Groupthink in the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster - Essay Example

The role of Groupthink in the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster Introduction Decision-making is a very important process that plays a central role in the success or failure of projects in organizations. Various factors influence decision in organizations and the outcomes they bring about. Flawed decisions often lead to undesirable outcomes for an organizations while success of often attributed to right decisions. The decision-making process is critical for the quality of decisions reached and it is a process that is affected by many different factors. Various decision theories and models have been developed in order to try and explain how different decisions are reached, their outcomes, and the impacts of those outcomes on organizations. Groupthink theory, and the model resulting from it, is one of the most prominent efforts to try and explain decision-making outcomes in organizations (Whyte, 1998). This theory is considered useful in the explanation of one of the most prominent disasters of modern time. In 1986, NASA launched a space mission in which the space shuttle Challenger was to deliver astronauts and a school teacher to space. This mission was supposed to be a bold statement that space travel was safe and NASA had made advances in space program that would be educationally beneficial to all Americans. This paper examines the decisional process that culminated to the fateful disaster that befell Challenger and its crew, sparking so many questions on NASA’s organization and its safety ethics. The paper particularly examines the role of groupthink theory in the disaster. After the introduction the paper provides a brief description of the Challenger disaster, it then discusses groupthink as was presented by Janis (1982). A big part of the paper is dedicated to examining the role of groupthink in the Challenger disaster after which suggestions are provided about how the disaster would have been avoided. The paper then ends with a brief conclusion summarising the key issues discussed. The Challenger Space Shuttle Accident In 1986 NASA launched what was to be its safest mission into space which was supposed to usher in an era of safe space travel. However, this was not to be as disaster struck shortly after the launching of the space shuttle Challenger. The shuttle exploded mid-air killing all crew and leaving NASA with the responsibility of explaining decisions leading to the accidents. Immediately after the shock of the disaster that befell Challenger, the public was demanding answers about how and why the accident took place (Solomon, 2006). Public investigations by a presidential commission set up for that purpose revealed that engineers from Morton Thiokol, the company contracted by NASA to build the solid rocket booster had been consistent in their opposition to the launching of Challenger but their warnings had been ignored by the management at NASA (Starbuck and Milliken, 2005). Morton Thiokol engineers had suspected that the immediate cause of the explosion was a burn through of the solid rocket booster joint O-rings. The commission investigating the accident discovered that engineers had been concerned about the O-rings for over eight years (Vaughan, 1996). One interesting observation from the investigations was that despite the concern about O-rings, senior decision-makers from NASA (Both levels I and II) indicated in commission hearings that they had not been aware before the accident that the O-ring issue had caused intense controversy between Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Centre (These were levels IV and II in the decision-making chain of the mission project). In summary, the following errors in decision-making led to the wrong decision to launch the Challenger mission resulting to the disaster: Although the managers at NASA were aware of the flaws in the design of the O-ring, they decided to overlook the problem just so that the mission could stay on schedule as planned. Although concerns continued to be raised by engineers at Morton Thiokol about the suitability of the O-rings, particularly in the cold weather conditions, evidence from the investigation revealed that data from Thiokol supplied to NASA by the Group Decision Support System (GDSS) declared it safe to launch the mission. This contradiction should have been enough for NASA to call off the launch. The investigation revealed that the prevailing atmosphere surrounding the project at that time was that ideas supporting scheduled launching were received positively while those supporting delay so as to address all concerns were received negatively, this could have influenced decisions. Although the engineers at Thiokol had consistently opposed the scheduled launching of the shuttle, they came to change their minds at later stages and supported those pushing for scheduled launching. This was seen as having been influenced by fear of losing their jobs or losing their company the lucrative contracts with NASA. Groupthink Theory/Model Groupthink is a term that is generally used to describe a situation in a group or team where members are expected to avoid bringing up controversial issues because of their loyalty to each other (Janis, 1982). Janis defines groupthink as a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are in a cohesive group where the desire for unanimity overrides their motivation for realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action (Janis, 1982, p.9). According to Janis’ model, groupthink consists of antecedent conditions leading to the desire to concur with others, which then results to consequences that have low probability of resulting to successful outcomes (Baron, 2005). Janis (1982) defined the variables with the use of examples; he indicated that there exist three types of antecedent conditions to groupthink. These conditions include cohesion of the group, organizational structural faults, and situational factors. According to Janis, some of the examples of factors leading to organizational structural faults include homogeneity of group members, presence of impartial leadership, absence of methodical procedure group norms, and insulation of the group against external scrutiny. Some of the situational factors exemplified by Janis include high stress from external pressure, and low self-esteem resulting from excess difficulty, recent failure or moral dilemmas. Janis (1982) had two categories of observable consequences: the symptoms of groupthink and symptoms of defective decision-making. The symptoms of groupthink include; Illusion of vulnerability: This is portrayed by members of a group being over-optimistic as a result of over-confidence in the group. The underlying feeling is that they are above criticism as professionals and outside forces or parties cannot influence their decisions as this would not be acceptable. Belief in inherent morality of the group: Being given power and authority by virtue of their positions in the organization, members of a group believe that their decisions and actions are moral and not questionable outside the group circle. Stereotyping of outsiders: This is the feeling that anyone outside the group is not knowledgeable or experienced enough to offer any useful opinion on any matter pending a decision by the group. Outsiders are stereotyped as being ignorant. Collective rationalization: Members of the group provide opinions or explanations that justify a decision and all other members tend to agree with them. No other alternative considerations are made that significantly contradict what the majority agree with. All decisions resulting are therefore considered rational and correct. Illusion of unanimity: The members of the group assume that all the decisions taken are unanimous and are acceptable to every member of the group even though some members may not have scrutinized a decision properly. Self censorship: Individual members may have reservations about some issues or decisions but they sensor themselves so as to agree with the majority regarding a course of action or decision. Pressure on dissenters: Members of the group or other people involved in a decision-process who seem to dissent or raise objections on issued that are agreeable to the majority find themselves under pressure to change their opinions. The pressure originates from objections from majority of group members or intimidating attitudes from colleagues. Self-appointed mind guards: Some members of the group take it upon themselves to challenge any opposing ideas or negative feedback to decisions being made by the group. They do this by trying to shield negative information and intimidate people advocating for alternative views. Several factors associated with a number of decisions made before the disaster indicates that groupthink played a significant role in the fate that befell the shuttle. According to Janis’ model, some of the antecedents of groupthink include group cohesiveness, structural organizational faults, and provocative situational context (Janis, 1982). These antecedents lead to concurrence seeking tendency, which exhibits symptoms of groupthink. Groupthink leads to defective decision making which finally results to a potential fiasco. Groupthink influenced decisions leading to the disaster in a number of ways. The diagram below illustrates the general flow-chart of faulty decision-making through groupthink and the resulting potential fiasco. Figure 1: Janis Model (Janis, 1982) Researchers and practitioners have applied the groupthink model to a variety of managerial issues in different fields. Examples of issues examined using the theory includes decision making, leadership, and team management (Esser, 1998). In most of the cases groupthink has been viewed a detrimental process that leads to chaotic outcomes. Many other scholars and researchers point out that the model does not work and that it cannot be applied to the whole decision-making cycle, however, the groupthink concept has been applied in widespread situations. Groupthink has been used to analyse jury outcomes (Mitchell and Eckstein, 2009), it has also been use to analyze boardroom decisions (Maharaj, 2007). Role of Groupthink in the Challenger Disaster According to Janis there are eight symptoms of groupthink, which can lead to flawed decisions in a group. From the investigations that were carried out and the report that was produced by the commission of inquiry, the following symptoms of groupthink led to the fiasco that was the Challenger accident: Illusion of vulnerability Although the managers at NASA were aware of the flaws in the design of the O-ring, they decided to overlook the problem just so that the mission could stay on schedule as planned. This shows that they were over-optimistic about their decision to continue with scheduled launching because they were over-confident that the shuttle would perform well irrespective of the fact that the O-rings had never been tested in similar low temperatures as were being experienced at the time. This overconfidence could arguably emanate from the feeling that their professional expertise and experience could not be challenged regarding this decision. The attitude can also be attributed to the fact that NASA managers felt vulnerable to media and public pressure because of ridicules for constant postponement of launching. According to Janis (1982) there were three examples of organizational structural faults including lack of impartial leadership, lack of methodical procedure group norms, and homogeneity of group members. These problems mainly arose from the fact that most of the project leadership, particularly at NASA saw the decision-making process at NASA as being justified because involving many people would have left the top-management vulnerable to manipulation. They did not agree even before the enquiry committee that there were structural issues that hampered flow of information and prevented concerns from lower levels reaching the higher decision-making echelons. According to the NASA leadership, there were no problems in the organization. Before the disaster occurred, it is evident that there were structural strains within NASA. Strong procedural and methodical norms for decision-making in the organization would have prevented the illusion of vulnerability; the decision-making hierarchy would have been able to listen to the engineers’ views about the feasibility of commercialization of shuttle flights and increased number of flights. This would probably have led to a unanimous decision from NASA to postpone the launch until safety concerns were solved completely (Whyte, 1998). Illusion of group morality Evidence from the investigation revealed that data from Thiokol supplied to NASA by the Group Decision Support System (GDSS) declared it safe to launch the mission. Although concerns continued to be raised by engineers at Morton Thiokol about the suitability of the O-rings, particularly in the cold weather conditions, NASA decided to go on with the launch despite the contradictions. This clearly shows illusion of group morality because the top management at NASA decided to believe that if the GDSS declared it safe to launch then this decision had moral backing. The fact that Thiokol had eventually agreed to sanction the launching of the shuttle with the O-ring problems unresolved indicates a type III symptom of groupthink whereby the organization was guilty of illusion group morality. This conformance characterizes the belief that if the group decides as a whole to carry on with the mission then it has the moral authority to do so. It can however be argued that this was not classical groupthink as the action was motivated by preservation of a contract rather than agreement with NASA over the safety of the O-ring. This incidence however outlines all the symptoms of defective decision-making outlined by Janis (1982) including incomplete survey of objectives, incomplete survey of alternatives, failure to examine risks, selective bias in processing information, and failure to prepare a contingency plan. This is a group of which clearly the members felt that they had moral authority to make the decisions they made. Answers given in the enquiry reveal that most of the managers felt they had made the right decisions at the time as long as the whole group involved was in agreement. Illusions of Unanimity Although the engineers at Thiokol had consistently opposed the scheduled launching of the shuttle, they came to change their minds at later stages and supported those pushing for scheduled launching. This situation strengthened the feeling of unanimity across the whole decision-making group in the project because it indicated that at the end of the day everybody with reservations about the scheduled launching had come on board to back it. The investigation revealed that the prevailing atmosphere surrounding the project at that time was that ideas supporting scheduled launching were received positively while those supporting delay so as to address all concerns were received negatively; this might have been the factor behind the change of mind of the Thiokol engineers leading to a situation of illusions of unanimity. This case also shows clear evidence of the illusion of unanimity from the fact that although concerns about the O-rings had been known for a long time; most of the managers seemed to unanimously agree with each other that this was not a serious issue that should delay the launch. This illusion clouded the judgement of managers at Thiokol finally making them to endorse the launch decision. Group cohesiveness was also evident in the way NASA officials conducted their business. The officials came out in the investigation carried out by the government as being a closely knit unit. In the Challenger project NASA was supposed to work closely with the other partners and listen to their opinions but interviews with NASA officials reveal that three of the most senior decision makers were not aware of concerns by engineers from Thiokol about the O-rings. This indicates that they were not keen to listen to external ideas or concerns because of their cohesiveness. Rationalization The behaviour of managers at NASA and the Marshall Space Flight Centre reveals a clear concurrence seeking tendency as a groupthink symptom. Because of the internal pressure to launch the shuttle, the management at Marshall Space Flight Centre tended to concur with each other that the problem with the O-rings was not serious enough to stop the shuttle being launched. As a result this concern never reached top management for decision-making. This is further proved by the finding of the commission investigating the disaster that Thiokol reversed its concerns and recommended the launch of the mission after pressure from Marshall Space Flight Centre; this was in contravention of the observations of its own engineers so as to accommodate one major customer. This was a classic case of both concurrence seeking tendency and defective decision making. It was concluded by the commission that there had been a number of decision-making mistakes that took place before the Challenger mission was launched. If these matters had been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight-readiness process then the shuttle would not have been launched before the issued were addressed properly (Vaughan, 1996). Serious concerns were raised about the propensity of the management at Marshall to keep quiet on potentially serious problems and its attempts to resolve them internally rather than communicating them across the project. These observations reveal that most of the decisions made by the managers at NASA, Thiokol, and the space centre were rationalized in one way or another. During the inquest, most managers had justifications for all decisions they made. A Thiokol manager even pointed out that the O-rings would have worked well if the weather had not been so cold. Suggestions for Avoiding the Disaster What should have been done to make the launch mission of the shuttle Challenger a success is a huge question. The first answer would be that the shuttle should never have been launched when it was; more time should have been given to solve all issues and concerns raised on the operations of the solid rocket. However, on reflection it is not possible to tell whether more time would have changed anything as some of the problems, particularly the O-ring, were known for ever five years before the launch. Secondly, one thing that NASA needed was a better form of communication (Packer, 2009). The communication between levels of decision-making was appalling. There was need to ensure that all levels in the project could freely communicate with each other in a timely and clear way and be able to understand each other. Engineering terminology should not have been a hindrance to communication as it should have been made clear to engineers that they had a duty to relay information to management in a manner that was clearly understandable both in terms of substance and urgency. It was also imperative that for top management level decision-makers to regularly work alongside the engineers at a lower level by making frequent visits to the workshops so as to learn the issues directly from the engineers. The divide in communication clearly indicates that there was little interaction between the managers at the top level and the rest of the organization. Thirdly, the failure or inability of managers at level III and IV, and indeed any other project participant, to ask serious questions about the launching of the shuttle under conditions of uncertainty indicate presence of a psychological or administrational barrier. Top-level managers needed to make it clear that they welcomed critical questions from those at lower levels (Packer, 2009). The top management bears the main responsibility of establishing an internal environment that can support the highest standards possible of achieving organizational goals. There should also have been a variety of external controls and monitoring mechanisms to minimize the likelihood of technological faults and associated risks. Conclusion This essay has discussed the role of groupthink in the Challenger shuttle disaster and how it influenced flawed decisions leading to the shuttle’s accident. The report of a commission set up to investigate the accident revealed an organizational culture at NASA that did not give room for criticism and acceptance of mistakes. The environment in the organization was also found to be dysfunctional for the flow of information between different levels of NASA. The most worrying trend in the organization however was highlighted by conspicuous lack of difficult questions or scrutiny of decisions by members of the organization. The top level management also seemed to be less interested in scrutinizing subordinate reports beyond facial value to identify possible mistakes or underlying concerns. From the report produced by the inquiry it is evident that there were antecedent conditions for groupthink in the decisions leading up to the launching of the Challenger mission and its subsequent demise. I agree with Janis’ theory to a large extent because it clearly explains processes that lead to groupthink in decision making and this case evidently provides a classic example of groupthink in decision-making. It is clear that the nature of the actions and decisions that were undertaken before the launching of the shuttle took place under the influence of groupthink. Several major issues highlight the influence of groupthink in this case. First there appeared to internal pressure to ensure that the mission took off on schedule. Secondly there appeared to be unanimous difficulty among the members of the project team and NASA to bring up or discuss information that seemed unfavourable to the preferred decision of launching within schedule. Thirdly, the organizational structure made almost impossible for information coming from outside NASA or from other partners on the project to reach the higher decision-making levels of the organization. Groupthink is also evidenced by the fact that NASA had an illusion of vulnerability and portrayed closed mindedness; this is illustrated by the fact that the mission management team overestimated the danger posed by the O-ring concerns on the basis of the success of previous missions. Basically they thought themselves infallible. All these factors and more support the conclusion that groupthink played a substantial role in the disaster that befell the Challenger mission. References Baron, R. S., 2005. So right its wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision making. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37, p.219-253. Esser, J. K., 1998. Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research. 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Recasting Janis‘s groupthink model: The key role of collective efficacy in decision fiascos. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 73, p.185–209. Read More