Risk Management Cycle and Strategy of Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004 - Case Study Example

Risk management cycle and strategy of Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 Introduction The risks of both natural and man-made disasters with devastating impacts have increased significantly during the last decades. Disasters associated with hydro-metereological hazards, which occurred during the last ten years amounted for 60 percent of the total economic losses and 97 percent of the total people suffered from the disasters (Shaw, 2006). One of such disasters has occurred in December 26, 2004, when the 9.0-scaled earthquake hit the province of Aceh in Indonesia. This seismic movement has resulted in a tsunami, which afterwards also affected some other East Asian coastal areas, including: Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar. This tsunami had an effect of delayed-action bomb as several hours later it reached India, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and later the shores of Seychelles, Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania in Africa (Shaw, 2006). This paper mainly focuses on the Tsunami disaster in Indonesia and utilizes the risk management cycle for analysis. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Indonesia; Section 3 provides brief theoretical introduction and definition of the risk management cycle stages followed with practical application of the theory to the given case study and followed with critical evaluation of measures undertaken for managing the risks; Section 4 offers a risk management strategy for mitigating and effective management of similar risks in the future; Section 5 is a concluding part of the paper, which summarizes the key findings of the research. 2. An overview of disaster On 26th of December 2004, at 00:58:53 Universal Coordinated Time, an earthquake measured 9.0 on the Richter scale hit the western coast of the northern Sumatra in Indonesia (Martin, 2007). This disaster was evaluated to be the fourth largest earthquake for the last 24 years. In result of this seismic event, there was caused tsunami of 2* joules of energy (Martin, 2007). Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 has incurred significant losses of human lives, whereas 130,000-160,000 people perished in the wake of the tsunamis and more than 37,000-43,000 people (data vary) are still missing (Martin, 2007; Kadiman, 2007). In addition to numerous human and animal deaths, there were incurred significant damages on houses, hotels, ports, boats, roads and railways, shops, vehicles, clinics and small family businesses (Shaw, 2006). However, the major macroeconomic effect was limited due to the fact that large densely populated urban cities and industrial hubs were not affected by this rare disaster. Instead, poor local communities living in rural areas took the major hit (Shaw, 2006). More than 1.5 million of people were displaced from their homes (Martin, 2007). 3. The risk management cycle The risk management cycle is usually comprised of four key steps which include: risk identification; risk measurement; risk analysis; decision-making; implementation, monitoring and policy (Ayling, 2009). All these elements should be properly communicated to stakeholders and responsible parties. Below is presented graphical illustration of the risk management cycle. Graph 1: The risk management cycle (Ayling, 2009). 3.1 Risk Identification Defining the problem and the associated risk issues is recognized to be the most important and the most difficult step in the risk management cycle (Slobodan, 2012). The issues should be clearly defined, specifically documented, and managed. At this stage it is critical to define all stakeholders that can be affected by a decision (Slobodan, 2012). Moreover, it is important to assess the vulnerability and to perform exposure estimation (Strunz et al., 2011). It is necessary to identify the exposure of people, infrastructure, and assets such as transport and communication networks, agricultural systems, etc. and then critically evaluate their vulnerability to harm evaluated (Dominey-Howes & Goff, 2013). When this is done, there should be evaluated the probable maximum loss. As this paper analyzes the case of Indian Ocean tsunami with a focus made on the risk management strategy adopted in Indonesia, it is worth to concentrate on the losses already incurred by this disaster. Briefly, the following losses were fixed in result of tsunami in Indonesia: Risk exposure Actual losses/damages: Human 132,000 confirmed dead 37,000 missing Homes and buildings 1,3 million destroyed Ports 8 ports damaged Fuel deports 4 fuel deports damaged Infrastructure and utilities 92% of the sanitation system broke down; 85% of the water system broke down 18 main bridges demolished; 120 km of roads demolished Table 1: Risk exposure and actual losses in result of tsunami in Indonesia (Kadiman, 2007) Total Damage and Losses (in USD) of Indonesia incurred in result of Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 are estimated at 4451.6 million or 97% of Aceh’s GDP (Kadiman, 2007). Based on the losses incurred it is possible to judge whether decisions on risk management and mitigation options made by the Indonesian officials were appropriate (Dominey-Howes & Goff, 2013). And it’s obvious that the decisions were wrong, if any were made at all. 3.2 Risk Measurement In order to provide pre-disaster mitigation and prevention, first of all, it is necessary to measure the potential risks and magnitude of the disaster. Therefore, risk measurement, or risk estimation stage, is the next stage of risk management cycle which aims: to define the methodology for estimating frequency and consequences of the risk; to estimate frequency of risk scenarios; and to estimate consequences of risk scenarios (Slobodan, 2012:36). Below is presented graphical illustration of this approach. Figure 1. Risk Management Cycle (Ayling, 2009). In order to make all these estimations there are required technical skills and availability of historical data, and professional judgment (Slobodan, 2012). Therefore, for measuring risks of Indian Ocean tsunami in this report, there was utilized secondary research from reliable peer-reviewed authoritative source. According to the estimates provided in Morin et al. (2008), Indonesia may have faced more than 250 tsunamis during the last 400 years, among which 35 per cent or more than 70 of cases with deadly effect. Thus, in average, tsunami occurs in Indonesia every two years. Taken into consideration the availability of historical data as empirical evidence of frequency and scope of tsunamis in Indonesia and Indian Pacific Ocean it is fair to suggest that there was a significant gap in risk management and prevention strategy. Indonesian authorities have failed to identify and measure the potential risks of tsunami of 2004, and therefore, have not undertaken necessary preventive measures. 3.3 Risk Analysis As the risk management cycle illustrates, the next step implies risk analysis. It is important to evaluate the severity and frequency (probability) of a specific risk and then make a decision either to avoid, control, transfer, or retain it. Below is presented a matrix of methods of risk reduction. Severity Frequency (probability) High Low High Avoid Transfer Low Control Retain Table 2. Methods of reducing risks (Ayling, 2009) It is necessary to accept as the fact or universal truth that natural disasters are unavoidable events, and the losses of natural disasters cannot be made to zero (Shaw, 2006). Still, some risks can be transferred. Proper and timely intervention can help to reduce the loss essubstantially (Shaw, 2006). To do this, it is critical to analyze the risk. The Metrological and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia operating 24/7 failed to provide on-time warning to both local governors and Indonesian population. The 26 December 2004 warning of earthquake has been simultaneously reported on Metro TV national channel and to Indonesian authorities in five minutes before the tsunami came to Banda Aceh city (Morin et al., 2008). This behavior has demonstrated lack of risk analysis strategy and availability of effective risk management plan. The lapse of 5 minutes given to population was not enough to prepare for tsunami and mitigate the risks of this disaster. There should have been developed a policy or other program that would have tough control over the work and performance of the Metrological and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia. In addition to the local metrological institution, there was operating the Pacific Tsunami Centre by the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Honolulu. This service has informed Indonesian authorities about potential tsunami only 20 minutes after the earthquake. Moreover, the staff of the NOAA had even no contacts of counterparts in the countries affected by the earthquake (Martin 2007). The International Data Centre in Vienna also has informed affected treaty signatories (including: Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Oman, South Africa, Kenya, and Malawi) only two hours after the earthquake (Martin 2007). This behavior and lack of preparedness indicates that there was no risk management plan and the system of inter-state information transfer and collaboration was not worked through enough. Worst effected countries were not informed as seismic and earthquake warning information were not managed properly (Martin 2007). Thus, people had met with tsunami face-to-face as there was given minimum warning decision time and warning dissemination time, an as a result practically no anticipated response time and evacuation time (Strunz et al. 2011). It is worth to mention that the Indonesian authorities and international communities have also failed to analyze the risks of the tsunami and its devastating effects on the neighboring geographical locations. The local communities residing on the coast-line area were not relocated to more safe places even though the predictability of the next tsunami was obvious and evidence-supported. 3.4 Risk Decision Being aware of the high risk of tsunami occurrence, the Indonesia authorities have failed to make effective decision before the disaster has actually occurred. It has failed to develop and implement early warning systems, to produce or manage tsunami hazard maps, and to implement and maintain education of the coastal communities. No decisions were made in order to exchange information about the tsunami and at-risk areas and to educate the local population. Thus, local communities who have been actually the most affected by the tsunami were not able “to overcome the damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazard, to save lives and to protect as much property as possible” (Morin et al., 2008:431). 3.5. Implementation Over many years, there were undertaken many initiatives and attempts across the globe aiming to develop disaster management models that could reduce potential risks (Shaw, 2006). Having learned a good lesson, the regional governments in the tsunami impact zone have established a reliable tsunami early warning system (TEWS) in the Indian Ocean (Martin 2007; Strunz et al., 2011). This initiative was offered by Germany on at the United Nations World Conference of Disaster Reduction in January 2005 (Strunz et al., 2011). Thus, Indonesia and Germany have signed a joint declaration in which was specified the program of development and implementation of a TEWS. This system is expected to: provide the knowledge of risks; to perform technical monitoring and warning service; to communicate and disseminate meaningful warnings to those partied who are potentially under the risk; and to inform public to enable them to react to the warnings. This measure could be evaluated as the right one, as it addresses the problem of inefficiency of early warning system and therefore, if implemented properly will enable the affected populations have more time for evacuation. In addition to this effort, there were published several reports and drafted calls to action, among which was the US Tsunami Warning and Education Act, identifying the improvements in the work of the NOAA (Dunbar, 2008). This initiative is also considered to be a good one as it addresses the problem of inefficient work of NOAA in 2004. 3.6. Monitoring Monitoring is “a key function of the risk management program in order to detect and adapt to changing circumstances, to ensure that the risk control is achieved, to ensure proper implementation, and to verify the correctness of assumptions” (Slobodan, 2012: 37). In case of Indian Ocean tsunami it is obvious that the Indonesian officials and international organizations have established early warning system as an instrument for risk mitigation, monitoring of this process was absolutely ineffective, and therefore, it was wrong. However, these gaps were filled as improvements were introduced to the TEWS. Now, not only local officials monitor this process but also neighboring countries/partners and extensive international support is provided for monitoring. Thus, for example, in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, there was formed the Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG/IOTWS) (Ioc-tsunami.org, n.d.). This Group is comprised of three working groups: Tsunami Risk Assessment and Reduction; Tsunami Detection, Warning and Dissemination; and Tsunami Awareness and Response (Ioc-tsunami.org, n.d.). These efforts and initiatives are undoubtedly perceived as positive. 3.7 Policy Policy is the final step of the risk management cycle. Initially, there was “no clear policy framework in place for Indonesia country program” (Acdi-cida.gc.ca, 2010, n.p.). However, later there was introduced the 2005-2009 Country Development Programming Framework aimed at providing support to the efforts undertaken by Indonesia to reduce vulnerability to poverty (Acdi-cida.gc.ca, 2010). Further, there was introduced a new law which implies restructuring of BAKORNAS – government body responsible for disaster management. As this specific government body has shown extremely poor performance prior 2004, this decision is the right one (Willitts-King, 2009). This law will envisages formation of both district and provincial disaster management agencies. It is definitely a good decision as it provides more operational capacity for directing disaster response (Willitts-King, 2009). 4 Risk management strategy Risk management strategy which should aim to mitigate the risks of tsunami in future in the Indian Ocean should include the following strategies: (1)regular maintenance and testing of early warning systems; (2) science-based tsunami hazard maps showing flooding impact should be designed for locations of important facilities (evacuation sites, safe areas, infrastructure, lifelines, hospitals, etc.); (3) all groups of coastal population should be educated and prepared; (4) school curricula should include relevant disaster preparedness sessions and educational programs; (5) infrastructure planning should be tsunami risk aware (including coastal setbacks, building construction styles, break waters, buffer vegetation, etc); (6) inland and higher grounds availability for transition of coastal communities; (7) annual hazard awareness days; and finally, (8) development of the whole-of-government cross-sectoral risk and multi-hazard warning and disaster management plans and policies (Dominey-Howes & Goff, 2013). 5 Conclusion The paper has provided an overview of the tsunami disaster which hit Indonesia and some other countries in December 2004. There was introduced the risk management cycle against which the risk management plan undertaken by both Indonesian government and international bodies was critically evaluated. Having analyzed the risk management identification, risk assessment and implementation stages it is possible to conclude that there the actions and risk mitigation measures were absolutely ineffective. Mainly this statement can be supported by the argument that none of the existing early warning monitoring institutions have communicated the potentially affected countries in efficient time. This indicates that there are obvious gaps in the system and it should be improved. The overall risk management cycle for managing such disaster as tsunami cannot help to avoid the risk of tsunami, but it might help to mitigate this risk substantially, thus minimizing potential losses and negative consequences. Even though the government of Indonesia and international community have undertaken necessary measures, mainly aiming to set up effective TEWS, it is difficult to monitor the effectiveness of the measures at the moment. However, the concept was right. There was also provided risk management strategy, which includes key measures necessary for effective mitigation of tsunami disaster risks. References: Ayling, D, 2009, “Corporate risk management”. Lecturer notes for module ASB_4414, Bangor: Bangor University. Dominey-Howes, D, & Goff, J 2013, Tsunami Risk Management in Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs): Some Issues, Challenges and Ways Forward, Pure & Applied Geophysics, 170, 9/10, pp. 1397-1413. Dunbar, P, Stroker, K, Brocko, V, Varner, J, McLean, S, Taylor, L, Eakins, B, Carignan, K, & Warnken, R 2008, Long-Term Tsunami Data Archive Supports Tsunami Forecast, Warning, Research, and Mitigation, Pure & Applied Geophysics, 165, 11/12, pp. 2275-2291 Ioc-tsunami.org, (n.d.). Indian Ocean Home. [online] Available at: http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=58&lang=en Kadiman K , 2007, ‘Lessons Learned and recovering from tsunami disaster’, International Forum on Tsunami and Earthquake, Progress of the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action and Recovery from Tsunami and Earthquake. Martin, N. 2007, ‘The Asian tsunami’, Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 188-200. Morin, J., De Coster, B., Paris, R., Lavigne, F., Flohic, F. & Floch, D.L. 2008, ‘Tsunami-resilient communities development in Indonesia through educative actions’, Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 430-446. Ruleworks.co.uk, n.d., ‘The Risk Management Guide - The Analysis Cycle’. [online] Available at: http://www.ruleworks.co.uk/riskguide/risk-cycle.htm Shaw, R 2006, ‘Indian Ocean tsunami and aftermath: Need for environment‐disaster synergy in the reconstruction process’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 15, 1, pp.5-20. Slobodan, P 2012, ‘Risk management: fuzzy set approach’. Floods in a Changing Climate. pp. 119-166. [Online]. International Hydrology Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strunz, G, Post, J, Zosseder, K, Wegscheider, S, Muck, M, Riedlinger, T, Mehl, H, Dech, S, Birkmann, J, Gebert, N, Harjono, H, Anwar, H, Sumaryono, Khomarudin R, and Muhari, A, 2011, ‘Tsunami risk assessment in Indonesia’. Natural hazards and earth system sciences (1561-8633), 11 (1), p. 67-82. Willitts-King B, 2009, ‘The silver lining of the tsunami? disaster management in Indonesia - Issue 43 - Humanitarian Exchange Magazine - Humanitarian Practice Network’ [online] Available at: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-43/the-silver-lining-of-the-tsunami-disaster-management-in-indonesia Read More