Emergency Management and the Incident Command System - Report Example

Incident Command System (ICS) Incident Command system (ICS) is a standardized, on-scene and all-risk system of managing both planned and unplanned incidents by emergency service personnel. It provides tools for the command, control and coordination of an emergency response resulting to better control of personnel, facilities, equipment and communications at an incident scene (see Irwin 1989). ICS systems in the world more or less share many elements, such as clear lines of command, span of control, sectorization, decision support, and inter-agency working (Smitherman 1998, pp. 3). 1. The reason for establishment of ICS Incidents cannot be totally prevented from happening. The most that may be done to at least mitigate their negative effects is to manage how emergency workers respond to the crises situations. But, responding to such occurrences similarly proves to be complicated and – when large scale incidents are involved – extremely difficult on account of the incidents’ being unplanned and emergency in nature. Thus, the reason for establishment of an effective ICS, especially for large scale incidents, is to reduce – if not eliminate – the problems that usually go with such situations (see Irwin 1989). Now, these problems can be decimated with an ICS on account of the system’s processes and structures. Firstly, ICS is designed to cope with the basic causes of disaster problems. Too, it provides ways to speedily perform situation analysis and to use the eventual analysis as a basis for realistic planning and action (Irwin 1989). Normally, this is made possible by an ICS section that is responsible in handling what disasters are potentially coming and in determining what courses of actions should be taken to resolve the incidents thoroughly and systematically. This accounts for the existence of Incident Action Plan, which brings order out of chaos. Besides, ICS also has designated sections that carry out the Incident Action Plan, identify and manage people, materials, supplies, equipment and facilities that are necessary for the carrying out of the plan, and is responsible for the procuring those items that need to be procured and tracking costs. Now, these sections and their respective roles come to produce the incident management cycle consists of basic elements of assessment of the situation, the development and implementation of the strategy, resource support, procurement and reassessment (Wolf 2001). Similarly, ICS facilitates the organization’s integration of multiple resources into definitive functional efforts and the provision of direction and management of multiple disciplines and different government levels under crisis conditions. It improves communications among the involved agencies, and it is posed to increase the effectiveness of all its participants (Irwin 1989). 2. The various levels of command in ICS The number of levels of incident management or command is primarily dictated by the severity of the incident that will be dealt with. It follows, thus, that a small self-contained incident would need less control and, hence, less layers of management than a large-scale systemic crisis (see Crichton, Lauche& Flin 2005). At most, though, there are four layers in the in the structure that deal with an incident. And, normally, too, level 1 is always the most senior (FSA 2004, pp. 7). Level 1 is the strategic management or command. Considered as the generals commanding wars, those who are designated to form this level have what is said to have the highest level view and the widest and most outward facing perspective. This level is reposed with the ultimate over-all responsibility for how the organization emerges from the incident (FSA 2004, pp. 7). The second level is the tactical management or command. The composition of this level is like colonels who are commanding campaigns. It has a wide view, but is focused more on the medium term or on the more internal perspective. In practice, this level sets divisional priorities, objectives and acts as it is the designated over-all immediate command for dealing with the specifics of the incident (see FSA 2004, pp. 7). The third level is the management or command level. The personnel who are in this level are the sergeants, and they command battles. This layer of management has a much narrower perspective. It is focused on the short term objectives. In effect, it sets their individual teams’ priorities, designates the team members’ tasks, and manages the immediate local situation (see FSA 2004, pp. 8). The people who are on the ground comprise the level 4 of the ICS. They are likened to the troops, and it is they who fight the battles. These people must be extremely focused on the immediate tasks in hand. They ensure that activities are completed swiftly, efficiently and with the minimum of supervision (FSA 2004, pp. 8). 3. Risk assessments that should be part of effective action plan and implemented at the scene HSE (n.d.) noted that a risk assessment should have been done involving the business operators against agreed timescales. This should have determined whether business operators are making satisfactory progress – that is, whether they are achieving the relevant milestones or whether they have a timetabled action plan that is in place but is unable to meet a timescale for site specific-reasons that may be acceptable to the regulators. Example of this is whether certain equipment – that is, for major infrastructure maintenance, operation practices, staffing levels and systems, among others – is unavailable because of supply difficulties. There is also a mention about the necessity for assessment of the safety integrity level (SIL) against the requirements of relevant standard such as BSEN 61511, or the Layers of Protection Analysis. Finally, there is also a need to assess the tertiary containment capabilities of organizations (see also MIIB 2006). 4. Public agencies and their roles and responsibilities during large scale incidents, as in Buncefield The following are the government agencies that are tasked to be involved in large scale incident in the UK (Coleman [n.d.], pp. 4-5, 14-16; see also HRF 2007). The police force normally assume the over-all coordinating role for operations, take responsibility for communications and protection of the site, investigate the incident and make criminal inquiry. Policemen also process casualty information, and act on behalf of the Coroner in establishing the identity and arranging for the removal of the dead (from the incident site). They also control traffic so that emergency service vehicles can access the scene. They similarly put up cordons to coordinate the scene of emergency and to preserve evidences. The Fire and Rescue Service is among the first emergency service at the scene of an emergency. It is responsible for the rescue of people who are trapped in a fire, wreckage or debris, making sure that the emergency does not escalate by extinguishing fire and undertaking measures to prevent fire and deal with other hazardous situations such as chemical leaks, assuming responsibility for the command, control and safety of all personnel within the inner cordon of a fire or chemical related emergency, and helping the police recover bodies. In addition, the Fire and Rescue Service also liaise and cooperate with the Police and the Ambulance Service in assessing the need for and the means of public evacuation, casualty removal and site security. The Ambulance Service treats and cares for the injured and their transport to hospital, designate which receiving hospital will take casualties during a major emergency, and deploy and serve as over-all coordinate all on-scene medical resources. The Local Authorities are expected to initially play the role of supporting the emergency services and then, later, leading the recovery. The Local Health Bodies – particularly those that have Accident and Emergency Departments which can provide a Mobile Medical Team to attend to the scene of a large scale incident – are designated as receiving hospitals. These Local Health Bodies normally have a Major Incident Plan, which provides for additional staff and the suspension of routine surgical care to allow for big numbers of incoming casualties. The Health Protection Agency has the role of providing authoritative scientific and medical advice to the NHS and other bodies about the known health effects of chemicals, poisons and other environmental hazards. The scope of this advice includes personal protective equipment, decontamination and evacuation, toxicological and epidemiological advice on impact on public health, clinical advice on antidotes and medical treatment, the public health impact of industrial sites, and the health effects from chemicals in the environment – among others. The Health and Safety Executive enforces health and safety regulations within the UK. They lead the investigations on the cause(s) of incidents. The National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC) is responsible for providing a 24-hour expert response to the emergency services, serving as a back up to company safety procedures and providing telephone advice in the CHEMSAFE scheme of chemical incident response. The Environment Agency is mandated to protect and enhance the environment. Its primary task includes food risk management, tackling pollution incidents, reduction of industry’s impact on the environment, restoration and improvement of rivers, coastal waters, contaminated land and wildlife habitats. It is also responsible in assisting the emergency service in making sure that the best environmental courses of action are adhered to and to prevent further damage during remedial actions. The Highway Agency has the role to manage the network of motorways and trunk roads by operating a network of regional control centers from which they manage the supply of traffic information to the motoring public and coordinate the response of their Traffic Officers, who attend to the on-scene of road traffic accidents supporting the police in their duties by removing damaged and abandoned vehicles. The Highway Agency also has the authority to close roads and divert traffic. 5. The need for effective liaison with media and other agencies during major incidents Coordination of all activities related to dealing with the media and serving as point of contact for participating agencies and organizations have corresponding positions in the structure of ICS (see Wolf 2001). This is because effective liaising with the media and other agencies during major incidents is a big must for successful actions during and after crisis situations. The Police Force usually assumes the coordinating role viz. media liaison. However, in certain conditions, the lead role may be assigned to another organization. The designated press officer, then, will liaise closely with communication officers of other organizations, who are not barred from making their own news releases, so that a structured and consistent response to the media is assured. Liaising with other organizations’ communications officers translates to consultation and exchange of information, which in return prevents conflicting accounts that may be passed to the public. In most situations, sufficient is a policy of close liaison to ensure a coordinated media response. And, liaising with media is served very well by an established central media point – which is principally manned by either the police press office or the designated press officer, with the help and cooperation by personnel from all agencies that are involved in the incident. Contact with other agencies, on the other hand, is served by a communication line that is open 24-hours between and among the press officers of every agency. This would facilitate the line of communication among them on any changes to each of the participating agencies. Aside from the open line communication system, inter-agency synergy is also served by regular conduct of meetings of all parties for the discussion of issues that are of mutual relevance. 6. Communications during major incidents When it comes to communication, ICS is built on a couple of principles. One is relative to common terminology, which covers organizational structures, operational resources, and facilities; the other is pertinent to the need for integrated communications that is inclusive of development and use of common communications plan covering processes and technology (Hawkins 2007). That there should be a common terminology is necessitated by inter-agency communications during crisis situations. Without common denominator, inter-agency coordination and cooperation would not be possible. It is because the “who,”” when,” “why,” “where,” “what” and “how” of joint operations cannot be established. Likewise, common terminology in communications precedes incident response. Akin to a common dialect, it makes possible the articulation of needs, description of processes, establishment of policies, crafting of joint standard operating procedures, and ultimately commanding resources during inter-agency operations (Hawkins 2007). Within the ambit of ICS, communications need to be integrated into the incident action plan in order to capture management goals and operational objectives. It is critically called for by effective response. Communications also support the responders’ safety and effectiveness. And, it reinforces command structure and span of control (Hawkins 2007). Essentially, communications is brought as closely as possible to the incident command. In ICS structure, the unit that is in-charge of communications operates in the Logistics Section, and is headed by a unit leader and peopled by dispatchers or radio operators and communications technicians. Given this set up, whether messages are passed through voice-over-radio, data over fixed wires, or in person, communications are essentially made through channels. For, essentially, communications in ICS follows a hierarchical order that either expands or contracts in consideration of the size and needs of incidents (Hawkins 2007). The hierarchical set up of communications has each person in communications unit fulfill a role through a pre-determined route – that is, they talk up one (slot) and down one (slot) the hierarchy. Practically, it means that anyone in the unit – except, of course, the Incident Commander (the top level supervisor) and the lowest crew member (who supervises no one) – would talk to their supervisor and everyone they supervise (Hawkins 2007). In instances of actual crisis situation, certain procedural measures for communications have been widely adopted by different systems of incident command. There’s emergency traffic that is given priority access to a unit’s operational or designated emergency channel – thus, disrupting normal traffic. Another practical concern relative to communications in crisis situations is the question of how many units of resources may be assigned on a channel. If not properly handled, too many people on a limited channel naturally results to system overload. Hence, channels are assigned their resources on the basis of their tasks – that is, some tasks require very little access to radio channels, while others make use of single channel very heavily. Likewise, it helps that during crisis situations, standard language – i.e., common terminology, standard resource definitions, naming conventions, and the use of plain language – applies to and helps (inter-agency) communications. Otherwise, the result is poor communications – which is actually miscommunications – between or among the involved agencies. Furthermore, communications in crisis incidents may follow a pre-defined communications-order model such as the positive message acknowledgement and the five-step process. With this in place, communication process gets initiated only when the intended receiver indicates readiness to receive a message, and the message is transmitted and the receiver restates the message to confirm that it is understood. When the message is received correctly, the sender confirms and completes the communications sequence. Finally, better communications among different agencies that are involved will be served by the establishment of operational unit reporting procedures and the ascertainment of the responsibilities for every communications positions (Hawkins 2007). References: Coleman, J. n.d. The UK emergency response systems: the case of the Buncefield incident and lessons learned. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/UK_Buncefield_EN.pdf [Accessed 23 February 2010]. Crichton, M., Lauche, K., and Flin, R. 2005. Incident command skills in the management of an oil industry drilling incident: a case study. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management [online], 13 (3). Abstract from Social Science Research Network database. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=871533 [Accessed 21 February 2010]. Freeman, J. 2006. The incident command system. Available at: http://fd.ema.arrl.org/ICS_TM.htm [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Hawkins, D. 2007. Communications in the incident command system. Available at: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/communicationsics.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Health and Safety Executive (HSE). [n.d.] Report on progress against the Buncefield Standards Task Group initial recommendations. Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefieldprogress.htm [Accessed 23 February 2010]. Hertfordshire Resilence Forum (HRF). 2007. Buncefield: multi-agency debrief report and recommendations. Available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131513/buncefield_%20_multi%20agency_debrief_report.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Irwin, R. 1989. Chapter 7: the incident command system (ICS). In E.A. der Heidi, Disaster response: principles of preparation and coordination, online edition. Available at: http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/DisasterResponse.nsf/section/07?opendocument&home=html [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB). 2006. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board publish recommendations on the design and operation of fuel storage sites. Buncefield Investigation. Available at: http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/press/b07001.htm [Accessed 23 February 2010]. Smitherman, M.W. 1998. British styles of incident safety: command decision making and team knowledge. Public Entity Risk Institute. Available at: https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/PERI_Symposium_CommandDecisionmaking.pdf [Accessed 21 February 2010]. The Financial Services Authority (FSA). 2004. Incident management: a generic guide. Available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/staff/incident.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Wolf, W. 2001. The incident command system – a management tool for emergencies. Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. Available at: http://www.calea.org/online/newsletter/No78/incident_command_system.htm [Accessed 22 February 2010]. Read More