Bradford City Football Stand Fire - Case Study Example

Bradford City Football Stand Fire 1. Question #1- In relation to Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, the Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW) regulations 1999, and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, and the errors and omissions associated with the activities of Bradford City Football Club, the directors, and employees of the club. Identify the prospective breach of law committed by each of the parties, explaining why each case specifies also breaches that you judge to be most serious. “A crime is an offence against the state” (Duncan 2004:4). In health and safety law, criminal accountability refers to the duties and responsibilities under statute, principally the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 that is also known as HSW Act. There are also sets of regulations like the MSHW regulations 1999 that give the minimum health and safety requirements expected of an employer. Both the HSW Act and the regulations are written in complex legal terminology, so in order to help describe them in a language that is straightforward and easy to comprehend approved codes of practice or ACOP and guidance notes are issued frequently (Duncan 2004). The HSW Act requires the business owner to carry out actions that are “reasonably practicable” (Perry 2003:8) in order to protect the workforce. The Act protects not only those who work permanently but also part-timers, casual workers and external contractors. It also includes those who may use your business premises or equipment, which may include visitors and deliver drivers (Duncan 2004). In the Bradford City Football Stand fire case, the fire happened in May 2008 and the result of the investigation reveals that the football stand is structurally unsafe. Smoking was permitted while large quantities of flammable rubbish were filled beneath the seats. Rear fire exist of the stand were locked and the crowd marshals were verified untrained and some of them are minors. On further inquiry, investigators found that the risk assessment had not been carried out and it has no safety management system or employing any fire safety officer. Even with an improvement notice from HSE, the management are still reluctant to rectify the problems and even argues that the improvement recommended is not reasonably practicable. Furthermore, Bradford City management still decided to hold the match despite of the perceptible risk threatening the safety of its employees and the public. As far as the HSW Act and regulations is concern, it is impossible to make any premises 100% safe and risk free. However, as a rule, they must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the business owner failed to act as a reasonable employer in all the circumstances and that the injuries were caused as a direct result of this failure. However, the burden of proof in respect of what is reasonably practicable in the circumstance rests with the owner. They would normally need to prove why something is not reasonably practicable at a particular point in time (Perry 2003). In Bradford City, the management used this argument to justify their neglect. They argue that despite improvement notices, they cannot simply remove the rubbish underneath the stand because it is not reasonably practicable. The reason according to them is the cost of dismantling the stand, which they cannot afford. However, despite of the notices and awareness of the facts, they still decided to host the event. This is apparently an act of total disregard to the public’s health and safety. Bradford City Football Stand is structural unsafe, back door fire exit locked, flammable rubbish in large quantities is kept under the seats, and more importantly, risk assessment had not been carried out. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 or MHSW sets down the requirements on employers to carry out risk assessments. It unambiguously demands for an employer to make an apposite and adequate assessment of risk to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed while they are at work. This means employer or person’s in control of the premises to ensure safe means of access and egress, and ensure that even persons that are not their employee (this includes visitors and spectators) are reasonably protected in respect of health and safety. Furthermore, they also need to ensure that their operations cannot harmfully affect any person’s health and safety. According to Perry (2003), the concept of risk assessment has developed over the years and has become an important part of the United Kingdom’s health and safety legislation (p.5). However, in forced laws are now self-regulatory and these regulations are no longer requiring telling employers what they need to do. In contrast, to being prescriptive, these laws and regulations set a framework for realizing goals so that employers can establish a solution that matches their organizations. Consequently, employers need to determine what the risks are and resolve it on their own. For instance, in relation to Bradford City Football Stand, the Fire Precautions at the Workplace Regulations 1997 and 1999 must guide its employer or management. Failure to carry out risk assessments may result to injury or death thus lead to compensation claims through the civil court or insurance companies. In case of accidents resulting from failure to conduct a risk assessment, employers can be fine £5000 or more for every missing or insufficient risk assessment. However, in the event that their neglect resulted in fatality, the Crown Court may ask for an unlimited fine. Risk assessment is also applicable in employing a young person. Employers are accountable and must take into account the experience, awareness of risk and immaturity of young persons, and the extent of health and training to be provided to young persons. Apparently, Bradford City Football Stand management did hire young persons (some were less than 18 years old) to work as crowd marshals which is a sensitive position, and did not even bother to train them on safety procedures. This is a clear violation of the MSHW Regulations 1999 Regulation 3 and 4 where respectively, it specifically demand that employers must take into account the immaturity of young persons and adapting the work to the individual, particularly to the design of workplace, and more importantly giving appropriate training to employees (Perry 2003:31). A building being structurally unsound is a great risk to the safety of any person. According to Collins (1993) referring to Brown vs. Lewis (1986) a committee of a football club were found accountable when a stand collapse because they hired an incompetent person to repair it (p.61). The case of Bradford City Football Stand is no different from this case and if fact much worse as they did not even attempt to repair it despite of the H & S enforcement authority’s improvement notice and demand for the performance of risk assessment. Moreover, the Bradford’s directors who allegedly considering the notice took an unreasonable decision to let the match proceed without any additional safeguard. In addition, let us take into consideration the Bradford City Football stand’s structure and materials. According to Rasbash (1993), the stand is on the side of hill with a wooden fence 1.5m high and above it was timber seats affixed to a timber frame. Let us not forget to mention that below the fence were polypropylene seats fixed to concrete. Access to and from the seating sections is through a long corridor extending to the back of the stand. More importantly, since as we mentioned earlier that it was erected on a hill, the sloping ground created a void underneath the wooden floor. Consequently, rubbish coming from spectators found their way through the gaps in the flooring and between the seats, and accumulated in void below through the passing of time. Lastly, the roof of the stand was made of close-board and was covered entirely with roofing felt (p.42). Undoubtedly, a wooden structure like this is not only structurally unsafe but a fire hazard particularly when equally combustible rubbish accumulated underneath. In fact, investigation reveals that fire started from the rubbish and the flame spread upward through the void under the floor, through the gap, and extends to the roof (Rasbash 1993:42). Consequently, when the fire broke off the number of casualties increased due to the poor escape routes and untrained young crowd marshals, which in itself is a violation of HSW Schedule 3 Section 15:14 for instruction, training, and supervision of persons at work. In HSE (1974) HSW Schedule 3 Section 15 8.1, it is a requirement that arrangement should be made for securing the health of persons at work or other persons with respect to any matter affecting their conditions. This includes structural conditions and stability of premises, proper access, and egress, cleanliness, temperature, lighting, ventilation, overcrowding, etc. More importantly at Schedule 3 Section 15:12, “taking of specified precautions in connection with the risk of fire” (p.116-117). In case of evacuation or emergencies, Regulation 8 of MHSW requires that the employer should nominate an appropriate number of competent persons to carry those procedures (Moore and Lakha 2006:451). Not only does the management of Bradford City is accountable to the breach of Health and Safety at Work but it is only fair to include that the HSE itself was also liable as they probably conducted an inspection before the incident and found potential fire hazard in the area. In practice, the procedure was to notify the management, which they did. However, they appear to be lenient about it and never made a follow up or prevent the stand from hosting an event until the recommended improvement is complied. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 consider it an offence when organization’s activities or management causes a person’s death. It can be a corporation, a partnership, trade union, or an employer’s association (c.19, 1:1a). The term “relevant duty of care” refers to duties owed by an organization under the law of negligence. For instance, a duty owed by an employer to its employees or to other person employed by the organization, people doing services for it, occupier of the premise, and people participating on its activities on commercial basis. The CMCH Act 2000 considers a gross breach of a relevant duty of care an offence punishable under the law. They are guilty if the way, which its activities are managed, is substantially violating the civil law of negligence (c.19:2). This means if a professional risk taker’s decision was made negligently, and led to loss, then he or she can sue. However, if he or she was employed to make those sorts of decisions then the person suing is also entitled to sue the decision-maker’s employer. Under this law, the guilty will be liable to an unlimited fine and publication of its own conviction and fine (Ministry of Justice 2007:2). 2. Question # 2- Estimate with reasons and supporting evidences of the fines imposed in broadly similar cases, the unlikely fine that Bradford City might have incurred if they had been guilty of breaching section 2(1) of the HSW Act of 1974. Section 2(1) of the HSW Act of 1974 is general duties of employers to the employees to ensure reasonably practicable health and safety measures at work. According to Collins (1993), the liability for injury through negligence may be shared by all people responsible (p.61). In Bradford City fire, the management claim that clearing the rubbish under the stand is costly as it would mean dismantling the structure itself. They cannot afford it and therefore not reasonably practicable for them. However, this is entirely irrelevant as far as the duty owed to spectators is concern since they can actually prevent spectator’s entry to the stand. As we mentioned earlier in the case of Brown vs. Lewis (1986), the football club was held accountable just because they hired an incompetent person to do the repair job. How much more if the management themselves are actually refusing to repair or do the necessary action to prevent an eminent disaster. Take for instance, the case of Fotherinham v Dunfermline District Council in 1985 where an employee was assigned to carry a sheet of glass that weighs 29.1 kg. The common law case was made out on the basis that the evidence was that such an awkward load was like to injure the average untrained employee. Although the Health and Safety Commission manual for handling loads is 75lb, the figure dropped in case of discomfort, difficulty of grip or centre of gravity being at a distance from the handler. The damages agreed for this very simple violation was set at £96,000. Another is Fraser and Greater Glasgow Health Board where a nursing auxiliary was injured when she was helping a fellow nurse in moving an elderly patient up the bed. The Greater Glasgow Health Board was found guilty of negligence liability for lack of training. The court maintained that the employer owed a duty of care to provide adequate and proper training for nurses. Liability was therefore established and they were fine £4, 155. There were also a number of cases where an organization was usefully prosecuted for failure to act in accordance with an improvement notice like the Health and Safety Executive v Gloucestershire Ambulance Service NHS Trust case (Mandelstam 2002:134). Analysing the case of Bradford City, they violated or breach at least four sections of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. For instance, they have failed to ensure the health and safety of their workers and other persons specified in HSW Section 1. Section 2 and 3 of the Act that sets out the duties of employers to avoid exposing to risk persons other than their employees. Section 7 makes similar provision as to the duties of employees. Although these sections are not basis for a civil action for negligence, violations with one of the above provisions of the Act are a criminal offence and it is triable in either way. The maximum penalty for a breach of sections 1 to 6 is £20,000 on summary conviction, or an unlimited fine on conviction in indictment (Mynors 2002:252). However, since the Bradford City case is also a violation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which is an Act, relying on the civil law of negligence their liability is probably greater or unlimited. An organization convicted of the new offence according to the Ministry of Justice (2007b), can receive an unlimited fine and a publicity order. The court can however set a remedial order to an organization and demand to address the source of the fatal injury (p.15). Normally, according to the guidelines of the Ministry of Justice, the court considers the sort of issues taken into account when setting fines under health and safety legislation. However, the court also recognizes that an organization is guilty of an offence of homicide. Therefore, the court decision usually reflects the magnitude of the offence and they already handed down very severe penalties in previous cases. For instance, a £1.5 million fine for Southall train crash in 1997. Another is the 2003 decision over Thames Trains and Network Rail where a fine of £2 million and £4 million respectively was imposed in relation to health and safety breaches resulting to a fatal train crash at Ladbroke Grove four years before. Health and safety breaches causing fatal explosion in Larkhall in 1999 was fined £15 million. The fatal derailment of a train near Hatfield in 2000 was fined £3.5 million (p.15). Therefore, fines are expected to be even higher in cases that are more serious. Normally, damages according to Collins (1993) will be paid to injured or harmed spectators in this type of incidents and dependants of those who past away. Damage claims for nervous shock resulting from negligence of responsibilities by the owner is not included. Take for instance, the attempt to claim nervous shock damages at the Hillsborough stadium disaster where 96 people were crushed to death at an FA Cup semi-final when crowds rush into the stadium. This is because the incident was shown live on television and consequently relatives of those who are injured who are watching it was traumatized by the horrible event. Those responsible were not the stadium’s management or employees but the South Yorkshire police who were dealing with the crowds at the match and the Sheffield Wednesday Football club and engineers who says that the ground is safe for the match. As a result, both parties accepted responsibility and paid compensation (p.62). However, not all claims for nervous shock are successful. For instance, the House of Lords and Alcock and Other v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1991) according to Collins (1993) decided who are eligible for this kind of claim. Unfortunately, most of the claims fail because their relationships with those who died or their immediacy with the disaster was not close enough. Moreover, even nervous shock claims caused by watching TV fails because of the code of the ethics followed by the television authorities that no suffering by a person will be shown (p.62). Bradford City Football Stand fire is undoubtedly packed with health, safety, corporate manslaughter, and homicide violations resulting to a great number of fatalities. If we are going to follow our assumption, their act of negligence is probably bigger than the above breaches or maybe more if we are going to examine it further. For instance, they were already notified about the improvement and they did nothing about it. In fact, they even argue that removing the rubbish is not reasonably practicable because they cannot afford it. Along with their childish alibis, they still push through with the match regardless of the eminent danger. They are aware of that rubbish are filing up underneath the floor but still allow smoking regardless of the potential risk. Moreover, they do not have a fire officer and hiring young and untrained employees. Lastly, the fire exit door at the rear of the stand is locked that is a clear indication that the management of Bradford City is not in anyway concern with the safety of its employees and the public. We can therefore expect that the court will impose very severe penalty and probably demand much greater fine from the respondent. 3. Bibliography Collins Valerie, 1993, Recreation and the Law, Published 1993 Taylor & Francis, ISBN: 0419182403 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, Great Britain Duncan Mary, 2004, Health and Safety at Work Essentials, Published 2004 Lawpack Publishing Ltd, ISBN: 1904053521 HSE, 1974, Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, UK Legislation (Health and Safety), /UK Parliament Mandelstam Michael, 2002, Manual Handling in Health and Social Care: An A-Z of Law and Practice, Published 2002 Jessica Kingsley Publishers, ISBN: 184310041X Ministry of Justice, 2007a, Understanding the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, Crown Copyright 2007, United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, 2007b, A guide to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, October 2007© Crown copyright Moore Tony and Lakha Raj, 2006, Tolley's Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Management: Principles and Practice, Published 2006 Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 075066990X Mynors Charles, 2002, The Law of Trees, Forests and Hedgerows, Published 2002 Sweet & Maxwell, ISBN: 0421590408 Perry Pat, 2003, Risk Assessment: A Practical Approach, British Standards Institute, Published 2003 Thomas Telford, ISBN: 0727731076 Rasbash D., 1993, Evaluation of Fire Safety, Published 11993 by John Wiley and Sons, ISBN: 0471493821 Read More