Evaluation of a Threat to Australian Interests - Essay Example

CONFIDENTIAL Copy No -1 of 10 copies Preparing Unit -7th Infantry Division (Intel) Place of Issue - Australia Date Time Group - 3013 00 A May 2011 Message Ref No - IQ10 Time Zone suffix designation - TANGO ‘T’ INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO7 REFERENCES; Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate: TANGO. Executive Summary Terrorism entails acts and threats that are projected and planned to push political, religious and dogmatic agendas, mission and objectives by using force and intimidation against a governments and the public by inflicting severe damage and destruction to property and people. Currently, terrorism is a modern day challenge that threatens to destroy the human race. Terrorism is not a problem of one country and therefore, it becomes a major threat to the interests of governments or economies, within their territories and abroad as highlighted by (A.N.U. 2008). For Australia, her interests abroad are under threat with the rapidly emergent of terrorist groups and Islamic extremists who see Australia as an ally of the west and a Christian crusader, thus un-Islamist. Furthermore, a country that frequently interferes with matters of the Islamic world such as the Afghan War and separation of East Timor and a state that has dissimilar values that contradicts the political cause of terrorist organizations. The following intelligence estimate offers a detailed military plan on countering a planned direct terrorist attack coupled with an invasion on Australia by Jemaah Islamiyah coming in from East Timor and Indonesia. Introduction The purpose of this intelligence estimate is to advise Commander in Chief of the Australian Armed Forces of the rising threat of terrorism and invasion that seeks to destroy and threaten Australia’s interests. It is meant as a counteract to enemy’s release of new terror threats that are meant to hinder and jeopardize Australia’s interests, which encompasses regional security, internal security, protection of critical infrastructures and the wellbeing of Austrialian nationals within and across borders. Mission Statement The main mission for this intelligence estimate is to increase intelligence awareness and enhance the Military combat strategies and mechanisms essential in countering the increasing rise of terrorism threat on Australia’s interests internally and abroad. The purpose of this estimate has been, necessitated by the clandestine nature of modern terrorist cells and the rising incidences of terrorism directed to international community by Islamic extremists who want to in Jihad. The mission of the intelligence estimate is meant to keep Australian population, boundaries, air, land and sea, safe and secure. MISSION. First Brigade will standby in zone northern territory from Darwin (AS0001) to Cairns (AS0009), and on command, assumes defensive positions along the Gulf of Campetaria from Kakadu (AS0002) to Townsville (AS00010). Review of the Current Situation Background Under the Australian Law, terrorist acts refers to actions and threats projected and planned to push political, religious and dogmatic agendas, mission and objectives by using force and intimidation against an Austrian citizen, the public and foreign governments by inflicting severe damage and destruction to property and people (Australian Government. 2004). Presently, it is apparent that war against terrorism can be won with international collaboration and co-operation of global economies as witnessed in failed attempt of terrorist attack across the globe and the recent capture of Al Qaeda’s terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden. International collaboration is key to fighting terrorism as discussed by A.H.C. (2006). Political environment in Australia is characterized by stability, while the security, commercial and enforcement law has seen immense progress. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are currently engaged in identifying relevant and updated strategies and mechanisms to counter terrorism and keep Australian Marine, Aviation and borders free of infiltration by terrorisms and other elements that may generate insecurity for Australia. Australia has strong and reliable democratic relations with countries from South Asia, South East Asia, Far East and Western states. It is the country’s democratic ties with countries perceived by terrorist as unfriendly such as United States and European countries that makes Australia a target to terrorism (Das & Kratcoski, 2003). Her participation in taking offensive in the Afghanistan war and separation of East Timor necessitated by the part she had to play as a member of the international community has been seen as terrorist groups and Islamic extremists as being an ally of the west meant to infiltrate and destroy the Islamic world. This intelligence estimate come at a time that regional security surrounding Australia has over the recent past seen considerable number of increased terrorist attack in countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand among others Australia depends on the action of Australia against the rapid rise of Islamic radicals and terror groups that have advanced techniques and ways of executing terror attacks (OCLC. 2003). Among such attacks that has interfered with Australian interests internally and abroad include the bombings in Bali, bombings of the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, Christmas Eve 2000 attacks in Indonesia and Metro Manila bombings among others as highlighted by Conte (2010). Nevertheless, there is more than needs to be done to ensure the Australian borders; air space, waters and population are safe and secure as noted by Verinakis, & U.C (2008). For instance, law enforcement and policies on matters relating to prosecuting persons suspected of participating or organizing terrorism in various jurisdictions within Australian territory are divergent, which causes inconsistencies that negatively impacts on counter-terrorism measures and strategies. The geographic location of Australia has been considered as the most significant aspect that has facilitated plans for a terror attack. Australia is almost sandwiched to the North, West and East by waters which she shares with South, South East Asia, Far East and the Middle East that are key sources of Islamic extremists and confirmed terror groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah among others that would want to push their political and religious ideologies and principles (L.I.R.S., 2006). The increasingly realities of a nuclear China, do not help matters at all as noted by Hocking (2004). Although the Australian marine and aviation forces have been on the forefront in safeguarding against insecurities, the threat is eminent as evidenced by recent intelligence reports on planned terror offensive and attack on Australian soil that has necessitated this intelligence report. Friendly situation Australian interests are under threat with disintegration of the countries around the region which necessitates Australia to support one side over another in the ensuing struggles, which puts Australia’s strategic national interests in the region and abroad in jeopardy. Australia as a member of the international community has an assured backing and support in combating terrorism directed at her and co-operation among domestic and foreign intelligences will be able to help sabotage the intended terrorist threat against Australia. The know-how and proficiency of foreign international intelligences will be key to not only maintaining current security but preventing future terror attacks. Threat Situation The planned terror threat against Australia is organized and is expected to be executed by Jemaah Islamiyah, according to intelligence reports relied on for writing this intelligence estimate, the terrorist group may be having financial and military backing from the Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells (Tan, 2007). The main intent of Jemaah Islamiyah in attacking Australia is a counter-attack for Australian participation in separation of East Timor. In addition, a way of sending a message to international community of the capacity the terrorists have in infiltrating and destroying Crusaders and powers contrary to their own. This is confirmed by the consistent mention of Australia in media statements and interviews given by terrorist leaders. A good example is that Osama Bin Laden is quoted in 2001 interview commenting on the Afghanistan War stating ‘Any country that supports the Jews can only blame itself ... what do Japan or Australia or Germany have to do with this war? They just support the infidels and the Crusaders.’ In a 2002 interview Osama says ‘we warned Australia before not to join the war in Afghanistan, and its despicable effort to separate East Timor. It ignored the warning until it woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali.’ The Australian law enforcement and defense agencies are effectively equipped with resources to counter terrorism when need be, which includes advanced military technology. This will be very crucial in the operation meant to boycott the planned terrorist threat. The country has adequate capacity on air and in waters to protect against attack from either it seems, the terrorists have found a weak point that they intend to manipulate. This includes using Indonesia coast as staging areas for developing terror attack on Australia. Stakeholder Situation The operation that this intelligence estimate is prepared for needs the participation and collaboration of stakeholders, which in this case calls for participation of regional intelligence and defense agencies in combating terrorism. Public awareness in the surrounding regions and within Australia is vital in ensuring planned terror threat does not materialize as implied by Jones (2004). Terrorists need the help of the locals to effectively, target and attack specific locations and if the public is well aware and reluctant to conform to terrorist ideals, the scope of terrorism will greatly reduce (Tan, 2007). Area of Operations a) weather Existing situation The operation is expected to take place on the 5th of June 2011. From the 4th to the 6th June 2011, the climatic conditions in Northern territory of Australia and southern part of South and South East Asia will be usually cold and rainy in the Beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT), slowly warming up and clearing as high pressure systems moving through from Australian borders upwards. The expected temperatures will range from 30 to 450F. Visibility will approximately range from 10 to 18 km with the exception of early mornings that will experience heavy rainfall and dense mist. The surface winds will move at velocity of 10 to 12 knots from the North Southwards into Australian northern territories. The humidity will range from 83% to 95% in the morning and noon respectively. The anticipated atmospheric pressure will be approximately 800millibars. On 5th June 2011, a new moon is expected to rise. LIGHT DATA Date Beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT) Beginning morning civil twilight (BMCT) End evening civil twilight (EECT) End evening nautical twilight (EENT) Moonrise (MR) Moonset (MS) 4th June 2011 0346 0405 2030 2046 2048 0818 5th June 2011 0348 0407 2032 2048 2050 0820 6th June 2011 0350 0409 2034 2050 2052 0822 Large scale operations on the 5th June 2011 will be carried out at 16hrs, 25minutes, and total limited visibility time would be exactly 1 hour 19 minutes. Adequate light on the 6th June 2011 will be available and favorable to instigating operation at 0409. Effect on enemy’s course of action If the enemy takes offensive during the operation, it is important to note the early morning expected rainfall will not impact the enemy’s reliance on nuclear, biological and chemical agents. If the surface winds were to change course and blow from Australian northern territories upwards and eastwards, this would favor the enemy. Low visibility during duration of heavy rainfall and mist in the morning will support the enemy’s offense but not its cover, since as soon as the weather clears and warms up, the enemy will be easily observed and tracked if they do take offensive. Important to mention is that the heavy rainfall and mist might act to disfavor the enemy’s ability to execute attack and offer our operational forces and agencies sufficient concealment. The heavy rainfall and mist expected may not favor the enemy, who is expected to come in by boats over waters. Effects on friendly course of action Due to high level of precipitation and early morning mists, our operation and activities will be limited and hindered as our air and water surveillance of the enemy will be limited. Surface winds to the Northern territory of Australia from the north and west, it will blow to our favor. Clearing of the weather will offer out surveillance team sufficient visibility allowing easy use of our air and ground power and enhance accuracy of available artillery. Important to note is that the expected rainfall shall not impact on land traffic ability of our forces. b) Terrain This section highlights the observation and area of fire, cover and concealment, barriers, essential nature of terrain and effective and appropriate avenues and means of approach. Existing situation Observation and areas of fire;- Except durations of heavy rainfalls and early morning mists over land and waters, the enemy will have unrestricted view on any approaches targeted towards their location. The optimum area of fire and surveillance for direct fire artillery will be 250 meters owing to the density of bushes, plant cover and trees. Areas of fire for indirect fire arsenal will be suitable for the whole area. Nevertheless, in the open fields and waters, surveillance is not limited and the areas of fire are constrained by the optimal range of the system. Smoke and fire originating from arms fire will more likely hinder surveillance during the entire duration in the area of operations. Suppression and Cover; Sufficient cover and suppression will be gotten in all forested areas, reefs, creeks, built up areas. The rolling nature of the terrain will permit cover and concealment in all areas of fire. Barriers; the Gulf of Campetaria is a significant barrier in the friendly area of operation. It is impassable by tracks. The hilly terrain is a hindrance to advancing offensive to the enemy location due to the more than 48% slopes. Road tracks in Townsville are packed with innocent locals who may panic if they see the army tracks advancing to area of operations. The city however, has passable alternative routes exterior to the city. Essential nature of terrain;- creek 320 (AS2010) controls avenues of approach into Kakadu, reef 210 (AS2076) and surrounding field controls avenues of approach from Cairns from the South. High ground of the Gulf of Campetaria will act as the main commanding terrain to facilitate our Area of operation. Avenues and means of approach;- the main avenues of approach into friendly areas will be Axis creek 210 (AS4320) to creek 254 (IN3218), Axis reef 312 (AS3814) to Hill 420 (IN1315). The avenues of approach into the enemy’s area will be creek 320 (AS2010) to Hill 621 (IN2050). Effect on enemy courses of action Terrain along axis hill 420 (AS2111) to hill 214 (IN2543) in the northern part of our area of operations restricts enemy attack. The dense woodland offers concealment but limits surveillance and use of direct fire arms. The steep hills and reefs do not offer sufficient area for troop attack. The route around Townsville offers an adequate view to approaching enemy offensive and offers good surveillance point to the sea. From this point, fields of fire are good and can support a troop attack. Effect on friendly courses of action Terrain in the southern part of Indonesia and East Timor favors our defense operations. The woodland, steep hills at Northern territory of Australia will limit the movement of the enemy and limit their use of a direct terrorist attack. The best defensive terrain is reef 210 (AS2076) that permits adequate surveillance and fields of fire in each avenue of approach. The Gulf of Campetaria is a favorable obstacle to advance by the enemy. Hills on either side will restrict advance of the enemy and allow good point of surveillance by the friendly operations. Enemy Situation Enemy forces directing terror attack and invasion in Australia are members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. They are anticipated to use the Indonesian coast lines, East Timor and the waters in the Indian Ocean to execute their invasion. They have access to motorized rifle regiment, nuclear, biological and chemical agents and suicide bombers. The enemy strength includes committed and dedicated forces, reinforcements from Al Qaeda, air operations and easy access to nuclear, biological and chemical agents. From the intelligence reports gathered after the Bali bombings, it is believed Al Qaeda supported Jemaah Islamiyah (Imre, et al., 2008).As it stands; the enemy has a force that can be able to gain air dominance for restricted duration of time. There are currently no approximations of the nuclear support the enemy has but will be available within the next fourteen days. The enemy presently has 152mm GHs with nuclear ammunition that can fire 20-60 kilotons into friendly zones. Present vital activities by the enemy Satellite images shows increased movement in the area expected to be preparation ground by the enemy, with increased airwave traffic. The aerial recon and air flights around the enemy’s preparation camp have increased in the last 72 hours especially along the shores of East Timor and Eastern and southern region of Indonesia. The number of unmarked vehicles entering the perceived enemy’s base has increased within the last 36 hours an indication that the enemy is readying for attack. Intelligence reports indicate large, camouflaged tracks are slowly moving into areas thought to be used by the enemy to initiate attack. Weaknesses of the enemy Low number of experts trained in armory and executing an invasion as extensive as this, low morale owing to the recent capture of the world terrorist group leader Osama bin Laden and high numbers of inexperienced very young men and women. In addition, the enemy has single source of information to rely on intelligence information which has been successfully been infiltrated by friendly stakeholders, defective organizational strategies and vulnerability to technological counter measures. The enemy has insufficient training of its men on defense, insufficient artillery delivery systems, incapacity to restock weapons, shortage of nuclear weapons, insufficiencies in management of their communication and movement during operation. The leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah lack the capacity, experience and proficiency to effectively organize and execute a successful invasion due to their limited know how on issues relating to defense and their intention are marred and limited by their political and religious ideologies. Nevertheless, the emphasis the enemy has placed on communication security has ensured their radio communication is safe, which has limited out ability to monitor their plan of actions and the movement of the enemy. In addition, through reinforcements from Al Qaeda group, the enemy is expected to have substantial amount of supplies that may be sufficient for hem in undertaking offensive and defensive actions. Capabilities of the enemy The enemy is anticipated to attack friendly areas with as many suicide bombers, bombers and fighters which can be increased through air and water operations can enhance the intensity of attack. The enemy has initiated attack through advance of motorized boats, unrelenting movement of armored forces while the enemy continues to gather intelligence on better avenues to execute an attack. The position of the fifth enemy camp used as the preparation ground shows a strong suggestion that it shall be the point of reinforcement to be used for whatever plan of action the enemy assumes. Conclusions Effects on intelligence considerations on operations Current intelligence reports shows that our forces can achieve the set mission and indicate the course of action suggested be adopted as soon as possible. Effects of the area of operation to our own and friendly courses of actions The terrain in the selected area of operations favors our defensive actions and strategies. The best are for defense is the terrain north of the Gulf of Campetaria the most fitting avenue of approach into this vicinity is the south owing to the diverse access to waters and wide view of the vicinity. Possible enemy course of action The enemy is expected to attack on the 5th June 2011 having reinforcements from the Al Qaeda. The enemy is reported to have access to biological, chemical and nuclear agents that can be used through air strikes or through direct fire weapons. Vulnerabilities of the enemy The enemy is vulnerable to our extensive defensive organization and planning systems and our access to modern military technological systems. In addition, our intelligence systems have been able t infiltrate and gain continuous flow of information on the enemy’s plans of actions. Summary A military offensive against Australia is a military offensive against the rest of the world since the world is interconnected and destruction on one is destruction to all. War against terrorism can only be won by collaboration and participation by all globally. Creating global public awareness, developing strict regulations on access to chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological equipments, effective management and control of Aviation, Maritime and borders are essential in preventing infiltration of terrorism within boundaries in all countries. The intelligence estimate offers a detailed plan on countering a planned terror attack and invasion against Australia. As discussed earlier, the political, democratic and national strategic relations are particularly good, which helps Australia in mobilizing support from allies in defending itself against an attack and effectively and efficiently keeping its people, borders, air, land and waters safe and secure. Since nuclear, chemical and biological agents as noted in the intelligence estimate offers the greatest advantage the enemy has in executing an attack, it is essential that the international community implement strict regulations and policies guiding governments to limit access by unauthorized people as indicated by Das & Kratcoski (2003). Increased investment in modern advanced military technology and intelligence gathering systems is essential in collecting important data which is essential in knowing who the enemy is, where they are operating from, who their friends are, who they are targeting, when, and how they are planning to execute attacks. With this kind of information, it becomes easy to develop and implement productive counter-terrorism initiatives and measures. References A.H.C. 2006. Addressing complacency in dealing with terrorism. Australian government website. Accessed from http://www.malaysia.highcommission.gov.au/klpr/info_terror3.html. On 28 May 2011 A.N.U. 2008. The Australian yearbook of international law, Volume 27. Queensland: Butterworths. Asthana, N.C. & Nirmal, A. 2009. Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities. New York: Pointer Publishers. Australian Government. 2004. Transnational terrorism: the threat to Australia. Sidney: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed from http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/overview.html. On 28 May 2011. Australian Government. 2010. Counter terrorism white paper 2010: securing Australia/ protecting our community. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 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