Operation Valhalla in Iraq - Assignment Example

Lecturer: MILITARY ESSAY ANSWERS Essay Question Analyze Operation Valhalla, Iraq (2006). In your opinion, what is the best leadership course of action to mitigate enemy manipulation of circumstances and kinetic operations? Dauber has described the Operation Valhalla which took place in 2006 in Iraq as an ordinary engagement involving three major forces namely the U.S. Special Forces, Iraqi Special Forces and Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) death squad1. Propagated by the U.S. Special Forces Soldiers, the Operation Valhalla was engaged for the simple purpose of stopping the JAM, which had been described as deadly, well trained, destructive, and illegal2. It was not surprising that the outcome of the operation was what Dauber described as the exact exemplification of its purpose. This is because by the time the Operation Valhalla was over, the U.S. forces had tracked down the JAM fighters who had been at the center of brutal murders of a good number of innocent civilians and other Iraqi troops who were in place for the simple reason of keeping and ensuring that peace prevailed in Iraq. The operation was described as an ordinary engagement because it did not take the initiator, who was the U.S. Special Forces, any ordinary requirement and demands in terms of armament, deployment or armory. All the U.S. Special Forces had to give critical attention to intelligence, through which important information could be gathered, as well as counter information on how to use very ordinary methods to track down the JAM, using personnel from the Iraqi Special Forces unit the U.S. was training. At the end of Operation Valhalla, several questions have come up, pertaining to the best leadership course of action to mitigate enemy manipulation of circumstances and kinetic operations. Judging from the overall outcome of the Operation Valhalla, which can be described as very successful with minimal records of casualties, the best leadership course of action that can be taken in such a situation can be noted to be the use of counterintelligence (CI). Executive Order 12333 (1983) identifies CI as the practice of gathering information aimed at protecting espionage, sabotage and intelligence activities using special agents other than personnel, physical and communications security programs. The overall validity of using counterintelligence in such as a situation to mitigate enemy manipulation of circumstances and kinetic operations is that it takes attention from the main force that is seeking to launch the major attack, and yet making it possible for the main force, which in the case of the Operation Valhalla would have been the U.S special Forces to have as sufficient information to undertake its launch operation as possible. In using CI, as a leadership course of action, three major options may be identified, which are collective counterintelligence, defensive counterintelligence and offensive counterintelligence. In the case of Operation Valhalla, the collective counterintelligence and defensive counterintelligence would have been more appropriate. While using collective counterintelligence, the force of the force launching the CI is to gain as many information about the target point as possible. This information would have been sought from the JAM and would have been the kind of information that is capable of aiming at entity3. Defensive counterintelligence would have also been used in a manner that ensures the thwarting of efforts being staged by a hostile intelligence service. Collective and defensive CI would be prescribed as the best leadership course of action as against offensive CI due to the overall peaceful nature of the first two as against the last one4. In Operation Valhalla, some level of calm and peace was used in the main operation because of the ordinary nature of the operation but much peace could have been attained. Dauber reported that the Operation Valhalla ended with no casualties among the U.S. Army’s 10th Special Forces Group and the Iraqi government forces, except for one Iraqi Soldier. On the other side, an approximated number of 17 JAM were killed with weapon cache seized and destroyed. There were other JAM members who were detained at the time the U.S and Iraqi government forces left the site5. This was however reported in the media to appeal as having much violence and force, which would not have been the case if a leadership course of action such as CI was used. Essay Question #2: “Argue a case either for or against General Douglas MacArthur and his controversial opposition to President Harry S. Truman during the Korean War.” Be sure to identify the important leadership issues as they relate to the individuals, security of the country, welfare of the military, and defense of the South Korean people. General Douglas MacArthur was generally known as a successful military leader for his role in the Korean War where he was the commander of the United Nations forces. When he would later take a controversial opposition against the president of the United States to lead to his relief would therefore spark much professional and academic debate. But to take a firm stand either for against General Douglas MacArthur fromleadership perspective, it is important to first have an idea of the entire issue and events that led to his controversial stand and relief. Most of the means by which the General would express his opposition to President Harry S. Truman during the Korean War was to use public statements. For example in Pearlman (2008)6 reports of how on December 1 1950, MacArthur described the restrictions on operations against Chinese forces on the far side of the Yalu River as “an enormous handicap, unprecedented in military history, when in fact the president had earlier defended the restrictions and called it the best resort7. What is more, in contrary to the president’s directive on December 6 of 1950 against making diplomatic statement public before they are cleared with the State Department, MacArthur directly went against this order by issuing a communiqué offering a ceasefire to the Chinese on March 23, 1951. Scrutinizing MacArthur’s opposition critically, it would be identified to be one that was breeding very high levels of leadership tension and power struggle between the president who was the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army and one of his General. In leadership however, it has been noted of the danger that such internal power struggle brings, especially when it involves the highest ranked leader and one of his subordinates8. The case becomes even worse in a democratic process such as the U.S. governance system, where such forms of oppositions among a General with so much power could spark political uprising against the president. From the individual view point of leadership therefore, MacArthur’s opposition would be condemned, especially in the approach it took, seeing it was taken from a public perspective where MacArthur did not use any private means of discourse but constantly went public on issues of state and international interest. Once such public oppositions were expressed, what MacArthur was indirectly doing was to instigate tension among the military against the president and reduce the president to an incompetent fellow who did not desire to be at the topmost hem of affair. Such actions however have the potential of sparking national security threats, including possible military overthrow or impeachment of the president for reasons of incompetence. In terms of the welfare of the military, the stand that was taken by MacArthur may not necessarily be described as inappropriate, especially as MacArthur was seeking the most innovative ways for the military to deliver their duties devoid of the usual violence and application of force. But yet again, the issue of approach where MacArthur consistently showed to be more comfortable with public statements rather than private discourse become very questionable and makes the whole conception wrong. Discussing the issue, Watson viewed the welfare of the military from a perspective where going to see them as no longer controlled by civil authorities, a condition that could have raised public tension and enmity against the military9. It is not surprising therefore that most members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the relief of MacArthur. For the South Korean people, because they were pursuing the issue from a more public perspective than a leadership and professional perspective, they are most likely to see the stand of MacArthur as one that protected their interest and ensured that their country enjoyed peace by the use of peace. From a generalized perspective however, it is important to note that the end justifies the means and that MacArthur as a leader had every opportunity of using very prudent leadership discourse strategies that would have avoided all the forms of perceived tensions that his opposition was accompanied with. Essay Question #3: “Should high ranking military leaders resign in protest if the Commander-in-Chief (President of the United States) implements a military policy deemed destructive, harmful, or defeatist to US security or the US military? [This issue was debated during and after the Vietnam War in regard to President Lyndon Johnson’s policies. The issue reemerges during times of debatable military policy.] The President of the United States under Article II Section 2 has constitutional powers to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy once he is called into the actual service of the United States10. The debate as to whether this is a ceremonial position or an actual position continues to rage on. Some scholars who have argued that president’s position as the Commander in Chief of the army merely confers expansive powers have said that this was done so as to preserve the civilian supremacy over the military. But the fact that the constitution backs the president’s position with specific functions and responsibilities makes it more of a practical and realistic position than a ceremonial one. Until the coming of the War Powers Resolution, the president acting as the Commander in Chief of the Army could commit U.S. troops to wars such as presidents like Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon did in their Administrations in sending troops to Southeast Asia11. The coming of the War Powers Resolution however came to somewhat define the president’s role and to limit it to some extent, requiring the president to confer with Congress for the commitment of troops within 48 hours. Once Congress does not grant extension, troops must be removed in 60 days. Based on the powers above, most of which seem to give authority to the Commander in Chief and Congress on very crucial war based decisions rather than uniformed military leaders, questions have often arisen as to what positions the military leaders ought to take when certain decisions are made by the Commander in Chief in which they find to be opposing to the ideologies and aspirations of the military. There are specific events in the history of the United States where presidents have been thought come under strict opposition with their military leaders due to decisions taken by the presidents. An example of this was what was experienced in the era of President Lyndon Johnson, pertaining to his policies concerning the military in the post Vietnam War. Once such decisions come up which are considered as detrimental to the progress of the military and the nation at large, there are a number of options that the military leaders can take, including resignation. The argument as to whether such resignations in such instances are ethical continues to rage on. From another perspective of however, it would be noted that the military leaders have every legal right to resign their positions in such instances. This point is strongly supported and defended due to the ethical merits that such actions present12. In the first instance, it would be noted that resignation when used as a protest against actions taken by the president gives the military leader the opportunity to take an entirely neutral stand, by which means he can clearly defend his stand and oppose that of the president13. Whiles in the military leadership, there are some acts of protest such as issuance of public statements that would generally be seen as amounting to in house wrangling and struggle of power. But once the military leader resigns, he is in a better position as a neutral person to explain his stand of issues to the larger United States citizenry. One may argue that a military leader could remain in service and use in-house and private discourse strategies to drum home their protests. As much as this may be accepted as the first point of call, it must also be realized that at the private level, it is often only the president and some few people around him who would have knowledge to the protests that are raised and once the president in his position as the highest military officer of the land opposes the military leader, there may be very little that the leader can do while still in office to gain public sympathy without appearing to be oppressive to the president. Essay Question #4: “Was the 2012 Afghanistan Quran Burning Protest Avoidable?” Be sure to analyze how the issue in this case (Qurans) should have been handled in order to avoid popular unrest and instability in the battle space. In the delivery of their roles, the military is expected to act in as much fairness as possible, even when they are operating in lands that have different ideologies from them. Some of the major areas of operations where the military is required to show highest levels of fairness and equality are in areas of religion, race and gender. On the 22nd of February 2012, U.S. troops at the Bagram Base collected copies of Quran, which were identified to be materials being used by Taliban prisoners to write messages and exchange with one another14. While taking their roles in a disposal, part of the collection of Quran were burned, sparking wide outrage among Afghans who besieged Bagram AFB, raining the premises with petrol bombs and stones15. Since the occurrence of the incident, which became known as the Afghanistan Quran Burning Protest, several debates have been held as to other the whole brouhaha was avoidable. In the first place, it is important to approach the issue from a professional point of view, where the U.S. troop could be seen as performing a duty that they deemed was necessary in averting future results and outcomes they perceived was going to be outrageous. But then again the question of ethical leadership comes in as to whether the U.S troop did not have other options they could have used to make their duty more peaceful and violent free. For example, with the fact that the materials at the center of affairs was a religious material, the troop should have considered their ethical responsibility in ensuring religious fairness and balance and known what the consequence of their action was going to be. If for nothing at all, there should have been religious tolerance and accommodation, which would have made the U.S. troop recognize the level of spiritual importance that the Islamic religion attaches to the Quran as the holy scripture of its religion. In leadership, empathy remains very useful subject if a leader is expected to come up with decision that will be seen as fair to all parties involved in a case. For this reason, even if members or leadership of the U.S troop were not Muslims, they should have empathized with the Islamic religion to know what the consequence of their action was going to be. Most certainly, the several days of violence that were experienced could have been avoided if some humane options had been used rather than the one that was used. Particularly as peacekeepers, the military leadership could have engaged religious leaders in Afghanistan as stakeholders for peace in resolving the issue. As partners and stakeholders for peace, the religious leaders could have been made to take custody of the seized materials, never to get them to the destinations they were meant for. On the other hand, there was the option of going into an agreement with the religious leaders for the U.S. troop to put the materials in a safe keep to prevent them from getting into wrong hands. Until now, the question as to why the burning had to be done in a manner that would attract the attention of Afghan forces working at the base remains puzzling because it merely shows an act of gross demonstration of disregard for the Islamic religion and its beliefs16. References Abdul, Kadir. Koran Burning by US troops in Afghanistan provokes outrage and revolts. National Turk. 21 No. 4 (2012) 34-53. Clayton, James. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman. Westport: Greenwood, 1987. Dauber, E. Cori. The Truth is out there: Responding to insurgence disinformation and deception operations. Military Review. 3 No. 1 (2009) 8-13 David E. Johnson. Preparing Potential Senior Army Leaders for the Future. New York: Rand Arroyo Center. 2002. Executive Order 12333. United States Intelligence Activities, Section 3.4(a). New York: EO provisions, 1981. Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President 249-272. Texas: Ultimate Press Limited. 2007. Greenstein, Fred. Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence, Political Science Quarterly, 94 No. 4 (1980) 578-84 Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. Armstrong. To Build Resilience: Leader Influence on Mental Hardiness. Defense Horizons. 3 No. 69 (2009) 1-8 Pearlman, Michael D. Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 2008 Watson, Robert J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III 1950–1951: the Korean War, Part One. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1998 Read More