Engineering Disaster: Piper Alpha Disaster in the North Sea - Case Study Example

ENGINEERING DISASTER of the of the This study describes an event that took place during 1988 in northeast of Scotland. Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea killed approximately 167 people and overall property damages accounted for billions of dollars. As human beings we tend to make mistakes and often neglect crucial evidence required for decision making procedure. Piper Alpha incident is considered to be worst accident in the history of oil and gas industry. This study encompasses background details of the incident. It even includes causes and effects of such accident on engineering practices. Contents Introduction 4 Body Sections 5 Cause Analysis 5 Impacts on engineering practice 7 Recommendations for future practice 10 Conclusion 12 References 13 Appendices 14 Appendix 1 14 Appendix 2 15 Appendix 3 17 Introduction This research study would focus on engineering disasters. There is large number of incidents taking place across the globe due to certain loopholes in engineering practices. Shortcuts used in engineering practices often results into disasters. Engineering can be stated as the technology and science which is utilized to meet demand and needs of the society. Failure in engineering practices occurs due to wide array of reasons. It mainly takes place when a design crosses design limits that denote proper functioning. In current scenario there are different safety measures adopted to prevent such engineering failures. This study will be centered towards a particular disaster caused by an engineering failure. Piper Alpha platform is known for its magnificent structure and a disaster that killed approximately 167 people. The platform was build during 1976. It was a major oil and gas production or drilling platform constructed on Northern North Sea. This platform was solely responsible for exporting gas and oil to St. Fergus and Flotta respectively. There were around 226 people who worked on this platform. Piper Alpha Platform served as a hub for export and import of gas. The disaster took place in 1988 when a series of events resulted. Amongst 226 people working on board around 165 individuals were killed. The rest of the workforce had a narrow escape by jumping from the deck. There was some design issues related to engineering practice at Piper Alpha. This platform was constructed by McDermott Engineering. It was located approximately 120 miles from northeast of Scotland at Aberdeen. The platform was well equipped with electric and diesel seawater pumps. This was done to enable automatic firefighting system. Body Sections Cause Analysis The accident at Piper Alpha resulted due to process disturbance along with a flange leak that resulted into vapor release. A series of explosions occurred followed by a pool of fire. The fire affected gas riser located in different platform causing an intense fire. Location of Piper Alpha has been elaborated in Appendix 1. Topside layout of the construction enabled quick propagation of firm from production modules to respective critical centers. The first explosion that took place on the platform caused failure of general alarm, electric power generation, emergency shutdown, protection or fire detection systems and public address. On the other hand, evacuation was also not properly ordered. Life boats were inaccessible and there was blockage in evacuation routes (Matsen, 2011). The west and east elevation of Piper Alpha platform has been further classified in Appendix 2. On basis of this framework a failure path can be identified that led to accident at Piper Alpha platform. As stated earlier there were series of events which combined together to cause such fire. All these event modes have been elaborated in Appendix 3. In midst of these events there was some basic cause that led to such explosion. The activities which were in place were drilling, maintenance, production and inspection (McGinty, 2010). Piper Alpha platform basically had two major condensate injection pumps. One of the pumps was operational whereas other was operating on a pressure relief value due to being out of service. The shut down operation was threatened and this caused second pump to increase flare intensity. Workers on board did not want to shut down and were unaware about a blank flange in place of missing PSV (Hartley, 2001). When the first pump had started it resulted into leakage of the blank flange. This in turn led to explosion within gas compression module. The explosion even developed a large fire at the topside inventory location on the platform. Tartan platform continues to supply gas to the platform. Fire caused initially melts the riser and it eventually ruptures. On the cellar deck there was a large portion which was kept unprotected. A huge fireball occurred due to the bursting riser and this engulfed the entire platform. There were design faults even witnessed in escape scenario. The helideck was totally disrupted and lifeboats seemed inaccessible. Safety vessel gangway also called as Tharos was short enough to fit into the platform. Designing defaults resulted into loss of 167 lives and rest was severely injured (Mannan, 2005). Controls were not working appropriately and many individuals on board had to escape through sea route. Failures behind this disaster can be categorized into three kinds like design loopholes, operations and management failures. Management failures were in terms of inappropriate usage of permit to work system; full authorization was not given to platform management, OIMs of surrounding platform do not possess authorization on exporting, failure of command system in emergency situation, and prescriptive safety inspection was passed without determining it’s a safe operation or not. Operational failures can be described as inappropriate handover shifts, lack of understanding about risks and manual fire water system. Designing issues were prominent in the disaster of Piper Alpha platform (Lilley, 2013). The first design default was presence of no default walls. There was a need to identify changed risks during initial stage of gas production. Control room was structured well but it was situated in an exposed and unprotected location. The platform even encompassed inadequate escape systems which resulted into many individuals being trapped on the deck. There was no sensible segregation constructed by engineers between non-hazardous and hazardous areas. The risers on the platform were not well protected and it even encompassed inadequate refuge areas. In overall context Piper Alpha had an inadequate tagout or lockout system and permit creating gaps. The engineers of second shift had taken it for granted that Pump A could be started since all documents were precise. Critical information could be shared efficiently due to a decentralized system. Between shifts there was absence of informal talks that resulted into communication gap. The control layers easily accumulated holes because of believe towards individual safety practices. In case of organizational disintegration or platform control room loss there was no such backup plans included. A public inquiry was conducted by Lord William Cullen in 1988 to determine probable cause behind catastrophe. The conclusion of this inquiry was reached exactly after two years. Condensate leak on the platform resulted due to maintenance work simultaneously on safety valve and on the pump. This leak intensified explosion that occurred at a significant location on the platform. After the enquiry many recommendations were outlined for safety procedures at North Sea. The operator of Piper Alpha or Occidental was stated as guilty in context of inappropriate safety and maintenance procedures. There was US$ 1.4 billion insurance claims raised due to such disaster at North Sea (Cavnar, 2010). The layout of Piper Alpha had some serious loopholes which can be regarded as the major cause behind such disaster. There were a lot of complexities and lack of redundancies in the layout. These complexities were mainly in the form of fuel storage on deck. It was even complimented by excessive compactness. Critical spatial couplings were created by mutual proximity. These were in the form of no spatial separation between other and production modules, insufficient redundancies or inappropriate escape routes, one platform end comprised of lifeboats or other escape means and emergency related critical systems was so close to production module that it was difficult to operate during crisis situation. Impacts on engineering practice Flaws within design philosophy often prove to be dangerous in engineering practices. There are several factors that contribute towards overall failure such as financial costs, flawed design, miscommunication and improper use. Failure at times occurs due to miscommunication, or fatigue and creep or static loading. To certain extent Piper Alpha disaster took place because of communication lack between departments and loopholes within platform design. The disaster in 1988 altered scenario of the world in context of adopting safety engineering measures. It had initiated significant changes in engineering practices and changed offshore legislation and safety management in North Sea. Piper Alpha disaster is regarded as the worst disaster in history of oil and gas industry. A new law was formed based on this disaster which was supposed to be aligned with engineering practices. Offshore Installation Regulations was signed in 1992 and this influenced duty holders to submit a document about accident hazard control systems and safety or health management standards used in the construction. Engineers after this law was passed had to be more cautious about risk identification and implementation of contingency plans. These engineering practices after the disaster had to be structured in such manner that it facilitated temporary safe refuge and highlighted provisions for rescue and safe evacuation. The regulatory framework even indicated that operators or designers had to consult with workforce and provide them with adequate documents to be used in critical scenarios. This law also stated that operators had to revise safety conditions on a daily basis. The accident had initiated incorporation of efficient tools in engineering practices. These tools not only eradicated manual errors but even encompassed a risk prevention mechanism. There were a lot of new decisions framed in context of human resources and management. The workers who were recruited later had to be properly trained on safety measures to avoid such disasters. Platform managers were even well trained in terms of giving prompt orders to workforce. After this disaster training appeared to be a common phenomenon in all construction sites. Safety and health standards were also revised on a daily basis. Regular inspection was a necessary measure implemented in all forms of engineering practices. On the other hand, auditing at specific time intervals was appropriately maintained in workplace. There was even law enforcement in worker’s health and safety standards. Process and design also went through a series of changes after this disaster had taken place. This event altered the traditional engineering practice and enabled engineers to become more aware about probable disastrous situations. A major impact was witnessed in real time engineering practice after occurrence of the disaster. This was in terms of usage of certain risk analysis tools like ALARP and QRA. Engineers started to design segregation areas so as to prevent any disaster to spread at a rapid rate. These hazardous areas were effectively segregated from accommodations and control rooms. It can be stated that engineers exhibited such segregation through utilization of blast walls, firewalls, muster areas and protected control rooms. Passive and active fire protection systems were incorporated in all types of construction sites. This served as a prevention mechanism in order to safeguard workers during hazardous events. Piper Alpha’s scenario raised alarming conditions across the globe where riser ESDVs was appropriately protected and positioned. To a great extent inadequate positioning of riser had led to intense fire on the deck. However in later time frame risers were taken care of appropriately in any form of construction. The other factor which proved to be harmful in Piper Alpha scenario was the presence of a single route. It was essential that more than one route is present so that individuals can escape during crisis situation. On a later time period this issue was taken into consideration by other engineering companies. There was a wide array of escape and evacuation systems developed to avoid the negative cause of a single route. In all constructions at later stage there were minimum three to four routes in the design layout (Regester and Larkin, 2008). There was another technique which gained importance after such disaster. This technique was known as TSR or temporary safe refuge. It was mainly included to avoid any form of smoke ingress that tends to make workforce more ill during a disaster. Engineering practices are not only restricted to planning and designing a layout. All engineers should be highly concerned about inclusion of required units or necessary elements in the design. Operational procedure shall not be the only area of concern for engineers but they need to be inclined towards safety precautions as well. This is an effective measure in engineering practice since it safeguards live from any form of disaster. After that disaster, engineering practices strictly comprised of wide range of secondary escape requirement for workers such as ladder, nets and ropes. Recommendations for future practice Piper Alpha disaster could have been prevented if certain precautionary measures were adopted by the management. Recommended approach is in context of operational procedure, management and safety engineering. The management system of the company needs to control overall operations. Construction site often requires more preventive measures to be undertaken by the management. Operational management system always has to perform effectively in order to avoid any crucial circumstances. It is recommended that in future years, constant system review and regular audits should be conducted. This would reveal any loopholes present in the design layout and shall facilitate early adoption of measures. Training is a vital component and team members need to be well trained in context of analyzing operational risks. Safety engineering practices can only be implemented when designers are well aware about probable circumstances which can occur in nearby future. It is recommended that certain tools have to be used such as ALARP and QRA so that risks can be identified properly. Escape routes are highly recommended since it plays a significant role during disasters. Engineering companies in the initial stage was more concerned about saving costs so as to enable maximum utilization of initial resources. This form of cost savings led to inadequate process planning and preventive mechanisms. In such oil or gas hub it is recommended that communication should be effective. Management should communicate efficiently with workers to convey any form of loopholes in the system. Workers have to be aware about operational conditions and must adopt precautionary measures in advance. Safety procedures and techniques are vital in engineering practices. This factor had been neglected in Piper Alpha. It is recommended that management should involve in analyzing safety measures and indulge into constant up-gradation of safety techniques. This would be an added advantage of such sites which are highly prone towards disasters. Safety measures are not confined to protection of workforce but it even includes restricting any form of explosion at the first stage. Apart from these measures, it is advisable that control rooms have to be positioned in proper locations. There needs to be segregation between operational units and control rooms. If control rooms are well protected then it shall guarantee signal transmission during hazards. Documentation is another aspect in failure of engineering practices. Over the years it has been assumed that engineers are only able to design proper layout for any given situation. However this belief proves to be hazardous in many circumstances. It is recommended that documentation has to be re-checked at every stage. This ensures appropriate flow of work with adoption of suitable communication channels. Human error usually occurs when such simple tasks are not given much importance. On the other hand, in current scenario, technological advancements have made tasks simpler and easier. For instance such sites can incorporate technical devices to forecast any risky scenario in coming years. This will influence management to undertake proactive measures. Technical equipments can also be included during documentation stage in order to transfer a back-up to respective individuals who are in-charge of the site. Conclusion As per this research study, engineering defaults at times results into a disaster. Events which had caused Piper Alpha disaster was associated with structure, culture and Occidental Petroleum procedures. These factors are common to major parts of oil and gas industry. Production situation at the platform was totally inappropriate in terms of structure along with functioning. A series of events had taken place on the deck that resulted into intense fire and smoke. This disaster had taken lives of 167 people and some was lucky enough to escape. There were many defaults witnessed within engineering practices at the site. Documentation part was highly neglected and it was assumed by officers that prior had maintained steps of operational procedure. This resulted into confusion within the system and workers were also not aware about techniques or tools being used in the process flow. No informal talks were encouraged in the workplace and this in turn created communication lack. On the other hand, control room was situated in an unprotected place. During explosion no signals could be transmitted since control room was not able to function. A series of operational failures had resulted into the big disaster of Piper Alpha at North Sea. Measures in starting phase were taken in terms of savings but it eventually led to recruiting inexperienced and overworked operators. According to cause analysis, there was a blind flange leak which caused the explosion. Engineering practices are bound to be inclined towards effective measures so as to prevent such disasters. References Cavnar, B. (2010). Disaster on the horizon: High stakes, high risks, and the story behind the deepwater well blowout. USA: Chelsea Green Publishing. Hartley, H. (2001). Exploring sport & leisure disasters. London: Cavendish Publishing. Lilley, S. (2013). The North Sea piper alpha disaster. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 7(4), pp. 1-4. Mannan, S. (2005). Lees loss prevention in the process industries: Hazard identification, assessment and control. USA: Butterworth-Heinemann. Matsen, B. (2011). Death and Oil: The true story of the piper alpha disaster on the North Sea. UK: Pantheon Books. McGinty, S. (2010). Fire in the Night: The piper alpha disaster. UK: Pan Macmillan. Regester, M., and Larkin, J. (2008). Risk issues and crisis management in public relations: A casebook of best practice. UK: Kogan Page Publishers. Appendices Appendix 1 Location of Piper Alpha Appendix 2 West Elevation East Elevation Appendix 3 Event Dependencies Read More