The Failure of the Launch in Thiokol and NASA - Term Paper Example

Engineering Management Executive Summary The Space Shuttle Challenger accident, which occurred in January, 1986 left several individuals at a global scene shocked. This accident was mainly caused by human misconduct, organization deviance, failure to adhere to professional ethics, poor decision-making and mechanical problems. The parties involved in the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger failed to have a consensus on when to launch the vehicle. This was because of personal interests by NASA to attain results while ignoring the element of safety, which may harm society intensively. This depicts that, in the management of such a project, one needs to adopt effective management skills, which have the ability of compelling all individuals to adhere to professional ethics. If such skills were implemented in the management of the shuttle program by NASA, the accident would not have occurred. This depicts that there is a need of considering the impact of technology in attainment of success while performing various tasks, as well as considering and mitigating risks, which may be experienced in a project. Inquiry The National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA)’s flight, which was using the Challenger spaceship, under the mission STS 51-L burst into flames within the first 72 seconds after takeoff, on January 28, 1986 (Kizza 170). The flight was scheduled to occur in July 1985, but it was postponed for three times until the day this flight took off resulting into a fatal accident. This accident destroyed the established reputation of NASA, as well as the prestige attached to the space program. Globally, millions of people were shocked by the event, which unfolded. According to (Kizza), the loss of the Challenger emerged due to a joint failure at the lower segments, which are located at the solid rocket motor found on the right side of the Challenger (170). This joint failure was attributed to destruction of seals, which are aimed at preventing leakage of hot gases. As such, a combustion leakage of a gas, which is found at the right solid rocket motor adjacent to the joint initiated shortly or at the ignition. This resulted in the initiation of the vehicle structural breakup, as well as the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in the STS 51-L Mission. Further investigations indicated that sabotage and pay-load or elements of the STS 51-L Shuttle did not contribute towards the joint failure. Moreover, the design specifications of the Shuttle were not altered. This was a conclusion was arrived at after the establishment of the investigations on non-conformance, quality control, assembly, manufacturing, and materials for the Space Shuttle were conducted. The launch activities of the Space Shuttle, including preparation and assembly were in accordance with procedures, which are established. This indicates that the launch activities were not factors of considerations as the main sources or contributors towards the occurrence of the accident. In the manufacturing process of a vehicle or any machine, design is a critical step, which engineers focus on in order to ensure that the designed machine, vehicle, or equipment has the ability to attain the desired objectives. For the design of the Challenger’s joints at the Rocket Booster, there was an element of ignorance in the design considerations. As such, the design process failed to focus on the factors, which might make the whole vehicle not to perform its functions effectively. The factor, which would have been considered, in this case, was temperature. This is because low temperatures caused the failure of the Challenger since low temperatures led to the stiffening of O-rings. The designers of the Challenger’s Rocket Booster joint at Thiokol, Inc, a Utal Company has warned that the launch of the Space Shuttle was not safe at low temperatures (Evans 260). Nevertheless, the management of NASA failed to adhere to the warnings and proceeded towards the launch of the Space Shuttle. However, other factors like reusability, physical dimensions, and dynamic loading among others ought to have been considered effectively. Provision of a manual, as well as operation guidelines is significant for any complex machinery, which is to be operated by human beings. In respect to this, the engineers who designed the Challenger’s Rocket Booster joints failed to provide safe operation guidelines of the Space Shuttle. This indicates that there was a loophole in adherence to the professional ethics of engineers in the sector of design. This may have occurred due to poor supervision and management of the design process of the Challenger’s Rocket Booster joint. The whistle blowing of the Space Shuttle Challenger was presented by the Thiokol, Inc, a Utal Company design engineers. The engineers argued that the Space Shuttle would not be launched successfully under low temperatures. Despite these warnings, the management of NASA proceeded with the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger. NASA management continued with this launch since it believed that the warnings were false. This is because there was no specification of the temperature range in which the Space Shuttle Challenger was expected to operate. Group think is also a factor, which contributed towards the Challenger accident. As such, engineers at Thiokol, Inc, a Utal Company knew that there was a problem with the O-ring for several months prior to the launch of the Challenger. Despite this, nothing was done towards curbing negative impact of the O-ring failure. Further, the group supported all forms of decisions by group members regardless of the credibility of such decisions. Moreover, the design process was flawed and the parties with interest on the project feared a cancellation for the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger (Forrest 1). Vaughan argues that the structural secrecy for the project failed to perform its duties effectively (397). The structural secrecy had a substantial autonomy and interdependence in the performance of its tasks. As such, structural secrecy tampered with the ability of safety regulators to counteract the functions of work group. This is because the structural secrecy failed to challenge the definition of the situation by the work group. The main job role of the structural secrecy was to review, but not to engage in production of data or conducting tests. This was to be done in the form of an independent check. However, the structural secrecy became enculturated by relying on information and interpretations of the work group. In addition, structural secrecy normalized joint performance, which was not within its job expectations. This indicates that structural secrecy contributed significantly towards the failure of the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger. Domination of managerial actions, individual wrongdoing, and rule violations acted as potential factors, which contributed to the failure of the launch. This included organizational and environmental contingencies. Ethical concerns for the Shuttle accident are based on information accuracy. Thiokol, Inc, a Utal Company, and NASA’s management were reluctant in supervision of the activities of the design engineers of the Challenger’s Robot Boost joints. This is distressing when it is known that the decisions made by the group were based on flawed information. This depicts that there was human deviance and misconduct, as well as basing of decisions in information, which was not reliable. NASA management claims to put safety first in operation of its activities (Hakkila and Adele 15). In contrast, the design and launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger placed operational goals first and safety last. Among the parties involved in the project, only one member focused on attainment of safety. Furthermore, free and open communication was discouraged through self-censorship, direct pressure and mind guarding. Ignorance was a higher ethical consideration for this project. Whistle blowing in such a situation would have been attained through taking control of a situation, which may result into social harm. This may also involve contacting relevant authorities, which may facilitate in eliminating the danger of a risky situation. When given such a project, I would ensure that strict adherence to professional ethics is maintained by all the parties involved in the project. However, more emphasis would be in the management and supervision of the design and manufacturing process. Further, I would not recommend the launch of such a project without having a pilot-test on the same. This would minimize any instances of loss of life. Furthermore, all the warnings, which might be presented by any interested party on the success of the project, will always be given a second thought. Moreover, all the contractors of the project would be encouraged to ensure that they conduct their job roles and specifications independently. Culture of job performance affected the success of the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger. With reference to this, as a project manager I would focus on ensuring that all participants and parties involved in the project are adequate prepared for the task ahead, as well as developing a positive attitude and behaviour towards the success of the project. Decision-making is a critical process in the success of a project (Sims 40). In reference to this, as a project manager I would ensure that I involve all the participants and stakeholders in the process of decision-making in order to ensure that the decisions, which are made are viable and have the ability to attain success in the overall performance of the organization. In conclusion, the Space Shuttle Challenger accident occurred due to a mechanical failure. This failure was evidenced at the pressure seals, which are found on the joint at the right Solid Rocket Booster. As such, the mechanical design of this vehicle was the main source of this failure. This is because the mechanical design did not take into consideration of factors, which may impact the performance of various components and elements of the designed vehicle. These factors include dynamic loading, reusability, temperature, character of materials, and physical dimensions. However, the ability of human beings to ignore operation conditions as specified by manufacturers, led to the occurrence of this fatal accident. This was evidenced when the engineers from the Utal Company who designed the Challenger’s Rocket Booster joints, made a warning of the launch of the Space Shuttle at low temperatures. This is because the engineers believed that low temperatures would result in the stiffening of O-rings. On the other hand, NASA management argued that there were no indications of the best operation temperatures. This provoked NASA management to launch the Space Shuttle. This inquiry provides an insight to the fact that organization culture influences attainment of results. This is because the decision to launch the Challenger is attributed to organizational deviance and decision-making in an organization. Further, the misconduct of parties involved in this project leads to inquiry of the impact of risk taking and managing projects. As such, factors, which contributed to the failure of the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger and accidents began at the inception of the project. Thiokol and NASA managed did not take into consideration the necessity of having quality assurance for the project. Works Cited Evans, Ben. Space Shuttle Challenger: Ten Journeys into the Unknown. Chichester, United Kingdom: Praxis Publishing Ltd, 2007. Print. Forrest, Jeff. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: A Failure in Decision Support System and Human Factors Management. 2005. Web. 21 Mar. 2012. Hakkila, Jon, and Adele, Richardson. Space Shuttle. United States: Smart Apple Media, 2000. Print. Kizza, Joseph. Ethical and Social Issues in the Information Age (4th Ed). New York: Springer-Verlag, 2010. Print. Sims, Ronald. Ethics and Organizational Decision Making: A Call for Renewal. United States: British Library Cataloguing, 1994. Print. Vaughan, Diane. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. ISBN: 0226851761. University of Chicago Press, 1997. Print. Read More