Logical Problem of Language Acquisition - Report Example

THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION Name Name of Class Name of Professor Institution Affiliation City and State Date The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition Introduction Language acquisition describes the process involved in the acquisition of the capacity to not only perceive, but also comprehend language by humans. It also entails the ability to produce and utilize the sentences and the composite words to stage a coherent communication. The term is synonymous with the first-language acquisition. According to Saville-Troike (2006), first language refers to the languages acquired during childhood, especially when the child is less than three years old, and continues to learn and speak them in the course of their growth. However, in some cases, it could also be used to denote second language acquisition. There are myriad theories that attempt to explain the process of second language acquisition and some of them include behaviorism, acculturation, comprehension hypothesis and grammar hypothesis (Menezes 2013). While most of the theories are acknowledged and recognized for their contribution to the understanding of the hypothesis of language acquisition, many researchers believe that there exists a logical problem in them. The analysis presents a completely incomplete and inconsistent input to the learner, which obscures the determination of grammar acquisition (MacWhinney 2004). In that respect, the following discussion seeks to analyze the logical problem of language acquisition. Precisely, the first section of the paper defines the logical problem of language and acquisition while the second section dissects the primary arguments presented in the document accompanied by specific examples for purposes of illustration. What is the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition? The logical problem of language acquisition stems from the nativist point of view. It is also called the ‘projection problem.' Most of the contemporary generative syntax operate on the basis that the acquisition of language is largely innate. The assumptive innate knowledge assumes the universally accepted premises and factors that undergird all the known human languages (Hendriks 2000). Specifically, the proposal maintains that people gain the understanding of the structure of the language they are learning that lacks evidence in the data they are exposed to during their early stages of learning. In simple terms, you children learn a language despite the inadequate linguistic exposure while adults exhibit a deeper yet mysterious knowledge of the language over which they had no prior experience or teaching (Pinker 2004). Main Arguments The first argument is that the proposal arises from the fact that there is a complete lack of ‘negative evidence.’ Consider the following variant forms of the same sentence. (a) Which team do you want to beat? (b) Which team do you wanna beat? (c) Which team do you want to win? (d) Which team do you wanna win? In these examples, the second sentence gives a grammatical contraction of the phrase ‘want to’ in the first sentence. Even so, the type of contraction in the last two cases is prohibited, thus, showing that there are only certain cases where the contraction of ‘want to’ is allowed. The example illustrates the problem of no negative evidence. The importance of the negative evidence can be examined through a consideration of two situations of learning: informant and text presentation. Regarding the presentation of the informant, the learner can get feedback from a faultless informant concerning the grammatical nature of each composite sentence. It is the corrective feedback, which connotes the concept of 'negative evidence,' which requires a clear and substantial refutation of every ungrammatical string in the sentences. Suppose the learner makes unsubstantiated claims about the grammatical structure of the language, the informant will inform the learner of the ungrammaticality of their guesses. The learner then uses the information as a boundary for their developing grammar. MacWhinney (2007) takes note of the absence of the negative evidence in a child. Thus, the language learning cannot rely on the presentation of the informant. Basing on text presentation, the learner only gets information on grammatically correct sentences while failing to capture the information concerning grammaticality. The lack of negative evidence would make it overly difficult for the child to transition from the general grammar to more specific and contextualized grammar of the learning language (Chater and Hsu 2010). Suppose we accept the unavailability of negative evidence, and that the children are able to emancipate themselves from the characteristic overgeneralization, then this must be accompanied by an assumption that the children by relying on the guidance from external cognitive or linguistic tenets, rather than on the information present in the particular language. If parents would act as the source of negative evidence to their children, then it could be possible to view the acquisition of language as a typical case of informant presentation as opposed to text presentation. Arguably, in the course of language learning, children overtly flout the grammatical principles of the specific language. Consequently, parents provide instant corrective feedback that signifies the ungrammaticality of the specific utterances. However, it is not guaranteed that the child will acknowledge and adopt the feedback because they may completely ignore the feedback at times. The incorrect agreement and the double negative that normally characterizes the feedback from the parents is one factor that leads to the oblivion of the correction in a child during the learning process. In that respect, the child may not be able to depend on simple, blatant negative evidence for emancipation from overgeneralization. The second argument to support the proposal is that the nativist perspective offers a stronger case for the problem as opposed to the empiricists’ point of view. In language, nativism encompasses two primary elements namely the Domain Specificity (DS) and Innateness (I) (Cowie 1997). (DS) postulates that the learning of a language demands that the learner has a prior domain or task-specific information concerning the language in question while (I) posits that the information in the (DS) is innate. Consider the example of learning about food. As a result of some gastronomic experience, almost all human beings have culinary competence. They are able to distinguish a variety of foods from non-foods. Thus, a child will automatically distinguish between a curry and a boat with a subconscious knowledge of the fact that a boat is not curry (food) (Cowie, 1997). Thus, concerning the DS, a child must have a prior knowledge of some of the properties of the natural languages before they can learn the native language. Correspondingly, (I) agrees that such form of knowledge is not learned, but is encoded in the original fabric of the mind of the child or the learner. In combination, (DS) and (I) result into the postulation that human beings have a special inbuilt psychological framework for language acquisition (Cowie 1997). However, it is clear that the information required for the particular task is inborn and specific to a domain; thus, the human mind may be considered the unique mechanism that defines a ‘language faculty.' It is noteworthy that, in linguistic literature, (DS) represents a standpoint of the theoretical underpinnings of the ‘Universal Grammar’ (UG). UG defines the underlying properties of any natural language. In the context of nativism, children must access the information if they are to succeed in learning any first language. Innateness (I) describes the linguist’s view of how the Universal Grammar finds application in the ‘language acquisition device’ (Cowie 1997). Evidently, the interlink between the (DS) and the (I) describe the position of nativists and distinguishes it from that of the empiricists. However, (DS) is single-handedly in line with empiricism. Empiricists contend that a prior knowledge of the form of the language is pertinent to the process of learning of the language. A distinction in their premise is the argument that such information is earned through gradual experience. Similarly, (I), on its own, contends with empiricism. Clearly, it is from the point of conjoining (DS) and (I) that a nativist differs with an empiricist making this conjunction the important aspect (Cowie 1997). Another notable argument concerns the challenge of the logical problem of language acquisition. The challenge of the Logical Problem is that it fails to offer an explicit expatiation why people rarely make such errors, especially since they have no inborn experience to bar them from making such errorsIn relation to the absence of negative evidence, the Logical Problem poses a challenge. Consider the sentence ‘John is possible to leave.' The absence of negative evidence leads to the disqualification of this statement as a sentence of English but considers it grammatical nonetheless. Given a few speakers have been taught to reject this as an English sentence, it is mysterious competent speakers of the language are able to discern that this statement is ungrammatical (Pinker 2004). It is incomprehensible how language acquisition could thrive alongside such overt evidentiary insufficiency. Apparently, the nativist advocacy for the (I) and (DS) seems to proffer a solution to this puzzle. The premises suppose that numerous information the languages people possess result from their genetic variants and not as a result of their world experiences; thus, one is introduced to a precise process of language acquisition based on such conditions. The bottom line is that the learners possess an inborn knowledge of the language that absolves them from making overt hypotheses or falsifications that are inexplicable through their experience. Essentially, the nativist perspective rules out all the errors that may result from overgeneralization. Largely due to the fact that the mechanism of learning focuses on the on the principle of Universal Grammar that prohibits learners from making broad erratic hypotheses. The problem of language acquisition is also known as Plato’s problem (Hendriks 2000). Conclusion The logical problem of language acquisition is regarded as one of the firm arguments stemming from the nativists’ standpoint of language as its validity does not depend on the particular empirical evidence. The central position of this argument is that it is principally impossible to acquire a language primarily on the foundation of the language input, without respect to the input data presentation and the amount of feedback the learner or the child receives. Despite the popularity of this view, it presents inherent challenges that beat the findings of normal reasoning concerning language acquisition. As such, several solutions have been proposed to normalize the challenges and reinforce the validity of the logical problem of acquisition of language. One of the solutions is concerned with limiting the class of grammars (MacWhinney 2004). The solution functions on the principle that language may be produced from finite-state grammatical constructions. In that respect, researchers like Hausser developed a parser that employs the use of left-associative grammar and seeks to prove that this kind of grammar can be transformed into finite-state grammar. Thus, this means that children should possess the ability to learn left-associative grammar seamlessly and directly without developing a logical anomaly. References List Chater, N & Hsu, AS 2010, ‘The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition: A Probabilistic Perspective’, Cognitive Science 34 (2010) 972–1016. Cowie, F 1997, ‘The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’, Synthese Vol. 111, pp. 17–51, 1997. Hendriks, P 2000, ‘The Problem with Logic in the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’, ResearchGate 2518536. MacWhinney, B 2004, ‘A Multiple Process Solution to the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’, NIH Public Access, 31(4): 883–914. Menezes, V 2013, ‘Second Language Acquisition’, Open Journal of Applied Sciences, 2013, 3, 404-412. Pinker, S 2004, ‘Clarifying the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’, J. Child Lang 31 (2004), 949–953. Saville-Troike, M 2006, Introducing Second Language Acquisition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Read More