Nationalist Feelings in the EU Countries - Essay Example

226097Does a Rise in Nationalist Feeling in Member s Affect the Functioning of the EU Introduction The member s of the European Union had a lofty goal; to bring all of the nations of Europe under the auspices of the Union, operating as a political voice of the member states out of Brussels, Belgium. The Union, formed under the initial act of 1987 known as the Single European Act (SEA), and has seen the rise of various departments within the Union including the European Union Court (EUC), which is responsible for overseeing legal matter that transpire between the member nations, creating policies and laws, and other matters of concern that occur or take place on the European continent (Wessels, Maurer, and Mittag 2000 xv). Since 1999, Brussels has become the center, too, for diplomats and all defence ministries (Wessels, et al, xv). There has been a coalition forged on matters of political and legal relevance, and the EU now has a credible and recognizable voice in world affairs. However the observation that critics return to time and again is that the EU has failed to bring all of the European continent into the EU, and even those member states have not agreed to surrender their autonomy to the auspices of the EUC/EU. Allegations of a nationalist sentiment permeating the individual states have repeated stated from within and outside of EU. How much, if any, validity is attached to the allegation of nationalism as the root caused of preventing the EU from achieving its full charter of goals is the focus of this brief study. Literature Review Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union informs this study with discussion of the evolution of the EU in terms of growth of member states. It discusses, too, those issues of nationalism that prevent the EU from admitting the former Eastern European Communist states of Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. It addresses, the EU’s long standing delay in admitting Turkey, and the racism that is associated with Western versus Eastern European identities. Policy-Making in the European Union provides perspective on the policies that are generated impacting and governing the EU and its decisions to admit members into the EU, and as a reason why some European nations, such as Norway, continue to reject the idea of joining the EU. Reflections on Elusive "Common Dreams": Perils and Hopes of European Identity provides the Eastern Europe perspective, from a personal and analytical approach. EC: Confidence Lost helps to explain why there is confidence lost in the EU politically, but not economically. That the nationalistic tendencies of the EU continue to hurt its potential for political leadership at a world level. The Face and Feelings of Nationalism Michael J. Brenner (1993), writing for Foreign Poilcy, argues that nationalism is dead. That it died when the Berlin Wall came down, and it was buried with the birth of the European Union (Brenner 24). Brenner argues: “Ambitious nationalism and ideological militancy have faded. Political elites with an appetite for adventure or heroic enterprise are but a memory. Ambition is circumscribed. Exclusive integral nationalism is dead in the West; so is doctrinal faith. The result is the draining of passion from political life, along with the disappearance of commitment to grand causes. That attenuated scope to politics, with its focus on interest satisfaction, was a condition for and a reinforced effect of European integration. Prosaic economic issues of the technocratic state were also behind the latest move to expand Brussels institutions. The fear of losing out in a relentless international competition with the United States and Japan was the spur to the single European market, inaugurated on January 1, 1993 (Brenner 24).” Even if we go back to the date that Brenner’s eloquent words graced the pages of Foreign Policy, it remains arguable, especially then, that nationalism had faded. Europeans countries were slow to join what was originally the European Community, or EC. What began in post World War II efforts to bring about economic unison in the goals for Europe, and to forge a political coalition that would be effective in resolving disputes that might erupt on the European Continent (Wallace and Wallace 2000 4). “The EU is built out of three originally separate Communities, each with different powers, characteristics, and policy domains, complemented by other pillars of organized cooperation. These various elements of the EU are: the European Coal and Steel Community ( ECSC), founded in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris the European Economic Community ( EEC), founded in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome; the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), also founded in 1957 by another Treaty of Rome; these three together came to be referred to as the European Community ( EC), and in a loose sense the first pillar, once the term EU was introduced by the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992; the second pillar for developing the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), acknowledged in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, and put on to a more formal basis in the TEU; and the third pillar for developing cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA), established also by the TEU in 1992 (Wallace and Wallace 5). As we observe the above cited evolution, we can see that policy making began without any authority for enforcing that policy, economically or politically. However, economically, the EU has emerged as a more powerful decision making body, and in 1999, most member states, with a few exceptions, began using the Euro as a single currency, and replacing the currency previously used by the member states (See Appendix I). One might be inclined, as was Brenner, to observe that the EU is of a western mindset, and that its members are west European, and its policies emanate out of the western European experience, therefore, nationalism is not a significant issue. However, Gstohl and Reinner (2002) observe, membership and policy have evolved, and as the policy becomes more dominant in the lives of people in the member countries, there are noises made by those countries that sound very nationalistic in nature (Gstohl and Rienner 3). They say: “As the cases of Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden show, reluctant integration policies do not easily disappear with EU membership. On the contrary, skepticism toward closer integration is likely to become even more salient in the future as efforts to further deepen integration encroach upon more sensitive areas and enlargements increase the EUs diversity. There is thus a compelling need to understand reluctant integration policies (Gstohl and Rienner 2002 3).” There is a need, too, to understand the changing face of the EU in the post Cold War environment. Eastern European nations that today stand as members of the EU have somewhat of a confidence problem in the EU, because of its western perspective, which essentially excludes the Eastern European perspective (Debeljak 2001 211). Ales Debeljak says: “If nationalism of large nations in the recent past and today is something normal; if it represents a general light in which other lights are seen as particular ones, than it is no wonder that a Europeanism that would only derive its building blocks from the cultural heritage of the numerous and well-established European nations (English, German, French) does not inspire me with fervent hope for a fairer and freer Europe (Debeljak 211).” As Debeljak divides the EU in east and western experiences, then as we begin to examine policies that were meant to forge as strong a political bond between the member states as it has forged an economic bond successfully, the problem is compounded individually. Each of the member states are sovereign nations with individual laws and governances. These states have presented with a reluctance to surrender unto the EU any measure of their sovereign authority, and this hampers the law making and enforcement processes of the EU, not to mention that it politically weakens it too. One of the ongoing sources of debate is Article 8 Amsterdam Treaty Protocol which is designed to: “Article 8 of the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol, which includes the Schengen acquis, states that future EU members will be required fully to comply with the Justice and Home Affairs acquis. In spite of the diversity of national practices visible in the flexibility of arrangements within the Justice and Home Affairs regime (to accommodate Western countries that opt out: members such as UK and non-members such as Norway), this regime is well on its way to becoming generalized in Europe, at least in its control and enforcement rationale and its tendency to create Central European controlling instruments, such as Europol and the SIS. 50 Most of the applicant countries have already started to adjust, changing their border control mechanisms and their visa regimes, and concluding re-admission agreements with their neighbouring countries (Zielonka 2002 67).” Even today, Norway remains a non-member state, although they do enjoy some of the economic benefits as do other member states by virtue of the fact that health and strength of the EU economically is strong, and Norway reaps residual benefits without having to belong to the EU (Zielonka 103). The Problem of Turkey and Other Non-European States When we talk about nationalism and the EU, the conversation ultimately returns to the subject of Turkey, and, more recently, Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Zielonka 103). Turkey has long awaited approval of membership into the EU, and it continues to wait; as do Bonia, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria because they just are not perceived by Europeans as European in culture and tradition (Zielonka 103). However, as Jan Zielonka points out, these states do indeed have some European characteristics (Zielonka 103). This is one of the areas that the EU is demonstrating a dysfunctional sense of nationalism that is contributing to its lack of political influence and credibility. If we look at the problems here, it stands to reason that the west might have some problem with admitting Turkey, a Muslim nation into the EU. However by virtue of Turkey’s geographic location, it deserves admittance as a European nation. The problems with the conditions that are invoked by the EU that perhaps makes it nervous, is that the member states of the EU, under Article 8, require that there be open borders between the member states. In today’s environment it is understandable that this would make the Western European states nervous (Zielonka 106). “If Turkey and/or the ex-Yugoslav republics were also to join the Union, these problems would be magnified further - although those citizens of the EU already playing host to substantial numbers of Albanian and Kurdish refugees might be forgiven for thinking that the external border of the EU makes little difference either way in some of these matters. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments for rapid and extensive enlargement is that the Union will have fewer problems when some of these countries are subject to the socializing effects of European integration than if they are left outside to fester (Zielonka 106).” As we look at these problems, we find that there is indeed nationalism feelings and reactions to the EU that cause it to be dysfunctional. If it is dysfunctional by way of its nationalism, then it is ineffective in its overall goals as union. The post Communist nations that continue to be a concern to the EU Western states is a manifestation the western identity that permeates the EU. If in those instances where the Eastern European countries, like Poland, for example, were awaiting admittance into the EU, there continued to be that nationalistic western mindset (Zielonka 120). We have, however, seen a evolution of the EU since 1951. So long as this evolving process continues, it is not unrealistic to believe that as events in those post Communist nations and in Turkey change, and if that change is of a nature that is perceived as not threatening to the western identity, then there is every reason to expect that the EU’s goals for a united Europe shall prevail. It does not, however, resolve the issues of sovereign states Western European and Eastern European, that are reluctant to surrender their political decision making authority and processes to the EU. There follows the problem with the independent laws of the nation states, which will not relinquish their legal decision-making authority to the EU. Although there do arise instances where the nation-states appear eager to shift the focus away from the individual nation-states towards the EU. One such instance would be on the subject of nuclear proliferation, since one of the EU’s original initiatives as the EC was to prevent nuclear expansion on the European Continent. Still, there continues to be a vicious circle that keeps brining the conversation back to the subject of nationalism. “explanations and interrogations concerning the ‘return of minorities’ continue to abound, usually connected to speculation about post-communist nationalism in general. The early ‘icebox’ theory, according to which the demise of communism ‘unfroze’ hoary national sentiments, turned out to be more successful as an image than as an argument. It was supplanted by the ‘vacuum’ or ‘default option’ theory, which stated that ethnic identity and nationalism stepped into the ideological void left by the disappearance of Marxism-Leninism and by the weakness of alternative value systems. Neither explanation has led to much in the way of a coherent Western policy, other than distaste for manifestations of nationalism and a vague concern for majority nationalism’s minority victims (Zilonka 120).” The vision that Brenner describes of a fading nationalism, has not yet faded, but it is a vision that is possible at some point in the future – just not a near future. Until such a time as the EU can eradicate itself of the nationalistic tendencies, then it cannot be fully credible and it will continue have a weak political influence in the world. Its economic success must manifest itself racially, and the Western European identity must allow for integration of other identities. There is, of course, continue to be: “. . . persistent differences between countries remain an enduring feature as well. Cooperation as a strategy has repeatedly to contend with egoistic and unilateral preferences among and within countries. Indeed cooperation is often a means to manage differences, rather than an instrument of convergence. It is this combination that brings much of the dynamic to policy-making across borders in western Europe, a dynamic that can intensify cooperation, but which also can interrupt it (Wallace and Wallace 410.” Debeljak says the social legacy of Communism is the tendency to be perceived as being from the “other Europe (Debeljak 211). The EU, he says, continues to do its own housekeeping and cleansing itself of attitudes that keep Europe separated West and East (Debeljak 211). He describes it as a “family apart” from the rest of Europe (Debeljak 211). Debeljak cites three problems that contribute to this situation: first, a negative articulation of the European habitus; second, economism as the European founding myth; and third, a feeble design of a common imaginative frame (Debeljak 211).” While Debeljak makes valid points, the issue that continues to haunt the West when looking East is security. There are some real and unresolved security risks that are posed by the Eastern former Communist countries. The security issues transcend the allegations of “identity politics (Zielonka 240).” They go beyond the fact, too, that European borders are historically perceived and coveted (Zielonka 240). “A widely diffused attitude among the populations of Europe links frontiers to the notion of security - in a broad definition of the term - against unwanted foreign intrusion: defence of physical and psychological security, of economic interests, of languages and cultures. This attitude persists even after the frontier can no longer be used for these purposes: on the Franco-Italian and Franco-Spanish frontiers frequently voices are raised that the French state ought to protect specific interests affected by the economic activities of Italians and Spaniards, despite the existence of the Single Market (Zielonka 241).” Conclusion The conclusion drawn here is that the EU has not completed it state of evolving into a union that is capable of supporting a multi-national community. There is a fear of the “non-European” cultures that share the geography, and that fear is preventing the EU from achieving the diversity in its membership as is represented by its neighbors on the continent. The EU member states have a vision, but that vision cannot be achieved so long as the member states fear the “other” Europeans moving freely between their borders as members of the EU. The blame cannot be put entirely on the shoulders of the EU. Nations seeking to join the EU, in hopes of exploiting the economic trade agreements that are represented by that membership have failed to demonstrate a commitment to the EU by taking positions or making statements that would help the Western European members feel comfortable. In other words, Turkey, for instance, a Muslim nation, has failed to indicate how it would contribute to the safety of the EU by helping to prevent and eliminate terrorism. If Turkey were admitted into the Union, and it had free movement within the borders of the EU, what steps would Turkey take to ensure or contribute to the EU’s safety? It is easy to shout allegations of nationalism and racism, but until Turkey and those Eastern European states like Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which have troubled and unstable political conditions and social conditions, it is not likely that the EU will consider admitting these nations into the EU. For instance, Turkey continues to have the Kurdish problem. How would the Kurds figure into the formula should the EU admit Turkey? That Turkey resolve the conflict between their nation and the Kurds, there cannot be an admission into the EU. It would not make sense for the EU to take on those kinds of problems, especially when admission would open up the borders between Turkey and the other member states for the problems to freely migrate within the EU. These are volatile conditions that the EU is attempting to avoid, but at the same time nationalistic tendencies cannot be ignored, and are, realistically accurate. That the member states cannot resolve political and legal authorities between themselves at this time demonstrates that the EU is far from evolving into its charter. The reluctance to relinquish to a governing body of elected officials state sovereignty is very much indicative of this. However, the EU has its charter, and so long as it continues to work towards that charter we can expect to perhaps see several manifestations of the EU towards its full evolutionary potential in the future. Appendix I Member states (EUR: Euro currency): Austria (since 1995-01-01) (EUR) Belgium (EUR) Bulgaria (since 2007-01-01) Cyprus (Greek part) (since 2004-05-01) (EUR: 2008-01-01) Czech Republic (since 2004-05-01) Denmark Estonia (since 2004-05-01) Finland (since 1995-01-01) (EUR) France (EUR) Germany (EUR) Greece (EUR) Hungary (since 2004-05-01) Ireland (EUR) Italy (EUR) Latvia (since 2004-05-01) Lithuania (since 2004-05-01) Luxembourg (EUR) Malta (since 2004-05-01) (EUR: 2008-01-01) Netherlands (EUR) Poland (since 2004-05-01) Portugal (EUR) Romania (since 2007-01-01) Slovakia (since 2004-05-01) Slovenia (since 2004-05-01) (EUR) Spain (EUR) Sweden (since 1995-01-01) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland European Union Works Cited Brenner, Michael J. "EC: Confidence Lost." Foreign Policy Summer 1993: 24+. Questia. 13 May 2008 . Debeljak, Ales. "Reflections on Elusive "Common Dreams": Perils and Hopes of European Identity." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26.2 (2001): 211. Questia. 13 May 2008 . Wallace, Helen, and William Wallace, eds. Policy-Making in the European Union. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Questia. 13 May 2008 . Zielonka, Jan, ed. Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union. New York: Routledge, 2002. Questia. 13 May 2008 . Read More