Military Operations and Issues for Congress - Case Study Example

Introduction The Haqqani Network, considered the deadliest Afghan insurgent group, shares a history of over thirty years of insurgency against the U.S. This lethal network has been fighting against the government of Afghanistan and US-led NATO-International Security Assitance Force (ISAF) actively by sending messages and countering their opponents through a series of highly infamous events ranging from the alleged assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai to the involvement in incident of bombings at Serena hotel, Kabul. It is considered one of the strongest factions and is reportedly connected with Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda. The Haqqani Network operates under the supervision of Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a highly dangerous fighter and anti-soviet resistance commander, and his son Sirajudin Haqqani, who now handles the important affairs of this enemy network. This group has been existing in Pakistan since Soviet era and is spread across Kabul (Clarke, R, 2011, p.105). The Haqqani Network is claimed to have been in alliance with many intelligence groups such as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Osama Bin Laden and Saudi Arabia’s Spy Service (Takashi, 2012, para.2). Leadership The Haqqani Network runs under the leadership of Haqqani family. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons now lead this insurgent group. Acording to Mazzetti, Shane & Rubin (2011) the Haqqani family is the Sopranos of the Afghanistan war, a family that made out its earnings and rose from the bottom through exercise of all kinds of illegal activities like trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and so forth (para. 1). That being said, they are also reported to acquire protection money from the American reconstruction funding that was particularly aimed at construction of schools and roads in Afghanistan. With increasing network horizon and an enormously vast web of connections, this group has many top-tier leaders that operate different parts of the group secretly. That being said, the pioneer of the group, Jalaluddin Haqqani is considered a chief figure in the leadership of this network. Jalaluddin acted as a mujahedin leader in his fight against Soviet forces where he received significant help from the ISI and CIA (Bowman, 2009, p.26). The leader himself focused more upon his hometown Zadran, which is a central territory that connects nine tribally linked districts at the border of Paktika, Khost and Paktia province. Since the leader Jalaluddin has turned old and weak due to illnesses, most of the network’s responsibilities and activities have been transferred upon the shoulders of his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, who has reportedly acquired a key leadership role in the operations of this insurgent network recently. In February 2005, Sirajuddin was officially made the head of the Taliban military committee for the provinces of Paktika, Khost, Paktia, Ghazni and Logar. In addition to stressing immense focus upon his home Zadran district, Sirajuddin has expanded the activities of the group in various dimensions, thus the network now operates in the south of Kabul as well. As the leadership status of the group comprises of many people from Haqqani family. The current state of leadership lies in the hands of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the most notorious of the leaders, who is reported to be “the most powerful, aggressive and active insurgent commander” who operates along the border (Between Afghanistan and Pakistan). Ever since the leadership laid down in the hands of Sirajuddin, the activities of the network have skyrocketed as the leader is diligently taking care of the group’s role by providing training and directing the group into a myriad of dangerous activities like suicide bombings, beheading women, kidnappings and planning executions and assassinations (Giustozzi, 2009, p.62). Although the son is known less as an ideological figure; he is particularly famous for his fierce and cruel form of leadership. Jalaluddin Haqqani’s main purpose to hand over leadership of the network to his son was to stabilize the group further and enhance its activities and horizon. As stated earlier the leadership roles stretch further down as other members of the Haqqani family also play leading roles in the network. From them is the second brother of Sirajuddin named Haji Maulvi Abdurrahman Zadran, who is considered the head of operations in the network. Badruddin, who is the second son of Jalaluddin, is also reported to have acted as a commander in the network. While the third son named Nasruddin is also reported to have been an operational commander as sources suggest (Dressler, 2011). Haji Mali Khan was also Haqqani’s main figure and a clan leader, but he got caught in 2011 (Healy, J, 2011, para.4). However certain operations of the network are also led by people who are not a part of Haqqani family, including network’s deputy commander Sangin Zadran who operates in Spera and is known to be an organizer and planner of terrorist attacks and strikes. He also appears on global terrorists list by the U.S. Maulvi Bakhta Jan operates in Paktika and Hakim Khan. Others include Maulvi Gul Badar for coordinating suicide attacks, Maulvi Sadiq Noor for coordinating and arranging deployment of car-bombs and Jan baz Zadran who is the head of Haqqanis’ office located at Miramshah and mostly deals economic activities of the network as he is at hand with financial management skills. In addition to this Jan Baz is also considered the closest and most trusted man of Sirajuddin therefore he is a prominent figure in the network. (Giustozzi, 2009, p.64). Ideology Al-Qaeda, Taliban and the Haqqani Network, all these insurgent groups have one thing in common; their beliefs and goals are similar to each other therefore they share similar ideologies as well. The Haqqani Network’s sole aim is to drive its strengths and efforts against the United States so as to weed out its influence from the Muslim nations where it has illegally marched in and gained control over through oppressive use of power and force. It is a widely accepted belief that the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda share similar ambitions, goals and ideologies, as Don Rassler (2011) in his report elucidates that the image or perception that has developed into our minds regarding the Haqqani Network is that of a local actor, however this insurgent organization has performed far more than that. Due to their existence in the country for over three decades they have formed a strong position from the point of view of militancy, hence it is concluded that this insurgent group shares very strong beliefs in expanding global jihad movement. (para. 7) The Haqqani Network’s real strength is not the infrastructure it has developed but the underlying ideology it has, its focused aims and objectives, intensity of its operations, and its joining with other factions of similar goals so as to end the widespread suffering caused by the ones they perceive to be the enemies of their religion. Ever since such dreaded historical events as 9/11, the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, etc, such movements have gained significant pace and have started to respond to the enemy’s actions rather more aggressively. Despite enemy’s counter-insurgent activities these insurgent groups never give up on their missions to stay calm and let their enemy win as is clear from the case of a similar organization al-Qaeda that slowed down its operations due to the U.S.’s counter-insurgency but did not give up (Ignatius, D, 2011, para. 11). Hence their ideologies have given birth to new terrorist organizations forming up and joining the same cause. The Haqqani Network is one such insurgent group, a highly practical organization that usually stays behind the curtains, plans its actions and responds to its opponents through series of events. Owing to the Haqqani Network’s strong ideology, it is highly committed to playing a pivotal role in jihadist movement and putting their enemies to rout (Rassler & Brown, 2011). Tactics The group has been working rigorously to expand their network to other provinces in the east that include Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, etc. It is also working on improving relationships with foreign terrorist groups so as to launch even more strategic tactics and plans against the United States. From 2005 to 2006, the Haqqani Network broadened its horizon to Kabul because it was a strategic position to launch attacks against the Afghan capital. As stated earlier the Haqqani Network enjoys strong links with Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI (Duffey, J.D., Farwell, J.P., 2011, p.212). The group colluded with ISI in executing a number of attacks; one of them includes the attack on government buildings in Kabul (Norland, R, 2011). In addition to this, the intensity and capability of its attacks has been intensive because it has invested heavily in broadening its ability to execute anti-government operations. Events like Paktia Governor Hakim Taniwal’s assassination and the attack against three government buildings in Khost city (Mangal, S & Ibrahim, 2009, para.1) are a clear indication of the power and capability this network holds. As far as its finances are concerned, a portion of their income comes from selling precious stones, timber and chromites but the majority of the network’s income comes from international donors especially from gulf countries (Mazzetti, Shane & Rubin, 2011, para.14). This makes the network’s earnings and flow of their operations swift and unhindered in their war against the U.S.-led forces. The Haqqani Network has gained prestige over the tribal belt because of its professional tactics and unrelenting operations. This makes the Haqqani Network almost an immune insurgent group to the country as it could easily wage war by joining hands with other insurgent groups in Pakistan, hence making it extremely difficult for Pakistan to help out US in exterminating the network. This strategically powerful position has provided the Haqqani Network a tactical advantage because the US had asked to take on Haqqani network but Pakistani government replied in negative to the demands of America as she fears that helping out America would result in the joining of tribal insurgents at both ends of the border, eventually leading to the war against Pakistan. But due to intensive pressure by the U.S., Pakistani government is contemplating agreeing to the U.S.’s demands. This group has over 12,000 highly trained fighters, who share expertise in bomb-making, sniping, as well as making explosives. Its tactical base is so strong and diversified that it has experts in guerilla warfare as well. The group holds a very strong position in the middle of the both the countries i.e. on Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and their control in North Waziristan, giving them an ideal position in launching their attacks. Hence this group enjoys alliance from all tribal factions around Pakistan who would unite and stand against Pakistan if she ever tries to hand over even a little bit of assistance to the US. U.S. Strategies on dealing with the network The United States has taken a number of measures to counter and even negotiate with the Haqqani Network but so far its efforts have ended in vain. The U.S. tries to put Pakistan into the position to initiate talks with the insurgent group so as to bring about peace and put an end to the war of terrorism. The U.S. is using Pakistan to “persuade” the Haqqanis but the group is not even willing to negotiate with the United States. In addition to this the U.S. has also signaled an aggressive response if the group denies negotiating on terms of peace (Tsakiridis, E, 2011, para.1). The U.S.’s failure at initiating peace talks with this ideologically strong, unrelenting group has led to many aggressive actions taken against the group. So far over five hundred operations have been performed against the insurgent network by the NATO-led International Security Assitance Force (Wendle, J, 2011, para. 4). Since peace talks or negotiations didn’t work out, the U.S. has put immense pressure on Pakistan to launch attacks against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan keeping in view the fact that the Haqqanis have the strongest position in North Waziristan as it is the group’s current headquarter (Hussain, T, 2011, para. 2). The U.S. is again dealing with this issue strategically by putting Pakistan in front and even using it as a platform to launch attacks. Works Cited: Bowman, S. (2009) War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Clarke, R. (2011). Crime- Terror Nexus in South Asia. New York: Routledge. Dressler, J.A. (2011, Sept 24). Structure of a Terrorist Network. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/24/world/structure-of-a-terrorist-network.html Duffey, J.D., & Farwell, J.P., (2011). The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability. Virginia: Potomac Books. Giustozzi, A. (2009) Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. New York: Columbia University Press. Healy, J. (2011, Oct 01). NATO Says It Caught a Haqqani Clan Leader. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/asia/nato-says-key-haqqani-leader-captured-in-afghanistan.html Hussain, T. (2011, Jun 1). Pakistan to launch offensive against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. The National. Retrieved from http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/pakistan-to-launch-offensive-against-haqqani-network-in-north-waziristan Ignatius, D. (2011, Aug 24). 10 Years after 9/11, al-Qaeda is down but not out. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/10-years-after-911-al-qaeda-is-down-but-not-out/2011/08/23/gIQARQ3tZJ_story.html Mazzetti, M., Shane, S. & Rubin A. (2012, Jan 09). Haqqani Network. Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U.S.in Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan.html Mangal, S. Ibrahim (209, May 12). Taliban onslaughts kill 7. Pajhwok Afghan News. Retrieved from http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2009/05/12/taliban-onslaughts-kill-7 Norland, R. (2011, Oct 30). Attacks on Foreigners in Capital Get Afghan Faction’s Message Across. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/asia/haqqani-network-sends-message-with-kabul-attacks.html?scp=7&sq=haqqani&st=cse Rassler, D. & Brown, V. (2011, July 19). NATO The Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/19/the_haqqani_network_and_al_qaeda Takahashi, K. (2012, Jan 09). Haqqani Network. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/haqqani_network/index.html Tsakiridis, E. (2011, Nov). The Strategic Logic of the Haqqani Network’s Refusal to Negotiate. Retrieved from www.tsakiridis.org Wendle, J. (2011, Oct. 10). Fighting Shadows: Why the U.S. Will Struggle to Defeat the Haqqani Netowrk in Afghanistan. TIME World. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2096545,00.html Read More