Chief Justice John Roberts and His Cases - Essay Example

Chief Justice John Roberts BACKGROUND Chief Justice John Roberts grew up in Long Beach, Indiana. He attended Harvard Law School, where he majoredin history and graduated a year early with honors. (Oyez). From there, Roberts went to Harvard Law School, where he was the managing editor of Harvard Law Review. (Oyez). This led to a clerkship at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. After one year at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Roberts began a clerkship for William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. After his clerkship with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Roberts worked for the Reagan Administration in two different capacities, that of special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, and as Associate Counsel to the President. (Oyez). Chief Justice Roberts next position was as a Deputy Solicitor General under the George H.W. Bush administration, from 1986-1988. In this capacity, Justice Roberts argued dozens of cases in front of the Supreme Court on behalf of the federal government, winning “well over half of them.” (Oyez). After Bill Clinton won the 1992 election, Justice Roberts went into private practice. However, he continued to argue cases in front of the Supreme Court. (Oyez). He remained in private practice until President George W. Bush nominated him, in 2001, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but he was no confirmed for this position until 2003. (Oyez). There, he wrote 49 opinions, only two of which were not unanimous and only dissenting on three other opinions. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY Little was known about Justice Roberts judicial philosophy before his confirmation as Chief Justice in 2005. His record on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia suggested that he was a minimalist, in that his opinions would reflect a respect for precedence, as opposed to a grounded judicial philosophy, such as originalism. (Oyez). His confirmation hearing suggested that he did not have an overarching judicial philosophy, finding merit with both the textualist and originalist methodologies and sometimes may consult legislative history to interpret a statute. (Eastland 3). He further made it clear that judges must be restrained by law - “the rules, principles, customs, practices and understandings that define it – and must not allow the law to be infused with the judges own political views and personal values.” (Eastland 3). In other words, in his view, a judge must only interpret the Constitution, not make law. (Eastland 3). OPINIONS A. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) is an equal protection case argued before the court in 2007. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. This case dealt with two different school districts, the Seattle school district in Washington State and the Jefferson County school district in Louisville, Kentucky. Each school district used race as a way to assign students to their schools. The Seattle school district allowed ninth graders to choose the schools that they wanted to attend. If too many students wanted to attend a particular school, then that school used a series of tie-breakers to determine who would attend that school. One of the tie-breakers is the race of the student – in the Seattle school district, 41% of students overall are white, and 59% are non-white. If a particular school did not come within 10% of the 41/59 split – say a school was 60% white and 40% non-white – then race was used to fill the available slots at that particular school, so that it would be brought into balance. Seattle operates the school in this way to address the “racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments.” Five different schools in the Seattle district used this method of assigning students to their schools, elevating racial characteristics above other merits. The Petitioner parents filed suit on behalf of their children who were denied a spot at the five schools because of their race. The Ninth Circuit Court of appeals decided in an en banc decision that this the school district presented a compelling state interest, achieving racial balance within schools, and that the school districts methods of achieving this racial balance was narrowly tailored, thus upholding the school districts method of apportioning students to these schools. Jefferson County Public Schools had a similar scheme. Their school district is composed of approximately 34 black students, and 66 percent white students. All non-magnet schools in the district were required to enroll a minimum 15 percent and maximum of 50 percent black students. If a certain school was not within this range, students would be denied a spot at that particular school based on that students race. So, if a black student wanted to enroll in School A, and that school had already reached its 50 maximum of black students, that student would be denied a spot at that school. If a white student wanted to go to School B, and that school was less than 15% black, then that student would be denied a spot at that school. Petitioner Crystal Meredith sought to enroll her son at a school that was close to her house, but her son was denied a spot at that school because her son would have caused that school to be racially imbalanced. She brought suit against the school district, alleging an Equal Protection violation. Both the Western District of Kentucky and the Sixth Circuit found that Jefferson County scheme was narrowly tailored to fit a compelling state interest, therefore was constitutional. The Parents Court began by stating that “when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.” (Parents, p. 4). To fulfill this standard of review, any action dealing with racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. To this end, two interests have qualified as compelling, according to past opinions. One compelling interest is that of remedying “past intentional discrimination.” (Parents, p. 5). In this case, the Seattle school districts were never segregated by law, while the Jefferson County school district was, in the past, but this was dissolved in a decree in 2000, and the Jefferson County school district did not rely upon remedying past discrimination as a basis for their current scheme. The other compelling state interest was that of achieving diversity, but this does not necessarily mean racial diversity. The court specifically looked to their decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 302(2003). In this case, the diversity label is used by higher education to accept students from different backgrounds – students who have overcome hardships, students who had traveled abroad, students from different geographical backgrounds, etc. Racial diversity is a part of that, but the schools were not using race to fulfill some kind of quota, just using it as a criteria to fulfill the schools goal of diversity in general. In the current case, race was used as determinative factor, standing alone. It was not part of a “broader effort to achieve exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” as was the case in Grutter. (Parents, p. 5). Race was “decisive in itself” in each of the schemes. (Parents, p. 5). Moreover, the school districts were using a “limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/ “other” terms in Jefferson County.” (Parents, p. 5). The Parents court decided that the decision in Grutter did not govern their decision in Parents, because Grutter dealt with higher education, and the Grutter court used racial characteristics as part of a larger diversity scheme, not standing alone. The school districts presented the compelling state interest of the importance of educating minorities in better schools, and the importance of achieving racial balance within the schools. However, the Parents court decided not only that the way that they went about it was not narrowly tailored to achieve this end, but that achieving racial balance was not a compelling state interest. Imposing racial proportionality, according to the Parents court, is a violation of equal protection, as the equal protection clause states that all citizens must be treated as individuals, “not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” (Parents, p. 7). Furthermore, allowing race to be a “compelling end to itself” would ensure that race would always be an issue in American life. (Parents, p. 7). Moreover, the schemes were not narrowly tailored, and the Parents court found that other methods would be preferable to meet the stated goal of racial balance, and further found that these school districts did not consider other methods to achieve their ends that were racially neutral. B. Morse et al. v. Frederick This is a freedom of expression case in which Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, a student unfurled a banner stating “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” at a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event. Petitioner Morse, the high school principal requested that Respondent Frederick take down the banner. Frederick refused, the sign was confiscated and Frederick was suspended from school. Frederick sued, stating that his constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech had been violated. Morse responded that the sign advocated illegal drug use, in violation of school policy. The District Court sided with the Petitioners, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, stating that Fredericks First Amendment Rights had been violated. The Morse court began by noting that, while students do have a right to freedom of speech, it isnt as strong as the freedom of speech of adults. The Morse court specifically found that students in a school environment have a right to free speech, unless their speech might “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” (Morse, p. 8). Frederick attempted to argue that this was not a school speech case, an argument that the Morse court rejected outright. This event was during school hours, attended by fellow students, and was school sanctioned, therefore Frederick was considered to be in school. (Morse, p. 6). The next argument that Frederick tried to make was that he did not mean for his banner to promote drug use – according to him, “the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.” (Morse, p. 6). However, the court found that the message either issued an imperative to take bong hits or as a celebration of bong hits, both of which encourage illegal drug use. Moreover, the Morse court could find no alternative meaning for the banner, other than as an encouragement to take illegal drugs. (Morse, p. 6). The Morse court further found that the message was not protected political speech. (Morse, p. 8). The Morse court determined that speech within a school setting may be curtailed, as a students right to free speech within a school setting is “what is appropriate for children in school.” (Morse, p. 11). Therefore, as indicated above, a school childs freedom of speech is not the same as an adult, specifically while the child is in school. If a child is not in school, then his or her freedom of speech is the same as an adults. (Morse, p. 10). The Morse court also found that deterring drug use was a compelling state interest, so, presumably, even if there was a constitutional violation, the schools actions would still be acceptable, as it served a compelling state interest, which is necessary to show in cases where a constitutional violation is alleged. BIBLIOGRAPHY Eastland, T. “Chief Justice Roberts.” The Weekly Standard September 26, 2005: 1-2. Retrieved at: Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). Retrieved at Oyez. “John Roberts Junior.” Retrieved at: http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr> Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 et al., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Retrieved at Read More