Effects Of The Buncefield Incident On Its Surrounding Areas - Case Study Example

 Effects Of The Buncefield Incident On Its Surrounding Areas Introduction The Buncefield fire also known as the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal fire refers to the series of explosions that occurred on the early Sunday morning of 11th December 2005. This oil terminal which is located in the Hemel Hempstead of Hertfordshire in England, stands very close to the M1 Motorway. This oil depot as the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (2006) tells us, is jointly owned by “Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited, a joint venture between Total UK Limited and Chevron Limited; United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited and West London Pipeline and Storage Limited, whose site is operated by British Pipeline Agency Limited; and British Petroleum Oil UK Limited” (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2006, p.5). It was the fifth largest oil storage in England with a storage capacity of about 60,000 imperial gallons. The first of the explosions, which was also the largest, occurred near the tank number 912 at about 6 in the morning. This led to a series of explosions which affected 20 storage tanks. Immediately after this at about 6.08 am, an emergency was declared with the fire-fighting department ready to take over. The entire incident measuring about 2.4 Richter on scale was monitored by a team from the British Geological Survey and was said to be caused by a strong air-fuel explosion. The main fire was completely put out by the fire-fighting department by the afternoon of 13th December 2005. This incident was touted to be the biggest disaster in the recent history of England and was said to be even bigger in magnitude than the Flixborough disaster of 1974. This incident led to 40 causalities with two of them showing major injuries. Fortunately, there were no reports of any fatalities. However, massive damages occurred to the residential and commercial properties around the oil depot and the fire which raged for two days ravaged most of the site area and also emitted black fumes into the surrounding atmosphere leading to environmental pollution. Investigations into this incident as is evident from the press release by the then UK government (2005) was conducted by “the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency (EA), who together form the joint Competent Authority (CA) responsible for regulation under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH)” (HSE Statement: Buncefield Oil Depot investigation, 2005), with the final report being presented on 11th December 2008. According to the latest report of 2008, HSE and EA has proceeded with prosecution and criminal charges against five companies related to this incident as is clear from their press statement that was made by the Joint Competent Authority in 2008, “Criminal proceedings have been commenced against Total UK Ltd, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd; British Pipeline Agency Ltd; TAV Engineering Ltd; and Motherwell Control Systems 2003 Ltd following a thorough and complex criminal investigation conducted by the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency” (Buncefield Investigation, - Buncefield Investigation Board Publishes Final Report, 2008) Summary of the incident The Buncefield oil depot was built in 1960 to supply fuel to the Heathrow airport and later developed in the 80’s and 90’s to supply oil through pipelines from Merseyside and Humber, situated in the northern part of England. A large industrial site known as the Marylands Industrial Park developed around it, with many small business establishments being built there because of the cheap prices. It was here on the 11th of December 2005, just after six in the morning, the first explosion took place, followed by a series of many other explosions. The impact was so great that the sound was reportedly heard from many parts of France and Netherlands. The main points of the incident as highlighted by Hiles (2007) are as follows: “ Although the explosion caused 43 reported injuries, fortunately there were no fatalities The explosion and fire destroyed some 5% of the UK’s petrol stock The north side of the oil storage terminal was largely destroyed, with the blast area covering over half a mile The M1 north- south motorway, the main highway between London and the north of England, was closed Smoke from the blaze could be seen from the neighboring county of Buckinghamshire and from London” (Hiles, 2007, p.501). If we take a closer look into the incident that took place on this eventful day, we will see a chain of events that took place, starting on the 11th of December and going on for the next few days. The repercussions of this incident continued until December 2008, when the final investigation report was made public. The first explosion which was heard at exactly 6.01 am took place near container number 912 in Bund 1, with subsequent explosions taking place at around 6.27 and 6.28 am. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board which did a detailed investigation into the whole incident gives us a hour by hour account what happened starting from the evening of 10th December 2008, when tank number 912 starting receiving its supply of unleaded fuel around 7 pm. There was nothing abnormal to report around 12 midnight when stocktaking was done. Around 5.20 am when the tank 912 became completely full and started overflowing, the automatic protection system did not shut off the flow which continued to overflow leading to the collection of fuel and air mixture in the surrounding region. As Regester and Larkins (2008) notes that the “Tank number 912 filled beyond its capacity, filling the bund wall with an estimated 300 tones of petrol” (Regester and Larkin, 2008, p.183). At 5.38 am, CCTV first captured the footage of vapor from the leaking fuel. By 5.46 am, the vapor cloud was about 2 meters thick and leaking out from all directions. At 6.01am, the first explosion was heard and as Buncefield major incident investigation board (2006) frames it, was “followed by further explosions and a large fire that engulfed over 20 large storage tanks. The main explosion event appears to have been centred on the car parks between the Hertfordshire oil storage limited west site and the Fuji and Northgate buildings” (Buncefield major incident investigation board, 2006 p.7). At 6.08 am, an emergency was declared and fire fighters were made ready to tackle the situation. Soon an extensive smoke plume from the burning fuel was seen, which spread all over southern England and even beyond, and was even recorded in satellite images. The next day the fire was at its peak with 25 Hertfordshire pumps, 20 supporting fire fighting tanks and 180 fire fighters trying to put out the fire. Finally, on 15th December fire management service declared the fire to have been completely put out. As Hertfordshire fire and rescue service presented in their report (2006), “an aggressive foam attack on two fronts was used to extinguish the fire. All main tank fires were extinguished within three days of commencing the main foam attack. The overall fire response lasted 26 days” (Great Britain: Hertfordshire fire and rescue service, 2006, p11). During this entire operation, residential and office building premises were evacuated, owing to the fear that there may be more explosions and also because of the fact that the damage caused to the building structures may prove to unstable and dangerous. The M1 north- south motorway was also kept closed to facilitate the fire fighters in their tasks and also for the safety of the motorists. Effects of the Buncefield incident on its surrounding areas Damage in the surrounding areas due to the explosions was quite extensive and severe. As Smith and Petley (2009) tell us “in this incident…43 people were injured with 2000 persons evacuated. Twenty business premises, employing 500 people, were destroyed and a further 60 businesses, employing 3,500 people, suffered damage. At least 300 residential properties were damaged and fuel supplies to London and parts of south east England, including Heathrow airport were disrupted” (Smith and Petley, 2009, p.309). The impact of the blast can be understood from an interview given to BBC news by a security officer from the depot, Mr. Troy Woodland (2005), “ I sat down and all of a sudden there was a huge orange light and a massive explosion which blew the doors through and knocked me off my chair, and the ceiling fell in," (BBC news, 12th December 2005). There were broken windows, doors that were warped by the blast and a warehouse that was located almost half a mile away, had its wall blown away. Neighboring towns also suffered damages due to the explosion. Business office blocks that were in the vicinity were severely damaged with windows in both the front and backside blown apart by the blast. As reported in the guardian.co.uk on 11th December 2005, “The blasts smashed the windows of many homes, knocked front doors off their hinges, destroyed indoor light bulbs and opened cracks in plaster walls and ceilings” (guardian.co.uk. 2005). Since the blast took place early in the morning, it reduced the number of causalities. Had the blast occurred during daytime the offices would have been full of people working, and would have resulted in many more fatalities. Cars parked nearby caught fire and the roof of one building was completely blown off. This explosion and the resulting fires produced a thick plume of smoke and other polluting particles that could be seen from far off places all across South East England. This smoke visible on satellite photographs, moved onto a height of about 9000ft. The hydrocarbons that were present in the smoke particles were mainly irritants with low toxic levels. During the first two days, the smoke plume remained quite buoyant, due to the released intense heat energies from the raging fire. This combined with a settled weather made it possible for the plume to rise to great altitudes without much cross mixing with the surrounding atmosphere. By 12th December the plume had moved on to France, letting to rest fears that as the fire intensity decreased it would make the plume less buoyant, resulting in high levels of ground level smoke concentrations. An investigation was carried into the smoke plume jointly by Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the met office and they found out that it was composed mainly of carbon soot and thus relatively harmless. In the report (2006) tabled by National Environmental Technology Centre (Netcen) who produced a report on the basis of day to day observation of the surrounding atmosphere during the Buncefield incident, tell us that, “A wide range of measurements confirm that the Buncefield fires did not appear to result in large ground-level air quality impacts over local, regional or national scales. Elevated pollution levels across the monitoring networks were within normal ranges measured on other occasions. Whilst it cannot be ruled out that the plume may have grounded in areas not currently covered by the monitoring networks, any resulting peaks were likely to have been localised and of a transient nature…. Both the monitoring and modelling suggest that the high buoyancy of the plume resulted in the bulk of the emissions being trapped aloft, above cold, stable layers of the lower atmosphere. Because of this, the emitted pollutants came only sporadically into contact with the ground.” (Netcen, Initial Review of Air Quality Aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion, May 2006). Medical aids were also not much required by the general public for the smoke pollution. Majority of treatments were given to the fire fighters, that too as a precautionary measure. People were asked to stay indoors with their windows and doors shut, to avoid the smoke. Thus, we can see the smoke pollution though at first thought to be of a serious type, did not pose to be too much of a problem. However reports of the ground water levels were not so good and there were confirmation of contamination of water levels in and around the accident site. In 2006 traces of the toxic and bioacculmulative complex compound named perfluorooctane sulfonate or PFOS used in the fire fighting foam, was found in a ground water sample from near the accident site. However, no water from this contaminated source had entered the public supply resources, so the government ruled out any health hazard from contaminated water. As the Institution of Chemical Engineers (2008) points out that “Results obtained in February 2007 indicated that groundwater and up to 2 kilometres to the North, East and South East of the site has been contaminated with hydrocarbons and fire fighting foam. Major treatment and disposal work has been carried out at 2 sewage treatment plants in the area, with up to 5 million litres of effluent uplifted from one of the sites” (Institution of Chemical Engineers - Great Britain, 2008, p.49). Since nearly all of the stored fuel had burned out instead of entering the soil and water tables, so future damage and health hazards, due to soil and water contaminations were at a minimum. Many homes in and around Hemel Hempstead had to be evacuated. Many were placed in alternative arrangements in their relatives’ homes, shopping malls or hotels. Schools, colleges and other public buildings remained closed on 12th and 13th December. The main motorway M1 and also other roads that were nearby, remained closed from time to time. Panic buying of fuel started in some localities, which was soon brought under control. Fuel shortage was faced by the planes that generally refueled from the Heathrow airport. They were asked to refuel elsewhere, from other airports. This fuel problem continued for some months, after the incident. In this explosion, the business community was affected to a large extent with the nearest buildings that housed Fujifilm and Northgate Information Solutions, being badly damaged. Fujifilm had to relocate, as their building was declared dangerous. Other buildings not so close to the oil depot were also quite badly damaged. Damages worth up to £ 1 billion were being claimed by the various business establishments and local families. Redevelopment of the contaminated site To redevelop this accident site, permission has to be taken from the Dacorum Borough Council. Since the BP section of the site remained more or less damage free, it has future plans to reopen its oil supply pipelines that supply fuel to Heathrow. Total UK also has submitted its plans for redeveloping this site, as is clear from the BBC news release (2009), where it says “Oil company Total wants to re-introduce fuel storage and distribution at the site, including a road tanker loading area and an administration building. The firm is launching a pre-planning application consultation” (BBC news, 24th September 2009). However if we assume that the site is closed and no oil depot is allowed to be rebuilt, then a developer who wants to turn this site into a commercial or residential property will have to follow certain procedural steps. The developer will have to determine whether the site is still contaminated or not and this is done by, as State Response and Brownfields Program Operations Task Force (2007) tell us “ Making a determination of whether a property is contaminated or not is accomplished by conducting an environmental site assessment, which includes a review of historical records, an inspection of the site and, quite often, collecting and analyzing soil and groundwater samples” (State Response and Brownfields Program Operations Task Force, 2007). Since this site was once confirmed to have been potentially contaminated, albeit in a minimal range, the developer will have to conduct certain environmental investigations into the area and submit a report based on these findings. As we find in the report of The Development of Contaminated Sites by Kirklees Metropolitan Council (September 2002) which states, “When submitting planning applications it is the applicant’s responsibility to provide information on whether the site is contaminated….matters that should be considered, depending on previous site uses and the extent of potential or actual contamination. The scope of submitted reports must reflect the size and complexity of the site, necessary level of investigation as well as likely contamination risks…. Supporting reports should be prepared by appropriately qualified professionals and submitted with the Planning application. The case officer will forward reports to appropriate Consultees for comment” (Kirklees Metropolitan Council, 2002, p.1). The first step or Phase I in the report will be a Desk Study Report which will give objectives of the study to be carried out. It will give a site map of Buncefield along with layout plans. A site history must be given, followed by the environmental assessment of the area that includes air, soil and water study. There will also be a report on the previous studies on contamination, done immediately after the accident in 2005, and a risk assessment will have to be done to analyze the present day risk factors, if any. The Phase II will be a report on the Site Investigation that will do a review on all previous contamination reports. This part of the report will present the methodologies taken up by the developer to assess the site and will also give the results and the conclusion reached from the various explorations conducted on the air, soil and water content of Buncefield. This will take in the risk factor and will discuss whether there is any likelihood of future contamination related problems. This part will also suggest for remediation and also check if any further investigations are needed into the subject or not. Next will be the Remediation Statement which will give the objectives of the remediated works to be carried out and will also give a detailed layout plan for the works to remediate. It will give all the consents, agreements and licenses necessary for developing the area and will also outline the procedures adopted to protect the neighborhood, the various safety and health procedures taken up, the sound, dust and odour control mechanisms that will be followed by the developer. It will also present the notifications given to the environment and transport services during remediation variations, if any. Processes used to validate and meet the remediation objectives will also have to be given. The last report to be submitted will be the Validation Report which will check whether the remediated objectives have been met or not, who all carried out the entire work and whether any changes have been made from the original remediation statement given, and justifications as to why the changes were deemed necessary. Key findings of the investigation into the Buncefield incident On 10th December 2005, tank number 912 was filled with unleaded petrol. Checking occurred at around midnight and nothing amiss was reported. At about 5.20 am, 11th December 2005, the tank should have started to overflow but the alarm system failed to operate. As The Buncefield Investigation report (2006) tells us, “Evidence suggests that the protection system which should have automatically closed valves to prevent any more filling did not operate (The Buncefield Investigation- Third Progress Report, p.5, 2006) Within the next 40 minutes, about 300 million tons of fuel must have spilled over from tank 912 and filled up bund A, an enclosed area containing many more tanks. This led to a formation of fuel-air mixture that collected in bund A. By 5.36 am, the vapor started escaping from the bund and by 5.46am, the vapour cloud flowing out in all directions was about 2 meters thick. At 6.01 am, the first and the main explosion took place. The exact source of the ignition was not known but was speculated to be the fire pump or the emergency generator in the depot The investigation agencies are pressing charges against Total UK Ltd, Motherwell Control Systems, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd, British Pipeline Agency Ltd and TAV Engineering Ltd for neglect in duty and causing the explosion. On March 2009, we find reports in BBC News that “The High Court has ruled that oil company Total is liable for damages caused by the explosion at the Buncefield oil depot in Hertfordshire” (BBC news, 20th march 2009). Total, in November 2009, pleaded guilty while the investigating agencies will proceed with the cases against the remaining four. Court proceedings are slated to start from April 2010. References BBC News. (Monday, 12th December 2005). Massive blaze razes at fuel depot. Online. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4517962.stm [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] BBC News. (24th September 2009). Buncefield site proposal revealed. Online. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/8272463.stm [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] BBC News. (20th March 2009). Total liable for Buncefield blast. Online. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/beds/bucks/herts/7954814.stm [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] Buncefield Investigation. (11th December 2008). Buncefield Investigation Board Publishes Final Report. Online. Available from http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/press/news.htm [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. (July 2006). Buncefield Major Incident Investigation. Online. Available from http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/initialreport.pdf [Accessed on 21st December 2009] Great Britain: Hertfordshire fire and rescue service. (2006). Buncefield : Hertfordshire fire and rescue service’s review of the fire response. Norwich: The Stationary Office. Guardian.co.uk. (11th December 2005). 43 hurt in fuel depot blast. Online. Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/11/buncefield3 [Accessed on 21st December 2009] Hiles, A. (2007). The Definitive Handbook of Business Continuity Management. West Sussex: John Wiley and sons. HSE: Health and Safety Executive. (15th December 2005). HSE Statement: Buncefield Oil Depot Investigation. Online. Available from http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2005/e05164.htm [Accessed on 20th December 2009] Institution of Chemical Engineers. (2008). Hazards XX: Process Safety and Environmental Protection. Warwickshire: IChemE Kirklees Metropolitan Council. (September 2002). The Development of Contaminated Sites. Online. Available from http://www.kirklees.gov.uk/publications/devcontam.pdf. [Accessed on 23rd December 2009] Netcen. (May 2006). Initial Review of Air Quality Aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion. Online. Available from http://www.airquality.co.uk/reports/cat05/0606201126_Buncefield_report_vF3_text2.pdf [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] Powell,T. (2006). The Buncefield Investigation- Third Progress Report. Timeline of events. Online. Available from http://www.total.com/static/fr/medias/topic1366/Buncefield_Third_Progress_Report_090506.pdf. [Accessed on 22nd December 2009] Regester, M and Larkin, J. (2008). Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations. London: Kogan Page Publishers Smith, K and Petley, D. (2009). Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster. New York: Taylor and Francis State Response and Brownfields Program Operations Task Force. (March 2007). Toolbox for Cleanup and Redevelopment of Contaminated Sites in Small Cities and Rural Communities. Online. Available from   http://www.astswmo.org/files/publications/cercla/Toolboxfinal.pdf. [Accessed on 20th December 2009] Read More