Khomeini vs. the International Community - Research Paper Example

?Khomeini vs. the International Community Introduction This paper shall discuss the rule of Khomeini in Iran, in particular, the US-Iran hostage crisis. This paper would first consider the impact of the crisis on the US-Iran relations while also discussing its main players; Jimmy Carter and Khomeini. Theories that help explain the crisis and international fallout will also be tackled in relation to international relation theories. A discussion of the US and Iran foreign policy would also be considered. Iran’s rationale for the crisis would also be assessed, followed by a general discussion on how the crisis came about and how it ended. The consequences and the overall aftermath of the crisis shall be evaluated. This paper is being carried out in order to establish a clear understanding of the US-Iran relations, especially during Khomeini rule and after the Iran hostage crisis. Iranian Revolution The Iranian revolution involves the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Demonstrations and protests were started in October 1977 mostly against what was viewed by the people as the oppressive and corrupt regime of Pahlavi (Kurzman, 2004). These protests escalated into a widespread civil disturbance leading into January 1978. These strikes severely compromised the stability of the country and culminated in the exile of Pahlavi by January of 1979 (Kurzman, 2004). Two weeks later, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and the regime of Pahlavi collapsed a month after Khomeini’s return. After a few months, a referendum was held and resulted to the establishment of the Islamic Republic under Khomeini’s Supreme Leadership (Kurzman, 2004). Khomeini’s victory Iranian religious leader and politician Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was a charismatic and independent leader and was able to write about and establish various religious and political teachings and standards, which have managed to stir Iran towards the international market. Ever since, he expressed his support for the Iran hostage crisis, and has authorized various human rights violations against Iranians, especially political activists that voiced opposition. His strength and influence as a leader was persistent; and he was considered one of the strong advocates for Islamic revival. His ideals however were largely objected to by the international community, especially in the face of human rights violations and other actions which were against international human rights and related laws. Khomeini was in exile before the revolution broke out, and when he finally returned to Iran, it was to a victorious revolution and to the highest political seat in Iran. He was lauded as a political and religious leader. Even if he was not involved directly in the revolution, he was a major part of it (Moin, 2000). His letters and messages spurred the revolutionary ideals of the Iranians who were not faring well under American-supported Shah Pavlavi. Khomeini, in other words, represented a leader for Iran who was committed to the revolutionary ideals, which the people were clamoring for (Chauvel, 1979). Hostage crisis background Before the US-supported Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979, Iran relations and US were more or less diplomatic (Christopher and Mosk, 2007). At that point, the US considered itself an ally of Iran and the Shah. President Carter was especially expressive of his support for the Shah, even if in actuality, the latter was highly disfavored by the people (Scott, 2000). The revolution by the people against the Shah eventually led to the unseating of the Shah. The US persisted in its support for Shah Pavlavi by allowing him entry into the US for cancer treatment. However this backfired on the U.S. at it led to strong anti-American sentiments from the people of Iran who wanted the Shah to be returned to their country to face trial for his crimes against his people (Scott, 2000). The tension between the US and Iran reached its peak when 52 Americans were held hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran by Islamist students and militants. These students demanded for the US to return Shah Pavlavi to their country. The US, in the person of President Jimmy Carter however did not wish to negotiate with these hostage-takers, labeling them as terrorists and anarchists (O’Reilly, 2007). A failed rescue attempt by the US further created tension between these two countries. The Americans were held hostage for 444 days; and were released after the Algiers Accord was signed in Algeria. US-Iran relations since and how the hostage crisis impacted it Due to this hostage crisis, the relations between the US and Iran became tenuous. Iran resented the US interference in Iran’s affairs during the Shah’s unpopular regime, and the US did not favor the actions and the leadership of the revolutionary group (Daniel, 2001). James Carter of the US and Khomeini of Iran were the main players in the hostage crisis. Carter was looked upon as the leader of the free world who was highly supportive of the Shah’s actions, and Khomeini was the revolutionary leader seeking to depose and take over the Shah of Iran. Jimmy Carter handled the crisis poorly and weakly. At first, the US was supportive of Carter’s decision to not give in to the terrorist demands. However, he also did not consider other alternatives for the hostage takers to consider during negotiations (McDermott, 2001). In effect, a deadlock resulted and the hostage crisis dragged on for more than a year. The botched rescue attempt did not help matters in any way. In fact, it showed US incompetence and also fueled Iran’s anger against the US (McDermott, 2001). Carter represented a leader who was willing to turn his back on the injustices which the Shah was perpetuating in exchange for continued diplomatic relations, and control over Iran (McDermott, 2001). In effect, Carter became significantly unpopular among Americans towards the end of his term, especially with the prolonged resolution of the hostage crisis (McDermott, 2001). His weakness and his poor handling of the crisis were considered one of the primary factors causing his defeat against Reagan. Khomeini on the other hand, manifested a strong picture of leadership. He was very much supportive of the hostage crisis and anti-American sentiments (Moin, 2000). Khomeini also did not show any hint of compromise during the hostage crisis; in fact, he justified their actions by declaring that America also held Iran hostage in 1953 (Brumberg, 2001). In considering the overall actions of President Carter and of Khomeini during the hostage crisis, Khomeini appears to have handled the crisis better than his American counterpart. Moreover, Khomeini was able to display the qualities of strong and effective leadership, qualities which President Carter seemed to lack in the face of a major political and diplomatic crisis. With the end of the Carter Administration, tensions between the US and Iran eased but only to a minimal extent (DuBoulay, 2011). This however did not stop the US from tightening its terrorist and economic sanctions against Iran. Efforts to ease the tension between the US and Iran were attempted and sanctions against Iran were also reduced in order to ensure the easy passage of medical and humanitarian goods to Iran (DuBoulay, 2011). The September 11 bombings however altered their relations to one of hostility. The basic nature of their relationship to this day remains tension-filled, especially with numerous instances where the US expressed its grievances against Iran’s policies (DuBoulay, 2011). Analysts declare that the hostage crisis effectively pictured Iran in a very bad light, not only as far as the US is concerned, but also as far as the international community is concerned (Amanpour, 2009). These analysts noted that Iran made a picture of untrustworthiness during the crisis. Iran could not make up its mind and their actions depicted a country which negotiated in bad faith, and one which was only concerned about its internal circumstances, ignoring any other considerations (Amanpour, 2009). This was considered Iran’s legacy after the revolution, and this legacy has not yet been disproved as far as the US and the international community is concerned. As a result of this negative perception of Iran, the US was already considering how to deal with Iran. Some lawmakers were considering opening relations again with Iran, however, these lawmakers represented the minority (Amanpour, 2009). At some point, even some lawmakers considered implementing changes in the Iran regime, a move which was discounted immediately because it was akin to the 1953 actions of the US which eventually sparked anti-American sentiments (Amanpour, 2009). During the Cold War, the possibility of opening relations with Iran was highly unpopular especially with Iran and the USSR’s mutual support of each other. In order to avoid any tension with the USSR, US-Iran relations remained closed. Nevertheless, in the years following the end of the Cold War, attempts have been made by the both countries to reopen relations (Amanpour, 2009). These efforts have not been successful. As a result, the tension caused by the hostage crisis has persisted to this very day. In fact, to some extent, this same tension is causing the escalation of the current political strain between these two countries. Based on this political strain, the US severed diplomatic relations with Iran. To date, the US has no formal diplomatic relations with Iran. As a result, no ambassadors have been assigned for both countries on each other’s territory with Iran maintaining instead an interests section at the Pakistan embassy in Washington, D.C and the US maintaining an interests section with the Swiss embassy in Tehran (Torbat, 2004). After the Iranian revolution, the US decided to freeze and seize about $12 billion Iranian assets, including bank deposits and similar properties. Commercial relations between these two countries have also been subject to sanctions; these products are mostly on the Iranian access of food, spare parts, medical supplies and American access to carpets and food (Torbat, 2004). These economic sanctions were originally set forth by Clinton, and later renewed by Bush. George W. Bush believed that Iran presented an unusual and serious threat to American national security. American companies have also been prohibited from trading with Iran and prohibitions for the purchase of Iran’s petroleum resources have also been firmly set by the US (Alikhani, 2000). The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) also declared penalties for non-American corporations investing more than millions yearly in the Iran oil and natural gas industry (Alikhani, 2000). Currently, sanctions against Libya were raised so the Act is now known as the ISA or the Iran Sanctions Act. Sanctions and actions against Iran have changed with each US President. Under the term of President Reagan, which was very much soon after the hostage crisis, the US assisted Iraq in its war against Iran (Everest, 2002). Although reports have been established that the US helped both sides, US assistance was extended to Iraq in terms of access to poisonous chemicals and deadly viruses like anthrax and the bubonic plague (Everest, 2002). The US even gave battle planning assistance to Iraq in this war and later publicly condemned Iran’s use of biological weapons. The CIA provided intelligence to Iraq, as well as plans for airstrikes and tactical plans (Reid, 2002). During the Clinton Administration, the US foreign policy placed an embargo on all Iranian dealings by American companies. This effectively ended all forms of trade between these two countries (Keddie, 2003). However, when the newly-elected president, Khatami called for more diplomatic relations with the US, a positive response was heard from the US government. For a while, freer travel and improved trading between these two countries resumed (Keddie, 2003). However, when Iranian conservatives declared their opposition against changes in Iranian policies, nuclear energy and terrorism, transactions between these two countries were again stalled. During George W. Bush’s term, the policy of the US against Iran was very much broken, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks and US declaration of its War against Terror (Khan, 2010). Bush went on to declare the countries he considered to be the ‘Axis of Evil’ which included Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Korea. He specified that the danger these countries posed were mostly based on their nuclear weapons and their weapons of mass destruction. Iran condemned this label, but this did not stop the US from flying its unmanned aerial planes over Iran in order to gain intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program (Linzer, 2005). Negotiations for diplomatic relations were once again considered in 2003 by the US, however the US did not respond well to the terms of Iran. The US still considered Iran a nuclear security threat and soon after started to send border incursions into Iran (Linzer, 2005). During Bush’s second term, the US further considered initiating a massive military presence in Azerbaijan in order to gain entry into Tehran. This threat was ever present during Bush’s term. The US also made its responses according to the change in terms in Iran’s rulers. In 2005, Ahmadinejad was elected as Iran’s newest president. He was a conservative politician and religious leader. The US however, remained wary of Iran. In fact, they refused to issue a visa to a group of Iranians entering the US to attend a UN meeting; under UN member rules, all members must issue visas for UN members to participate in UN meetings, regardless of their political ideologies (Hunter, 2010). The Pentagon also created the Iranian Directorate in order to handle Iranian intelligence data gathered. Many US officials were also keen on launching a military attack against Iran (Alexandrovna, 2006). They believed that they could justify the attack under the principle of preemptive strike, especially with major speculations about Iran’s nuclear power capability. When Ahmadinejad sought to negotiate with the US in relation to its nuclear arms, the US did not entertain Iran’s proposal, declaring these to be publicity stunts and not genuine concerns about the impact of nuclear weapons (Hunter, 2010). The possibility of a military attack was strong during Bush’s term, but the unpopularity of the Iraqi war forced the government to consider setting it aside as a possible option. Nevertheless, the US was in full readiness to battle Iran if definite proof of its threat to the US and to the international community was ever proven. Aside from this military readiness, the US also resorted to other sanctions against Iran, including sanctions on an Iranian bank in 2006 after Iran was accused of supporting Shias in Iraq (Xinhua, 2006). The current president has also established its policies on the Iran problem. Obama’s current policy has been on seeking peaceful and diplomatic relations. It has invited Iran to be a part of the community of nations, but also to bear the responsibilities of being part of such community (Stephens, 2009). The US however expressed concern over Ahmadinejad’s controversial reelection, especially in relation to the suppression of the freedom of speech and allegations of widespread election anomalies. However, the US chose to not express any official declarations on the matter (Stephens, 2009). So far, Obama’s policy on Iran has been one which has been considered solicitous, incoherent, inconsistent, and some declare as obsolete. Obama has not taken a definitive stand on Iran relations, choosing instead to be noncommittal about Iranian relations. Iran’s foreign policy In Iran, the hostage crisis is considered as an official holiday and is considered a time for everyone to gather in public squares to express anti-American sentiments (Amanpour, 2009). However, the anniversary of the crisis is also used by other Iranians to express their sentiments against the government, especially with the recent presidential elections which they believe to have been rigged. The two countries remain deadlocked in their concerns and issues and the effects of the hostage crisis are significant for both sides even after 30 years after the resolution of the even. Iran’s foreign policy as far as the United States is concerned has also varied with each ruler. After the Iranian revolution and soon after the hostage crisis, Iran has rejected diplomatic relations with the US. As manifested above, US has reciprocated accordingly by also rejecting any diplomatic relations with Iran. Soon after the Iranian revolution ended, the newly established government of Iran established its political institutions which turned out to be largely influenced by Western philosophies, not so much by Islamic laws (Rasmussen, 2009). This created a confusing system. Khomeini was also bent on exporting his foreign policies which were considered to be confrontational. His policy also created a system which isolated it from the Islamic countries and from the international community in general. Under Rafsanjani’s regime, economic prosperity became his focus and he advocated improved international relations with other countries to achieve this (Katzam, 2011). He was able to place the economy back on track, but his strategy was highly unfavorable to the working class who later resented his reign and fought against his reelection. Khatami, a reformist leader followed Rafsanjani’s regime. Khatami’s policy also favored improved international relations with Europe and the US. After the September 11 attacks however, Iran was again placed under the American terrorist microscope (Katzam, 2011). This also prompted Iran to withdraw its diplomatic relations with the US. Iranian foreign policy is also shaped by various elements, including the national environment, the regional environment, and the global environment (Rasmussen, 2009). Pressure from the regional and the global environment increased after the September 11 attacks. The US and Iran has been fighting a form of trench warfare ever since the War on Terror was launched (Rasmussen, 2009). The rejection of the Bush Administration of any attempt on the part of Iran to open up improved diplomatic relations has also prompted Iran to adopt an ambivalent foreign policy towards the US. The US recommendations on the trade embargo and economic sanctions against Iran has also forced Iran to “further isolate and radicalize the new neo-conservative leadership of the Islamic Republic” (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 5). Iran has manifested signs of rationality in its general foreign policies. However, since the 9/11 attacks, Iran has been forced into diplomatic and political isolation. Any attempts at dialogue and diplomacy by Iran have been viewed with suspicion by the US. For which reason, anti-American sentiments continue to prevail in Iran and will also likely lead to more conflicts between these two states. International Relation Theories There are various theories which help explain the Iran hostage crisis and the relations between Iran and the US. One of the preferred theories is the realism theory, otherwise known as the political realist theory. This theory explains that the practice of state power is founded on realpolitik or power politics (Gold, 2011). Realism was established in response to the political idealism which always assumed human nature to be good. Realists on the other hand saw the world for how it really was, not for what it ought to be (Gold, 2011). In terms of international relations, realists are of the belief “that the international system exists in a state of anarchy – a term that implies not chaos or absence of structure and rules, but rather the lack of a central government that can enforce rules” (Gold, 2011, p. 41). Realists point out that although each state can set its own rules for their citizens in their countries, the international scene has no central authority to establish and to implement rules for international actors to follow. As a result, the power of one state can easily be negated by the power of another state. In these instances, these states must focus on self-help and on agreements with allies in order to ensure harmonious relations (Kemp, 1998). In the realist scenario, the state actors focus on the capabilities of other states and the threats they may pose. The US and Iran relations are not inherently good as far as dealing with each other. In fact, their instinct as far as the other country is concerned is one of distrust and wariness (Kemp, 1998). Nevertheless, still in accordance to the realist theory, both countries more or less comply with norms of behavior and shared expectations on what defines proper behavior. These countries are more or less on a mutual standoff, but they are also very much on a guarded behavior as far as the other state is concerned (Kemp, 1998). In other words, hostilities between these two countries may break out and when they do, it would not come as a surprise. Although the realist theory seems to be based on anarchy and on chaos, most states have agreed norms of behavior. Some of these norms include sovereignty (Gold, 2011). The reality of states is that they are all sovereign countries with their rights to self-determination and non-interference. The relations between US and Iran will therefore be difficult to ever settle without both countries voluntarily considering negotiations with each other (Gold, 2011). For as long as their relations are filled with tension, either country can insist on what he wants in his own territory without interference from the other country. Based on the realist principle, a state can also treat its people in any fashion and be protected under the principle of sovereignty (Gold, 2011). The international laws are only legal declarations, and without ‘police’ to legally implement these laws, these international laws will remain mere declarations. As a result, various states can often get away with their illegal actions under the protection of the principle of sovereignty. This was seen in the 1990s when North Korea declared that it would no longer submit itself to inspections of its nuclear facilities by other states (Gold, 2011). Other states pressured North Korea under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but North Korea withdrew from the NPT. North Korea justified its actions under the rule of sovereignty. To this day, North Korea poses a significant threat to the global community, especially to the United States which has been the main target of its anti-Western sentiments. This current application of the rule of sovereignty presents a difficult reality and norm in the international system. In the case of Iran and the US, the rule of sovereignty has often been cited by Iran for warding off the interference and the pressures of the US and the international community (Jordet, 1998). Iran has always been keen on using this against the US and once again, the difficulty of ensuring a more balanced application of sovereignty has been apparent. This is the reality of international politics. The Iranian revolution can be understood better when analyzed in the sense of revolutionary states causing conflict and war. There is a major relationship between social revolutions and warring with neighbors as soon as power is gained (Jordet, 1998). Social revolutions are also often used as a tool for gaining power. This was used by Khomeini in order to gain power over Iran; later Iran’s newly found power enabled Khomeini to enter into the Iran-Iraq War against Saddam Hussein. Before this war unfolded, the hostage crisis was carried out by Iranian vigilante groups controlled by Khomeini. This hostage crisis was meant to declare a new regime for Tehran, one which was decidedly anti-American (Wright, 2000). This crisis also served to embarrass the US in front of the whole world, making them look incompetent and vulnerable. The Iranian revolution served to increase the threat presented by the new regime (Jordet, 1998). These revolutions also caused confusion in the traditional systems and the recognized balance of power. In order to gain leverage over the other, opposing factions may often exaggerate their intentions against the other. Theories on revolutions help explain the hostility between the US and Iran, however, these theories do not explain the longevity of these hostilities. Other countries were able to resolve their issues with each other, and even to accept the rise of new regimes. However, none of these regimes have been heavily involved in significant diplomatic issues and problems with each other. Unfortunately, the US and Iran have had various issues on diplomacy, ideology, and similar issues. Moreover, anti-American sentiment has always been encouraged among the Iranian people (Wright, 2000). On the part of the US, Iran would always be considered a threat to democracy and to its peace and security. Iran was able to pull off the 1979 hostage crisis, and the US believes that Iran has been building and enhancing its nuclear arms, in clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part of the realist theory is the so-called Balance of Power theory (Turner, 2008). Neo-realists, declare that there are various assumptions which relate to their assessment of states’ behavior in the international system. These assumptions include the fact that states are sovereign and independent actors in the international system; secondly, this international system is highly founded on anarchy; thirdly, the accepted behavior under this system is that of self-help; fourth, that the behavior of states in the international scene is affected mostly by external elements; fifth, states are considered rational actors; and lastly, the international system is made up of states who have no central governing authority (Turner, 2008, p. 3). Beyond these assumptions, theorists establish opposing opinions in relation to the competing behavior of states under the realist system. Theorist Mearsheimer (2001) is more focused on the behavior of the powerful states and their need to gain power at the expense of offensive realism. He also declares that in an anarchic system, maximizing power is the only means of guaranteeing security and that great powers seek absolute power, not relative power (Mearsheimer, 2001). He also declares that these powers would be unlikely to share it. Under offensive realism, states are constantly seeking power and as a result, in a multi-polar and multi-power system, wars and conflicts often break out. Realist Waltz (1981) on the other hand advocates for his defensive realism theory. Waltz argues that anarchic systems are often involved in wars and that states always wanting power often invite aggression from lesser countries (1981). According to Waltz, states going to war can often believe that they would likely win and if they would lose, defeat would be unbearable. However, nuclear warfare they may engage in may cause catastrophic defeats (Waltz, 1981). In evaluating the US and Iran relations, Iran is seeking to flex its power against the US, which is decidedly the stronger and more powerful country. Gathering force and weapons, including nuclear weapons has given Iran and the US a sense of security and in order to secure their power, both countries sought to maintain their positions within the system (Turner, 2008). Balance has been achieved in terms of the actors involved within the system of anarchy. Waltz (1981) further explains that states seek to balance threats against them through new tools and weapons and for Iran and the US, they have both indeed sought to seek a balance in their tools and weaponry. Conclusion The Iran hostage crisis was the main trigger which completely broke down US and Iran diplomatic, political, and economic relations. The US support of Shah Pavlavi led to anti-American sentiments among the Iranians which then culminated in the Iranian revolution. This led to the entry of anti-American leader Khomeini and the end of American control and influence in Iran. Various hostilities between these countries have broken out throughout the years and these hostilities have only served to strain an already strained relationship. After the September 11 attacks, Iran faced the scrutiny of the US and this was not favored well by Iran. Any attempts by Iran and the US in establishing improved relations have not progressed well. In reviewing the theories of international relations, the realist theory applies well to their relations. 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