Health and Safety: Piper Alpha Incident 1988 - Assignment Example

Health and Safety: Piper Alpha Incident – 1988Management – Indirect Causes Management played an indirect role in the Piper Alpha Fire in 1988 in a variety of ways. First, there was a significant breakdown of communication between management and the operating crew. A permit-to-work system had been created which had not been adhered to, creating the situation in which the changeover crew was completely unaware that a specific pressure safety valve had been removed by the crew working on the previous shift (Oil & Gas Journal, 1993).

This represents a failure of management to adhere to specific safety guidelines regarding the communication of rig activities from work crew to work crew. In any type of environment where health and safety is a factor, this failure to adhere to these guidelines led to the deaths of many on the oil platform. Additionally, before the fire spread completely out of control, the rig manager was supposed to coordinate evacuation using the PA system in the radio room, however the radio room had been damaged thus the operators on board had absolutely no idea where they were to go or what to do.

Because of this management failure to communicate effectively, the men on the platform waiting for a helicopter evacuation, which was impossible due to the fire’s rapid spread across the platform (Sreejith, 1994). Even though the accident had already begun to occur, had management issued the appropriate evacuation instructions, per safety guidelines, there would likely have been far fewer causalities on the platform.Engineering – Direct Cause After an engineer discovered that a backup condensate pump required maintenance, the engineer found the on-duty custodian busy with other activities.

Because of this, the engineer does not inform the custodian that the pump was currently inoperable. Instead, the engineer authorises the pump tube to simply be sealed using a plate. Additionally, current crew activities would not allow for instant check of the pressure valve in question so the work was postponed. From a structural perspective, engineers who designed the platform did not build firewalls on the rig which were capable of withstanding the type of explosion experienced on Piper Alpha (FABIG, 1993).

Operator Errors Because the engineering negligence, workers had absolutely no idea that vital pump components had been removed, allowing large volumes of flammable gas to escape as the operators attempted to perform their routine operations. Additionally, the engineers had turned off the fire suppression system as part of the maintenance programme, thus the initial fire was not contained. Because operators had not been trained adequately in evacuation and generic emergency procedures, they repeatedly went back and forth to the accommodations area, causing themselves to suffocate on carbon monoxide fumes from the spreading fire.

Additionally, the operators had switched the fire suppression pumps to manual control because there were divers in the water at the time. This is intended to avoid divers from being sucked into the vacuum pumps. Lack of training led to the pumps not being switched back to automatic, preventing immediate fire suppression from occurring. ReferencesFABIG. (1993). ‘Piper Alpha’. http://www.fabig.com/Accidents/Piper+Alpha.htm. (accessed March 9, 2009). Oil & Gas Journal. (1993). ‘New Piper B reflects Piper A safety lessons’.

22 Feb 1993. Vol. 35. http://www.proquest.com. (accessed March 9, 2009).Sreejith, Pillai. (1994). ‘Piper Alpha Accident Case Study’. BBC Video: Spiral to Disaster. http://www.scribd.com/doc/5070962/Piper-Alpha-Discussion?_user_id=-1&enable_ docview_caching=1. (accessed March 9, 2009).