Buncefield Incident: Fire and Rescue Service Management - Assignment Example

Note: You presentation will follow tomorrow evening (your time). Thanks FIRE & RESCUE SERVICE MANAGEMENT INCIDENT COMMAND Buncefield Incident 1. The Incident In the morning of December 11, 2005, large parts of the Buncefield Oil Storage and Transfer Depot at Hemel Hempstead were destroyed by a series of explosions and subsequent fire. The first large explosion occurred at around six in the morning that was followed a huge fire that engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks in the Buncefield site. The incident also caused extensive damage to nearby properties but nobody was killed or seriously hurt. However, a number of commercial and residential structures were severely damaged and sections of the M1 motorways were closed to traffic. The fire nearly destroyed most of the site and burned for five days releasing large plume of smoke into the atmosphere and scattered over and beyond southern England. 2. Why an effective incident command need to be established in large scale incidents An Incident Command or ICS is generally know as a management tool to effectively handle incident by combining facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications within one command structure. Typically, an Incident Command has five main functional areas- Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance (Becker 2008, p.154). During a major incident, numerous agencies normally respond and unfamiliar and unexpected task are required. At first glance, the situation seems to require more equipment, materials, and personnel to stabilize. However, this is not the case when incident management use an Incident Command system since resources would be staged rather than just chaotically applied it. It is structured to enable manageable span-of-control helping responders to control and track activities and personnel without become overloaded by tasks (Balog 2005, p.3). In a large scale incident like Buncefield, an effective incident command would be beneficial since many agencies, resources, personnel, and equipment were required. The response to the Buncefield incident, according to the investigation board initial report, highlighted the need for effective emergency arrangements (Buncefield Investigation Board 2006, p.2). In the timeline of the event, a major incident was declared at around 6:08 am but the Strategic Coordinating Group or Gold Command was convened only three hours later at around 9:00am. Although the first responders particularly the fire and rescue services and the police were impressive considering the size of the incident, the Buncefield incident according the recommendation of the board is a” multi-agency task that requires a clear lead” (Buncefield Investigation Board 2006, p.22). Apparently, the board noticed something wrong with the emergency response command and it has reminded everyone concerned that an effective emergency response depends on the initiatives and good working relations of the responders (Buncefield Investigation Board 2006, p.51). The first comment given by the investigation board is the lack of clearly defined role for people who will give health advice at the Gold Command and Control Centre to local responders. Moreover, there were no local agreements that would allow health agencies to decide quickly who will do what in any incident to support the Gold Command on things they need. Secondly, the availability and sufficiency of materials and equipment for the response were not known. Third, communications between the Gold Command and government offices were a problem since there was no liaison staff to coordinate the work. The communications were not managed efficiently and the level of technical and human resources cannot sustain the demands of the response and recovery phases. In a large scale incident, the effectiveness of an Incident Command can make a big difference. The Buncefield incident definitely requires not just a simple command and control structure but an effective Incident Command structure that has the ability to put things together in a short time. A type of Incident Command structure that can effectively handle communication, materials and equipment, human resources, and inter-agency coordination. A multi-agency response is so complex thus it requires a strong leadership and control. For instance, a large scale disaster like Buncefield requires determination of appropriate level of protection and the right type of protective equipment thus an Incident Command should have the capability to acquire or source out these equipments if not available. A Buncefield scale incident requires effective coordination with local and national agencies and superior communication facilities to meet the needs of the emergency and communicate with the entire responding units. It requires coordination with hospitals, clinics, emergency medical units, and others. In addition, coordination with concern agencies for the possible evacuation of people from the immediate area surrounding the incident site (Campbell & Langford 1991, p.120). Clearly, a large incident is complex that definitely requires not just simple command and control or coordinated emergency respond efforts but an Incident Command that can effectively decide, control, coordinate, bring in materials and equipment, and provide health and safety needs. According to Roth (2008, p.47), a review of problems associated with incident response were mostly attributed to the inadequacies of management rather than availability of resources. Some of them are lack of accountability, unclear chain of command, poor communication, and failures of orderly planning. 3. Various Levels of Command Required to deal effectively with large scale incidents The span-of-control in an Incident Command is maintained by adding levels of management since it is possible that during a major incident, an effective span of control of an officer exceeds his capability (International Association of Fire Chiefs 2009, p.290). In the three levels of command, responsibilities during an incident response are set in each level. Strategic Level – in this level, the overall direction and goals are set. For instance, the overall goal may be is to stop the spread of fire to the neighbourhood. Typically, the incident commander and command staff functions in this level. The strategic level is responsible for managing the strategy and the overall management of the tactical priorities (Barr & Eversole 2003, p.531). Tactical Level – this level provides the responders the opportunity to define the actions that are essential to attain the strategic goals. Depending on the size of the incidents, the tactical level can have more divisions, groups, units, and companies. The tactical level sector officers are responsible for managing the various geographical and functional elements of the incident site (Barr & Eversole 2003, p.531). Task Level – in this level, the tasks are the actions required to attain the tactical objectives. In other words, this is the level in which the physical work for the incident is being done and completed. Fire fighters and health agencies perform in this level and their work may include searching for victims, operating hose lines, treating patients, and others (International Association of Fire Chiefs 2009, p.290). In a large incidents such those similar in Buncefield, there may be a need to add additional level of management to ensure an effective span-of-control over the period of the incident. Consequently, an officer assigned to a branch is expected to look after some combination of divisions, groups, and units (International Association of Fire Chiefs 2009, p.290). 4. Appropriate dynamic risk assessment that would have implemented at Buncefield and the structure of an effective action plan Initially, a risk assessment should provide an indicator of priorities and requires regular updating if the risk is dynamic (Kaye & Graham 2006, p.9). Dynamic risk assessment is required to constantly identify hazards thus monitoring and review of the changing circumstances is necessary (Ferrero 2002, p.94). In Buncefield, a site-specific dynamic assessment could have done well but the lack of information and details of the site prevented the responders to do so. A good risk assessment could have led the responders to specific action plan and priorities that can reduce risk (Kaye & Graham 2006, p.9). This incident action plan would reflect the objectives of the overall strategy and specific tactical actions and since the conditions constantly change, it will be flexible and would lead to completion of major objectives (Klaene & Sanders p.82). To be effective, the ideal structure for this incident action plan should come from the tactical objectives categorized in their relative importance. For instance, controlling or extinguishing the fire and rescuing people in dangerous situations in Buncefield would be the primary objective while property conservation measures would be a secondary objective. The Structure of the Action Plan a. Extinguish Fire and Rescue People in Danger b. Distinguish other potential risks in the area c. Investigate and eliminate health hazards d. Secure the area and start search e. Search on surrounding area f. Damage assessment g. Contingencies Work and Reconstruction 5. Roles and Responsibilities of Various Public Agencies that would have been involved in Buncefield a. Fire and Rescue Service As a Category 1 responder (Civil Contingencies Act 2004, p.23), the fire and rescue service should be competent enough in all aspect of incident command and find their way into a dynamic and complex operational environment. Their primary responsibility is to control and extinguished the fire. Rescue and evacuate people who caught and in danger at the site. Coordinate their effort to the Incident Command and ensure safety of all personnel (Cote 2003, p.297). Moreover, they are required to assess, plan, and advise when necessary, share information, and respond immediately (Coles 2006, p.101; Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004, p.5). b. Police Generally, the police responsibilities are to secure the location and maintain public order during the crisis. However, in the initial response, the police may assume command and passed it up to higher authorities as the respond progresses (Campbell & Langford 1991, p.119). The police are responsible for protection of life, coordination of emergency services, protect and preserve scene and investigate the incident in coordination with other agencies. In addition, they have the responsibility to collate casualty information, identify the victims for the coroner, and restoration of normality (James et al. 2003, p.568). c. Health Protection Agencies During the crisis, a health and safety management structure should be created and the responsibility of health and safety staff is carry out on-site risk assessments and identify control measures and safe systems of work (London Emergency Services 2007, p.43). They are responsible for assessing the situation taking into consideration the number of casualties, degree and nature of the incident, contamination or pollution if any, and the extent of injuries. As a member of the Incident Command responding agencies, the heath protection agencies should ensure the safety and adequacy of protection of staff treating the casualties. In addition, ensure that staff is kept well informed as the crisis progresses. It is also their responsibility to monitor the incident until the hazard is reduced to a tolerable level (Carley & Jones. 2005, p.128). d. Environmental Agencies Since the Buncefield incident involves oil and associated products, responders may include the members of the environment protection. Moreover, in view of the investigation results, large volumes of fire water and foam were used and penetrated the soil and may have contaminated ground water and streams (Buncefield Investigation Board 2006, p.11). The responsibility of the environmental agencies in these circumstances should be to ensure that all areas surrounding the site are inspected, tested, and monitored for contamination. Moreover, although there may be no noticeable effects to soil and plants made by smoke plume that had spread over a wide area, it is the responsibility of these agencies to monitor the effects of plume on people’s health and plants. e. Media The presence of media in any incident is a major factor particularly when delivering information that could call the attention of concerned agencies. However, unconfirmed reports could damage the response operation. The media is responsible to the public as well as to the incident command in place. They should be objective in delivering reports about the incident and should get their information to the media liaison assigned. 6. Effective Liaison with Media and other Agencies During Major Incidents A press officer is very useful in establishing regular liaison to the media and other agencies so that contentious or conflicting information can be clarified before releasing it to the public. The person assigned the duties of media liaison must have the authority and knowledge to know what is going on at all times. An effective media liaison takes control of the exchange and does not wait for questions but begins providing information as soon as it is available. The media liaison should detail the scope of the emergency so it does not become exaggerated, and reports what actions are being taken to control or contain the threat. More importantly, the media liaison controls the information and ensures that it is accurate since misinformation provided to the media and other agencies can cause harmful consequences (Cashman 2000, p.77). a. How information would have been communicated and managed during the incident Since it is recognised that the frequent cause of failures in an incident response is in the areas of communication and decision-making (Veenema 2007, p.150), the incident command centre should ensure that communication needs are addressed on various levels, between agencies, the media and the public, and the staff members as well. A liaison officer, as mentioned earlier, should effective manage the information being communicated with the media since public perceptions are greatly influenced by them. Moreover, all staff needs to be inform about the policy regarding the release of information to any group, media, general public, and other responding agencies. The Incident Command Centre should have installed a mechanism for contacting staff and managing communication facilities to ensure that all are informed. In addition, there own staff should be provided with a means of communication with their families. This is because eliminating the worries of staff will result in a more focused workforce and effective incident response (Veenema 2007, p.150). b. Analysis of prudent decisions would have been taken during the incident In a large incident such as Buncefield, making a prudent decision may be difficult particularly when the situation is so overwhelming. However, with strong determination and leadership making such practical and appropriate decision is possible. For instance, an effective incident management involved rapid extraction of the most relevant information and in the case of Buncefield, the investigations shows the lack of clearly defined roles of the staff, information regarding availability of materials and equipments, and communication problems between the command centre and the government. In these circumstances, the incident commander could have taken a prudent decision to consult the leaders of category 1 responders and extract the necessary information he needs to resolve the problem. For instance, the incident commander could have contacted and seek the help of a more experienced person to defined the roles of everybody working in the command centre. He could also take the decision of declaring the incident a national concern so he could get all the materials and equipment he needs to rectify the problems. More importantly, he could have assessed the problem much earlier by consulting the first responders on the amount of resources, personnel, equipments, and other associated requirements to progress and accomplished their work effectively. Bibliography: Balog J. 2005. Public transportation security, US: Transportation Research Board Barr R. & Eversole J. 2003. The fire chief's handbook. US: PennWell Books Becker R. 2008. 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