Strengths and Weaknesses of the Sunningdale Agreement - Coursework Example

Word Count 473 Sunningdale WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE: THE SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT Sunningdale 2 Sunningdale and Belfast Almost twenty-five years separate the Belfast and Sunningdale Agreements. Both represent serious attempts to heal deeply rooted divisions created primarily by the 1920 division of Ireland into two separate and distinct political units. The Sunningdale Agreement lasted barely six months, from December 1973 to May 1974, before it collapsed under a wave of Unionist-instigated strikes. (Wikipedia, The Troubles). Therefore we can’t really judge its effectivity as an agreement, based on actual practical experience. However, we can review the history and trace the roots of the “Irish Troubles.” From that vantage point we can study the provisions of Sunningdale and evaluate their potential to facilitate the solution of long standing problems in Northern Ireland. Partition The British government created Northern Ireland against the wishes of the majority of the Irish People who wanted a free and independent Irish republic. Though there are some counter claims, the victory of the Sinn Fein in the 1918 Irish Elections is a convincing indication of the people’s strong Sunningdale Agreement 3 republican sentiments. The 1920 partition created the first great divide between Irish nationalists and Unionists and left it festering like an open wound. (NIFR, 1984). The partition did benefit the Protestants in Northern Ireland, where they assumed the role of the majority, while the Catholics became the minority in a highly sectarian society. Discrimination against Catholics over jobs, education, and housing; violations of many of their basic rights; and Protestant apprehension over nationalist organisations and activities have only widened and hardened the differences between them. Years of Discontent The discontent created by this situation has sparked off various protests in Northern Ireland since 1920. A non-violent civil rights movement launched by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) from 1968-1972 was able to gather massive support from Catholic communities based on the following five demands: “To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens, …protect the rights of the individual…highlight all possible abuses of power… demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association…(and) inform the public of their lawful rights.” (NICRA, 1978). Sunningdale Agreement 4 “The civil rights movement drew a hostile response from the Protestant state, which saw it as a threat to its very existence.” (Fitzduff, 2000). British troops landed on Northern Ireland soil in 1970 to deal with civil rights actions. Internment was introduced in 1971, and Catholics were incarcerated without being tried. This created widespread resentment. The IRA became increasingly active and received increasing support from Catholic communities. From 1970-1972, in a paroxysm of violence, almost 500 people were killed due to conflict that involved British troops, unionists, nationalists, and their paramilitary groups. By 1972, Home Rule by Stormont was replaced by direct rule by the British government. Something had to be done, and that something was Sunningdale. Sunningdale Revisited The Sunningdale Agreement provides strong assurances to Northern Ireland Unionists that the principles of consent and majority rule will preserve their dominant position in NI society. (CAIN, Sunningdale Agreement). It states that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland will decide whether they want to remain within the UK or become part of a united Ireland. Both the Irish Republic and British government guarantee that they will respect and abide by the decision of the majority. Logically, since the NI majority are Sunningdale Agreement 5 Protestant Unionists, we can expect Northern Ireland to remain within the UK for the foreseeable future under the agreement. Viewed from the other side, Catholic nationalists can expect little improvement in their situation since the Unionist majority will naturally strive to perpetuate their privileges, often at the expense of the politically and economically weaker minority. The conservative inclination to preserve the status quo can block even the most peaceful attempts to implement reforms. The protection of the rights of the minority in Northern Ireland’s divided society is one of the fundamental issues and concerns that are not adequately addressed by the Sunningdale Agreement. Democracy for the Minority “Since 1922, the identity of the nationalist section…in the North has been effectively disregarded. …They have had virtually no involvement in decision-making at the political level. For over 50 years they lived under a system of exclusively unionist power and privilege and suffered systematic discrimination. They were deprived of the means of social and economic development, experienced high levels of emigration and have always been subject to high rates of unemployment.” (NIFR, 1984) Sunningdale Agreement 6 Such discrimination is evident even in the Sunningdale Agreement. It provides no assurances to the relatively substantial Catholic minority nor does it contain measures or proposals that will guarantee the rights of the minority, promote unity within a multicultural society, and eradicate the prevailing sectarianism in Northern Ireland. Power Sharing What Sunningdale offered was power sharing, the political strategy behind the Sunningdale Agreement. It was an approach to the resolution of conflicts between groups, and concretely, Unionists vs. Nationalists, Northern Ireland vs. the Irish Republic, the British government vs. both Unionists and Nationalists. Power sharing was envisioned to be a compromise that would attract contending parties into agreeing with and implementing the provisions of the agreement. The Sunningdale agreement encompassed the following: “a devolved assembly, a power-sharing executive, and a cross-border institution, called the Council of Ireland. Although few of the provisions of the accord were brought into effect, a power-sharing government was established involving the Official Unionist Party (OUP), the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).” (Morton, n.d.) This, and Sunningdale Agreement 7 other efforts, ended with the final blow against the Sunningdale Agreement, a strike called by Northern Ireland labor unions with Unionist sympathies. Many Unionists believed that the cross border Council of Ireland would only pave the way to a united Ireland, where they would be the Protestant minority, a reversal of the situation in Northern Ireland, where they are the Protestant majority. “The unionist majority was determined to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the UK, while the substantial nationalist minority never having accepted this constitutional position aspired to see NI reunited with the rest of the island in a separate Irish state.” (Farren, 2006) As long as the parties remained adamant and closed to any possible compromises or adjustments, there could be no progress made. It is hard to believe that power sharing would be attractive for the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland in 1973. It would be perceived as a threat to their position and using that logic, the Unionists mounted their successful campaign against Sunningdale agreement. It is also hard to believe that real power sharing can be implemented without a fairly level playing field for unionists, nationalists and other groups within NI. For power sharing to be really effective and beneficial, each political bloc or group should enjoy the same political and economic rights and opportunities as the others. Sunningdale Agreement 8 Beyond Sunningdale The solution to the problems of Northern Ireland goes beyond the Northern Ireland framework. “So long as the legitimate rights of both unionists and nationalists are not accommodated together in new political structures acceptable to both, that situation will continue to give rise to conflict and instability. The starting point of genuine reconciliation and dialogue is mutual recognition and acceptance of the legitimate rights of both … A settlement, which recognises the legitimate rights of nationalists and unionists, must transcend the context of Northern Ireland… It requires a common will to alleviate the plight of the people, both nationalists and unionists. It requires a political framework within which urgent efforts can be undertaken to resolve the underlying causes of the problem.” (CAIN, NIFR). What is the character of that political framework? It takes the form of a “sovereign, independent Irish state to be achieved peacefully and by consent.” (CAIN, NIFR) This state must be founded on an enriched Irish identity that accommodates the common historical thread and the best of the nationalist and unionist heritage. It is through this state that Sunningdale Agreement 9 a united Ireland can take its proper place in the European and global stages. The reworking of Irish identity will make it possible for the Irish state to exist, survive and prosper. The identity and desires of both nationalists andunionists will be validated (not lost or subsumed) as part of the Irish state’s broad people’s agenda. The Irish state should provide for the structures that will make all these possible. A New Future? Just yesterday, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, Irish Prime Minister, confirmed that the March 7 elections will go on as planned, since all the parties involved were fulfilling their assigned responsibilities. When elected, the new assembly will organize the power sharing executive by March 26. As reported by the BBC on 30 January 2007, Tony Blair said he believed that the election could be "the start of a completely different future for the people of Northern Ireland." The people of Ireland, and other countries, certainly hope so. References 1. BBC news. Accessed March 1 from: http://bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6311507.stm 2. CAIN. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. Accessed 25 Feb. 2007 from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm 4. CAIN. NIFR-New Ireland Forum Report (1984). 3.1-3.3, 4.13-4.15, 5.4-5.5. Accessed 24 Feb. 2007 from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/nifr.htm 5. Farren, S. (2005, 15 June). Sunningdale – An Agreement too Soon. Pars. 35-36. University College, Dublin. 6. Fitzduff, M. & O’Hagan, L. (2000). The Northern Ireland Troubles: INCORE background paper. Accessed 24 Feb. 2007 from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm 7. Morton, A. (n.d.) Anglo-Irish Agreement – Background Informatino Accessed 24 Feb. 2007 from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/bac.htm 8. NICRA. (1978). We shall Overcome – The History of the Struggle for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland 1968 - 1978. Chapter on Origins. Accessed 28 Feb. from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/nicra/nicra78.htm#contents Read More