The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster - Case Study Example

The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster Introduction On 28th January, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger had a tragic accident thereby killing seven astronauts who were piloting it: one minute after takeoff, the Challenger exploded. Actually, the explosion resulted from a failure by the O-rings solid rocket boosters to properly seal thereby allowing leakage of hot combustion gases from the booster’s side and burning of the external fuel tank (Lieurance, 2007, P.37). The O-ring’s failure was attributed to a number of issues, including insufficient O-ring’s material low-temperature testing, Solid Rocket Boosters’ (SRB) defective design, and poor communication amid the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) management (Vaughan, 2009, P.56). This report provides details about the sequence of events that led to the accident, the root causes of the accident, steps that would have helped prevent the accident, impact of NASA’s culture on the decisions made, and a comment of NASA’ management and implementations. Sequence of Events Leading to the Accident Pressure To Launch The managers at NASA, for several reasons, were apprehensive to launch the Challenger. This also included political pressures, scheduling backlogs, and economic considerations. Unanticipated competition from European Space Agency (ESA) pushed NASA into flying the Challenger dependably on an ambitious schedule purposed at proving cost effectiveness and commercialization potential of the Space Transportation System. This, in 1986, impelled NASA to program a record of missions aimed at making a case for the budget requests. Actually, prior to the Challenger, there had been several delays of the shuttle mission owing to mechanical factors and inclement weather. NASA, without delaying, intended to launch the Challenger; NASA knew that launching the shuttle in time would enable them collect data before the Russians who also planned a similar launch (Micklos, 2014, p.47). In addition, Mahler, 2009 believes that pressure to launch resulted from the desire that the Challenger be in space while the State of the Union address was being given by President Reagan. The main topic of Reagans address was education, and there were expectations that he would mention Christa McAuliffe, first teacher in space, and generally the shuttle. Solid Rocket Booster The SRB are the main elements of the shuttle’s operation. Absence of the boosters simply means inadequate thrust production by the shuttle. This thrust is what achieves orbit and helps overcome the gravitational pull of the Earth. Often, the SRB is attached to the external fuel tank sides. Every booster’s diameter is 12 feet and 149 feet long. Every booster approximately weighs 2 million pounds before ignition. Generally, per pound, the SRB produce a higher thrust compared to the liquid fuel counterparts. However, a key disadvantage is that it can never be controlled or turned off once it has been ignited (Houston, 2013, p.94). It is, therefore particularly important to consider designing a SRB properly. Morton Thiokol, in 1974, received the contract of designing and constructing the SRBs. Thiokols design of the SRBs was however a Titan missile’s scaled-up version that had been in use for years. Unfortunately, in 1976, NASA approved the design (Evans, 2007, p.55). O-rings According to McDonald and Hansen, 2009, the O-rings help prevent the escape of hot combustion gasses from the motor’s interior. Two O-rings seal each joint of the SRBs (the bottom ring is called the primary O-ring while the top ring is called the secondary O-ring). Only one O-ring was present on the Titan booster. As a determination of redundancy the engineers added the second ring since humans would be lifted into orbit by the boosters. The Launch (Delays) On January 28th, 1986, NASA’s decision to launch the space shuttle was at best a controversial. There existed several warning signs from the launches, which preceded the Challenger’s launch. After the second mission of the shuttle, in November 1981, the O-rings appeared like they had received erosion from the hot gasses. In addition, the launch done on January 24th, 1985 happened in a similar low temperature (cold-weather) conditions just like the January 28th, 1986 fatal launch. After the mission, Thiokol’s engineers examined the joints of the boosters and identified traces of grease and soot, which resulted from hot combustion gases’ passage past the O-ring before completely sealing the joint. This made Thiokol to commence studies of the O-rings’ resiliency at low temperatures. Thiokol then ordered steel billets, on July 1985, which could be used for redesigning the field joint. However, when the Challenger was being launched, the steel billets were not yet ready (McDonald & Hansen, 2009, p.123). Actually, it is of significance to look into the events that occurred some few days preceding the fatal launch. The initial scheduling of the Challenger’s launch was on January 22nd at 3:43pm. However, this was postponed to January 23rd and then again to January 24th. Further, the launch was rescheduled to January 25th due to bad weather at Dakar, Senegal. The launch was then pushed to January 27th at 09:37am because of the predictions made by Kennedy Space Center about unacceptable weather. The launch was further delayed for another 24 hours due to the inability to remove the hatch closing fixture (ground servicing equipment) from the orbiter hatch. On the night of January 27th, at a conference, Thiokol’s engineers recommended that launching should not be done below 53oF, the coldest temperature under which the launching of a preceding flight had been made. The expectations were that the temperature would be below 18o F during the night before the launching day. This was 30 degrees colder than any launch ever made. Unfortunately, Thiokol management overruled the decisions of their engineers and gave a go-ahead for NASA to carry on with the launch (Marsh, 2009, p.45). The Accident’s Root Causes After the accident, the US president instituted a commission (Rogers Commission) to investigate the cause of the accident. This commission addressed the problems in two key areas: 1. Mechanical problems 2. Administrative problems. The mechanical blunder, which caused the explosion, was identified in SRB’s right side. A field joint amid the SRB’s sections permitted leakage of exhaust flames via the field joint. These leaked flames imposed on the external fuel tank. These flames then managed to infiltrate and ignite fuel inside the external fuel tank resulting to an explosion (Kapurc, 2010, p.22). Vaughan, 2009 believes that the sealing system failure on the field joint, which caused the Challenger’s explosion, resulted from a combination of four major problems: a) The seal’s decomposition as a result of contact with hot exhaust gases. b) Formation of holes in the putty that prevented high-temperature exhausts gases from reaching the seals. c) An immediate elevation of the gap size amid the booster’s mating sections generated by the SRB’s high internal pressures. d) The seal’s inability to respond quickly to the changing size of gap during operating conditions featured by low temperature. Kapurc, 2010 comments that administrative problems appeared more profound because of the mere verity that the Thiokol engineers had identified all the mechanical problems linked to the field joint. All problems were regarded a potential risk, however communicating these problems to the manager having the launching obligation had some difficulties. Despite the acknowledged risks, the decision to launch the shuttle was an amalgamation of a difference in risk evaluation and poor communication. Generally, a year before the launching of the Challenger Thiokol engineers had discovered a major fault in the SRB’s design. The accident resulted from a failure existing in the joint amid two lower parts of the Solid Rocket Motor. The failure particularly resulted from damage of the seals, which prevent leakage of hot gases. In addition, the temperature under which the launching was done was not safe due to the existence of ice on pad (Lieurance, 2007, P.42). Steps to Prevent the Accident To prevent the accident a key factor that should have been considered was the engineers present in the management positions. Managers in this position ought to have never ignored their own experience in engineering or their subordinate engineers’ expertise. Often managers with engineering experience do not have up-to date information on engineering practices like the real practicing engineers have. They must therefore always ensure that they make decisions with regards to an understanding of the technical matters (Dodaro, 2011, P.211). In addition, there should have been a keen focus on the temperature before the launching process. Actually, the manager gave a go-ahead for the launching despite having insufficient data on low-temperature. Since the managers lacked enough data for making informed decision, in their opinion, low-temperatures was no grounds for postponing the launch. Further, as the engineers were testing designs before the actual construction, they ought to have been aware of the obligation they have to the society: to protect the welfare of the public. The Thiokol engineers should have considered the fact that they had the responsibility to protect the public in their professional efforts (Campbell & Miller, 2010, p.287). Had the managers at Thiokol considered this, then they would have stopped the launching process. Impact of NASA’s Culture NASA’s culture exhibited organizational misconduct. Often, companies give organizational interests priority over the safety of humans since risk taking is a routine in most companies. All organizations often engage in misconduct for the purpose of competing for the scarce resources. Because of organizational misconduct NASA failed to pay attention on few key parameters while they were assessing the potential risks of the launch, therefore they failed to undertake systematic risk assessment (Handber, 2005, p.86). This culture made the engineers and staff not to predict full implications of the decisions they made. NASA also had a Risk and Work Group Culture. According to Werhane et al 2013, NASA’s managers and engineers worked, made decisions and negotiated risk under uncertainty. In most cases, the flights made by NASA had residual risk, because of the shuttle’s unique design, and several uncertainties linked to the large multifaceted technical system that never exhibited prior experience. Therefore, the work groups seemed to have calculated risk in a situation that was fundamentally incalculable. The notion of “acceptable risk” that was an official status bestowed upon a constituent through following an approved procedure depending on a documented technical rationale and engineering analysis was key to approximating the flight risk. While other commissions of enquiry expressed their astonishment at the application of acceptable risk, it was NASA’s norm to fly with a well-known residual risk. The choice to evaluate risk and to classify it as acceptable risk was founded on engineering judgment and scientific methods based on data and tests, and the work groups always incorporated it in their negotiation (Handber, 2005, p.87). Also, NASA had a particular culture of production and a culture of structural secrecy. These cultures defined the environment under which managers and engineers in NASA operated. Generally, the influential years of NASA’s culture were determined by complete technical culture where the self-image was largely by embracing “can do” attitude. Unhurriedly, it structurally became more bureaucratic and complex, and later on budgetary constraints changed it into technical production system (Carlson, 2012, p.172). In consideration to this, the decision-making was influenced when NASA’s initial technical culture became merged with the political and bureaucratic accountability, resulting to the disaster’s structural source. Carlson, 2012 explains that structural secrecy refers to the manner in which the organizational transactions, processes, and structure, patterns of information, and regulatory relations’ structure analytically undermines the efforts on “take decisions” and “to know,” in a firm. NASA’s structural secrecy affected transmission of information and its interpretation. Information intended for individuals at higher levels was always filtered, and individuals occupying the high ranks of the line of command were rarely aware of the fundamentals of the facts and discussions that took place concerning several technical issues that were tackled and categorized or resolved as acceptable risk by the engineers. Further, NASA desire to save cost led them into cutting down the cost that would have been incurred on safety testing; therefore their engineers did not focus much on ensuring safety. This, compared to the Apollo Program, was a complete divergence. According to the Covert report (Department of Aeronautics) the major components of the shuttle were not sufficiently tested and certification of the components needed more time than the time that NASA allocated thereby causing problems in the main engine. As a result of the economic constraints, the program’s success heavily depended on the success of the business model that was based on ensuring a launch of high frequency to achieve financial goals (Baofu, 2009, p.220). Comment on NASA’s Management NASA’s management depicted several faults in the way they implemented their systems and procedures. With the high level of bureaucracy and organizational misconduct NASA’s management ended up overlooking important risks that led to the accident. Actually, the management was not concerned about human safety, but achieving its organizational goals. Conclusion The Challenger’s accident presents numerous issues relevant to engineers. The issue may raise several questions, which may lack definite answers; however they can act as awareness to engineers faced with similar situation. Further, it is important to recognize that NASA failed to apply a quantitative technique of risk evaluation on a project so high-profiled. Their main reason for this was expense linked to statistical model generation and data collection. In addition, NASA had no engineers with training on statistical sciences. However, investing on these costs would have saved the situation. References Baofu, P. 2009. The Future of Post-Human Engineering: A Preface to a New Theory of Technology. Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan. Campbell, T & Miller, S. 2010. Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organizations. Kluwer Academic publishers. Carlson, C. 2012. Effective FMEAs: Achieving Safe, Reliable, and Economical Products and Processes Uisng Failure Mode and Effects of Analysis. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Dodaro, G. 2011. NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. Washington DC: NASA Headquaters. Evans, B. 2007. Space shuttle challenger : ten journeys into the unknown. New York ; Berlin : Springer ; Chichester  Handber, R. 2005. Reinventing NASA: Human Space Flight, Bureaucracy, and Politics. Chicago : University of Chicago Press Houston, R. 2013. Wheels Stop: The Tragedies and Triumphs of the Space Shuttle Program, 1986-2011. London. Cengage Learning Kapurc, S. 2010. NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. Washington DC: NASA Headquaters. Lieurance, S. 2007. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster in American History. New York: Routledge Mahler, J. 2009. Organizational Learning at NASA: The Challenger and Columbia Accidents. Washington DC: Gerogetown University Press. Marsh, R. 2009. After the Challenger: A Story of the Space Shuttle Disaster. Chicago : University of Chicago Press Micklos, J. 2014. The Challenger Explosion: Core Events of a Space Tragedy. New York: Routledge McDonald, A. J., & Hansen, J. R. 2009. Truth, lies, and O-rings: Inside the space shuttle Challenger disaster. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Vaughan, D. 2009. The Challenger launch decision: risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Werhane H., Hartman L, Archer C, Englehardt E., & Pritchard M. 2013. Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making: Mental Models, Milgram and the Problem in Obedience. UK: Cambridge University Press. Read More