Critically Assessing the Statement - Private Life Should Mean What It Says - Essay Example

Critically assessing the ment “Private Life Should Mean What It Says” Introduction The extent of a person’s act in his or her private life that affects his or her work has often been considered in dismissal cases. Cases involving fairness of a dismissal of an employee based on what he or she did in his private life have been put forth by the UK courts. This essay would critically assess if private life should mean what it says in that it can be isolated from what a person does in his or her work. It would first present the significant cases tackling the issue of private life, then would present commentaries on such interpretations by the courts. This essay would also present arguments which show that private life affects a person’s work. Pay v Lancashire Probation Service One of the known cases related to private life and employment is Pay v Lancashire Probation Service ([2003] UKEAT 1224_02_2910 (29 October 2003). This involves a probation officer, Mr Pay, who joined Lancashire Probation Service in 1983 ([2003] UKEAT 1224_02_2910). His work involved “the treatment of sex offenders” and even had a so-called “Sex Offenders Initiative” programme which he founded along with another colleague (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). This programme “ran successfully for a period of 4 years” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). His work with sex offenders was properly regarded “by his employers and by the courts” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). However, it was found out through an anonymous fax letter that he was a member of an organization called Roissy Workshops Limited (“Roissy”) that maintained a website, wherein Mr Pay performed the “fire act,” and merchandised products connected with bondage, domination and sado-masochism (BDSM) (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Mr Pay even admitted that “he performed shows in hedonist and fetish clubs” but argued that this would not bring him into disgrace (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Ms Mallabone, the Assistant Chief Probation observed that this material posted on the internet may relate such to Mr Pay and that such was “an unsuitable activity for a Probation Officer” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Ms Wyham to whom the matter was referred to, commented that the important issue is “whether or not as a public servant, and as a member of a criminal justice organisation working with sex offenders and other vulnerable groups, Mr. Pays activities in his private life, as depicted on the Internet are commensurate with his role as a probation officer and the public trust in him” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). She noted that there might be an effect as to Mr Pay’s disclosure of his relationship to Roissy especially “on victims who looked to the Probation Service for help” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). She stated that such website information may be ‘badly misinterpreted’” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). The Panel set forth the following reasons for his dismissal thus, “The Panel regards the nature of the act shown in the photographs presented and Mr Pays participation in those acts, and also the advertising material for Roissy Workshops Ltd, as incompatible with the role and responsibilities of a Probation Officer. The Panel further takes the view that involvement in such activities by Mr Pay is additionally inappropriate, having regard to his work with sex offenders. ... The Panel shares the view of the previous Panel … that the Probation Service has a responsibility to the public to demonstrate the integrity of its officers, and that public knowledge of Mr Pays activities would damage the reputation of the Service. The Panel does not accept that the decision to dismiss Mr Pay constitutes infringement of his rights within the Human Rights Act 1998. The Panel note that Articles 8 and 10 … are qualified rights, and that due regard must be had to the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedom of others. The Panel has deliberated upon the argument put forward on Mr Pays behalf that the Probation Service should have considered alternative employment for Mr Pay within the Service. The Panel, however, took the view that any such proposal was inappropriate, given its conclusion that the activities of Mr Pay had been found to be incompatible with the role of any Probation Officer” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Mr. Pay was dismissed on due notice, and in 2001, he challenged the legality of such dismissal using section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), arguing that such a decision violated his Convention rights, which law has been integrated in the domestic law or the Human Rights Act 1998 (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). The Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal did not accept Mr Pay’s argument that his right to private life under Article 8 and his freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were breached (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). The Employment Tribunal reasoned that “Mr Pays right to private life was not engaged, because his activities took place in public--in dance clubs, in bars and on the Internet” and even admitted that he “promoted the interests of Roissy in BDSM” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). It stressed that “respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings” (Niemietz v Germany 16 EHRR 97). The Tribunal also explained that Mr Pay did not contend that “the interference was not in pursuit of a legitimate aim” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Such an aim was specified in the letter of dismissal dated 23 October 2000 which states that “the Probation Service has a responsibility to the public to try and demonstrate the integrity of its officers and public knowledge of Mr Pays activities would damage the reputation of the Service” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Mr Pay’s work with “sex offenders and vulnerable people” further illustrates this aim (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). His freedom of expression, although interfered with, was not violated (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Hence, they ruled that “the restriction was proportionate, because his activities could damage the reputation of the Probation Service” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the decision of the Employment Tribunal stating that “Article 8 of the ECHR was not engaged and that the restrictions of his freedom of expression were proportionate to the aim pursued” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Further, it was determined that Mr Pay was not willing “to give up his connection with Roissy,” which is incompatible with the Panel’s view on the Roissys activities, therefore, there is no possibility that alternative work would be an option (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). Mr Pay in 2004 then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). However, this application was subsequently denied for the reason that “the relevant questions of principle had been resolved by the Court in a similar case, and the tribunals had applied the correct principles” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). X v Y [2004] ICR 1634 Another relevant case is X v Y (X v Y [2004] ICR 1634) involving the dismissal of a charity development officer working with young offenders and those at risk of offending, who were within the 16- to 25-year age group (X v Y [2004]). He had been previously arrested and warned for engaging in sexual activity with a consenting male adult in the café lavatory during his break time (X v Y [2004]). He signed the caution acknowledging that “he had committed a criminal offence contrary to Section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, as amended by the Sexual Offences Act 1967” (X v Y [2004]). The employment tribunal ruled that “disciplinary hearing was fairly handled” as “the dismissal was for a conduct reason (Section 98(2)(b) Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996) and that it was fair and reasonable for the respondent to treat it as a sufficient reason for dismissing him” (Section 98(4) ERA) (X v Y [2004]). As to the issue of whether there was “fairness of the dismissal,” the tribunal ruled that “it was within the range of reasonable responses to treat the conduct as gross misconduct and to apply the sanction of dismissal for it” (X v Y [2004]). As to the issue of whether the dismissal was in breach of the Human Rights Act, it explained that it “does not have the jurisdiction to make any declaration of incompatibility” (X v Y [2004]). It held that X “should have told his employers of his involvement in this offence and the caution that he received and chose not to do so even after May when he knew that he should have done strikes us as an acknowledgement by X that he did wrong in withholding that information” (X v Y [2004]). Hence it held that “whatever the rights and wrongs of any breach of privacy he acknowledges that he should have done so and chose not to do so” (X v Y [2004]). The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on the other hand, held that there was no breach of the Convention rights because the act was not done in private, but in a public lavatory, hence not covered by the “right to private life” (X v Y [2004]). It further explained that the dismissal was reasonable because of the significant role which the employee had with young offenders or those at risk of offending, and that the nondisclosure of the criminal offence he committed was significant to his employment (X v Y [2004]). The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of the EAT that Article 8 of the ECHR was not engaged, as “Mr X had committed a criminal offence and that the location of his sexual activity was accessible by the public” (X v Y [2004]). It explained that, “The applicants conduct did not take place in his private life nor was it within the scope of application of the right to respect for it. It happened in a place to which the public had, and were permitted to have, access; it was a criminal offence, which is normally a matter of legitimate concern to the public; a criminal offence is not a purely private matter; and it led to a caution for the offence, which was relevant to his employment and should have been disclosed by him to his employer as a matter of legitimate concern to it. The applicant wished to keep the matter private. That does not make it part of his private life or deprive it of its public aspect.” (X v Y [2004]). Commentaries Despite the above-mentioned cases, David Christie comments that there is a “lack of reported decisions” which makes it hard to recommend employers as to how tribunals would tackle different issues (2009). However, the already existing cases on unfair dismissal may provide guidance related to behaviour outside work (Christie, 2009). These cases involving “dismissals for behaviour outside work” are likely “to be highly fact-specific,” and have been criticized by “practitioners and academics” (Mantouvalou, 2008). In Pay vs Lancashire Probation service, the employer dismissed Mr Pay explaining that his activities in his private life (visiting fetish clubs and ran a website that sold merchandise connected with sado-masochism, bondage and domination) were “inconsistent with his professional role” as a “probation officer who worked with sex offenders” (2003). The decision of the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal was that Mr Pay’s activities were “in public” hence, “not protected by his privacy rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2003]). However, when this case was brought to the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, it held that “Article 8 was engaged” without clearly deciding on this issue (Christie, 2009). Later on, however, it decided that “the interference was justified and that there was therefore no infringement of Article 8” (Pay v UK [2008] EHRR 1007; [2009] I.R.L.R. 139). The jurisprudence used in the Strasbourg decision were Niemetz v Germany [1993] 16 EHRR 97 and Copland v United Kingdom[2007] 45 EHRR 37, where it explained that “privacy rights guaranteed under Article 8 include a social dimension.” It espoused the idea that there should be freedom in developing relationships with other people, unless there is justification by law or is “necessary in a democratic society” that there be interference on this freedom (Christie, 2009). This notion is significant especially in social networking wherein such activity is done by the employee outside or away from his or her workplace (Christie, 2009). Edward Brown was one of those who studied rulings of authorities wherein tribunals and courts upheld the dismissal of employees’ in relation to their “behaviour in their private lives” (Brown, 2008). These cases considered issues determining “whether the employees behaviour outside work has breached the employer’s rules” (Hadjioannou v Coral Casinos Ltd[1981] I.R.L.R. 352) and the possible impact of such behaviour of an employee in relation to “other members of the staff (Matthewson v R B Wilson Dental Laboratory Ltd [1988] I.R.L.R. 512). Other factors include the tribunal’s determination as to the extent upon which “the employees behaviour away from work is thought to be consistent with his professional role” (Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] I.R.L.R. 129). In Laskey v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39, the ECtHR ruled that there was “no violation of Article 8 where applicants were imprisoned as a result of sado-masochistic activity in private between consenting adults” (1997). It reasoned that the interference on the private life made by a public authority, was “in accordance of law” and in the pursuit of a legitimate aim, that is for the protection of health and morals (Laskey v United Kingdom (1997). Because of the increasing significance of online profiles, dismissing employees based on such online profile may spur “moral and human rights issues,” as well as data protection issues (Christie, 2009). Courts have not yet addressed this situation wherein the dismissal commences the moment the employer discovers such profile (Christie, 2009). The extent that employers can dismiss or subject an employee to disciplinary action for online materials, need to be addressed (Christie, 2009). Questions as to whether employment can be threatened by opinions that were expressed when the employee was a teenager or old party photos should also be delved upon (Christie, 2009). Social networking sites makes trivial issues preserved. For instance, “an employee letting off steam about his boss on a social networking site” creates a “potentially permanent digital record” as compared to a mere “transitory experience” which may be forgotten (Christie, 2009). Because of the amount of personal information which may already be posted in the internet, employers may still use this in a different context than that originally posted (Christie, 2009). David Christie puts forth some questions such as the extent that courts and employment tribunals will be able to protect individuals with their online profiles, if they would protect people from the damaging effects of the information that they have published voluntarily (2009). The case of Pay indicates that they might be averse to such action (Christie, 2009). The Strasbourg case recommends a great scope of privacy than what the “UK courts and employment tribunals have traditionally been willing to apply within the context of working relationships” (Christie, 2009). However, case law providing for protection to employees who have online profiles still has to be developed (Christie, 2009). In the meantime however, people would just have to face the consequences as to “what they say and do online” (Christie, 2009). As Christie says, “privacy, once surrendered, may be very difficult to reclaim” (Christie, 2009). Proportionality Test Proportionality test has also been used in applying the unfair dismissal law. Courts have viewed the “”principle that Section 98 ERA 1996 should be construed in accordance with Convention rights, using Section 3 HRA” (Davies, 2009). This principle espouses that it would be unreasonable under the unfair dismissal law if an “employer dismisses an employee in breach of his or her Convention rights” (Davies, 2009). Hence, the “employer’s reasons for infringing the employees’ rights, would be subject to a test of proportionality (Davies, 2009). This test was used in Pay v Lancashire Probation Service. Being involved in sadomasochism in his private life, running a website and performing in fetish clubs, the employer dismissed him, having failed to give up such activities. He invoked both Article 8 and 10 of the ECtHR in his claim for unfair dismissal. And as already discussed above, his claim under Article 8 failed because the activities were done publicly. The protection under Article 8 therefore cannot be invoked as pointed out by EAT. However, as to Article 10, EAT recognized that the rights under such article was infringed, but then it was to “maintain the reputation of the service (particularly with victims of sex offenders) and that dismissal was a proportionate sanction” (Davies, 2009). Davies comments that although the “employer has a legitimate concern to maintain its reputation, the EAT failed to explore in any detail the various stages in the argument” (Davies, 2009). For one, Davies says that the assertions of the employer that victims could find out about Mr Pay’s activities in his private life was not verified by the EAT (Davies, 2009). In particular, the EAT did not question the employers assertions that victims of crime. Neither was it verified that the people with whom he dealt with at work would see any connection of his activities with his work or “that the reputation of the Probation Service would be damaged if either of these things occurred” (Davies, 2009). Davies comments therefore that the proportionality test might be based on the “employers perception of the situation” especially as to the facts of the case (Davies, 2009). The ECtHR in a recent consideration of the case, ruled that “the proportionality test was satisfied” (Davies, 2009). In that “although the court recognised that dismissal was a severe sanction, it found that it was not disproportionate on the facts” (Davies, 2009). However, “it did not subject the employers arguments to detailed critical scrutiny” (Davies, 2009). In the decision to dismiss Mr Pay “the employers expertise in the management of its own reputation was the deciding factor” (Davies, 2009). In another commentary made by Virginia Mantouvalou, she argued that “the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) casts considerable doubt on the correctness of the interpretation that has been placed on the right to privacy by the Court of Appeal in the context of claims for unfair dismissal” (Mantouvalou, 2009). She then suggests that there be a correct interpretation of the provision which would render “a standard of protection in dismissal higher than the current test of reasonableness that courts and tribunals employ” (Mantouvalou, 2009). Although the case of Pay suggested an interpretation “that the employer would no longer have such a wide band of reasonable responses available when a dismissal interfered with Convention rights” (Vickers, 2004), these very same cases were also criticised “for not being sufficiently appreciative of the particularities of the employment relation, which would lead to a different interpretation of the right to privacy in the employment context” (Collins, 2006). It was said that there could be a misconceived understanding that “the right to private life,” would mean the “right to act in spatial isolation, a position that did not reflect the values underlying privacy” (Mantouvalou, 2008). The ruling may be viewed as there may only be protection from dismissal under Article 8 if the employee’s “activities took place in a secluded location” (Mantouvalou, 2009). Finally, in assessing whether or not an interference with a right by an employer was justified, the courts appeared to be applying a broad reasonableness test rather than the appropriate stricter test of proportionality normally used in connection with the application of Convention rights (Mantouvalou, 2009). Mantouvalou also comments that as to issue of whether the right to private life was engaged under Article 8, a different approach was made by the ECtHR than of the UK courts and tribunals (Mantouvalou, 2009). It examined that “there is zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life” (PG and JH v United Kingdom, 2001). This means that “the right to privacy may be engaged even when a person acts in public spaces, outside home or private premises” (Von Hannover v Germany (App. No 59320/00, Judgment of 24 June 2004). It is significant to note also that a person may reasonably expect privacy although this is not a conclusive factor especially in unfair dismissal cases (Mantouvalou, 2009). Further, as already explained in a previous case, the ECtHR clarified that although the act in question is prohibited under criminal law, it does not mean that it is already “outside the scope of private life” (Dudgeon v UK, App. No 7525/76, Judgment of 22 October 1981). This view is in contrast with what was held in cases such as X v Y and Pay (Mantouvalou, 2009). In the case of X v Y, wherein the issue of whether the act contested is within the scope of his privacy claim, Mummery LJ held that the act took place in public and publicly accessible (X v Y, 2004). On the other hand, in the appeal of Pay ([2004] EWCA Civ 776, unreported), there was a wider approach in interpreting the right to privacy, where they reasoned that such a right had been engaged but that such activities is outside “the zone of private life” (2004). The Pay case dealt with the “separation of public and private spaces” especially in dealing with the issue of right to privacy (Mantouvalou, 2009). Because the contested activities of Mr Pay were made publicly such as being posted in the internet or being in clubs, it is for this reason that the Court held that it prevented such acts “from falling within the zone of private life” (Mantouvalou, 2009). The scope of privacy however, was tackled by ECtHR emphasising that going to nightclubs or posting one’s act in the internet in anonymity is part of a person’s sexual expression (Mantouvalou, 2009). Hence, it stated that “although the public could go to the nightclub, just as they could go to the toilet of the café where Mr X was caught engaged in sexual activity in X v Y, that did not necessarily make it a public place, outside the zone of respect for private life” (Pay v UK [2008] EHRR 1007; [2009] I.R.L.R. 139). This then cast serious doubt on the previous rulings of the Court as regards the Pay case dealing with the issue of the “scope of the right to privacy” (Mantouvalou, 2009). ECtHR decided that Article 8 was applicable and that Mr Pay’s right to private life was interfered with (Mantouvalou, 2009). However, the issue next tackled is whether such interference is justified by Article 8(2) (Mantouvalou, 2009). With this the Court stated that the restriction made was “in accordance with law” and “in pursuit of a legitimate aim of the employer, namely the protection of the reputation of the probation service” (Mantouvalou, 2009). The proportionality test was then applied to answer the issue of whether the dismissal was justified in its pursuit of the legitimate aim of the employer (Mantouvalou, 2009). The Court then used the doctrine “margin of appreciation” which is usually applied to national authorities allowing them to a certain “degree of discretion in the regulation of sensitive social and political matters” (Mantouvalou, 2009). The ECtHR did really delve into the issue of “whether the employer acted reasonably” or that their action was “within a range of reasonable responses” (Mantouvalou, 2009). The Court’s examination in this case was different from the approach made “by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd ([2005] EWCA Civ 932, [2005] ICR 1789; petition refused [2006] ICR 205, HL), wherein the justification for the interference on the Convention rights were determined based on “the normal reasonableness test for unfair dismissal” (2005). ECtHR held that “the dismissal was a severe measure because of its effects on Mr Pays reputation and on his chances of exercising the profession for which he had been trained and acquired skills” (Pay v UK [2008] EHRR 1007; [2009] I.R.L.R. 139). It then suggested that a less severe measure, other than dismissal be taken, since Mr Pay’s activities had not yet really become of public knowledge (Pay vs UK, 2008). However, because Mr Pay was unable to restrain his activities where the possibility of the information posted in the internet might have already entered the public domain, the “ECtHR concluded that the interference with Mr Pays right was proportionate (Pay vs UK, 2008). Although the dismissal of Mr Pay was spurred by his activities that were “related to his sexual preferences,” which is considered as the “most intimate aspect of private life” wherein there might be some limitation as to the “scope of the margin of appreciation” (Dudgeon, para 52), the national authorities were allowed to “to take a restrictive approach to matters involving the applicants sexual practices” (Mantouvalou, 2009). Indeed, it was because Mr Pay refused to “take some measures to reduce the risk that his sex-related activities that had some links with the nature of his job might become known to the public or clients of the probation service” which led him to his dismissal (Mantouvalou, 2009). Had he timely removed the pictures from the Internet, his appeal could have prospered. Because of the nature of his work in dealing with sex offenders, this justified the interference to his right to privacy (Mantouvalou, 2009). The activities that he does outside of his work was still “related to the nature of his job” (Mantouvalou, 2009). Conclusion Respect for private life as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1996, is a fundamental principle espoused by most decisions. However, there must be a clarification as to the extent where the act of an employee done privately must be expected or when there is a reasonable interference. Given the recent decision of ECtHR in the case of Pay v UK, the right of an employee to “enjoy his or her private life” without the employer preventing him from doing activities which are considered to be outside of his work and beyond his working time, have been strongly advocated (Mantouvalou, 2009). This presents a view that although an employer may disapprove the activities of an employee done in his private life on moralistic grounds or because of the possible “adverse publicity,” it does not follow that the dismissal of an employee was done fairly (Mantouvalou, 2009). Dismissal of an employee may still be considered unfair even if the activities are deemed related to an employee’s nature of work, especially if the employee assists in minimizing “any risk of adverse publicity for the employer” (Mantouvalou, 2009). It does not mean that if the employee’s activities were done in public or were accessible to the public, then it is already outside the scope of one’s right to privacy (Mantouvalou, 2009). The criminal character of the employee’s behaviour off duty does not remove such act from the right to privacy (Mantouvalou, 2009). The decision of the Strasbourg Court in showing “the test of justification under Article 8(2)” is different from that test normally used to determine the reasonableness in unfair dismissal cases (Mantouvalou, 2009). Hence, if UK courts were to “harmonise their decisions with the ECtHR,” the right to privacy should first be reinterpreted and then apply the “test of proportionality” in cases of unfair dismissal when there is a finding that there was an interference with the employee’s Convention right (Mantouvalou, 2009). It is however admitted that the scope of “private life” still continues to be undeveloped in the area of employment law (Delaney, 2008). There are also lots of challenges that employers face especially on how to deal with employees who, now a days “use of social networking sites” or the internet in somehow giving information on their private lives that may affect their work (Christie, 2009). The employment law can only provide minimal solutions to problems that might beset the Courts in the future (Christie, 2009). However, as more cases are filed questioning the fairness of dismissal on employees, this might provide some guidelines as to the extent or the boundaries that activities done in the employees’ private life may affect his or her work (Christie, 2009). Employers should practice caution as to the drafting of work policies and its enforcement (Christie, 2009). Employees should also be cautious on the information they post and state online (Christie, 2009). Lastly, it should be clarified if the application of these principles would also apply to the private sector (Oliver, 2000). An anomaly may arise wherein a “public body can assert a right of privacy against his employers, whilst an employee of a private employer cannot do so” (Buxton, 2000). Hence, there is a need to further study the extent of “private life” application to the private sector. References Brown, Edward (2008). “Facebook: Workplace Policies and Privacy Issues.” Employment Lawyers Association Briefing, April 2008. Buxton, Richard (2000). “The Human Rights Act and Private Law.” Law Quarterly Review, 2000, 116(Jan), 48-65. Christie, David (2009). “Online Profiles and Unfair Dismissal.” Employment Law Bulletin, 2009, 94(Dec), 2-4. Collins, Hugh (2006). “The Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace.” Modern Law Review, volume 69, 619. Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd ([2005] EWCA Civ 932, [2005] ICR 1789; petition refused [2006] ICR 205, HL). Delaney, Alan (2008). “Online Misconduct.” Employment Law Bulletin, 2008, 84(Apr), 4-5. Dudgeon v UK, App. No 7525/76, Judgment of 22 October 1981. Hadjioannou v Coral Casinos Ltd [1981] I.R.L.R. 352. Laskey v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39. Matthewson v R B Wilson Dental Laboratory Ltd [1988] I.R.L.R. 512). Mantouvalou, Virginia (2008). “Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces.” Modern Law Review 2008, 71 (6), 912. Mantouvalou, Virginia (2009). “Private Life and Dismissal.” Industrial Law Journal, 2009, 38(1), 133-138. Oliver, Dawn (2000). “The Human Rights Act and Public Law/Private Law Divides.” European Human Rights Law Review, Issue 4, 343. Pay v Lancashire Probation Service ([2003] UKEAT 1224_02_2910 (29 October 2003). Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] I.R.L.R. 129. Pay v UK [2008] EHRR 1007; [2009] I.R.L.R. 139. PG and JH v United Kingdom, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-IX, p 195. Vickers, Lucy (2004). “Unfair Dismissal and Human Rights.” 33 Industrial Law Journal, volume 33 (1), 52-58. Von Hannover v Germany (App. No 59320/00, Judgment of 24 June 2004). X v Y [2004] ICR 1634. Read More