Domestic Terrorism Situation in Australia - Research Proposal Example

Research Project Student’s Name Institutional Affiliation Date Background Domestic terrorism is a significant challenge encountered by many global nations. The USA, Germany, and Australia are among the nations that are battling with the challenge. The shootings in Orlando and the killings in Germany and France are some of the recent incidences of domestic terrorism. Different governments have devoted numerous resources towards wiping out domestic terrorism. However, it is evident that combating the phenomenon is not an easy task (Burgen, 2016). Australia has not been an exception to home-grown terrorism. The nation has witnessed several instances of shootings and subsequent killings from individuals believed to be Australian citizens. On 2nd April 2015, the British Police arrested a 14-year-old minor from Northern England in connection with a planned terrorist attack on an Anzak memorial event in Australia. On 11th February 2015, police also arrested two prospective terrorists with a hunting knife, a video that described the planned attack, and an IS flag (BBC, 2016). These incidences among other attacks have necessitated the need for effective measures to curb home-grown terrorism. The study targets to identify the effective approaches that can address the challenge. Literature Review Domestic Terrorism Situation in Australia Stopping home-grown terrorists is a wish and desire for many nations. Cases of ‘lone-wolf jihadists’, the term that best describes domestic terrorists continue to exhibit an upward trend in Australia just like the other nations in the world. Recent incidences of domestic terrorist attacks have revealed the case of Australian nationals that either executes the attacks as sympathisers of the Islamist militant groups in Syria and Iraq. As a result, they resort to fighting with the militant groups to communicate specific messages to target recipients especially the Australian Government and other governments that have engaged in relentless fights against militant groups. Recently, the Islamic State Magazine issued a notice that encouraged lone wolf terrorists to kill Australians in public terror acts. According the Magazine, the lone wolves should attack and kill Australians in different mentioned areas such as the Opera House, Broadmeadows, Brunswick, Bondi, and Bankstown. The other areas include the SCG, MCG and even in their backyards. The Magazine encourages the attackers to use any means whatsoever to kill Australians. Ezzit Raad, an Australian national from Melbourne was convicted for an attempt to launch a suicide attack that targeted the Melbourne Cricket Ground. The conviction occurred in 2005. The terrorist later died in an ISIS attack in 2015 (Stephens, 2016). These among many other incidences have instilled fear among other targeted Australian nationals. Understanding the cause of the rising threats and cases of lone wolf terrorist attacks is essential towards developing effective strategies to combat the phenomenon that threatens Australian nationals. Since 2012, Australia has witnessed a rising number of its nationals that have joined militant groups in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been the major recipient of Australian nationals. Approximately 100 Australian nationals have resorted to fighting for militant groups in Syria and Iraq respectively. Out of the number, 25 have succumbed to attacks against the groups while 30 have already returned to Australia (Zammit, 2012). The ‘Sydney Siege’ incidence has necessitated the integration of additional measures in the fight against domestic terrorism. The scrutinising of visas, monitoring of firearms and increased sharing of information are some of the recommended intervention measures aimed at combating home-grown terrorism. Most importantly, there is an increasing need for the implementation of aggressive follow-ups by responsible agencies. The necessity emanated from the realisation that the lone wolf behind the incidence was an individual that the authorities had already spotted out. The disturbing news was the ability of the lone gunman to execute the attack despite the existing awareness of the local authority about the lone wolf. However, a closer analysis of the issue reveals that security agencies know many individuals. Therefore, picking out or identifying suspicious individuals that can execute a terrorist attack is difficult for the authorities. As a result, it would be unreasonable for security agencies to chase after everyone with the anticipation that the people in question are potential lone wolf terrorists. Using the approach may weaken the response mechanism thereby subjecting it to possible loopholes such as the ability of real attackers to masquerade and execute attacks without the knowledge of the authorities. Dealing with Terrorism New “Anti-Terrorist Laws” have proven to bear fruits and discourage Australian nationals from joining terrorist groups. The laws have resulted in the possible prosecution of preparatory terrorist actions rather than waiting to prosecute the terrorist in the aftermath of an attack. The new laws have also seen the confiscation of passports possessed by immigrants that prove to be potential terrorists. The new measures including foreign incursion charges have discouraged locals from joining militant groups (Williams, 2011). The main concern surrounding the new laws is the possible harming of innocent Australian nationals that are not potential terrorists. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) focuses on the use of non-coercive measures to discourage or prevent individuals from taking part in terrorist attacks. CVE recommends the use of a number of measures. It has resulted in the introduction of prison rehabilitation programmes that targeted convicted terrorists. Such programmes aim at ensuring that convicted terrorists do not engage in acts of terror again. The other strategy encompassed in the CVE is the use of online campaigns against terrorist propaganda (Sageman, 2008). The introduction of the strategy emanated from cases where militant groups spread propaganda that justifies their involvement in acts of terrorism. The CVE also identified the psychological role played by counselling in advising people against taking part in terrorism. In the case of individuals that present high likelihood of taking part in violent extremism, CVE recommends the use of mentorship programmes aimed at changing their perceptions regarding the issue (Zammit, 2012). The measures recommended by CVE are co-efforts to the existing law enforcement measures implemented by the Police and other security agents. As a result, foiling planned terrorist attacks and charging terrorists are measures that continue to prevail regardless of the introduction of new laws (Hoest, 2015). The advantage of using the non-coercive CVE measures is the fact that they reduce the proportion of individuals that require monitoring, investigation and prosecution thereby reducing the overall number of terrorism incidences witnessed in the country. It is evident that terrorists use the social media to communicate propaganda and lure lone wolf terrorists to execute the attacks. Debate rages on regarding the right held by terrorist groups to have pages on social sites such as Facebook and Twitter. However, home-grown terrorism is a challenge that faces all nations in the world. As a result, it is the collective responsibility of all individuals to report terrorist groups and enable the consequent blacklist by the social media organisation as a strategy of combating the spread of propaganda that contributes massively towards home-grown terrorism. Barnes (2013) also addressed the issue of dealing with the home-grown threat. According to Barnes, changing the counterterrorism policy is one of the most important measures of combating the home-grown threat. This entails changing the perception of domestic terrorism from a “standard” crime to a serious crime that requires prevention just like the other crimes against humanity. Just like the CVE measures, Barnes mentions the need for preventing counterterrorism instead of convicting terrorists in the aftermath of the attack. The Police, in conjunction with the investigative agency should conduct thorough investigations on threats related to terrorism and report such threats to the Federal Government for further investigation and subjection to scrutiny (Bjelopera, 2012). In essence, proactive measures are better than reactive measures in dealing with threats associated with domestic terrorism. As a result, the objective of government officials should be the need to disrupt terrorist plots prior to the actual occurrence of the attack. In essence, charging the terrorist does not repay the life lost by an innocent individual that succumbed to the attack. The basis of the argument is the fact that the life of an individual is far much better than the charges raised from prosecuting and convicting terrorists. From the approach, it is apparent that the prospective terrorist is the target. Therefore, the strategy aims at the discovery, apprehension, and prosecution of the prospective terrorist before the occurrence of the attack (Eijkman & Schuuman, 2011). The effective implementation of the strategy requires massive redeployment of essential tools and resources aimed at identifying prospective terrorists. The additional tools play the role of investigating and prosecuting prospective terrorists. Utmost levels of secrecy suffice to be the foundation of fruitful home-grown terrorism plots. Therefore, identifying proper ways of accessing such hidden information is detrimental towards unearthing such plans and prosecuting potential terrorists before they execute the attacks. Extracting such secret information requires extraordinary measures on the part of the police. Penetrating the network of terrorists is one of the probable measures that can grant access to the hidden information. Counter-radicalisation and the engagement of the community is one of the ways of accessing information about a possible terrorist plot. The strategy requires law enforcement agents to engage with individuals that exhibit the highest level of susceptibility to terrorist attacks (Gunaratna, 2011). By so doing, investigators develop strong relationships and trust with local members that plays a pivotal role towards averting possible incidences of radicalisation. Engaging with members of the community also guarantees cooperation from the community members. This enables the identification of individuals that sympathise with militant groups as well as those that present radical tendencies. It is evident that the proper implementation of counter-radicalisation is fruitful in the identification of prospective terrorists. The proactive cooperation from the members of the community also guarantees the effective enforcement of the law. Interacting with the Muslim and Arab communities yields better results. In order to disrupt terrorist plots, it is also necessary to have confidential informants. The informants provide pertinent information that leads to the identification, arrest and prosecution of prospective terrorists. In some instances, though rarely, an insider from a militant group may decide to change his or her mind and report all proceedings to the investigative authorities. In such a case, the insider acts as the confidential informant (Bjelopera & Randol, 2011). However, there are cases where the authorities in charge are unlucky to have an insider. In such cases, they should place an individual in the target group to source information upon receiving information of a potential terrorist plot. The governments can also use an arrested terrorist as a confidential informant for rewards such as a favourable sentence or dropped charges. The other probable way of using confidential informants is to use law enforcement officers in “sting” operations by acting as vendors of weapons for terrorists that intend to use the weapons to execute attacks. Regardless of the approach used to get the confidential informant, it is evident that information sourced from a confidential informant is effective in disrupting terrorist plots. Physical and electronic surveillance suffices to be the other approach of collecting intelligent information about potential terrorist plots. Surveillance encompasses several activities that include listening to, monitoring, evaluation, and observations, recording the conversations of individuals, their communications, activities, and movements. Electronic surveillance basically entails signals intelligence. It involves the interception of communications such as Internet monitoring and wiretapping (Bloss, 2002). In the case of home-grown terrorism, the Police can monitor the communications of individuals particularly those that use public communication channels. However, it is important to note that the use of surveillance does not guarantee the disruption of terrorist plots. Therefore, the successful disruption of such plots requires the use of intelligent data gathered from the other intervention measures. Denial of means suffices to be the other complementary approach that can enable law enforcement agencies to prevent a possible terrorist attack. It entails denial of access to both weapons and specialised knowledge. Apparently, access to specialised knowledge and weapons suffice to be the fundamental enablers of acts of terror by home-grown terrorists. The provision of physical security is the other preventative measure of domestic terrorism. The approach has been in place ever since the advent of the phenomenon. However, it is evident that the use of the approach bases on the already existing intelligent information sourced from confidential informants and surveillance. The availability of such information enables law enforcement agencies to identify target individuals, communities, and areas thereby allowing them to provide the required physical security. Upon receiving intelligent information about the possible attack on a target area, it is the responsibility of security agents to heighten the security of the area in question (Barnes, 2013). Some of the target areas include critical infrastructure such as water treatment facilities, major commercial centres, power plants, and public transportation systems. The approach suffices to be the most effective in the protection of already identified target areas. Aims and Objectives of the Study There are three main objectives of the study. They include: To examine the impact of domestic terrorists on Australia’s national security. To determine the most effective strategies to deal with home-grown terrorism. To evaluate the impact of the strategies on national security. Study Outcomes The study outcomes are based on the aims and objectives of the research. They include: Proposal of effective strategies in addressing the issue of domestic terrorism. An outline of the effects of the various approaches implemented by law enforcement officials in dealing with home-grown terror attacks. An overall description of the state of home-grown terrorism in Australia. Creating awareness concerning domestic terrorism. Research Methodology The research targets to examine the impact of domestic terrorists on Australia’s national security. The study also targets to determine strategies that are effective in dealing with the issue of home-grown terrorism. Moreover, the research targets to evaluate the impact the strategies on national security. From the stated objectives, it is evident that the purpose of the research is threefold. The sample units targeted by the research are three distinct jurisdictions that exhibit overlapping responsibilities. The study intends to conduct a survey on two state-level jurisdictions and one local-level jurisdiction. The first two state-level jurisdictions are law enforcement agencies at the state level. The prime responsibility of the jurisdictions is to maintain order and law enforcement. As a result, the first two law enforcement agencies at the state level emanate from the State Police. The research also targets the Department of Public Safety as the second sampling unit. The selection of the sampling unit emanated from the need to survey respondents from the emergency preparedness unit. In addition to the two sampling units, the research also intends to survey members of the public. Surveying public Australian nationals will enable the study to determine the perception of the public towards the home-grown terrorism menace as well as their previous encounters with the threat. By so doing, the study will determine the extent of domestic terrorism in Australia. The researcher intends to issue three mailings in the survey process. For the first three sampling units, the study will send an initial packet that comprises of the participation request letter, survey instrument adopted by the research and the confidentiality statement. Seven days following the issue of the first packet comprising of the three documents, the research team will send another packet that reminds target respondents that have not responded to the first letter. The second letter will also express gratitude to respondents that have responded positively to the first letter. Approximately three weeks from the first mailing, the research team will send another packet containing the three documents of the first mailing to respondents that would have failed to respond to both the first mailing and the reminder. Two weeks later, the research team will make phone calls to the non-responsive law enforcement agencies. In the event that an agency fails to acknowledge the request mail and follow-up call twenty one after the call, the research team will replace the agency with another sampling unit of an equivalent status. The selection of the survey approach emanates from its effectiveness in availing first-hand data (Kelley et al., 2003). The study will use Ms Excel to analyse the collected data. Ethical Considerations Addressing the researcher-participant relationship is the first ethical concern for the study. To guarantee warm reception and the willingness of the research participants to respond to the survey questions, the research will send request letters to the sampling units. Seeking permission from the sampling units will improve the quality of social interactions between the researcher and the participants. Preventing the disclosure of confidential information will be the other ethical objective of the research. The need to conceal confidential information emanates from the fact that the sampling units may reveal data on prospective domestic terrorists to enable the researcher to attain objectives. The researcher also understands that research participants from all sampling units are autonomous individuals that will share information based on their willingness. As a result, the researcher will maintain a balanced relationship to create awareness of the possible ethical issues, encourage information disclosure and trust. Project Schedule Activity Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 5 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11 Week 12 Week 13 1 Send the request letter to sample units 2 Send the survey instrument to the sample units 3 Send the confidentiality statement to the sample units 4 Make gratitude calls to sample units that have accepted to participate in the research process 5 Remind unresponsive sample units about the need to respond to the research process 6 Resend the request letter, survey instrument, and confidentiality statement to unresponsive sample units. 7 Remind unresponsive sample units about the need to consent to the research process 8 Replace unresponsive sampling unit(s) with substitute unit(s) and by resending the request letter, survey instrument, and confidentiality statement 9 Confirm that all target sample units have consented and are ready for the research 10 Conduct the survey on the respondents 11 Analyse the collected data 12 Conclude the survey and make recommendations 13 Present the findings The Proposed Budget Item Cost in Dollars Source Transportation 800 Sponsor Operation Cost Research Personnel 2000 Sponsor Maintenance 1000 Sponsor Equipment 1000 Sponsor Total Cost 4800 Figure 1: The Proposed Budget References Barnes., S. (2013). Confronting the one-man wolf pack: adapting law enforcement and prosecution responses to the threat of lone wolf terrorism. Boston University School of Law. BBC. (2016). Timeline: Australia’s Terror Threat. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-30474414 Bjelopera, J. P. (2012). The domestic terrorist threat: Background and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Bjelopera, J. P., & Randol, M. A. (2011, April). The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Bloss, W. (2002). Escalating US police surveillance after 9/11: An examination of causes and effects. Surveillance & Society, 4(3). Burgen, P. (2016). Can We stop Homegrown terrorist? The Wall Street Journal. Eijkman, Q., & Schuuman, B. (2011). Preventive counter-terrorism and non-discrimination in the European union: A call for systematic evaluation. The Hague, NL: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 10(187502311797457102). Gunaratna, R. (2011). Communities Defeat Terrorism: Post-9/11 Community Engagement Strategies. UNISCI Discussion Papers, (27), 279. Hoeft, G. (2015). ‘Soft” Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalisation Programmes. International Institute of Counter Terrorism. Kelley, K., Clark, B., Brown, V., & Sitzia, J. (2003). Good practice in the conduct and reporting of survey research. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 15(3), 261-266. Sageman, M. (2008). A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists. Political and Social Science. 618(2008). pp. 223-231 Stephens, K. (2016). New Islamic State magazine encourages lone wolves to kill Australians. News.com. Williams, G. (2011). Decade of Australian anti-Terror Laws, A. Melb. UL Rev., 35, 1136. Zammit, A. (2016). Domestic Terrorism in Australia. Hector Sharp in Conversation with Andrew Zammit. Retrieved from: http://rightnow.org.au/interview-3/domestic-terrorism-in-australia/ Read More