Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision - Case Study Example

Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision Q The Challenger was NASA STS program’s 25th mission, which was meant to deploy a comet observer and a Satellite (Edmondson; A 1). This particular flight took place in an environment that placed massive demands on its success. Beginning in the 1960s, NASA undertook a process of selling the need for reusable space shuttles to the US public and the political system, touting it as a major national security, scientific, and economic tool for the future. Once completed, the program had to live up to its promise, while NASA now had to coordinate the needs of the scientific, military, commercial, and political communities. Specifically, there was immense pressure from the US government for this program to be declared operational and to beat its deadline as part of the space race with the USSR (Edmondson; A 1). Finally, there was pressure from Congress for the program to become financially self-supportive. The environment NASA was operating in forced them to operate pseudo-commercially (Edmondson; A 2), which resulted in a culture of short-cuts, stress, and conflict between and within different contractors and NASA. Pressure increased before the launch of the Challenger, although they were still confident after conducting 24 successful launches. However, prior to the Challenger launch, NASA was faced with territorial battles and internal strife due to competing interests and political pressure. In short, NASA seems to have been operating in a semi-controlled decision making phase as they tried to serve industry, scientific, and military demands with a shuttle that was declared operational prior to completion of development. The decision-making process was also open to political manipulation (Edmondson; A 2), which left an impression on the employees that decision making was a political directive, leading to complacency among employees with safety decisions traded for keeping political deadlines. Q#2 Roger Boisjoly was an engineer working under the Director of the Solid Rocket Motors project at Morton Thiokol (Edmondson; A 4), which was one of NASA’s contractors. His opinion on the decision to launch was that Challenger’s launch should be stopped. He gave this opinion based on data he had found about the rocket boosters meant to lift the Challenger into space, writing a memo to the Vice President of Engineering Robert Lund that the O-rings in the SRM joints were eroded and that this should be rectified (Edmondson; B 9). During the teleconference just before the Challenger launch, Boisjoly made a presentation to managers and engineers from Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Morton Thiokol to convince them that cold weather could exaggerate issues related to delayed O-ring sealing and joint rotation, along with other related data. Boisjoly’s attempts to stop the launch were highly appropriate in specific instances. He used his professional engineering judgment to show that the O-rings could not be relied upon (Edmondson; B 2). Although he failed to prevent the launch and the ensuing disaster, he exercised his professional responsibilities as part of the group. In addition, Boisjoly’s decisions were made in an uncertain environment where there were no definitive or clear answers in advance. Therefore, his attempt was appropriate because it was only one of several possible judgments and arguments. Finally, his judgment was made to the managers, who were the main decision-makers and, thus, he could not overrule them. However, he could have done better by speaking up at the end of the tele-conference, notifying the upper levels of NASA’s management separately, or leaked the issue to American and international press. Q#3 Bob Lund was the Engineering Vice President at Morton Thiokol. His opinion was that the launch should be delayed until the temperatures in Florida were at least 530 (Edmondson; B 2). During the tele-conference prior to the launch, Lund watched his engineers give an hour-long presentation about the problems that the cold weather would cause to the O-rings sealing ability and joint rotation. He then presented the main conclusion and presentation, stating that the lowest temperature under which a safe launch could be made was 530F. He based this conclusion on the fact that his engineers had no data for any launches made below 530F. Thus, reading his recommendations, he commented that predicted temperatures were outside the safe range and the flight should be delayed. However, he was cajoled by a senior executive to ‘put on his managerial hat’ (Edmondson; B 5). Lund should have asked for more tests prior to the launch, especially after receiving the first memo from Boisjoly, in order to gather more data for any tests made at temperatures below 530F and the outcome. Lund might also have strived to ensure that the concerns about faulty O-rings made by Thiokol was communicated to NASA, refusing to take no for an answer and ensuring that necessary data was available to NASA for them to understand the dangers of launching below 530F. These concerns should have been raised earlier to avoid making last minute decision made on incomplete data. Finally, Lund should also have ensured more of a presence during the teleconference, particularly given his high-level position at Thiokol. He should have supported Boisjoly and made his opinion known, rather than allowing groupthink to influence his decision-making. Q#4 Larry Mulloy was a level III manager at NASA and was the solid rocket booster project manager at Marshal Space Flight Center. His opinion on the decision to launch was that the Challenger’s launch should go ahead. He referred to Flight 15’s chart, arguing that despite presence of erosion, Flight 2 had the worst erosion to the point with temperatures of above 750F (Edmondson; B 3). He also argued that a decision not to launch would require more data, using the lack of evidence to convince the team. Mulloy could have done better if he listened to the engineers more and considered their warnings, rather than working on assumptions. In addition, he should have eschewed the rational method of decision-making and not assumed that the rest would agree with him. Finally, he might also have considered the consequences more thoroughly, instead of rushing the launch. George hardy was the Deputy Director for Science and Engineering at Marshall Space Flight Center. He argued that the launch should be halted due to the engineers’ objections. During the tele-conference, Hardy agreed that the data from Thiokol’s engineers failed to convince him that the launch should be halted, but also said that he would not recommend a launch not sanctioned by Thiokol (Edmondson; B 4). He was ‘appalled’ by the recommendations made by Thiokol’s engineers, urging them to reconsider. However, Hardy could have done better by not being selectively perceptive and interpreting the engineer’s opinions on the basis of his interests and experience. Moreover, the decision should have been made based solely on the outcomes and consequences of a failed launch. Finally, the decision should have been impartial and fair to ensure equitable distribution of costs and benefits from the results of the launch. Q#5 NASA encountered several decision-making problems during the challenger’s launch. To begin with, there was frustration from NASA about conflicting advice from Thiokol that was to be relied upon in making the launch decision, where Thiokol made them aware of a risk but also aid that launching under the forecasted temperatures was safe (Edmondson; D 2). In addition, decisions made to delay launches had become ‘unwanted’ by shuttle team members, which meant decisions to delay the Challenger’s launch were more likely to be rejected by the group. Moreover, members in the group decision support system felt the need adhere to the group’s norms, which saw the engineers at Thiokol change their firm recommendations to delay the launch once the threat of being expelled from the shuttle program was alluded to by Hardy. Finally, managers and engineers at Thiokol were susceptible to groupthink, which is evidenced during their request to take a Caucasus (Edmondson; B 4). There are many conclusions that one may draw regarding the contributing factors and primary cause of the Challenger tragedy. To avoid similar disasters in the future, each member of the group should vote anonymously within the group decision support system on the launch decision, which would maintain the decision making process’ integrity, as well as the final decision’s quality (Castellan 23). Indeed, it emerges from the case study that majority of the group decision support systems group members were concerned about the consequences of the O-ring situation immediately after the presentation by the engineers to NASA. Despite obvious misgivings about the launch due to the engineer’s opinions, only the selected officials proceeded to vote their opinion verbally at NASA’s request. If the total group decision-making system had conducted an anonymous vote, the launch would have been cancelled. Works Cited Castellan, N J. Individual and Group Decision Making: Current Issues. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. Internet resource Edmondson, Amy. "Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)." HBS Case 9-603-068 (2002). Print Edmondson, Amy. "Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (B)." HBS Case 9-603-070 (2003). Print Edmondson, Amy. "Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (C)." HBS Case 9-603-072 (2003). Print Edmondson, Amy. "Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (D)." HBS Case 9-603-073 (2003). Print Read More