002 amended the Andean Trade Preference Act 1991 and increased the list of duty-free items in respect of products that had not been previously listed under the 1991 Act.6 Colombia has been designated a member of the Andean Trade group and entitled to the duty-free benefits under the Act.7Invariably aid under the Acts includes military aid and pursuant to this initiative the US has provided Andean nations with weapons, technical and logistical aid via the military and law enforcement in those regions. The aid is calculated to assist in the interception of drug dealers and crop eradication programs. The US Office of National Drug Control Policy reports that Colombia is the source of more than 90 percent of the cocaine that infiltrates the US. Likewise the US identifies Colombia as a significant source of heroin in the US.8 Liang-Fenton characterizes the US drug policy toward Colombia as one of “eradication, interdiction and extradition”.9 Eradication is aimed at the crop and invariably involves “aerial herbicide”.10 Interdiction involves interdicting the drugs either in the source country or en route to the US and requires cooperation with the security personnel of the source state.11 Extradition is motivated by eliminating and/or immobilizing drug traffickers on a state to state cooperation basis.12 This three-tiered approach to US drug policy toward Colombia has been in place since the 1970s.13 Although the success of this three-tiered approach relies almost entirely on bilateral relations and cooperation, the US has demonstrated a tendency to adopt a unilateral approach with respect to its drug policy toward Colombia at times. Inciardi explains that while the US is entirely cooperative in its narcopolitics with Colombia during times when the US cocaine market is relatively low, this approach changes once the US market share of cocaine increases. As Inciardi maintains that it is during: those periods when Colombia’s share of America’s drug market increases and/or in the wake of unfortunate personal incidents, that Washington abandons its binational cooperative stance and acts unilaterally without consulting or even warning Bogota.14 The US response to a Colombian judge’s release from prison of Jorge Ochoa, a “notorious cocaine capo” in 1987 illustrates the point.15 The Colombian government’s jurisdiction over the judge was entirely limited. Even so, upon Ochoa’s release the Colombian government ensured that he was surrounded by intense security. Nevertheless, the US responded by criticizing and ridiculing Colombia and in addition subjected Colombian travelers and Colombian products to intensive checks by US Customs at entry ports into the US.16 Taken unilateral action does nothing to advance the spirit and intent of mutual cooperation and bilateral relations between countries. In fact, unilateral action defeats the purpose of bilateral relations and undermines its underlying goals and purposes. Specifically, the US unilateral stance in the Ochoa case only served to heighten public disapproval of the US government’s antidrug agenda and compromised efforts to revive the extradition treaty between the two countries.17 Complicating matters for the US with respect to its drug policies toward Colombia is the level of ongoing internal conflict in that country. The demand for drugs in the US and Colombia’s ability to meet that demand has only contributed to the internal conflicts in Colombia.18 The drug trade has increased to such an extent that no “aspect of the crisis facing the nation is ‘drug free’”.19 US efforts to curtail the demand for drugs, to eliminate its production and to interdict drugs have been expensive. Even so, the drug trade continues to grow and the far-reaching consequences for Colombia’s domestic situation continue to be negative. The US drug policy toward Colombia appears to be failing on both fronts. In the US for example, the US prison population has grown exponentially and the primary targets are “petty traffickers drawn disproportionately from the nonwhite underclass.”20 As for Colombia’s situation, the emergence of aggressive and strong criminal organization have come into direct contact with Colombia’s government with the result that political corruption is widespread and “honest officials and innocent civilians” remain “at the mercy of mafia hit men and indiscriminate bombings”.21 The US eradication policy toward Colombia has been particularly problematic. It has brought with it widespread damages to the ecosystem of Colombia and has compromised the income sources for many of Colombia’s farmers with the result that they invariably turn to the Marxist guerillas, another source of US concern on the ground in Colombia. As Bergquist et al explains: Despite the expenditure of billions of US taxpayers’ dollars on these programs and a massive effort to interdict the flow of drugs, this policy has reduced neither consumption nor production.22 The drug policy with its emphasis on eradication and extradition has proven to be entirely unsuccessful, but continues to drive US anti-narcotics policies toward Colombia. The use of eradication and interdiction campaigns typically forces the drug trade to relocate to areas that might have never been impacted by the illicit drug trade. Often times this can be profitable for the drug trade. For instance in 1989, under pressure and with the cooperation of the US government, the Colombian government took steps to eradicate Medillin Cartel in 1989. As a result the Cali Cartel increased its cocaine output from about 30 percent to 70 percent in under a years’ time.23 The U.S extradition demands in respect of drug traffickers from Colombia has also increased anti-American attitudes. Boaz and Crane maintain that the US demands has brought about divisions and alienation not only between the US and the Colombian government but also between the US and the general Colombian population. Ultimately, public opinion on the ground in Colombia as a result of US demands for the extradition of suspected Colombian drug traffickers have been entirely unpopular in Colombia. The Colombian public views these demands as “an expression of Yankee imperialism”.24 As a result, Colombian officials have “resisted US pressure” rather than “continue its bloody battle against” drug cartels.25 There is an ongoing tension between the US and Colombia with respect to annihilating the drug trade in Colombia. Essentially, the Colombian government takes action and the US does not agree with it. Moreover, there are times that the US takes action of its own and as result necessarily challenges Colombia’s territorial sovereignty. For example in 1991, Colombian officials successfully negotiated with drug cartel leaders for their surrender. The negotiated surrender called for reduction of custodial sentences and reassurances against extradition. Although the population in Colombia was largely satisfied with the terms of the surrender, officials in Washington were not entirely pleased.26 Another incident in 1992 also demonstrated the division between the US and Colombia with respect to US drug policies toward Colombia. In July 1992, cartel leader Pablo Escobar managed to escape from a Colombian prison. From the US perspective, Escobar’s escape was irrefutable evidence that the criminal justice system in Colombia was entirely flawed and corrupted. The US organized and executed its own search for Escobar by the deployment of military plane over Medellin. This move by the US resulted in more claims that the US was disrespectful of Colombia’s territorial sovereignty. There was an ongoing distrust and suspicion of the US’s motives.27 The US drug policy toward Colombia involves the provision of approximately US 1 billion in respect of anti-drug strategies. The US has also deployed 1,000 US troops together with advisers and a number of military helicopters calculated to train Colombian soldiers.28 The militarizing of the drug war in Colombia has had counterproductive consequences for the US drug policy toward Colombia. By ensuring that weapons are readily available in the area, the US is indirectly arming the narco-guerillas who by virtue of advanced weaponry have been able to wage sophisticated terrorist attacks.29 US Drug Policy Toward Afghanistan The illicit drug production and cultivation of opium is the primary concern in relation to Afghanistan although the Afghan opium is not a problem in America.30 The approach taken to Afghanistan’s drug production is, like the Colombian policy, focused on eradication and interdiction.31 The US drug policy toward Afghanistan dates pact to the early stages of the Cold War era. In 1956 the US was primarily focused on tightening its control over Pakistan in its power struggles with the Soviet Union. As a result, Afghan calls for economic, political and military aid from the US were largely ignored.32 Territorial disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan influence the US decision to lend aid to Pakistan and to virtually neglect Afghanistan. As a result Afghanistan turned to the Soviets and by 1953 became the “first non-communist member of the Soviet sphere.”33 As Soviet aid poured into Afghanistan the US came to the realization that it could no longer ignore that country and the US National Security Council recommended that the US take steps to: Encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the communist bloc…and look to the United States and other Free World Sources for military training and assistance.34 In 1956 the US responded by describing Afghanistan as an “emergency action nation”.35 One of its first moves was to help Afghanistan with transforming its opium crops to a major source of licit trade so as to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union.36 In this regard, the US drug policy toward Afghanistan was predicated on its containment policy and was more about making Afghanistan self-sufficient as a means of warding off Soviet infiltration and obtaining Afghanistan’s neutrality. Ultimately, the US drug control policies in Afghanistan remained intricately “tied up with foreign-policy concerns will into the 1980s.”37 When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, US drug policies were compromised and resulted in contradictory approaches to its general anti-drug policies. During the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan, the US furnished the Afghan Mujaheddin rebels with weapons and other military supplies and this support expanded to “toleration of Mujaheddin opium production” which was a conventional income source for the vast majority of tribes in Afghanistan.38 As Brewly-Taylor notes: The American willingness to support anti-communist factions in the region conflicted with the long-term US desire to control the illegal production of opium at source.39 Once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the US took a less committed and objective position with respect to the drug trade in Afghanistan. The events of September 11 forced the US to take a more committed approach to the role of the illicit drug trade in the threat of international terrorism.40 The installment of the Taliban in 1994 and the human rights abuses that followed had previously concerned US policy makers.41 In the post-cold war area the US had made a committed effort to intensify its military operations in South-East and South Asia and this invariably included Burma and Afghanistan.42 The US drug policy in this region since the 1980s has always been combined with strategic efforts to fight international terrorism and strengthen US national security. This leads to coordinating efforts with and strengthening the country’s military and law enforcement. The US State Department characterizes Burma and Afghanistan as the world’s two largest producers of both opium and heroin.43 In Afghanistan, the US drug policy is also facilitated by a “poppy eradication/alternative development program” organized through Mercy Corps Internaitonal which is an American NGO.44 The problem with the US efforts to curtail the drug trade in Afghanistan are similar to those efforts in Colombia. The end result is that the efforts, which are primarily military in design is that it strengthens insurgents and guerrillas. Likewise, military assistance can have the unpleasant result of creating “market incentives that boost the profits of the traffickers.”45 As Honey and Barry explain: Crop-substitution programs fact numerous obstacles, from difficulties in finding alternatives to high-priced illegal crops, to trade barriers blocking access to the US market for products that compete with US growers. 46 The US current occupation of Afghanistan resulted in a restructuring of US anti-drug policies in Afghanistan. The Obama administration recently announced that it was moving away from eradication and focusing more on interdiction of drug supplies and “cultivating alternative crops.”47 Representative Richard Holbrooke noted that: …Western policies against opium crop, the poppy crop, have been a failure. They did not result in an damage to the Taliban, but they put farmers out of work and they alienated people and drove people into the arms of the Taliban.48 Pursuant to the US new position with respect to its drug policy toward Afghanistan, Holdbrooke noted that the US would commence “phasing out eradication” which typically involved “spraying or plowing under poppy fields” which were frequently “under fire from Taliban militants or angry farmers.”49 The focus would therefore be on helping Afghan farmers become more self-sufficient by focusing on other crop sources and on: seizing both drugs coming out of the country and growing and processing supplies coming in.50 The idea had been advocated for before the Bush Administration. Policy makers and advisors had warned the Bust Administration that eradication was too costly on all fronts. Defeating the Taliban would require deprivation of drug revenue. The proper and more effective means of executing a drug policy, according to advisors would be “crop substitution and foreign aid” as a means of stimulating the economy.51 Even so, it remains to be seen whether Obama’s new approach to drug control in Afghanistan will even be implemented. Ben. Khodaidan the Afghan Minister of Counternarcotics noted that the Afghan government would have to see the new policy play. He added: We are still waiting to see what kind of changes they have made in the new policy. If the strategy is not in accord with Afghan culture and tradition, any such changes would have no real effect.52 In the final analysis, the US is now actively engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan. In the state rebuilding process, the military is heavily on the ground and the ability to produce and trade in illicit drugs is undermined. Once the ground forces are reduced and the state governance is completely returned to the Afghan government it is possible that the illicit drug trade will maintain momentum and US policies will return to military and eradication enforcements. Once again, the shift in policy by the Obama administration is just another manifestation of the US policy in that area. In its plans to create a stable and self-sufficient government in Afghanistan, the new drug policy is no more than a necessary part of the overall state rebuilding and stabilization efforts. Comparing US Drug Policies Toward Afghanistan and Colombia The most obvious difference in the US approaches to its drug policies in Afghanistan and Colombia is the US commitment to actually prevent the drug production. The US took and takes a far more aggressive approach to Colombia and the drug policy in that region is genuinely aimed at crippling the supply. The US policy in this regard has been far more centric and focused and appears to be its top priority in terms of US-Colombian relations. The US drug policy toward Afghanistan has not been as intensive and as focused as its drug policy toward Colombia. There are two reasons for this. The first is the US relationship with Afghanistan has been influence by world power politics emanating from the Cold War era and carrying on through the war against terrorism. The second reason is, the Afghanistan is on another hemisphere, making the export of illicit drugs to the US far more problematic than the export of illicit drugs from Colombia. As a result, opium is not readily available on American streets to the extent that cocaine which frequently originates from Colombia is. A common thread however, is that, although driven by entirely different objectives, the US has used military strengthening tactics in its anti-drug policies in both Afghanistan and Colombia. The consequences have been entirely counterproductive in the sense that the US has inadvertently fueled and armed both sides of internal conflicts in both countries. The result is, instead of eliminating the problem of drug trafficking, the US created internal problems that only ensure that drug trafficking can thrive in. The eradication programs introduced in both regions also fueled the drug trade. Small scale farmers have had their crops destroyed by these operations and on both sides of the Atlantic have seen those farmers turn to assistance from unfriendly groups who depend on the drug trade for power. In Afghanistan, the farmers turned to the Taliban for support and in Colombia, the farmers turned to the narco-guerillas for support. In the final analysis, US drug policies in both Afghanistan and Colombia can be described as a colossal failure. Conclusion The US should abandon its hard line approach to Colombia and take on a shared responsibility approach to the drug problem in Colombia. The US is required to accept that in respecting territorial sovereignty, it needs to take a far more cooperative approach with Colombia and focus more sharply on promoting development and trade in the area. It should focus more decidedly on helping Colombia become more economically and politically self-sufficient so that it could confront the drug trafficking problems on its own. The reconstruction and stabilization operations in Afghanistan are aimed at producing the same results, although not brought on by an anti-drug policy. Essentially, stabilizing and reconstructing the government and the economy will have essentially the same consequences. It will remove the weakness in society that fuels drug trafficking in much the same manner as it will remove the weaknesses that facilitate terrorism and other forms of security threats. 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