The United States Federal Government - Case Study Example

1. The Tenth Amendment limits the power of the federal government in a truly unequivocal way. It reads simply, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This seems simple. Unless the Constitution specifically gives the federal government, whether the President and executive branch, the Senate or House, or the Supreme Court and federal court system, a power, or specifically disallows a state from doing it, the federal government does not have that power. Clearly, the size and complexity of the United States federal government means that this Amendment must have many exceptions. The question, then, is not, “How did the 10th Amendment limit the power of federal government?” but rather, in what ways does it not? It's tempting to say that the Bill of Rights and later Amendments specifically grant the federal government power. For example, it is tempting to say that the First Amendment gives the federal government the power to protect free speech. But it does not. The First Amendment specifically stops Congress from abridging on free speech, press, or religion, or creating an official religion. In general, the Bill of Rights limit federal action. State Constitutions, if they do not have similar restrictions, do not prevent state and local authorities or private actors from acting. While this is not always true, it is certainly true for the First Amendment. This was the case until the Fourteenth Amendment became incorporated. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the equal protection under the law. The Court has interpreted this to mean that all elements of the Constitution must be equally enforced, as has federal law. To what degree this undermines the Tenth Amendment and obviates state constitutions is constantly debated. Do note, though, that the language is not so specific in all the Amendments, even without the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”. That does not specify the states. Nor does the Third Amendment, which says, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law”. In fact, the only Amendment that mentions the Congress of the Bill of Rights is the First! However, there are certainly Amendments even above and beyond the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation that give the federal government power. In general, the Amendment process gives the federal government the potential to get over Tenth Amendment limitations. If the Constitution were amended to make gay marriage illegal, state and local authorities would not have the power to ignore it, the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding. Other Amendments that give the federal government specific powers include The Eighteenth Amendment, which federally prohibited alcohol. This has been overturned. The Thirteenth Amendment, which criminalizes slavery. The Sixteenth Amendment, which specifically gives Congress the power to levy income taxes. Finally, the interstate commerce clause, which declares that Congress has the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”, is the last lynchpin for federal government programs. Most things impact on commerce and occur between state borders: Most banks and businesses are connected to the entire world, not just other states! The Tenth Amendment does not prevent Congress from using this power, which is specifically enumerated to it, nor does the Ninth. This is a common way that Congress and the President can regulate companies and institute enforcement over their business practices. 2. The cases National League of Cities V. Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, henceforth known as Usery and Garcia, concerned the right of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, specifically the ability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to enforce minimum wage and overtime requirements. The general debate that these two cases are about is this. To what degree does the federal government have the right to regulate private industries or firms, mandate safety standards, mandate a certain wage or interest rate, require the payment of overtime, require benefits, etc.? Some people on the extreme free-market side of the spectrum argue that the government has no such power. They claim that the free market should be allowed to run untampered with by anything but the most cursory federal government interference. Sometimes, their argument is aconstitutional (that is, they are talking more philosophically about what governments should do, not what they legally can do), but many interpret the Tenth Amendment very broadly and the interstate commerce clause very narrowly. Others are not against the government regulating wages or industries per se, but feel that doing so violates the state's plenary power and makes the states irrelevant. Yet others feel that the federal government should regulate business, that because business is inherently interstate in the modern era the government has the authority to, and to protect workers, consumers, citizens and other businesses from ecological and market distortions, the state should act. The Supreme Court tried to balance all of these perspectives. In Usery, they declared that even though the government does have the general right to regulate private endeavors, the government must do so in a way that does not obviate a state's reason for existence or its plenary power. If federal regulation using the interstate commerce clause would obviate the proper functioning of a state, then it is not constitutional. Regulations of state employee wages, compensation and benefits are “functions essential to separate and independent existence”. It is key to note that the regulation affected state governments as well as private businesses. The Court did not deny the right of the federal government to regulate private businesses, but because the FLSA regulated state wages as well, it would be illegal. Blackmun delivered a concurring opinion in which he offered the idea of a “traditional government function” test for Constitutionality. In essence, he argued that the standard should be if the state or local governments traditionally performed the function, like determining how to remunerate state employees. It was in Garcia that Blackmun revised his opinion, turning the 5-4 majority opinion in Usery around. He found that the “traditional government function” test was untenable and gave the unelected Court too much power to veto decisions undertaken by the democratic federal government. Otherwise, the opinion was identical. Blackmun's majority decision also noted that the structure of the states protected them from being overreached by the federal government. The majority viewed that the Supremacy Clause empowered the federal government to overwrite state preferences on the matter of wages and benefits under the FLSA. Garcia effectively and explicitly overturns Usery. “This principle requires the Court to enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate commerce power. National League of Cities v. Usery represented an attempt to define such limits. The Court today rejects National League of Cities and washes its hands of all efforts to protect the States. In the process, the Court opines that unwarranted federal encroachments on state authority are and will remain "`horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world.'"” Thus, in a mere decade, the Court had gone from erring on the side of the Tenth Amendment and state power as regards their ability to control the pay structure for their employees to siding with the federal government, Supremacy Clause and interstate commerce power. 3. New York v. United States and Printz v. United States concerned the power of the federal government in regulation of nuclear waste and guns, respectively. The two have competing effects. In New York v. US, the reason that the “take title” clause was declared unconstitutional was because it interfered with state legislation. States either had to comply with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act or “take title” to the nuclear waste. O'Connor in the majority opinion argued that this would “commandeer” state governments to comply with federal legislation that they had the right to oppose. Congress could not force the states to take title to the waste even if they did not comply with the law. According to O'Connor, the government had crossed the line from incentive to compulsion by having a “stick” element that the states should not feasibly be considered to have to comply with. If state governments did not want to suffer the consequences of being liable for the cleanup and management of nuclear waste, they had to proactively legislate and take on costs of the federal government, which O'Connor and the majority was uncomfortably close to forcing state governments to write language they liked. It is important to note that other schemes like the “take title” clause remain constitutionally unchallenged. For example: Federal highway moneys are keyed to the drinking age being to 21. Since federal highway costs are far beyond most state governments' abilities to pay, this prompts most state governments to comply. In Printz, the Court ruled on the side of the states once more as regards the Brady Bill. Interim provisions like the waiting period and requiring firearms dealers to gain information from the client and communicate this information to local law enforcement to verify that they were not criminals. Scalia notes in the majority decision that the government had the ability to make state governments legislate in accord with the federal government in the past, but that this case was different. He argues that the Tenth Amendment was designed to establish “dual sovereignty”, not higher sovereignty of the federal government: It was designed to let the state and federal governments be parallel to each other. But the interim provisions would essentially draft state police to enforce federal law, which would eliminate the importance and role of the state governments. Scalia also provided a “unitary executive theory”, declaring that, “The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, §3, personally and through officers whom he appoints (save for such inferior officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the "Courts of Law" or by "the Heads of Departments" who with other presidential appointees), Art. II, §2. The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control...That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws”. Both these decisions, then, establish that the government cannot force states to comply with regulations by either effectively recruiting their law enforcement agencies or giving them an onerous disincentive to non-compliance. Justice Stevens' dissent is important because it provides another common justification used by those who propose more federal government action: The “necessary and proper clause”. Congress has the ability to enact whatever laws are necessary and appropriate to carry out the laws it has written. If it finds that handgun law enforcement is done most accurately and efficiently by coordinating with state governments, it has the power to do so. Stevens notes that there are many times when state governments cooperate with or enforce federal laws: For example, when a quarantine is enacted by federal authorities with state assistance, coordinating with state officials against terrorist threats, or enforcement of drug laws which are typically codified by the DEA. One can add that state and federal governments also coordinate all the time in law enforcement: For national data banks of criminals, fingerprinting, DNA, etc. In fact, this exact element basically obviated the Brady Bill's interim provisions, since a national criminal database became so easily acceptable! Printz does not overturn New York; rather, it amplifies it. The federal government can neither conscript legislators or law enforcement to do their dirty work. Conclusion: The Tenth Amendment has certainly seen many blows dealt to it, whether from interstate commerce, the supremacy clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. But there has been a movement, emphasized by cases like Printz and New York, to balance back to the states in terms of rights and responsibilities. As long as this does not exceed the capacity of the federal government to regulate, the benefit from this pro-state movement in terms of state power and policy laboratories are meritorious. Citations Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al. 469 U.S. 528 (more) 105 S. Ct. 1005; 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016; 85 U.S. LEXIS 48; 53 U.S.L.W. 4135; 102 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P34,633; 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P34,995; 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 65 Jay Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana, Petitioner 95-1478 v. United States; Richard Mack, Petitioner 95-1503 v. United States. 521 U.S. 898 117 S. Ct. 2365; 138 L. Ed. 2d 914; 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4044; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5096; 97 Daily Journal DAR 8213; 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 224. New York, Petitioner, v. United States et al.; County of Allegany, New York, Petitioner, v. United States; County of Cortland, New York, Petitioner, v. United States et al. 505 U.S. 144. 112 S. Ct. 2408; 120 L. Ed. 2d 120; Nuclear Reg. Rep. P 20,553; 34 ERC 1817; 60 USLW 4603; 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,082 The National League of Cities, et al. v. W. J. Usery, Jr., Sec. of Labor, State of California. 426 U.S. 833 96 S.Ct. 2465; 49 L.Ed.2d 245 Read More