Handling Transferred Intent - Case Study Example

TRANSFERRED INTENT CASE TRANSFERRED INTENT CASE Insert name: Insert course code: Instructor’s name: 7 February, 2011. Introduction One of the common law’s great contributions to contemporary justice is to limit criminal punishment to morally blameworthy individuals who consciously choose to cause or create a risk of harm or injury. Such persons are punished based on the harm caused by their decision to commit a criminal act rather than because they are bad or evil people. A famous Supreme Court Justice once noted that a system of punishment based on intent is a celebration of the ‘freedom of a human will’ as well as the ‘ability and duty of the normal person to choose between good and bad.’ This emphasis on individual choice and free will assumes that criminal law and punishment can deter people from choosing to commit crimes, and those who engage in crime can be encouraged to develop a deeper sense of moral responsibility and avoid crime in future. Mens Rea Sometimes you find in paper that your much loved rock star gunshot and murdered one of his associates. Murder is a very serious crime, but before condemning the killer you want to know ‘what could have been wrong or what was in his mind?’ the rock star might have intentionally aimed and fired the rifle. However, he might have aimed and fired the gun believing that it is not loaded. The two reactions are based on whether the rock star intended to kill his friend or acted in reckless manner, but the act is the same. As it can be seen, it is the bedrock principle of criminal law that a crime requires an act or omission and a criminal intent. The suitable punishment of an act depends largely on whether the act was intentional or accidental. There is a common repetition in law texts that actus non facit nun nisi mens sit rea: ‘There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.’ The mental part of crimes is referred to as mens rea (‘guilty mind’) or scienter (‘guilty knowledge’) or criminal intent. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the requirement of a relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory (not responsible) plea, ‘But I did not mean to.’ The killing of an individual is a murder, whether committed intentionally or recklessly. The religious law, with its stress on sinfulness and moral guilt, helped to introduce the idea that punishment should depend on an individual’s moral blameworthiness 1(Lippman 2009). The Model Penal Code Standard There are normally two kinds of bewildering mens rea, a common intention as well as a definite intent. A general objective is merely intention to obligate the actus reus or illegal act. There is no need that prosecutors show that the lawbreaker had an intent to breach the rule, an attentiveness that the action is a felony, or that the action would end up to be a particular form of injury. Evidence of the defendant’s common intention is basically incidental from the environment of the action as well as the adjoining conditions. A nonconsensual injurious touching or a felony of battery, offers an excellent image of a common intention felony. The prosecutor’s role is just to show that the offender planned to commit an action that was liable to considerably injury another 2(Emanuel, 2007). A particular intention is a psychological willpower to achieve a particular outcome. The accuser is needed to show that the wrongdoer had the intention to perform the crime and then is needed to produce extra verification that the offender had the specific intention to achieve a particular end result. For instance, a battery with an intention to murder needs evidence of a battery together with extra proof of a particular intention to kill the victim 3(Buckley, & Okrent, 2004). Transferred intent There are additional sorts of general rule intent. According to Gardner and Anderson, a transferred intention becomes valid only when a person plans to assault an individual but unintentionally wounds another4. A good example is the one in this assessment where Charlie, after drinking meets with his ex-girlfriend, accuses her of being unfaithful and then tries to attack her by throwing a stone on her. Accidentally the stone misses her and hits a nearby shopper who happens to have eye problems. His mere intent was to frighten her but this ended up in mayhem. In such situation, Charlie is supposed to be convicted of aggravated battery. The classic formulation of the common law doctrine of transferred intent states that the defendant’s guilt is exactly what it would have been had the blow fallen upon the intended victim instead of the bystander. Transferred intent also applies to property crimes in cases where, for instance, a person intends to burn down one home, and the wind blows the fire onto another structure, burning the latter structure to the ground. If a killer is a poor shot and misses the intended person buts hits and kills another individual, he or she could argue that there was no intent to kill that person. If there was a mistake of identity and the killer kills that wrong person, the same argument could be made 5(Best, & Barnes 2007). For a long time now, the defense lawyers have used this argument stating that because there was no ill will and malice toward the victim killed by accident, the defendant should not be convicted of intent-to-kill murder but, at the most, negligent or reckless homicide. Gardner and Anderson noted that ‘Transferred intention is a policy utilized when the intent to hurt one person unintentionally leads to a second individual being wounded instead.’ The individual causing the harm will be seen as having ‘intended’ the act by means of the ‘transferred intent’ doctrine6. However, transferred intention is restricted to outcomes that produce the similar damage as was essentially planned. For instance, if Mary flings a pebble at Jimmy and strikes John, the intention is alleged to shift, and Mary will be found guilty of deliberately striking John. On the contrary, if the pebble does not strike Jimmy but shatters a plate glass window behind him, the intention is not shifted. We find that the law transfers any negligence or malice or the intent to the party that was affected by the incident. Like now, where the injured person is partly blind, or disabled, Charlie should be convicted of intent and the case should be dealt with in the higher levels of the law. According to the laws of England, this is battery and Charlie is guilty of hurting the shopper even if he intended to frighten his ex-girlfriend. Such cases are referred to as the transferred intent cases. Most courts deal with the last case; Oblique intent by treating the defendant as though he had intended the actual result. The defendant didn’t rally intend the result, but knew that if he acted, the result was practically certain to happen if he achieved his actual goal. In other instances, the courts declare that if someone knew that the result would certainly take place, even if the defendant did not in fact want it to happen, the defendant would be deemed to have intended it. Thus if, for instance, a pilot wants to destroy an enemy munitions factory to slow down the war effort, but the munitions factory is located so as to make inevitable the deaths of scores of children in an adjoining school, the pilot may well be found to have intended their deaths, even if he desperately prayed that they would all be safe 7(Singer & La Fond 2010). The policy behind the doctrine of oblique intent is fairly clear: the defendant is almost as morally blameworthy, or as much in need of rehabilitation or incapacitation, as the defendant who actually intended to kill the person he shot. The explanation can as well explain the transferred intent doctrine, Mary guilty of intending to hit John, but it will not explain her acquittal when she breaks the window. If anything, she is more morally culpable (and in need of rehabilitation or incapacitation) than a person who actually intends to break a window. Only adherence to the statutory meaning of mens rea and the view that this outcome is mandated by the principle of legality can explain that result 8(Statsky, 2000). Limitations of transferred intent Whenever a person intends to harm, but because of bad aim or other cause the intended harm befalls another, the intent is transferred from the intended victim to the unintended victim. This is referred to as the policy of transferred intention. If John Defendant observed a neighbor who was burning the American flag and in anger shoots at him, missing him but killing William, the doctrine of transferred intent permits prosecution of defendant as if he intended to kill William. There are restrictions on the principle of transferred target. First, the damage that essentially results ought to be related to the anticipated harm. If the harms are significantly different, then the intent does not transfer. For instance, if A throws a baseball at B’s window, hoping to break it, and the ball instead hits C in the head and kills him, it cannot be said that the intent to break the window transfers to C and that A can be punished for intentionally killing C. person A may be criminally liable for a lesser crime, such as involuntary manslaughter, depending upon the amount of negligence involved; but he is not responsible for intentionally causing C’s death 9(Hall, 2008). The second limitation on the doctrine is that the transfer cannot increase the defendant’s liability. This is to mean that any defenses the defendant has against the intended victim are transferred to the unintended victim. For instance, A shoots at B in self-defense, but hits C, inflicting a fatal wound. Because A had a valid defense if B had been killed by the shot, then A also has a defense as to C. in this case A has committed no crime. In some situations a defense may only limit a person’s criminal liability to a lesser charge 10(Morissette 2008). Non-fatal offences against the person The law involving the non-lethal crimes against the individual is found in a hotchpotch of common law and statutory provisions. The major offences are: Offences Against the Person Act 1861 – wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent; Offences Against the Person Act 1861 – malicious wounding or grievous bodily harm; Offences Against the Person Act 1861 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm; Common assault; and Common battery. According to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 – wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent, “whosoever shall illegally and spitefully by any means injure or cause and serious physical impairment to whichever individual with intention to do some heinous physical damage to any individual, or with intention to resist or avoid the legal nervousness or detainer of whichever person, shall be culpable of an felony, and being found guilty thereof shall be legally responsible to incarceration for life” 11(Molan, 2007). However, according to section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, “Whosoever shall illegally and spitefully injure or cause serious physical injury upon any other individual both with and without any weapon or gadget shall be culpable of a crime triable either way and being found guilty thereof shall be legally responsible to incarceration for five years. By all means whoever injures or cause any heinous physical damage to any individual with intention to do some heinous physical damage.” The main difference between the two offences is the mens rea. In section 18 the defendant must have had intent. This makes it the most serious offence of the non-fatal offences. The mens rea to be proved by the prosecution in section 18 is higher. The difference between the two can as well be seen in the sentences available to the judge. Crimes with intent carry life imprisonment while others may vary between six months and five years 12(J. O'Riordan 2003). According to this Act, Charlie is guilty of causing fear to his ex-girlfriend and also wounding the blinded shopper. In one part, his ex-girlfriend anticipates immediate and unlawful personal violence being applied to her by her ex-boyfriend. On the other hand, he would be accused of wounding the shopper under the case of transferred intent 13(Allen, 2007). Assault and battery Actus reus The actus reus of an assault consists of causing the victim to apprehend immediate physical violence. The actus reus of a battery consists of the actual infliction of unlawful physical violence. The degree of ‘violence’ needed is minimal and can consist of the least touching of another. Touching a person’s clothing may amount to a battery, provided the contact is both unauthorized and capable of being felt by the victim 14(Routledge-Caven, 2004). Fatal offences – Homicide There has been a development of several specific homicide offences (which can each be committed in several quite distinct specified ways) that the result can only be as morally bewildering. Fair labeling would involve something of broad-brush approach and calls for questions of judgment as to when moral differences need to be marked by the criminal law. There ought to be good reasons, in terms of different levels of culpability or different contexts in which the offence is committed, justifying the existence of separate offences 15(Ashworth, & Mitchell, 2000). Case procedures When Charlie throws the stone towards his ex-girlfriend, who is standing nearby, his ex-girlfriend, is put in fear and thus Charlie is liable to his ex-girlfriend for assault especially because he intended to frighten her. Even though he never intended to frighten her, he is still liable. Furthermore, we find that Charlie uses harsh words accusing his girlfriend of being unfaithful. Even though words alone are not sufficient to constitute an assault, this case holds because the words were accompanied by an overt act of throwing a stone towards her thus adding the threatening character of the words. Thus Charlie is guilty of committing a crime and should be convicted of assault under the law of transferred intent according to section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. He is also supposed to be charged with assault for apprehending his ex-girlfriend and wrongly accusing her of being unfaithful 16(Stone 1999). Works cited: A. Ashworth, & B. Mitchell, Rethinking English homicide law. Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 143. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=sRUcEn7reu0C&pg=PA143&dq=Fatal+offences+against+the+Person+Homicide&hl=en&ei=gZNPTf2ALon4waH5ZGoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person-%20Homicide&f=false A. Best, & D. W. Barnes, “Basic tort law: cases, statutes, and problems”. Edition2, New York, Aspen Publishers Online, 2007, p. 48. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=c99CumsiZ1QC&pg=PA48&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false D. C. Brody, J. R. Acker, & W. A. Logan, Criminal Law. MA, Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2000, p. 189. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=2ipUSeStAzQC&pg=PA189&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q&f=false D. C. Brody, J. R. Acker, & W. A. Logan, Criminal Law. MA, Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2009, p. 89. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=6PW7vzhqK8C&pg=PA89&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false D. E. Hall, Criminal Law and Procedure. Edition5, London, Cengage Learning, 2008, P 56. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=KnBnknQAHlkC&pg=PA56&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=94hNTeauOcf14Ab6jY2oCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q&f=false E. L. Morissette, Personal Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals. New York, Aspen Publishers Online, 2008, p. 77. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=l6iJop96jRgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Torts+and+personal+injury+law&hl=en&ei=1AxNTcnFCYR4gbq45mnCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false Great Britain: Law Commission, A new homicide act for England and Wales: a consultation paper, The Stationery Office, 2006, p. 82. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=DIbEcxaYlNIC&pg=PT50&dq=Fatal+offences+against+the+Person-+Homicide&hl=en&ei=gZNPTf2ALon-4waH5ZGoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CE0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person-%20Homicide&f=false J. O'Riordan, A2 Law for AQA. Oxford, Heinemann, 2003, p. 30. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=YE5cnbhpilUC&pg=PA25&dq=Non+Fatal+offences+against+the+Person&hl=en&ei=JqhOTdb5NIWy4AaC_PGpCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=Non%20Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person&f=false M. J. Allen, Textbook on criminal law. Edition9, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 352. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=DDRzO7o14jEC&pg=PA351&dq=Non+Fatal+offences+against+the+Person&hl=en&ei=JqhOTdb5NIWy4AaC_PGpCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEEQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Non%20Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person&f=false M. Molan, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law. Edition2, NY, Taylor & Francis, 2007, p. 253. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=FFYoblPvRX8C&pg=PA252&dq=Non+Fatal+offences+against+the+Person&hl=en&ei=JqhOTdb5NIWy4AaC_PGpCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Non%20Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person&f=false M. R. Lippman, “Contemporary Criminal Law: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies”. Edition2, illustrated London, SAGE, 2009, p. 114. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=MGh70EYDws8C&pg=PA115&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CFwQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q&f=false P. S. Watson, W. S. McAninch, Guide to South Carolina Criminal Law and Procedure. Edition4, Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1994, p. 166. Retrieved February 7, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=Y0aKaW7s53oC&pg=PA166&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false R. Singer & J. La Fond, Criminal Law. Edition5, Aspen Publishers Online, 2010, p. 62. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=lcUbmtpzD2UC&pg=PA62&dq=a+case+of+hitting+a+third+party+with+a+stone&hl=en&ei=bBBNTZQFtS4gb8qpmoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=a%20case%20of%20hitting%20a%20third%20party%20with%20a%20stone&f=false R. Stone, Offences against the person. UK, Routledge, 1999, p. 194. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=eVprc0NVXdMC&pg=PA194&dq=Fatal+offences+against+the+Person+Homicide&hl=en&ei=gZNPTf2ALon4waH5ZGoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person-%20Homicide&f=false Routledge-Caven, Criminal Law cards. Edition4, UK, Routledge, 2004, p. 45. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=l9U9i2dwX1MC&pg=PA45&dq=Non+Fatal+offences+against+the+Person&hl=en&ei=JqhOTdb5NIWy4AaC_PGpCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CFUQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=Non%20Fatal%20offences%20against%20the%20Person&f=false S. L. Emanuel, Criminal Law. Edition6, New York, Aspen Publishers Online, 2007, p. 57. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=PTH_8p6kriIC&pg=RA1PA58&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=94hNTeauOcf14Ab6jY2oCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q&f=false S.L. Emanuel, Torts Caselines Suitable Courses. Edition 11, New York, Aspen Publishers Online, 2007, p. 14. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=PTM2N_4U7qgC&pg=RA1-PA15&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=94hNTeauOcf14Ab6jY2oCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CFQQ6AEwCTgK#v=onepage&q&f=false T.J Gardner & T.M. Anderson, Criminal Law. Edition10, London, Cengage Learning, 2008, p. 241. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=vzHQUDvsPr4C&pg=PA241&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=0hFNTePRDcit4AaS8MSoCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CGEQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q&f=false W. P. Statsky, Essentials of torts Edition2, London, Cengage Learning, 2000, p.28. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=bkJUdrW4SIAC&pg=PA28&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=94hNTeauOcf14Ab6jY2oCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCwQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q&f=false W. R. Buckley, & C. J. Okrent, Torts and personal injury law. Edition3, London, Cengage Learning, 2004, p. 117. Retrieved February 4, 2011 http://books.google.com/books?id=nuatCuF1vygC&pg=PA118&dq=handling+transferred+intent+cases&hl=en&ei=94hNTeauOcf14Ab6jY2oCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q&f=false Read More