Communications Problems on 9/11 - Coursework Example

Case Study: Communications Problems on 9 11 Copyright In an increasingly complicated world with ever more complex urban habitats and cities, responding to incidents and emergencies can also become a complicated affair. However, planning, coordinated action and communications are likely to provide the best means for successfully managing emergency incidents. The previously mentioned position is likely to be supported by anyone who has had an interest in emergency or disaster management. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States of America can be described as being the single most colossal emergency incident in modern history. Thus, it is likely to be instructive to study how this emergency was managed and the lessons learnt are also likely to be valuable. This essay presents a discussion about what can be learnt from the communication problems that were experienced during the 9 / 11incident that is described in the 9 – 11 Commission report. Declaration I certify that, except where cited in the text, this work is the result of research carried out by the author of this study. _____________________________________________ Name and Signature of Author September 2008 This write - up is presented in fulfilment for the requirements related to a report on Communications Problems on 9 / 11. Biographical Sketch Acknowledgements Contents Introduction 1 Communication Problems that are Evident from the 9 – 11 Commission Report and Suggestions for Improvement 4 Conclusion 10 Bibliography/ References 12 (This page intentionally blank) Introduction The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were carried out after 19 militants, a majority of whom were from Saudi Arabia and had established themselves in the United States, hijacked four domestic aircraft (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “September 11 Attacks”). The hijackers were members of the Islamic extremist organisation al – Qaeda which had previously indulged in numerous terrorists acts around the world, including the destruction of United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998. Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al – Qaeda was disillusioned with the presence of United States troops in Saudi Arabia and the corruption that existed in this country which according to him was the result of Westernization. Thus, al – Qaeda wanted to exact revenge on the West and the United States in particular for a failure of strict Islamic orthodoxy. Most of the hijackers who had been involved in the hijackings had entered the United States of America as trainees and some had received training as commercial pilots (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “September 11 Attacks”). They had travelled in small groups around the country and on September 11, they had boarded four domestic aircraft from airports that were located on the East Coast of the country. It is said that a twentieth hijacker was also involved in the conspiracy, but this hijacker had been detained by United States authorities. After the aircraft had taken off, the hijackers took control of the aircraft and overpowered the crew. The aircraft that were hijacked were all large passenger jets and because the hijackings had taken place shortly after takeoff, all of the four aircraft had a full load of fuel. At 8:46 am local time, the first of the four hijacked aircraft was deliberately rammed into the north tower of the World Trade Centre in New York and a second plane struck the south tower of the same World Trade Centre about fifteen minutes later. Both of the previously mentioned aircraft had been hijacked after takeoff from Boston. At 9:40 am the third aircraft struck the southwest side of the Pentagon in Washington DC, while the fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania countryside as the hijackers lost control when passengers tried to overpower them after being informed about what had transpired via cellular phones. The hijackers had wanted to inflict massive damage that was expected to draw world attention to their cause and they were willing to sacrifice their lives and the lives of many innocent people to get this attention. Clearly, no ethic of armed conflict or any moral standard including Islam will have permitted what the hijackers had done, but it will appear that somehow such considerations were lost on those who had perpetuated the previously mentioned acts. Massive damage was inflicted on all the targets that were attacked and in the surrounding areas (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “September 11 Attacks”). The North and South towers both erupted into flames because the aircraft had been laden with fuel and at 9:59 the south tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed. The north tower collapsed within the next half hour and substantial damage was inflicted on the surrounding buildings. Both of the World Trade Centre towers had been full of people at the time of the attacks and it is certain that all those within the two towers and in the aircrafts lost their lives. Fires on the World Trade Centre site smouldered on for at least the next three months and it is certain that the collapse of the two previously mentioned structures will have caused the deaths of many more in the peripheral areas. Record losses were suffered as a result of the closure of financial markets and the lives of very many individuals were influenced in complicated ways. More than 400 police officers and fire fighters who had been trying to attempt rescue lost their lives as a result of the September 11 attack. Well coordinated rescue and disaster management operations are always important for managing any strike or disaster because the level of coordination that is able to be achieved determines how much damage can be averted. It is important to try to minimise damage in terms of lives lost and also to contain physical damage. The ability to communicate effectively determines the level of coordination that is possible and because various agencies have to work together to contain a disaster, it is important that effective communication coordinates agency efforts. This essay presents an examination of the communication problems that had existed after the September 11 attacks in the light of what has been mentioned in the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States of America and an attempt is later made to try to learn from the failures that had presented themselves after the terrorist attacks. Communication Problems that are Evident from the 9 – 11 Commission Report and Suggestions for Improvement Chapter 9 of the 9 – 11 Commission report presents a detailed transcription of what had transpired immediately after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Chapter 9). After reading the previously mentioned report, many are likely to be left wondering if construction of very tall skyscrapers is a good idea. Complex elevator systems, standby generator systems, emergency lighting systems, public address systems, computerised security and fire alarm systems, elevators, sprinkler systems, HVAC systems, communication systems and building management systems are essential for maintaining an acceptable level of safety in such buildings even for normal living. Perhaps if lateral expansion were to be attempted, the costs may be acceptable. However, thanks to the wireless mobile phone systems, it was possible for a large number of callers to contact the 911 emergency call centre and the system jammed. Clearly, if all of the more than 50,000 people who were said to frequent the World Trade Centre daily were to give a 911 call, any system will jam. There is little that can be done to prevent such jamming and the best that can be done is to try and device systems that can provide better information management for 911 operators so that they can provide quality guidance to callers. If skyscrapers are to be built then perhaps it is appropriate to provide better drills and information about stairwells and their configuration as well as smoke doors and other building systems to the inhabitants. A lack of the previously mentioned information caused problems during the 9 / 11 evacuations. Perhaps the format of information that should be provided and the drills should be approved by the fire department authority. If building inhabitants are lacking in information and knowledge about what to do in an emergency, then this is a communication problem. A large number of agencies with different command structures responded after the terrorist attacks. Although these agencies were to operate under a single Incident Command, a lack of planning for disaster created confusion. Also, the agencies used a very diverse range of communication equipment, some of which was not as elegant as it could have been. A huge number of radio frequency channels and low power radio equipment contributed to problems. Perhaps it may be possible to standardise on radio equipment for all agencies that use wider channels, higher power, redundant links and a chain of repeaters that are always on to provide improved security of communications and a ruggedness that will be useful in emergencies. Reliable standard issue agency radio systems with rapidly switchable channels that not only make it possible to communicate within a single command structure, but also to contact a limited number of master contacts for other agencies may be better than having more than sixty communication channels on which everyone is calling. It should not have been necessary to turn on a radio repeater system as was the case for the World Trade Centre and perhaps well designed and user friendly standard issue radio systems will have worked better. The Port Authority lacked a standardised operating procedure and it is important that all agencies within a region have a standard procedure for responding to emergencies. Such a procedure should be made known to concerned officers. It is also necessary to have established procedures for communication, preferably on standard issue radio communications equipment. It has been mentioned that the 911 operators were trained in the rudiments of emergency response, but better training and computer systems that provide relevant information to operators to make better decisions are likely to be useful. It is mentioned in the 9 – 11 Commission report that the Incident Command Centre had no backup site. Perhaps having a requirement to establish a backup command to which operations can be rapidly shifted is desirable in all emergency response plans. Emergency response plans should emphasise a strictly coordinated approach and this had been lacking during the 9 / 11 emergency. Although agencies may have their own command structure during normal situations, a rapidly adaptable command structure during an emergency has to be emphasised to all agency commanders and men so that coordinated efforts can be presented without any inter – agency bickering. It has been suggested in the 9 – 11 Commission report that eyewitness accounts were flooding the 911 system. However, it will appear that the Incident Command did not have an accurate picture about what was going on. This will tend to suggest that an information processing and planning task force is necessary at the time of an emergency as a part of an overall emergency response plan. Such a force should be supported by field communications units and this should also have contact with the media channels as well as 911 so that rapidly evolving situations can be accurately described to the Incident Command in real time. The 9 – 11 Commission report states that dispatches from the 911 to fire department and police were delayed or unsuccessful. Such transfers are acceptable during normal times, but in an emergency transfers and dispatches to individual commands are inappropriate and only the information processing and planning unit of the Incident Command should be constantly fed information from all sources. Having information constantly being fed from media channels is likely to ensure that the Incident Command will have the best possible picture. 911 operators had not been able to present useful information during the 9 / 11 incidents. Processed information presented by Incident planning units should be made available to 911 operators through the computer monitors in front of them so that they can pass on the best possible advice to any callers. It has been mentioned that public address announcements were not heard on all floors during 9 / 11 because of the damage that had been inflicted. Perhaps it makes sense to have a radio connected public address system on a fixed channel instead of a wired system that can be switched on during emergency so that structural damage has a minimal impact on communications between all floors of a skyscraper during a serious emergency. When more than one incident is being handled such as for the two towers of the World Trade Centre, it makes sense to have separate Incident Commands for incidents. Each command should have its own set of responders, chain of command and information processing and planning units so that efforts remain focused on incidents. Thus, agencies should be able to allocate resources to each Incident Command separately and the Incident Commanders should only focus on their own emergencies over which they have full operational control. Instead of calling for “all available men” or a “level 4”, agency command should communicate how many men and what resources are required for each incident to agency field commanders. The 9 – 11 Commission report suggests that air traffic controllers were unaware of what had occurred. This indicates that the air traffic controllers were not tracking all aircrafts and any deviations from the prescribed flight paths had not been detected. It is important that all aircraft remain identified at all times and their movement should be monitored, with any suspicious deviations being reported to airspace commanders who can then decide on the best set of actions. It is desirable that when responding to an incident, the aviation wings of all agencies report to any Incident Commands that are relevant instead of to their own agency command, once they have been assigned to an incident. Thus, clear operating procedures must exist to transfer command of different agencies to Incident Command once it has been decided by their agency command to make such transfers. However, constant exchange of information between two or more Incident Commands may be desirable if it has been decided that a situation warrants this. Building management computer systems should be designed in such a manner that if a malfunction of the computer system is detected and an emergency situation exists, any locks or emergency exits are released to their unlock position and the best possible assistance is provided to the inhabitants of a skyscraper. The 9 – 11 Commission report indicates that radio channels were jammed because too many units were trying to communicate at once. Perhaps procedures should require that a designated chain of communication for every unit be followed. Also, it is important that efforts are made to train officers to ensure that they follow designated communication procedures during emergencies. If officers belonging to an agency cannot contact their command structure or the incident command, then it should be impressed on them to use their best judgement to assess a situation to determine the best course of action. Also, all officers assigned to an Incident Command should have been strictly trained to follow orders and it should be impressed on them that they should not of their own accord leave to assist with an emergency without consulting their local command. Thus, it is essential that officers from all agencies should be thoroughly trained in emergency response and communication procedures. Also, all agencies that can possibly assist should be integrated into emergency response plans to define their role and procedures. Although leadership demands that senior officers set a good example on their men by involving themselves in frontline operations, this should not be done if the role of command and coordination is likely to be compromised. Conclusion From the previous discussion it should be obvious that although every disaster, emergency or incident is unique and a rapidly evolving situation, these situations are best tackled by coordinated efforts that involve decent communication and control by Incident Commanders that are empowered in accordance with plans. Having the right communication systems and information processing can assist with the management of all types of incidents and transfer of command from agency structure to Incident Command structure is desirable during emergencies. (This page intentionally blank) Bibliography/ References 1. Encyclopaedia Britannica. September 11 Attacks. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Ultimate Reference Suite.  Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008 2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 9 – 11 Commission Report. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004. September 23, 2008. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm Read More