Iran and Nuclear Weapons - Research Paper Example

College: Iran and Nuclear Weapons Contents Contents Introduction 2 Factual Context of Iran and Nuclear Power 4 Global Community on Iran’s Nuclear Program 5 Discussion 7 U.S. Foreign Policy toward Iran’s Nuclear Program and Emergent Issues 7 Iran’s Actions that the U.S. Intends to Prevent 10 Saudi Arabia and Iran 12 Major Ethical Considerations 14 Realism in the U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations 16 Potential U.S. Policy Choices to Diminish Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities 19 Conclusion 22 Works Cited 25 Introduction With the shifting geopolitical environment globally, one of the most predominant issues of concern is the growth of nuclear production (Sagan 225). The cause of worry stems from a possibility of nuclear weaponry usage to demonstrate political power or supremacy over other nations or regions. Particularly disconcerting, is the capability of countries considered unfriendly or hostile, to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is one such country that has raised security concerns, prompting the involvement of other nations globally and within the Middle East region to counter the country’s efforts in the venture. Major global powers including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Russia, Germany, and China have over the years adopted a two-pronged policy on Iran (Davenport 36). The policy constitutes encouragement of Iran to participate in diplomatic talks, coupled with imposition of sanctions in the financial and energy sectors. The United States, through its foreign policy, supports these two approaches, but also warns Iran of possible military action in case of defiance. While the U.S. allies in the region including Israel and Saudi Arabia are supportive of these policy provisions, these countries call for stricter policies since they consider Iran to be a direct threat to their security and political standing. Of particular interest is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which wields immense influence globally in terms of politics and economic contribution. This influence has grown progressively since the Kingdom’s inception in 1932, owing to its administration of the origin of Islam and its enormous oil reserves. Saudi Arabia, however, feels that Iranian ambitions to gain this regional hegemony would be fuelled by its acquisition of elevated nuclear production capability. The latter, coupled with the fact that Iran has been proven to finance extremist terrorism linked to Shia Islamists, poses the greatest risk to Saudi Arabia’s security and political sovereignty. The perceived threat explains Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the U.S administration’s failure to take decisive action against Iran. America has shown reluctance to deal with Iran, despite the country’s continued non-compliance with United Nations (UN) sanctions. The U.S is expected to take critical steps to stop Iran’s nuclear production, if the strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia as a significant regional partner in the Middle East is to continue. Unless appropriate action is taken, there is a possibility that if Iran is allowed to build its nuclear capabilities, Saudi Arabia will acquire nuclear weapons to counter the perceived threat and safeguard its interests. Factual Context of Iran and Nuclear Power Although there have been suspicions and inconclusive assertions that Iran has a nuclear program focusing on more than energy production, the comprehensive account of the sensitive situation is best described by The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) findings. The IAEA, which monitors nuclear energy production in an effort to ensure peaceful use of nuclear energy, produced a comprehensive and incriminatory report on Iran’s program towards the end of 2011. The report was compiled from findings of research carried out by 10 countries independently, intelligence gathered from foreign scientists that aided Iran in developing its program, as well as, investigations carried out by the IAEA itself. The IAEA final compilation of findings explicitly stipulated that Iran is involved in activities pertinent to development of a nuclear weapon. Some of the activities outlined included, investigation into uranium cores and nuclear weaponry detonators, accompanied by acquisition of documented information on development of nuclear weapons from a covert network. The report further indicated that Iran is developing an original nuclear weapon design, while testing individual components of the same. In addition, the IAEA report noted that Iran is also carrying out computer simulations of nuclear blasts, compiling logistics for testing nuclear devices, and exploring engineering methods to make nuclear warheads. In a more recent report, the IAEA indicated that Iran held a 182kg load of uranium at 20% enrichment and 6, 357kg of uranium that was 5% enriched. This amount of enriched uranium can produce pure uranium capable of making seven bombs. It is also important to note that Iran is continuing to install nuclear material centrifuges underground, hence elevating its ability to enrich uranium quickly and in relatively large amounts. Global Community on Iran’s Nuclear Program As stipulated in the introductory section of this paper, the international community has been impeding Iran’s nuclear production through pursuance of diplomatic negotiations and enactment of economic sanctions against the country. In regard to diplomatic efforts, the P5+1, that is, Germany, France, Russia, China, the U.S., and the UK, presented a potential framework agreement on 2nd April 2015 (ADL para.4). The framework set possible parameters for the projected Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) treaty with Iran in regard to its controversial nuclear program. These restrictions, which were formulated after two years of negotiations between Iran and the global powers lay the foundation for consultations over the expected final agreement. The framework agreement proposes measures that the international community and the Iranians will take, with respect to Iran’s program when the final treaty is approved. Even though the proposed steps have been defined as the principal elements of a possible agreement, specific details can still be negotiated (Davenport 37). It is imperative to point out that both Iran and the U.S. published fact statements that outline the framework agreement, but there are differences between them. Nonetheless, some of the measures to which Iran has agreed, according to the U.S. fact sheet include: reducing the number of centrifuges to 6,104 from 19,000, limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67% for a decade and a half, and reducing the current stock of partly enriched uranium to 300kg. The U.S. further published that Iran has agreed to stop uranium enrichment at its Fordow plant for a 15 year period, during which the facility will be converted to a research center dedicated to the study of nuclear-physics technology. Another measures to which Iran has agreed involves the redesign and reconstruction of its reactor in Arak to ensure that it cannot manufacture pure plutonium for weapons. Finally, Iran has purportedly agreed to allow IAEA consistent access to every nuclear facility and suspicious sites, while implementing extra IAEA protocol that grants the agency higher access to information concerning the country’s nuclear program (ADL para.6). The P5+1, on the other hand are reported to have consented to suspending E.U. and U.S. nuclear-linked sanctions imposed on Iran, as soon as the IAEA verifies that the country has complied with all the necessary steps. If Iran fails to fulfill the agreed commitments, the sanctions will be reinstated and reinforced again. The U.S and other global powers also agreed to lifting prior resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program, put in place by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), when Iran completes all actions addressing nuclear issues. The P5+1 also agreed on execution of a new resolution by the UNSC, which endorses the framework and urges complete implementation, while leaving some policy provisions concerning nuclear weapons (ADL para.8). Discussion U.S. Foreign Policy toward Iran’s Nuclear Program and Emergent Issues Just like other global powers, the United States currently employs policy provisions that seek to impede Iran’s pursuance of the controversial nuclear program. A notable policy used by the U.S is the raising of costs, with the primary aim of ensuring that Iran cannot afford to continue running its nuclear program. The second policy employed by the U.S in the Iranian situation entails providing the country with incentives to forego its development and possible production of nuclear weaponry. In regard to raising costs, the United States has attempted to isolate Iran from its significant economic partners through use of economic sanctions. These sanctions have been both broad-based and specific to certain targets. Some of the wide-ranging economic constraints have been restrictions on the export of services and goods to Iran, as well as, preventing importation of Iranian goods or services into America. The U.S. has also called on allied governments to take similar measures, thus making it possible to isolate the country from economically beneficial associations. In terms of specific sanctions, the U.S. has targeted Iran’s energy sector, as well as, restricted movement of high-profile Iranian nationals (Geranmayeh 8-9). In addition, America has military capabilities within the Middle East region, which demonstrate that it wields the ability to take drastic action against Iran, if it pursues development of nuclear weapons. Despite the looming military threat and economic sanctions, Iran’s aggressive regime continues to survive and even increase its non-cooperation with the rest of the world. Concurrent with the incentives, sanctions, and the threat of possible military action, the U.S. has been an active partisan to diplomatic talks with Iran. A recent and notable preliminary step taken by America to engage Iranian authorities in peaceful and productive nuclear energy usage, involved negotiations over exchanging nuclear material. The negotiations which started in 2009 have not been successful thus far. The fact that Iran continues to enrich uranium is a clear indicator that these talks could fail to guarantee a positive conclusion. Diplomatic talks have proven unfruitful in the past. This is a failure attributable to the possibility that Iranian leadership gain domestic validity partly from opposing the U.S. and other global powers (Barzegar 22). In the year 2010, the United States revised the negative security provision towards Iran, instead presenting the country with both a chance and a threat in regard to the continuing nuclear program. In a department of defense (D.O.D) report exploring the status of nuclear development programs, the U.S. published declaration that it will no longer threaten nuclear attacks on states without nuclear weapon, as long as they are signatories to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). The removal of a nuclear weapon attack would only stand if these non-nuclear countries fully comply with the non-proliferation responsibilities stipulated under the NPT. In accordance with the report, the revised reaffirmation is expected to emphasize the security advantages of being in full compliance with the NPT. Since Iran is currently considered to be operating against NPT provisions, the U.S. has the implied right to use nuclear weapons against the country. If Iran willingly decided to comply with the treaty that prohibits increased production of nuclear material and consequent production of weapons, the U.S. would remove this threat (Katzman 46-48). Iran, however, responded negatively to this potential incentive; arguing that the U.S. posed a threat greater than their proposal. Iran’s Actions that the U.S. Intends to Prevent Judging from the current state of Iran’s program on nuclear production, it is beyond doubt that the country has made significant strides in acquiring the technology, equipment, and materials necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, efforts made by the international community such as economic sanctions and trade restrictions can only serve the purpose of slowing down the progress. These restrictive measures can also deny Iran the specific tools and expertise needed to advance nuclear weapons, like the ability to create small warheads and matching them to missiles. With respect to these concerns, the U.S. is expected to aid in preventing Iran from successfully producing functioning nuclear warheads. Although it has not been proven that Iran has made the administrative decision to create nuclear warheads, the evidence provided up until this point indicates possibility of such an undertaking. In addition, there is no guarantee that Iran would declare its nuclear program intentions, even if it follows the path to nuclear warheads’ production. As a result, the U.S. and its allies have a responsibility to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons. The U.S. is also obliged to dissuade Iran from strengthening its hostile foreign policy. This is because, if Iran acquired nuclear proliferation abilities, it is highly likely to engage in more aggressive confrontations with members of the global community that go against its interests (Chubin 2-3). Iran already possesses mainstream weapons that make it capable of attacking the U.S. and allied forced currently stationed within the Middle East and other regions within Europe. Consequently, if Iran gained the ability to produce nuclear weapons, the present threat would grow substantially. It is also important to point out the fact that Iran has been confirmed to be a world leader in providing state sponsorship to terrorist groups through both operational and financial support. Some of the groups that Iran has been known to sponsor include Hamas and Hezbollah. For this reason, Iran could share or sell its nuclear expertise or products to extremist organizations that pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the West. Iran would also pose danger to affiliates close to the U.S. within the region. For example, Israel is in extreme danger since Iranian officials have often declared that the country should not exist. Other nations whose security would be threated if Iran acquired nuclear know-hows include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. These countries already feel threatened by Iran’s hostile foreign policy and nuclear weapons would only aggravate the situation. In addition, if Iran is allowed to wield nuclear power, other countries in the region would rush to get the same privileges. This would cause instability in the already unstable region, causing significant global problems since the Middle East is still a principal energy source for the U.S. and the rest of the world (Luer 7). Saudi Arabia and Iran The regional policies currently wielded by Iran, coupled the country’s nuclear program make up the point of focus for most of Saudi Arabia’s present security concerns. As a result, these concerns also form a crucial part of the cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Some Saudi Arabia leaders opine that Iran policies are part of its long-term strategy to expand sectarian rule within the Middle East region. Others are of the opinion that the expansion is meant to empower Shia Muslims to the detriment of Sunnis who make up the greater populace of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Iranian leaders also feel that Saudi Arabia is attempting to maintain its authority within the region. Iran further criticizes the cooperation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with the U.S. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that there are lingering tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran that may escalate to unprecedented heights if relevant action is not taken. Although Saudi leaders have shown a relatively positive response to the agreements between the U.S. together with other P5+1 partisans and Iran concerning its nuclear program, the Kingdom’s officials remain highly skeptical about Iran’s ultimate intentions. The doubt is increased by the fact that Iran has continued to ignore security resolutions recommended by the U.N. As a result, there is no guarantee that the country will adhere to terms upon which it has agreed with the international community (Rauf and Kelley 9-12). The Saudi Arabia cabinet views the projected agreement with Iran on its nuclear program as a crucial step in the efforts to develop an ample solution to the Iran problem. The Kingdom’s principal concern is to ensure that negotiations conclude in a Gulf region and Middle East without weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia also upholds the belief that with adequate restrictions on nuclear production, countries in the region can get the opportunity to use nuclear energy in a peaceful and productive manner. Such peace and energy opportunities are, however, not possible if there is still no final, definite and legally binding agreement. If Iran continues stalling diplomatic solutions, ignoring extant security provisions and interfering with governance affairs of other Arab countries, all while failing to respect their sovereignty, there is a possibility that nations like Saudi Arabia may feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons to protect themselves from possible military intrusion (Guzansky 13). The possibility of Saudi Arabia seeking its own nuclear capability is further emphasized by the argument that, it would be impossible for the U.S. and international community to grant Iran a deal on its nuclear program which other Arab countries do not deserve. This implies that, if Iran is granted the approval to continue with its program, albeit at a limited capacity, then Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries would deserve a similar chance. Some Saudi leaders also note that U.S. leniency in dealing with the Iranian situation may act as an indicator of better U.S.-Iran association. Closer relations between U.S. and Iran would, in turn, weaken the foundation for U.S.-Saudi cooperation. Such an association shift would also signal empowerment of Iran to increase its assertiveness within the Gulf region and possibly, the entire Middle East. This would most probably prompt Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab nations to take radical measures, so as to ensure that their sovereignty, together with the integrity of their territories is not compromised by increased Iranian power. This is especially due to the fact that Iran has demonstrated hostility towards other countries in the region, and shown blatant ignorance of nuclear restrictions imposed on it (Kerr 18). Major Ethical Considerations There is a wide array of moral concerns that justify immediate action by the U.S. and its allies against Iran and its nuclear program. For example, the Iranian administrative regime is widely known for its forceful suppression of political opponents. The governing regime cruelly subdues any person or group that opposes its intentions or ideologies. For example, in the year 2009, opposition supporters were attacked by security forces, as they demonstrated in protest of the doubt-filled presidential election results. Several people were shot dead in the course of the protests, while others died while in custody after being arrested at the rallies. In another incident in 2011, the government’s security forces violently stopped demonstrations aimed at showing solidarity with individuals rising against dictatorial regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. These incidents are clear indicators of the current regime’s willingness to use violence even against its people, in an effort to further its agenda (Sebenius and Singh 53-54). In addition to the cruel repression of opposing individuals and groups, Iran’s regime serves as a primary contributor to extremism, terrorism, and destabilization not just in the Middle East, but throughout the world, as well. The country is a leading sponsor of these vices, as it provides monetary support and even training for groups that perpetuate terrorism including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and Hamas, among others. There is also a predominant belief that Iran is responsible for the heightened insurgence of Shia militia in Iraq. Iran has over the years campaigned against Israel and Judaism, having played a role in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as well as, that of a Jewish community center in the same place in 1994. The Iranian regime’s leaders have even gone to the extent of calling for complete destruction of Israel. Moreover, Iran’s government supported Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, in his administration’s violent suppression of rebel forces and citizens opposing his leadership (Anonymous 298-299). The Iranian government is also infamous for its violation of basic human rights. For example, the country’s citizens are denies freedom of assembly, speech, press, and even religion, especially those who go against Shiite Islam, which is the country’s official religion. There is open brutal suppression of rights of women, ethnic and religious minorities, and political opponents, among other vulnerable groups. All these ethical violations point to Iran’s political regime’s tendency to undermine people’s rights and basic humanity, as well as, other countries’ sovereignty. The current Iranian regime poses danger to other countries within the Middle East and beyond, since it does not shy away from use of terror and violence to gain political power. These threats would undoubtedly be elevated if Iran gains nuclear capabilities and is not controlled by strict restrictions (Abulof b 691-692). Realism in the U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations It is beyond doubt that the rise of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons would be amongst Saudi Arabia’s key threats. Since the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic has primarily posed an ideological threat to the Kingdom. Iran has, however, progressively gained the courage of openly and boldly opposing the West (Mason 32). In addition, the Saudi Arabia government structure is increasingly being forced to wrestle with Iran for control and influence in various war-torn countries in the region, such as Bahrain, Palestine, Yemen, Lebanon, and even Syria, in the most recent conflict. In virtually all of these cases, Saudi Arabia has cautiously depended on the U.S to gain required influence, but this approach seems to be placing the Kingdom at a potentially more dangerous position, considering Iran’s blatant defiance against the West. The Saudi Arabia administration is also starting to argue that the U.S. government is not adequately playing its role to defend its stance and that of its allies against Iran’s nuclear program (Mason 34). Saudi Arabia’s biggest concern is that, although the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran may not necessarily pose a direct threat to its territorial integrity, it would make Iran bolder and increase its involvement in the extended regional conflicts. As a result, Iran would be in a better position to gain respect from smaller states in the Gulf region, subsequently undermining the Kingdom’s claim to influence in region considered strategically important to the world. Even more threatening is the possibility that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities, the move might evoke appreciation from unhappy members of various Arab nations, who support Iran’s stance against the West. This may, in turn, force Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons to try and sustain its influence in the region (Mason 36). Also part of the fears outlined in the previous paragraphs is the thought that there would be a U.S.-Iran agreement with the respect to the nuclear crisis, resulting in a better bargain than Saudi Arabia currently has with its Arab allies. It is as a result of the actual and perceived threats that the Saudi government has publicly campaigned for a Gulf region and Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. Saudi officials also believe that diplomatic negotiations between U.S and Iran constitute a waste of time and Iran is simply using the talks as a delay tactic. Further, although Saudi Arabia has called for the United States to take military action against Iran, the Kingdom is still skeptical about military destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is because there is a possibility that Iran may become bold enough to strike back at the Gulf nations. Such an attack may also increase Iran’s desire to develop and perhaps even use nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia also suspects the United States’ waning support following the numerous populist revolutions that characterized the Gulf region. This is especially after the American government seemingly abandoned Egypt’s then incumbent president Hosni Mubarak. Saudi Arabia has deep concerns that Iran could take advantage of the chaos to increase its political reach (Bolan 155). These concerns explain why Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has shifted towards attempting to contain the spread of Arab revolutions into Gulf nations, while trying to reduce Iran’s influence by supporting Syrian rebel fighters. Saudi is also increasingly focusing on increased assurance and renewed diplomatic agreements from the U.S. The calls for revival of association with Washington are aimed at expeditiously resolving the nuclear crisis in Iran, in order to lay the foundation for a more secure Gulf region (Barzegar 23-24). If the U.S. fails to make appropriate renewed pledges with Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom could be forced to seek other international alliances, just like it did following the political alliance of Arab states when President Nasser was in power in Egypt. The most logical partners for Saudi Arabia in the modern world are the main importers of oil and its hydrocarbon derivatives in Asia. However, the possibility of such an alliance would largely depend to some degree on whether the U.S. and regional Saudi rivals like Iran manage to match policies on security and other major concerns in the GCC. Potential U.S. Policy Choices to Diminish Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities A principal policy option that the United States can adopt to reassure Saudi Arabia of its commitment to their association is to take precise military action. The primary priority of the U.S is to ensure that the Iranian nuclear program comes to an end, without getting involved in the country’s internal affairs. The U.S. could, therefore, focus its attention toward strategic, precise military action solely aimed at the destruction of the country’s nuclear facilities. This could be achieved using targeted strikes, cyber-attacks, or location specific drone attacks. Such action would send a clear message to rogue or hostile nations globally that, proliferation of nuclear materials or weaponry is unacceptable. Such a policy could also convince the Islamic Republic to cease pursuing the nuclear program with the intention of creating weapons. It could also bring destruction to the country’s nuclear capabilities, setting the program back by several years and giving America and allied nations, adequate time to explore alternative diplomatic, economic or military actions (Abulof 405-407). Alternatively, the U.S. could deny Iran military gains by applying additional military pressure on the country for its nuclear program. The U.S. can achieve this by demonstrating its military power in the Middle East and other areas where American and allied forces are stationed. This would effectively convey to Iran the message that investing further in its nuclear program could not improve security. In addition, such show of military capabilities by the U.S. could show Iran that there is increased risk to the regime’s power and the country’s security. This is because there would be a looming threat of destruction to the country’s nuclear infrastructure (Bowen and Brewer 924). Another plausible policy, however radical, entails overthrowing the current Iranian regime. This is because it has become apparent that the government is hostile and cannot be convinced to avoid pursuance of nuclear weapon development. Even though the regime might agree to the most recent outcomes of nuclear talks with the P5+1, there is no guarantee that it will comply to stipulated terms. The regime has previously shown brazen ignorance of policy provisions and restrictions. It has also demonstrated willingness to use violence and terror to dominate, propel its hostile agenda forward, as well as, threaten the security of sovereign nations. These factors suggest that, as long as the present Iranian administration continues to hold governance power, the U.S., the Middle East, and possibly the world may not be guaranteed of safety (Dobbins 38). In the event that the proposed military actions are deemed too radical to resolve the Iranian crisis, the U.S. could apply the policy of providing Iran with incentives. The U.S. could reverse prior policies and take on diplomatic measures to support political legality of Iran’s government, while facilitating integration of the country into future security activities of the Gulf region. For instance, from the economic front, the U.S. could lift certain economic sanctions and cease freezing Iranian assets presently held in America. Avoidance of the military action option may help Iran’s regime alter its perception of threat, thus gradually strengthening reform, encouraging political debate, and paving way for a diplomacy-based termination of the nuclear program (Dobbins 39). Although viable, this policy provision is highly difficult to execute since the Islamic Republic has shown limited interest in reaching a positive conclusion to diplomatic negotiations. Such a move would also be impeded by the Iranian regime’s hostility and aggressive inclinations. Conclusion As can be discerned from the extensive discussion, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has close security and defense links with the U.S. These connections are rooted in long-standing economic interactions, military training arrangements, and collaborative initiatives to counter terrorism, as well as, provision of high-value weaponry to the Saudis by the Americans. Currently, the U.S. foreign policy attempts to ensure coordination with Saudi government officials and other allied nations in the Gulf on regional issues, helping them deal with domestic security and economic issues. These countries also share security challenges, with the most notable of them all currently being the Iranian nuclear program. The program poses a significant risk to Saudi Arabia’s security in addition to that of other nations within the region. The reluctance of the United States to take decisive action against Iran has prompted Saudi Arabia to question the practicality of U.S. foreign policy and the country’s commitment to Saudi-U.S. dealings. The ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia would be hard and expensive for both sides to replace or break. The two countries should, therefore, make an effort to strengthen these ties. Despite the disparities in preferred strategies and tactics to deal with prevailing security issues, the U.S. and Saudi should strive to maintain their bilateral coordination. The U.S. should strive to resolve the Iranian nuclear program crisis in a manner that clearly declares its stand without ambiguity. Failure to be clear-cut in dealing with the sensitive issue may force Saudi Arabia to pursue an independent path on certain issues. This is particularly due to the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wields both the financial capacity and strategic motivation to pursue acquisition or development of nuclear capabilities. Further, owing to Saudi Arabia’s role as an influential player in the unstable Gulf region and greater Middle East, Iran might pose a significant threat to the Kingdom. These implications show that Saudi Arabia is financially capable yet directly and indirectly vulnerable to powerful regional security threats like Iran. As a result, if Iran is allowed to wield nuclear capabilities, Saudi Arabia will be forced to acquire nuclear weapons, in order to prevent potential aggression and equip Riyadh with the ability to retaliate if this hostility escalates to war. Works Cited Abulof, Uriel (a). Revisiting Irans Nuclear Rationales. International Politics, 51.3 (2014): 404-415. Abulof, Uriel (b). Nuclear Diversion Theory and Legitimacy Crisis: The case of Iran. Politics & Policy, 41.5 (2013): 690-722. 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