Business Law - Dabir and Edwina - Case Study Example

Introduction to Business Law: Case Studies PART A: Dabir The law of negligence defines the duty of care as the responsibility that one individual owes the other. This law was established in the case Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932], where the House of Lords sought to define the concept of negligence, by offering that an individual can be held responsible for the breach of the duty of care, even under circumstances where there is no contractual relationship between the parties involved. Under this case, Lord Atkin offered that a person owes his neighbor a duty of care to prevent a neighbor from incurring any harm, by defining the neighbor as the person who is directly affected by the action of the other (Shaman, 2000:77). In this respect, a car park owner owes the car owners a duty of care, owing to the fact that the actions of the car park owner, either in form of omission or commission will directly affect the car owners. Thus, under the case Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932], Lord Atkin provided that reasonably foreseen harm must be compensated. Under the case Dabir v. Uxbridge University, the University provides its staff with a parking lot, although on selective basis, to favor the staff that lives above 10 miles away from the University’s premises. Thus, Dabir, being a member of the staff of the Uxbridge University, parked his car on the available parking space of the university’s parking lot, but had his car stolen. In this respect, Uxbridge University owes Dabir a duty of care to protect his car while it is in the University’s parking lot, thus needs to compensate Dabir for the loss of his car. However, under the case Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2, Lord Bridge provided that although a person owes another a duty of care, the negligence case cannot be defined on the basis of a blanket excusal, owing to the fact that the other party might also be responsible. Thus, three set of terms were defined under this case, which must be fulfilled for the claim of negligence to hold. First, for negligence to be defined under any relationship, and for a party to be held responsible for the breach of a duty of care, it is required that there should be a close proximity between the person and the other (Maryland Law Review, 1980:185). Secondly, for a party to be held responsible for the breach of a duty of care; there must be a foreseeable ability of harm. The concept of the foreseeable ability of harm was underlined under the case Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078, where the house of Lords provided that a party can only be held liable for the breach of the duty of care, where the foreseeable harm is as a result of the conduct of the party, through action or omission. Thirdly, a party is only liable for the breach of a duty of care, under conditions that it is just and fair to impose the duty of care on that party (Smith, 1985:102). Thus, the case Dabir v. Uxbridge University must be assessed on the basis of these three legal provisions, to establish whether Dabir was owed a duty of care by Uxbridge University. To start with, Dabir is a member of staff of Uxbridge University, which means that there is close proximity between the university and Dabir, and thus the university should owe Dabir a duty of care, by protecting him and his property as one of the members of its staff. Secondly, the aspect of foreseeable harm in this case is also present, owing to the fact that the Uxbridge University had erected a sign warning the users of the parking lot that the university would not be responsible for the loss occasioned by the use of the parking space. Additionally, the security department of the university had received prior reports that three cars had been stolen from the university’s parking lot in the past two weeks. This is an indication that the university was fully aware that there was an eminent foreseeable harm of car theft that could occur to the members of staff using the parking lot. The final assessment related to the legal requirement of assessing whether it is just and fair to impose the duty of care on the university is affirmed. This is because, the Uxbridge University had employed a parking attendant to man the parking lot, and he was responsible for recording the cars parked in the parking lot against the staff records, while at the same time being responsible for lifting the barrier to let the cars out. In this respect, it is fair and just to impose a duty of care on the university, since the parking attendant owes a duty of care to check the record and verify whoever is leaving with a car, before it is moved from the parking lot. Thus, the three requirements of the breach of duty of care as provided under the case Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2 have been fulfilled. Therefore, the university is responsible for compensating Dabir for the loss of his car. Nevertheless, under the case Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 KB 532, the ruling provided that a sign erected on a parking lot warning the parking users of lack of responsibility by the car park owner on the event of any loss amounts to an offer, and thus by the car owners entering and parking their car in the car park even after having read the sign, amounts to the acceptance of the offer. Thus, since Uxbridge University had erected a warning sign on the parking lot, Dabir is assumed to have accepted the offer based on the terms set by the parking lot, and thus cannot hold the Uxbridge University responsible for his loss. Secondly, the parking was reserved for staffs that were travelling for more than 10 miles from the university, and it was later found that Dabir was only travelling for 9.95 miles, which makes him not eligible to use the university’s parking lot. Thus, due to these two conditions, Dabir cannot hold the university responsible for his loss, and thus is no due for compensation. Nevertheless, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 of the UK provides that liability for loss can be apportioned between the defendant and the plaintiff. Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 offers that where an individual suffers loss due to partly his fault, any claim on that loss shall not be defeated by the fact that the claimant was on fault. Thus, the loss shall be shared appropriately between the claimant and the defendant, but the claim cannot exceed the maximum value of the property lost (Fontenot, 1962:887). Thus, the conclusion of this case will be through sharing of the value of the lost car between Dabir and Uxbridge University, as provided under Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. PART B: Edwina Misrepresentation is a concept that has been defined under the English law as the situation where an individual has been lured to enter into a contract by another party either entirely or partly, through false assertions (Burrows, 2013:794). In this respect, misrepresentation is a ground for legal action by an individual, on the event that the inducement to enter into a contract through false assertions have caused the individual to incur certain losses. Thus, under the English law, misrepresentation claims can be made either under negligence or under the tort law. Section 1 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides that where an individual has been induced to enter into a contract through false assertions, then the individual has the right to rescind the contract, even when the contact had already been performed. Further, section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides that; where an individual has suffered loss arising from the performance of a contract that he was allured to through false assertions, then, the individual is legally allowed to seek for damages for the loss incurred. Thus, the case Edwina v. Uxbridge University campus bookstore is a case that falls under the misrepresentation aspect of the English law, owing to the fact that Edwina was induced to enter into a contract of purchasing the wrong book by the sales person of the campus bookstore, who falsely stated that there was no recent version of the by James Roll, causing her to purchase the book by Anne Roberts, published in June 2013, yet indeed there existed a new version by James Roll, which was published in 2014. However, the major complexity in the case arises from the fact that it is not possible to accurately determine whether the misrepresentation was an innocent misrepresentation or a fraudulent misrepresentation. Nevertheless, under whichever circumstances, Edwina had already suffered a loss, and thus ought to be compensated. Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides that the courts can offer the remedy of either rescission of the contract or the payment of damages in case of an innocent misrepresentation that was not intended by the defendant, but cannot issue the remedy for both rescission and damages. On the other hand, section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 offers that the courts have the option of issuing both rescission and damages, on the event of either negligent of fraudulent misrepresentation, both of which are foreseen by the defendant. In this case, the need for Edwina to be given the right book by the campus bookstore can be addressed under the provisions of Misrepresentation Act 1967, which allows the courts to either award her remedy in form of the rescission of the contract or in payment of damages or both, based on the court’s interpretation of whether the misrepresentation by the salesperson of the campus book store was innocent, fraudulent or negligent (Edwards, Edwards & Well, 2008:121). The courts will assess whether the sales person should have known that the 2014 version of the book James Roll was available, and if it is determined that the salesperson was aware, then, the courts will rule for the remedy of rescission of the contract or the payment of damages. On other hand, if the courts find that the salesperson of the campus book store was not aware of the existence of the new version, then, the courts will rule for the rescission of the contract, so that Edwina can receive back the money she had paid for the book by Anne Roberts. However, in relation to the issue of compensation for her broken arm, a different set of laws will be applicable. The case of payment of damages arising from misrepresentation is tackled under the case Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] EWCA Civ 12, where the ruling held that the claimant, who relied on false assertions when purchasing a commodity, was amenable for payment of damages. However, the case was also dealt in a different manner under the case Doyle v Olby Ltd [1969] 2 Q.B. 158, where the court provided that the plaintiff is amenable for compensation for all the damages occurring as a result of the reliance on the false and fraudulent assertions in the performance of a contract. Nevertheless, in order to qualify for the compensation of the damages suffered, the law requires that the claimant must offer a proof of various legal requirements. First, the law requires that the claimant must show that a duty of care was owed by the defendant (Edwards, Edwards & Well, 2008:72). Secondly, the claimant must be able to demonstrate that the defendant failed to exercise the duty of care he owed, as would be expected of a reasonable person (Burrows, 2013:795). Thirdly, it is required that the claimant must show that he suffered a loss and/or damages as a result of the breach of care by the defendant (Burrows, 2013:795). Thus, it is apparent that the campus bookstore salesperson owed Edwina a duty of care, and the salesperson had breached the duty of care through giving false information regarding the books and thus caused Edwina a loss, out of misrepresentation. Thus, Edwina is amenable for payment of damages for the broken arm. Nevertheless, even where these three requirements of the law have been fulfilled, the ruling under the case Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 [1940] provided that the concept of proximate cause must be proven in the claim for damages of loss caused by negligent misrepresentations. Thus, Edwina will be required to show that she suffered the breaking of the arm as a result of the misrepresentation by the salesperson of the campus bookstore. The ruling in the case Liesch v. The Standard Life Assurance Co. BCCA 195 [2005] offered that; where a claimant is able to show that the damages/loss suffered was as a result of the negligence of the other party, then the claimant was amenable for the payment of damages. Thus, since Edwina can clearly demonstrate that she suffered the breaking of the arm as a result of the stress she experiencing due to the misrepresentation by the salesperson of the campus bookstore that made him purchase the wrong book, the conclusion of the case is that Edwina will be paid for the proximate cause damages for her broken arm. PART C: Filippo The United Kingdom employment law provides for different grounds under which an employer may terminate the engagement of an employee, an occurrence also referred to as fair dismissal. First, an employer can terminate the engagement of an employee fairly, under conditions of statutory provisions, such as the laws that provide for the restrictions of employees for example after the attainment of a certain age (Towers, 2004:189). Secondly, conduct is another basis on which an employer can terminate the engagement of an employee, requiring that if the employees conduct is grossly wrong, then, the employer can terminate the employee contract (Upex, Benny & Hardy, 2009:27). Thirdly, an employer can terminate the employee’s engagement under the terms of fair dismissal on grounds of incapability and redundancy, where the employee has been proven incapable of undertaking his/her duties appropriately (Burrows, 2013:794). Nevertheless, under section 86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, an employee has the right to reasonable notice before he/she is dismissed by the employer. The case of Filippo v. Uxbridge University falls under the provisions of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which sets the grounds for which an employee’s engagement should be terminated. According to the employment agreement between Fillipo and Uxbridge University, the university was supposed to give Fillipo a 2-months notice of termination before he could be dismissed. In this respect, the fact that Fillipo was only given a two-week suspension and then summarily dismissed amounts to wrongful dismissal. Under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that employees have the right not to be unfairly dismissed by the employer. Thus, since the principal did not adhere to the employment contact that was signed between the university and Fillipo, fillip has a sufficient ground for raising a claim against unfair dismissal. In the ruling under the case Abrahams v. Performing Rights Society Ltd [1995] ICR 1028, the employment contract of an employee must be given sufficient notice of at least 1 month before termination or the notice period agreed under the contractual agreement, whichever is longer. Further, under Employment Relations Act 1999 the reasonable grounds for termination must also be given under the notice. In this respect, since the principle did not give a least the one month notice that is required by the law, and since the principle failed to adhere to the contractual agreement between the university and the employee, then, Fillipo has remedy in a court of law action, where he can sue for lack of sufficient notice for dismissal by the employer (Towers, 2004:190). The UK employment law also provides that the employer must provide the written reasons for dismissal to an employee who has been terminated, on the event that the employee has been working with the employer for more than 2 years, as provided under the ruling in the case Sajid v Chowdhury [2001] EWCA 1684. Therefore, owing to the fact that no such written reasons were given to Fillipo other than the one month’s salary, Fillipo has the fair ground for suing Uxbridge University for unfair dismissal so that he can either be reinstated, paid damages of the unfair dismissal, or both. References Abrahams v. Performing Rights Society Ltd [1995] ICR 1028 Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078 Burrows, A. S. (2013). English private law. United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 793-795. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2 Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 KB 532 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] Doyle v Olby Ltd [1969] 2 Q.B. 158 Edwards, L., Edwards, J. S. & Well, P. (2008).Tort Law. Cengage Learning. Employment Rights Act 1996 Employment Relations Act 1999 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 Liesch v. The Standard Life Assurance Co. BCCA 195 [2005] Maryland Law Review. (1980). Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, 185-191. Fontenot, F. (1962).Torts - Liability of Owner for the Negligent Driving of Automobile Thief. Louisiana Law Review 22(4), 886-889. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 [1940] Sajid v Chowdhury [2001] EWCA 1684 Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 Section 1 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 Section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 Shaman, J. M. (2000). Constitutional interpretation: Illusion and reality. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Smith, R. M. (1985). Liberalism and American constitutional law. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] EWCA Civ 12 Towers, B. (2004). The handbook of employment relations: Law and practice. London: Kogan Page. 188-190. Read More