Crimsons Motion for Judgment - Case Study Example

Tom Bueller, Senior Associate. Junior Associate Richard Frye Client Matter: No. 2008-144 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Crimson Assurance Insurance Company (“Crimson”) is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Richard Frye’s (“Frye”) claim where: (1) in order to deny coverage on the grounds that the vehicle was unoccupied, the insurance company must establish a causal connection with the vehicle, geographic proximity to the vehicle, vehicle orientation, and engagement in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle; and (2) the insurance company must establish that no issues of material fact exist as to whether the claimant’s son intentionally damaged the vehicle. SHORT ANSWER Possibly not. The facts and circumstances of the case appear to satisfy the Ohio Supreme Court’s parameters that “occupying” should not be given an unduly narrow definition and must satisfy the four part test to determine vehicle occupancy, namely: (a) causal connection with vehicle; (b) geographic proximity to the vehicle; (c) vehicle orientation; and (d) engagement in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle. Applying this four part test, Cameron Frye will be found to have been occupying the vehicle for purposes of policy coverage. Courts also require that deliberate intent be established before recovery will be precluded under public policy for deliberate infliction of injury. This may not be established in Richard Frye’s case. In light of the foregoing, summary judgment should be precluded. STATEMENT OF FACTS Richard Frye has an automobile insurance policy issued by Crimson Assurance Company for his 1961 Ferrari 250 GT California car. The coverage under the policy also extends to Frye’s family members, including his son, Cameron Frye (“Cameron”). The coverage includes medical expenses as well as collision coverage. Crimson, however, has denied Frye’s claim for payment against the policy. Crimson has based its denial on Cameron’s deposition testimony regarding how the damage occurred. In his deposition, Cameron described the series of events that lead to the damage to the vehicle. Cameron stated that his father was very fond of the vehicle, but never allowed him to drive it. Cameron was only allowed to run the car in the garage, the same way he runs the other cars because that is one of his jobs. Cameron stated that on one occasion, because his friend Ferris Bueller was depressed, he and another friend, Samantha Peterson, decided to cheer him up by giving him a ride in the car. But once the ride was over, Cameron was concerned that his father would notice that the mileage on the car had increased. He attempted to reverse the mileage by running the car in reverse in the garage, with a stone on the accelerator and the gear stick in reverse. When the attempt was not successful, his friend Ferris suggested that they try something else. While he was in the garage, Cameron stated that he was suddenly filled with anger against the car, because his father loved it more than he loved him. He decided that he wanted to confront his father and figured that if he dented the car, his father would surely notice it and therefore also notice him. In order to achieve this objective, Cameron began to kick the car long and hard, venting all his anger at the fact that his father loved the car more than him. During this process, he fractured his metatarsal; although with the rush of adrenaline, he was not aware of it at the time. After kicking the headlights and hood for a while, Cameron stated that he felt slightly better. He then leaned against the bumper of the car; this was a mistake because the jack tipped over and since the car was still running in reverse, it hit the floor, moved backwards, crashed through the back window of the garage, rolled down an embankment and hit a fence. Since the back wall of the garage was made entirely of glass, the damage to the car resulted in a total lost. As a result of the injuries he sustained, Cameron also had to wear a cast for a few days. Our client Richard Frye filed a claim for payment of insurance against the coverage on the policy, but Crimson has denied the claim. As a result, our client filed suit. Crimson has filed a motion for summary judgment of the case. DISCUSSION Under Ohio law, a party filing for summary judgment “bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). Where insurance contracts are concerned, ambiguous terms are to be construed in a manner most favorable to the claimant. In this instance, there is a triable issue of fact– was Cameron Frye occupying the car? To determine whether a claimant is occupying a vehicle, courts rely heavily on a four part test: (1) whether a causal relation or connection exists between the injury and the use of the injured vehicle; (2) whether the claimant was in close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle; (3) whether the claimant was engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time; and (4) whether the vehicle was oriented. Williams v. Safe Auto Insurance Company, 2004-Ohio-3741; Etters v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 102 Ohio App.3d 325 (1995). This Memorandum will focus on whether Crimson has presented valid grounds for a summary judgment of Richard Frye’s claim on the grounds that Cameron Frye was not actually “occupying” the vehicle. Since senior counsel is addressing the other issue raised by Crimson in its motion for summary judgment, this Memorandum confines itself to the issue of occupying the vehicle and whether summary judgment on these grounds would have merit under Ohio laws. More specifically, this Memorandum discusses the applicability of the four part test to determine occupancy as set out in the Ohio Supreme Court case of Joins v. Bonner and its extension in Etters, as well as whether medical injuries may also be recovered. Finally, the Memorandum discusses the summary judgment standard, as set out in Drescher, as it applies to denial of the claim on public policy grounds. A. Crimson cannot establish that the vehicle was unoccupied and, thus, summary judgment is not warranted.  When language in an insurance contract can reasonably be construed to have more than one meaning, it “should be liberally construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Price, 39 Ohio St.2d 95; 68 Ohio Op.2d 56; 313 N.E. 2d. 844 (1974). In determining the meaning of the term “occupancy” in the context of an insurance contract, the Ohio Supreme Court has stipulated that in determining whether a claimant was occupying the vehicle, it is necessary to take into account: (1) the immediate relationship the claimant had to the vehicle; and (2) if the claimant and the vehicle were within a reasonable geographic area. Joins v. Bonner, 28 Ohio St.3d, 398, 401 (1986). This has been supplemented by two additional tests: (1) was there a causal relation between the injury and the use of the injured vehicle; and (2) whether the claimant was vehicle oriented rather than highway or otherwise oriented. Etters v Travelers Ins. Cos., 102 Ohio App.3d 325 (1995). Specifically, in Etters, the claimant’s car slid off the median, but while he was helping another car in a similar predicament, he was hit by a third vehicle. Although the term "occupying" as defined in an insurance contract “may not seem ambiguous on its face, it often becomes ambiguous when determining whether insurance coverage should be extended in certain factual circumstances.” 102 Ohio App. 3d at 328, citing Robson v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 59 Ohio App.2d 261, 263, 13 Ohio Op.3d 268, 393 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (1978). While the claimant in this instance was in geographic proximity to the vehicle and had an immediate relationship to the vehicle as its driver, the court found that this was not adequate to establish occupancy since Etters was outside the car when the injury occurred. However, by establishing the causal relation between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle, and by establishing that the plaintiff was oriented towards the vehicle rather than the highway, the court found against the insurer in this case. Courts rely heavily on this four part test to determine occupancy and it may be necessary to satisfy all the four factors in the instant case. Cameron Frye may satisfy the following conditions: (a) immediate relationship to the vehicle; and (b) proximity to the vehicle. Additionally, he may also satisfy the other two criteria: (c) causal relation; and (d) vehicle orientation, which may aid in recovering for his injuries. He may be held to be within the policy definition of "occupying" even when he is "out" or "off" of the vehicle so long as there is a reasonable relationship to the vehicle at the time. Here, we must establish Cameron Frye had just left the vehicle, which will also bolster his claim for damages related to his medical injuries. Pennington v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 579 N.E.2d 507, 509 (1989). The occupancy test may be satisfied because a reasonable relationship to the vehicle may exist on the basis of a ,liberal definition of “occupying”:. Crimson has sought summary judgment on the grounds that Cameron was not “occupying” the vehicle, as per the definition set out in the insurance contract. The relevant insurance policy defines “occupying” as “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off the insured vehicle.” If the definition of occupying is read literally, occupying “means anywhere "out" or "off" the vehicle, as the word "getting" does not modify either of these two words, but only the word "in." There is no conjunction before "getting in" as there would be required for the word "getting" to modify "out," "on," and "off" and "in." Accordingly, a person "out," or "off" of the vehicle need not be "getting" in or "getting" out or "getting" off, but is within the policy definition of "occupying" when he is "out" or "off" of the vehicle so long as there is a reasonable relationship to the vehicle at the time. The relationship here would be leaving the vehicle. Pennington, 579 N.E.2d at 509. In interpreting the meaning of occupying, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the word occupying should not be given an unduly narrow definition; occupation would be established for purposes of insurance coverage even when the individual has alighted from the vehicle. Joins v Bonner, 28 Ohio St.3d 398 (1986). In the Joins case, a child exited an insured vehicle and moved away towards the curb, but was struck down by an uninsured vehicle. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the child was occupying the vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage because a person is not “finished with exiting a vehicle until he or she reaches a place of safety on the side of the street or road to which he is proceeding.” Id. at 400. Although Cameron Frye was not seated inside the car at the time of the accident, the mere fact of his being “out” or “off” the vehicle would not preclude recovery under the definition of occupying. The language in the contract is required to be interpreted in favor of the insured without a narrow construction being placed on the term occupying. Id.; Etters, 102 Ohio App.3d at 328. The relationship in this instance would be Cameron’s presence near the vehicle, after having left it. On this basis, we have a strong argument that Cameron Frye was occupying the car. Crimson, however, could offer a strong argument against Cameron’s occupying the car by citing to Kish v. Central National Insurance Group, 67 Ohio St.2d 41 (1981). In this case, the court held that a claimant returning to his vehicle for a purpose not specifically related to the operation of the vehicle was not occupying the vehicle. Since Cameron was outside the car, kicking it when he sustained his injuries, this could be a basis for the insurance company to argue that recovery would be precluded under the definition of occupying. The Occupancy test may be satisfied because geographic promixity may be established. The Ohio Supreme Court in Joins also held that in construing the provisions of automobile insurance policies which provide coverage to persons occupying insured vehicles, “the determination of whether a vehicle was occupied by the claimant at the time of an accident should take into account the immediate relationship the claimant had to the vehicle, within a reasonable geographic area.” 28 Ohio St.3d at 401. In Etters, where the first part of the four part test was raised, i.e., question of geographic proximity, the court held that the claimant had been injured at “approximately twenty to thirty feet away from his vehicle” and pointed out that other courts have found much greater distances to be still within a reasonable geographic proximity. 102 Ohio App.3d at 331. Applying this to our case, the injuries to Cameron’s leg were sustained when he was just outside the car, at a distance well within the twenty to thirty feet required to establish geographic proximity to the vehicle. The occupancy test may be satisfied because the relationship between the vehicle and claimant exists. In determining whether a sufficient relationship exists between the claimant and the vehicle, the Claimant’s performance of a task related to the operation of the insured vehicle provides a sufficient basis to establish relationship to the vehicle. Id at 329. A sufficient relationship to the vehicle also exists if the claimant’s conduct is “foreseeably identifiable” with the normal use of the vehicle. Morris v. Continental Ins. Cos., 71 Ohio App.3d 581 (1991). Foreseeable identifiable conduct includes “performance of activities related to the Claimant’s prior presence in the insured vehicle.” Id at 587 Cameron Frye would be within the policy definition of occupying the car, although he is outside of the vehicle, so long as (a) he is within the geographical distance of sixteen feet from the car and (2) there was a reasonable relationship to the vehicle at the time. The first condition is established because he had exited the car after driving it into the garage and was present within the garage itself. Performing a task which is foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle would provide a sufficient basis to establish relationship to the vehicle. For example, a claimant was held to be occupying the car when siphoning gas into it despite never having been inside the vehicle, and another claimant who was under a car repairing the brakes was also held to be occupying the vehicle. Etters, 102 Ohio App.3d at 329-331. Cameron had just driven the car and was in the process of running the vehicle in reverse  while inside the garage. Running the vehicle in this manner is identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle; hence, this may be adequate to establish that Cameron was occupying the vehicle for the purpose of insurance coverage. Moreover, since the policy also covers the family members of Richard Frye, there would not be grounds to exclude coverage to Cameron as well. The occupancy test may be satisfied on causal connection and orientation to the vehicle: Cameron may also satisfy the definition of occupying, applying the additional factors set out in Etters: (a) causal connection to the vehicle; and (b) vehicle orientation. Since Cameron had been driving the car earlier and is also insured under the policy, the causal connection to the vehicle may be established, while his close proximity to the vehicle would also serve to establish that he was vehicle oriented, rather than highway, road or otherwise oriented. Crimson could argue that Cameron’s activities would not conform strictly to a definition of tasks foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. Since the accident occurred as a result of Cameron kicking the car and leaning against it when it was on a jack and running in neutral, this might not constitute a “reasonable relationship” that would merit coverage by satisfying the definition of occupying. B. Recovery for Cameron’s injuries should also be covered under the policy. Injuries sustained are generally covered under an insurance policy if the Claimant is occupying a vehicle. In the case of Pennington, the claimant Pennington was injured when a man attacked him in his car while he was waiting in a drive through line at Taco Bell. Pennington left the car to try and reach a safe place, but later died of injuries sustained in the car. The court held that Pennington’s injuries would have been covered under the policy because he fell within the policy definition of occupying, despite being outside the car. Pennington, 579 N.E.2d at 509. Since Cameron also falls within the policy definition of occupying in terms of his proximity to the vehicle and the performance of a task, i.e., running the vehicle in neutral, associated with the vehicle, the injuries sustained to his foot may also be recoverable under the policy. Crimson could, however, offer the argument that since the injuries sustained by Cameron did not strictly occur while he was within the car or within the performance of a car related task, recovery is precluded. Applying the additional factors set out in Etters for establishing occupancy of a vehicle, Richard Frye has good grounds to claim that there is a triable issue of fact in assessing whether or not Cameron was occupying the car, and these grounds must be evaluated by the Court in a manner most favorable to the insured. C. Triable issues of fact exist regarding Cameron’s Frye’s intent to damage the vehicle and, therefore, summary judgment must be precluded. Crimson could argus that although Cameron was in the vicinity of the car, he sustained injuries that were self inflicted by kicking the car and similarly, the damage to the car was also caused by his own negligence. Thus, in this instance, paying the claim may amount to encouraging similar negligent and deliberately inflicted damages to cars, which would not be in the interest of public policy. “The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 292-293. In the case of Drescher, the court set out the standards for granting summary judgment and held that the non moving party has the burden of setting forth facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. A court is then required to evaluate the record "in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Link v. Leadworks Corp., 79 Ohio App.3d 735, 741, 607 N.E.2d 1140 (1992). Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment must be overruled if reasonable minds could find for the party opposing the motion. Id. Crimson seeks to use Cameron’s deposition testimony to establish his intent to intentionally cause damage to the car, which would preclude coverage under public policy. The intent behind the claimant’s actions will also be taken into consideration to determine whether coverage should exist. Direct intent is established when the actor does something which brings about the exact result desired, but coverage may not be excluded when an actor does something which he believes is substantially certain to cause a particular result, without actually desiring that result. Harasyn v. Normandy Metals Inc., 40 Ohio St.3d 173 (1990). Crimson’s motion for summary judgment filed relies upon Cameron’s deposition testimony, suggesting that the damage to the insured car was deliberately inflicted, to establish that honoring the claim would be against public policy. But public policy does not exclude coverage in those instances where a wrongdoer (Cameron Frye) is not helped and where an insured person who did not commit the wrong act (Richard Frye) receives the protection of the contract. Rather, precluding coverage would mean that a victim may not get a fair and adequate recovery for damages. This was also the conclusion of the court in Harasyn, explaining that “public policy [seeks] to favor liability insurance for negligent acts as a means of assuring that innocent persons are made whole.” Id. at 965. This may help Richard Frye’s case because he did not perform the act of causing intentional damage to the car. Moreover, Cameron Frye did not intend to cause such an extensive level of damage to the car and it was not a deliberately planned act. In his deposition, Cameron Frye has stated: “I was just so mad at my father, and I decided I had to take a stand and confront him.” He has further explained how the car was related to his feelings about his father: “I was standing in front of the car, and I was really mad, at my father for loving the car more than his family, and--I don’t know, it was like the car was a symbol of all the frustration in my life. So I kicked it.” It must also be noted that, after kicking the car for some time, Cameron calmed down and the damage to the car would not have been extensive, but for the fact that the car accidentally slipped off the jack. The extensive damage caused to the car by smashing through the glass doors of the garage was therefore accidental, rather than deliberately planned and executed. The insured car was part of a small, elite group and, therefore, extremely valuable. Richard Frye, who did not commit the wrongful act, has incurred the loss of an irreplaceable vehicle because of the negligent acts of his son. Denying him any form of recovery would cause an innocent person to suffer; this would not be acceptable public policy in accordance with the rule articulated in Harasyn. CONCLUSION Crimson’s motion for summary judgment fails to establish that the vehicle was indeed unoccupied. As detailed earlier, Cameron Frye satisfies the requirements of the four part test to determine occupation of a vehicle. Firstly, he was in the geographic proximity of the vehicle, i.e., within twenty feet. Secondly, he was engaged in a task foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle, i.e., running the engine of the car. These factors offer strong evidence that he was “occupying” the car for purposes of insurance coverage and, thus, weaken the merit of the insurer’s grounds of non-occupation of the vehicle. The strongest argument Crimson could offer appears to be that Cameron Frye deliberately inflicted harm on the vehicle and, therefore, recovery for such damages would be against public policy. But applying the rule in Harasyn, it appears likely that the necessary mental intent may not be established. As such, there are triable issues of fact in this case and summary judgment is not merited. Outline For Paper 1. Question Presented •Should be a question •Can …… when: (1)____; (2)______; and/or (3)_______……? •Give CONTEXT •Then give DETAILS •Should incorporate KEY facts GOOD and BAD (it is a good one; if you have a lot of facts, it may be better to number them – see above) It is okay to ask 2 questions here: one about occupying (including facts) and one about summary judgment (without the facts) It may help you keep organized and write good questions if they are separate 2. Answer Presented •Should answer the question •Give CONTEXT •Then DETAILS •Does not contain cites Should include broad test from Supreme Court Can include the basic four tests The Answer should always contain the “buzz” words that will decide the outcome of the case [in Closed Memo, it was sensitivity, knowledge and purpose/manipulation] If you have two questions, then have 2 answers 3. Fact Pattern •Must give CONTEXT •Then DETAILS •MUST give all LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTS to come in Memo –Use this as a CHECK that you covered all –In both the memo and the FACT section • Also give helpful background facts • Chronological order is BEST • Don’t give Conclusionary statements or provide analysis. Facts Only. 4. Discussion. A. Overview Paragraph/s This memo discusses… Give the Background Law Talk about Motion for Summary Judgment Construction of Contracts in Insurance- When terms in Insurance contract are ambiguous, how are they construed Ambiguity of “Occupied” in Auto Insurance Lack of case law on medical payments, but talk about how Pennington loosely correlates.-Pennington applies the Joins line of cases to the definition of “occupying” under the medical payments part of an insurance policy B. Thesis Paragraph/s This is where you provide your roadmap Set out the rule on the definition of “occupying” which includes 2 principals of “Proximity to Automobile” and “Relatedness to Vehicle Operation” – do this first because it comes first – just cite to the Supreme Court cases that set out the test – do not do any explaining Set out the 3 or 4 rules of as set out in Williams and Etters Decide if you think they restate the whole Supreme Court test of relationship and proximity or do they only discuss and further define what is “relationship to a vehicle” and make that conclusion here by the way that you describe what the 4 tests are [you may find that there are only 3 rules] Set out a conclusion whether all 4 tests must be satisfied (explanation is later) Set out a conclusion whether client meets all, some or none of the tests. (explanation is later) [Think of this as a paragraph that gives overall construction to the paper and follow according to the roadmap closely]. . In General this is what a thesis covers; it should be SHORT: Rule(s) to be discussed Cases (to be discussed later-no discussion in thesis ) are cited Factors (and sub factors possibly) are mentioned In order to be discussed THE ORDER YOU HAVE THEM IN THE THESIS IS THE ORDER YOU MUST ADDRESS THEM IN THE PAPER C. Discussion Paragraph/s. Address Supreme Court cases and broad articulation of the test – relationship to a vehicle and proximity (Most persuasive) If you will discuss proximity separately from the tests, then discuss it here and your roadmap above is set up to do that 1. Give a Reason Explanation of the First test of “Occupying” through case law from Etters and Williams [look for facts and language from the cases to help apply the test to your client’s situation and discuss them as part of your RE] Then Give a Reason Analysis Applying the Rule Explanation of the First Test to the Client GIVE DETAILS FROM FACT PATTERN AS CRIMSON WOULD VIEW THEM AND AS YOUR CLIENT WOULD VIEW THEM 2. Give a Reason Explanation of the Second test of “Occupying” through case law from Etters and Williams [look for facts and language from the cases to help apply the test to your client’s situation and discuss them as part of your RE] Then Give a Reason Analysis Applying the Rule Explanation of the Second Test to the Client GIVE DETAILS FROM FACT PATTERN AS CRIMSON WOULD VIEW THEM AND AS YOUR CLIENT WOULD VIEW THEM 3. Give a Reason Explanation of the Third test of “Occupying” through case law from Etters and Williams [look for facts and language from the cases to help apply the test to your client’s situation and discuss them as part of your RE] Then Give a Reason Analysis Applying the Rule Explanation of the Third Test to the Client GIVE DETAILS FROM FACT PATTERN AS CRIMSON WOULD VIEW THEM AND AS YOUR CLIENT WOULD VIEW THEM 4. [if you do proximity separately first, you may not have a fourth test] Give a Reason Explanation of the Fourth test of “Occupying” through case law from Etters and Williams [look for facts and language from the cases to help apply the test to your client’s situation and discuss them as part of your RE] Then Give a Reason Analysis Applying the Rule Explanation of the Fourth Test to the Client GIVE DETAILS FROM FACT PATTERN AS CRIMSON WOULD VIEW THEM AND AS YOUR CLIENT WOULD VIEW THEM 5. After evaluating all proximity and 3 or 4 rules then apply analysis show the connection between the tests and our client based on the case law and evaluate if our client will be able to get past summary judgment.-you may make conclusions about each test after each test in your discussions outlined above – but then you will make an overall conclusion here that puts all tests together It is okay to repeat facts when addressing each rule; it is also ok to refer back to a detailed discussion of the facts set out under explanation and application of another rule This analysis section will be the time to bring it all together. Its okay to note that we will construe things broadly to make our case and the insurance company will construe thing narrowly. Read More