Risky Technology of the Challenger Launch Decision - Assignment Example

Report and analyse Challenger space shuttle incident on 28 January 1986 Report and analyse Challenger space shuttle incident on 28 January 1986 Background The Challenger Space Shuttle accident happened on 28th January 1986, killing all the seven crew members on the spacecraft. Only 73 seconds into the flight, the shuttle exploded over the Atlantic Ocean, near the Florida Beach. Another highlight of the disaster was the “Teacher in Space” project, under which Christa McAuliffe was the first female teacher planned to go in space. The technical companies involved in the space shuttle Challenger disaster were Morton Thiokol (Thiokol), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Morton Thiokol was outsourced by NASA to produce the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) with O-rings. Ronald Reagan, the then President of USA, formed a special committee named Rogers Commission to investigate the catastrophe. Technologies involved The Space Shuttle Challenger was named mission STS-51-L, using two solid rocket boosters (SRBs) with primary and secondary O-rings. The Space Shuttle main engines are in complete computer control and the launch can be called off until the vertical lift-off of the spacecraft. The telemetry was recorded in precise seconds and data and photography of the lift-off were documented in real time. The design requirements of the Challenger space shuttle were two O-rings, primary and secondary, per each SRB segment. The orbiter, external fuel tank, and the SRBs with O-rings were the main technology used. Furthermore, the material with which the O-rings were made was fluoroelastomer, which was not tested under the conditions in which the launch took place. The same O-rings had been used in previous launches and it had appeared to work fine. This is why the staff at NASA ignored the warnings issued by Thiokol engineers despite the O-rings having a “criticality one component.” (NASA 1986) Another technological component that had a major role in the Challenger disaster was the launch pad. The engineers at Thiokol also deliberated their concerns that the space shuttle had spent three nights on the launch pad that was covered in ice, due to a temperature noted at less than -7 degree Celsius. They argued that the launch pad was not tested under these conditions. What happened or what went wrong As the event was photographed and documented to the closest seconds, the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster investigation showed every detail of what happened or what went wrong. It was noted through pad cameras that from T+0.678 to T+3.375 dense smoke of dark grey colour was seen emitting from the aft strut that connected the right-hand booster with the external tank. This was caused by the gases leaked from the bent O-rings at temperatures more than 5,000 °F (2,760 °C). From the time the space shuttle cleared the launching tower until it crossed the speed of Max Q at T+51.860, everything was in accordance with the due procedure. The first sight of the flame was visual on T+60.238 and a few seconds later, the flame changed its colour showing that liquid hydrogen had leaked into the external tank. 13 seconds later at 48,000 feet, the Challenger exploded and started falling towards the ocean at 320 kph (vaughan 1996). What caused the incident? The accident happened due to highly contested and debatable sealing technology, that allowed hot gas to vent through the SRBs to deform the O-rings, and pierced one of the primary fuel tanks. The investigators cleared all doubts for a technical reason of the crash, demonstrating how the O-rings became brittle under the cold temperatures. These O-rings at the ends of SRBs malfunctioned due to low temperature, and failed to seal the joints during the gases released at the lift-off ignition. The O-rings were rated a “criticality 1 component” by Thiokol engineers, which dictates that it could not be neglected for even a misconception regarding that technology component. However, NASA staff argued over a conference call between engineers and officials at Morton Thiokol (Thiokol), Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), that the backup O-Ring would definitely hold even if the primary one failed, which was a very weak case for a criticality 1 component (Hall 2003). Another factor could be shear winds recorded to be strongest in launch history. These winds had facilitated the tearing of the back-up oxide seal, after the primary O-rings had failed, which was the final barrier in preventing the flame to reach the external tank through the joint. How the incident could have been prevented? The launch of the Challenger was already delayed due to weather conditions and launch site not equipped with night landings. The incident could have been prevented, as the engineers and professionals at various companies involved in the mission were not completely in favour of the launch. The technology of the solid-fuel rocket boosters and its rubber O-ring joints were dangerous technologies, not performing to the par with under comprehensive safe measures. The “blow-by” effect and the “Extrusion” process were inadequate for a safe launch. Furthermore, the launch was not tested under the prevailing temperatures. Discussion The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster has had dramatic influences in the field of engineering and workplace ethics. Canada has made it a prerequisite for acquiring licence to become professional engineers. The problem with the Challenger disaster was inadequate technology components, with negligence in communication, decision-making and unseen political agendas. There were many organizations involved and each was acting in its own interest. NASA wanted to justify a budget increase, therefore, had planned large number of missions in 1986. Morton Thiokol did not want to lose the contract for making the O-rings, and poor communication and compromised decision-making on both the company’s part, lead to the disaster. Furthermore, President Reagan was due an address to the State of Union later that night, and therefore the companies were pressured politically and internationally from European Space Agency, to have the Challenger in space when the President gave his speech (kosmosbusiness.com 2012). List of References Hall, J. L. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA. Space Policy , 19, 239–247. Kosmosbusiness.com. (2012). kosmosbusiness.com. Retrieved 2012 йил 15-May from http://www.kosmosbusiness.com/UserFiles/File/Books/CaseStudy1.pdf NASA. (1986 йил June). Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved 2012 йил 16-May from http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at Nasa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Read More