Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence - Case Study Example

Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence Student’s Name Instructor’s Name Course Name Date Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence Introduction The determination of any court decision is the role of the jury. However, at some point, the jury requires the opinion of a science expert to gain scientific facts necessary to avoid possible violation of the law by making decisions based on hearsay issues arising from inadequacy in the jury’s testimony to meet the requirement of the law. To avoid such violations, the grand jury has to eliminate any doubts in their testimony by introducing expert witnesses for their opinion. The Common Law in the United Kingdom (UK) today focuses on the qualifications of the expert witness and the subject matter. An expert witness is classified as qualified if they have expert knowledge, experience, skill, training, or education such that their opinion in the courtroom is highly regarded. The fact that the common law requires expert opinion is fundamental. First, the expert witness brings to the courtroom expert scientific, specialized, or technical knowhow that assists the trier of fact to determine the fact in a given issue or comprehend the evidence. Further, the fact that the witness is an expert makes the testimony to be founded on adequate data and facts. Thirdly, the testimony is the result of dependable and consistent techniques and principles. Finally, the expert is believed to have applied consistent principles and methodologies to develop the facts of the case. These reasons make the expert opinion in courts more reliable than any other alternative means of supplying it. However, the common law in the UK’s England and Wales has lagged behind in raising concerns over the accuracy and consistency of the science behind the expert’s opinion. Consequently, when the law and such science meet in the courtroom, the most evident result is remarkable insufficiency of justice since the jury’s decision takes its cause based on expert’s facts yet no one questions the reliability of such expert opinion or testimony. In some cases, the jury even goes beyond the testimony in some cases. Consequently, the wrong design for including expert testimony in a given case is chosen, thereby sabotaging the accuracy and making it immaterial. Current Situation Today, the common law in the UK fails in averting issues of expert testimony reliability previously experienced in the UK and other nations like United States, and permits abstention by reliable and relevant expert opinion from interfering in the decisions of the jury (McKie 2011, p. 2). The resulting laissez faire in the admissibility of expert testimony in Wales and England permits the admission without sufficient scrutiny since the expert’s evidence is not subjected to any test to determine whether or not its admission into the courtroom defies all odds of unreliability. According to Cornell University Law School [Cor14], the assumption that the testimony of an expert is only through the form of opinions lacks logical foundations. This is because the expert can provide a dissertation or exposit scientific or other principles necessary to the case, but leave the facts’ trier to relate them to the facts. Consequently, the experts’ opinion brings in the question of dispensability. For instance, Cornell University Law School (2014) points out that expert testimony is not indispensable and that expert opinion should be utilized in non-opinion forms where the counsel realizes that the trier can actually draw the necessary extrapolation. The implication in this case is not to abandon the use of expert opinions using the rule but to make it possible for the experts to also contribute through suggesting the forms of inference where specialized knowhow of fact is necessary or not. This is because the hypothetical question has led to great criticism as it is perceived as promoting partisan bias, complicated and wastage of time, and as creating an opportunity to conclude in the middle of the case. Although the determination of the best situation to use expert testimony is complex, the best way is to determine the testimony’s impact on the trier, for exclusion if it is unhelpful, therefore redundant and time wasting. The General Acceptance Test and Intellectual Rigor Puzniak [Puz00] highlights that one of the techniques used to determine the relevance of and reliability of expert opinion was through general acceptance. This meant that the determination of whether or not expert opinion was used in a courtroom was done by subjecting the evidence to tests that would sufficiently establish that within the expert’s field, such testimony was acceptable. According to Puzniak (2000, p. 32-33), the jury first identified the field of the testimony before confirming that a given principle in that field was accepted by other scientists in the field. This approach eliminated time wastage in that prolonged admissibility hearings were reduced and ascertained even decisions. Additionally, this approach made it possible to determine evidence admissibility. However, the general acceptance test was criticized for developing very large threshold for useful and reliable testimony that was not accepted in the field. Consequently, the general acceptance test is insufficient in determining whether or not the evidence present by an expert adheres to any acceptable methodologies in the field. In the case of (Truck Insurance Exchange v. Magenetek, Inc. 2004) the plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange claimed that a fluorescent light ballast was the cause of fire at a client’s restaurant in Colorado and had been manufactured by MagneTek, Incorporated. In order to win the case, MagneTek failed to submit the part of Truck’s expert opinion testimony and for this the court ruled in MagneTek’s favor on the basis that no rational trier of fact could find for Truck without sufficiently reliable expert opinion. In other words, the evidence from the plaintiff’s Fire Protection experts did not applicable general acceptance standard for testimony admission. Upon appeal, analysis under Daubert revealed that the District Court’s conclusions of the defendant were not sufficiently reliable. According to Berger [Ber00], such ruling comprised of a misunderstanding of the role of general acceptance and resulted to using it as the chief screening factor for the case. However, the court through Daubert gatekeeping requirements was expected not only to ensure reliability and relevancy of the testimony but to ascertain that an expert employs opinions in the courtroom that are founded on personal experience or professional studies with similar amount of intellectual rigor attributed to and expert practicing in the relevant field. In the case of (Truck Insurance Exchange v. Magenetek, Inc. 2004) the court had to access expert testimony to determine whether the testimony from the defendant was scientifically valid on the basis of whether: the expert opinion was subjected to testing; subjected to peer review and publication; methodology used had controlled usage and defined error rate; and the theory was acceptable within scientific community. Despite qualifications to testify as a fire expert under Rule 702, the Daubert trilogy revealed no reliability in the defendant’s expert opinion regarding the cause of the fire, and the testimony failed to be classified as the product of reliable principles and methods. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the original ruling in favor of MagneTek supporting that there was insufficient evidence by the plaintiff to support a rational trier in understanding the facts on the cause of fire. Problems with Current legal System in the UK (Scotland, Wales, and England) Despite consistently pointing out the drawbacks of general acceptance test, the legal system continually shies away from facing the complex issues presented by the changing legal systems. Based on McKie [McK11] the passing of time is associated with advances in scientific, emotional, psychological, biological, technical and other expertise. Consequently, it is difficult to consistently present the components of legitimate and admissible expert. Common Law Admissibility Test In England and Wales, the common law admissibility tests in constitutes of four requirements that are assistance, impartiality, relevant expertise, and evidentiary reliability (The House of Commons 2011, p. 15). From the House of Commons (2011, p. 23) assistance expert opinion admissibility is acceptable only if it offers additional information beyond the jury’s expertise, experience, and knowledge failure to which it is not necessary. Further, expert testimony admissibility requires that the individual’s claim of expertise must be evident from acquired study or sufficient knowledge of the subject. The qualified expert is also expected to offer objective evidence that demonstrates impartiality on matters of that fall within their area of expertise. The implication is that the expert must be qualified to supply unbiased opinions on matters that the evidence relates. Finally, the common law evidentiary reliability requires that the testimony by the expert achieves a threshold of acceptable reliability (The House of Commons 2011, p. 15). A major drawback with evidentiary reliability is that like general acceptance tests, it presents insufficiently robust common law admissibility test that results in a laissez faire approach in the admission of expert testimony in Wales and England (Jackson & Summers 2012, pp. 31-32). The issue is mostly evident in instances where expert opinion presentation is by a neutral well-qualified expert and there is need to evaluate the soundness of the expert’s field and methodology and the nature of validity of the assumptions the expert relies on. Recommendations Singh et al. [Sin14] highlights that England and Wales’ admissibility of expert evidence requires reforms to eliminate laissez faire situations that allow unreliable expert opinion to influence the jury’s decision without subjecting it to any tests that confirms its relevance and reliability. The recommendation according to The House of Commons [The111] is adoption of novel admissibility that eliminates the danger of juries abdicating their duty of ascertaining and weighing the facts by allowing cross-examination of expert’s own opinion especially where it is complicated for non-specialists to understand and evaluate without assistance. Additionally, besides the common law’s permitting courts to seek the witness of expert in a given field, and proving such evidence is from an expert, new recommendation require that such opinion is tested to confirm that it is soundly based and that the opinion is warranted as concerning the grounds in which it is based. For instance, evidence is sufficiently reliable for admission if the hypothesis is subjected to adequate scrutiny such as experimentation or other forms of testing, or did stand up to investigation (Richmond et al. 2012, p. 141). Additionally, sufficiently reliable evidence must be founded on justifiable assumption, founded on flawless data, and that depends on scrutiny techniques, process, or method that was properly used in a given case, and that is founded on inference that was properly reached. Furthermore, it is recommended that courtroom practitioners and judges should receive practical training on methodology standards. For the jury, such training will ensure that statistical relevance of research findings are determined and provide the way forward in determining the reliability of expertise based on experience. To oversee such training and assessment of expert testimony, the recommendation is to have the Judicial Studies Board work with the professional bodies in the development of a guide (The Law Commission 2010, pp. 65-67). In order to efficiently make great decisions, UK judges under the recommended changes in expert opinion appear to be ill-equipped to implement the tasks of sufficient decision making. Consequently, education and training is required for the participating judges to be adequately prepared to manage the range of scientific evidence proffered for court admissions. Additionally, training judges implies that juries are better placed to obtain and deliberate information that contains evidence of despite resolution whether scientific or other expert field. Consequently, such judges are better placed to comprehend the substance of professional testimony and the existing association to the issues. This way, the expert can exclude untrustworthy and ambiguous evidence from the jury such that it is a part of their over-arching obligation to protect the reliability and impartiality of the provisional process. From The Common Law (2010, p. 66), training the judges and other court practitioners does not mean that they receive training to become scientists but are trained to understand concepts and know the fundamental questions to ask, and comprehend the methodological and statistical issues that experts need to address. Additionally, judges are expected to know what to listen to and search for during the presentation of expert testimony, and what to ask when information is withheld (Jackson & Summers 2012). Conclusion The situation in the UK admissibility of expert testimony under the common law is wanting. Instead of ensuring that the expert is qualified and that their evidence relevant and reliable to the case, the UK admissibility of expert opinion involves a laisez faire approach where the jury infers decisions on untested, thus unreliable and irrelevant, evidence. Consequently, a miscarriage of justice prevails given that the evidence from an expert was founded on unjustified assumptions, faulty data, the use of an examination technique that inappropriate for use in a given case, or the opinion is founded on faulty inferences as guided by the Daubert case. For the recommendation, the jury is expected to have minimum understanding of expert’s field of study while the experts must be qualified and their evidence well tested prior to admission into the courtroom. References Cor14: , (2014), Puz00: , (2000, p. 32), Ber00: , (2000, p. 23), McK11: , (2011, p. 2), Sin14: , (2014, p. 106), The111: , (2011, p. 17), Read More