Maritime Insurance: Frustration and Deviation - Dissertation Example

 Maritime Insurance: Frustration and Deviation Introduction to Maritime Insurance and Law Marine insurance covers the loss or damage of ships and goods at sea and is the oldest form of insurance Lloyd’s of London and the Institute of London Underwriters developed standardized clauses for marine insurance in the 19th century known as Institute Clauses (Nunes 2004). In 1906 the Marine Insurance Act was passed, which codified previous common law principles. The terms in the Act had been test for two centuries of judicial precedent, but the language was very archaic, which prompted a new standard policy, MAR 91. The MAR from was a general statement of insurance paired with the Institute Clauses, which detailed the insurance coverage. A maritime locus is defined as being on navigable waters (Force 2004). Jurisdiction is a complicated issue with commercial navigation being world wide, but there are several considerations when determining legal jurisdiction; 1. Place of wrongful act 2. Law of the Flag 3. Allegiance or residence of injured party 4. Allegiance of defendant ship owner 5. Place where contract was constructed 6. Inassessability of a foreign forum 7. Law of the Forum 8. Ship owner’s base of operations (can be most important factor but just because a ship owner has US base does not mean the case will be tried in US courts. [Hellinic Lines Ltd v. Rhoditis] The majority of maritime commercial transactions involve the carriage of goods. The primary document is the bill of lading, which is basically a contract of carriage. In 1936 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) was passed in the United States, only applies to foreign trade and is limited to the time the cargo is loaded and discharged from the vessel. COGSA was in implementation of the Hague Rules, which sought to ensure a seaworthy ship and the proper care of goods. COGSA was also enacted to cover encompass the international sphere of uniform liability rules governing domestic voyages found in the Harter Act of 1893. It covers only the period of time between the times the goods are loaded on the ship and when they are discharged from the shop. The main point of the Act was to prevent ship owners contracting out of the duty to properly care for the vessel and the cargo onboard. Two terms for dispute in maritime law are in personam and in rem. The in personam suit is typical of other forms of law, but in rem is nearly exclusive to admiralty jurisdiction and is basic to the maritime lien. In maritime law an aggrieved party has a property interest in the vessel or other tangible item involved in the amount of the accrued liability and this right is a maritime lien. In rem is an action directly against the vessel bearing the lien. An in rem can only be brought to a federal court as a court of admiralty. The in personam can be brought to federal or at common law in state courts. Particular to marine insurance and general insurance law are the terms condition and Warranty. In English law a condition is a portion of the contract that is fundamental to the performance and if breached voids the entire contract. A warranty is not essential to contract fulfilment and will not constitute a breach. In Marine insurance law the terms are reversed and refer to implied warranties such a seaworthy vessel and those specifically expressed in writing. Warranties can be excused upon a change of circumstance such as a deviation or a situation that frustrates the contract. Expressed warranties do not exclude implied warranties, that is, it is assumed that the ship is seaworthy even though the fact is not stated in shipping documents. The Marine Insurance Act 1906 has several very important sections that include foremost section 4 which states that a policy without insurable interest is void and section 17; Insurance is uberrimae fides. Marine contracts are based on good faith or the truthfulness of both parties and if that does not occur then the contract maybe voided. Section 5 (1 and 2) defines insurable interest as any person who has an interest in maritime adventure, which he has a legal or equitable interest. Another important aspect of the Marine Insurance Act is section 34 (2) which provides that if a warranty has been broken there is no defence to the insured that the breach has been remedied and the warranty complied with prior to the loss. Good faith or honesty in contracts is paramount to maritime insurance law if the liability is to be honoured. This is again stressed in section 18 which indicates that the assured must disclose all relevant information to the acceptance and rating of the risk with failure to do so known as non-disclosure or concealment. The insurance can then be rendered void by the insurer. The Doctrine of Frustration applies to situations where after the conclusion of the contract some unforeseeable event happens, making fulfilment of the contract impossible. Under the doctrine courts have the power to discharge any contract that falls with is scope as “frustrated.” Frustration as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is commercial impracticality; something needed to complete the contract is no longer available at the time of performance (Black’s Law pg 462). The Doctrine of Deviation involves a vessel intentionally diverting from the usual and ordinary route appropriate for the destination. It is a voluntary, unnecessary or unexcused departure without reasonable cause from the course of the voyage insured or an unreasonable delay in pursuing the voyage or commencement of an entirely different voyage (Black’s Law pg 311). The doctrine traced to pre COGSA law of marine insurance, which held that insurers only accepted the risks reasonably contemplated by the parties. Since a carrier’s unreasonable deviation avoided it the shipper’s insurance and courts forced the carrier to assume the liabilities of the insurer. A shipper’s insurance policy will insulate the cargo form all deviations and carriers should be entitled to the statutory liability limitation provided by COGSA. Deviation is still vital as an incentive to ensuring that carriers behave properly. Deviation Vision Air v MV National Pride US 9th Court of Appeals 9716839 Vision Air Flight Service, Inc A Philippines Corporation Plaintiff/Appellant v. M/V National Pride, in rem, Madrigal-Wan Hai Lines. Defendant/Appellees In this case the plaintiff, Vision Air, had purchased two refuelling trucks in the state of Kansas for shipment to Manila, Philippines. Vision Air obtained the services of Madrigal to deliver the trucks from Oakland, California to Manila. In October 1995, Madrigal issued a bill of lading for the contract of carriage, which included a clause that would limit its liability to $500 as per COGSA, 46 U.S. C. App. SS 1300-1315. Madrigal also advised Vision of the option to pay a higher shipping charge for increased liability coverage, but Vision opted for an independent insurance company. The trucks were placed aboard the vessel, National Pride, and discharged at the Manila International Container Port on October 17, 1995. Anthony Jamora, a Vision Air representative was there to witness the unloading of the cargo. The trucks were offloaded using the ship’s own cranes, but rather than using spreader bars and platforms, cables were placed on the first truck and tires used for padding. Extensive damage was done to the truck; however, even after inspecting the damage, the stevedores unloaded the second truck in the exact same manner causing the same amount of damage. Vision sued Madrigal claiming that Madrigal did not give adequate notice that liability was limited under COGSA and that Madrigal’s method of unloading the cargo constituted unreasonable deviation. The district court granted a partial summary judgment limiting Madrigal’s liability to $1000. COGSA does limit liability in section 4(5), but the carrier can limit liability under COGSA only if the shipper is given a fair opportunity to choose a higher shipping charge for a greater liability ( Nemeth v General Steamship Corp, Ltd, 694 F. 2nd 609, 611 (9th Cir 1982). The appellate court found that Madrigal has met prima facie in the bill of lading as Vision Air opted for third party insurance, indicating that Vision did know about the COGSA liability [Cothino, Caro & Co. v M/V Sava 848 (5th Cir. 1988]. The point of contention was the method of unloading that cause a total loss on both refuelling trucks. Vision maintained that the damage to the second truck was intentional since after witnessing the damage to the first truck, the stevedores unloaded the second truck in the exact same manner. Such “quasi-deviations” stray from actual geographical deviation “St. John’s N.F. Shipping Corp. v S.A. Companhia Geral Commericial Do Rio D e Janeiro, 263 U.S. 119” (1923). The appellate court also granted a partial summary judgement, but opposite that of the district court. It found that on the first point Madrigal had conformed to the bill of lading and offered Vision the opportunity for a higher shipping charge. On the second point, Vision was correct in stating that the damage to the second truck could be construed to be intentional. One of the main purposes for COGSA was to ensure that carriers maintain incentive for careful transport and delivery of cargo. Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v American President Lines Ltd., 32 F. 3d 1244, 1251 (8th Cir. 1994). Also applied to this case was COGSA 3(2), 46 U.S.C. App. S 1303 (2) which require a carrier to handle and discharge the cargo with care. 248 U. S. 392 Messrs, Julius Frank and Everett Wheeler for Standard Varnish Works v. Clarence Bishop for The Bris A shipment of varnish that was prepaid was not delivered to Gothenburg, Sweden by the steamship, The Bris as agreed. At the time of the contract on August 17, 1917 no license was required to ship varnish from New York to Sweden. At the time of the contract the Bris presented the export license from Britain that were required. While still at port, the US government proclaimed that a license to export varnish to Sweden would be required as of August 27, 1917. The Bris applied for the license and waited until October 8, 1917 as without the license the ship could not precede due to the war. The application was denied, so the Bris unloaded the cargo and discharged the charterparty on October 22. Standard Varnish Works took back the varnish and demanded that the Bris return the shipping payment. The Bris refused. The questions in this case were, did the bill of lading give the carrier the justification to keep the prepaid freight and did the Bris have the right to discharge the cargo before the destination? Clause 6 in the bill of lading stated that the prepaid freight would be retained by the vessel owners if there were a forced interruption or abandonment of the voyage at port of distress or elsewhere. In Clause 7 the ship master could wait until the impeding obstacle be removed if prevented from reaching her destination by war or discharge the goods into any depot or any convenient port [248 U.S. 398] The appellate court affirmed the decision of the district court in that the Bris was justified in keeping the prepaid freight. The cargo was not delivered due to an action of the government and thus the deviation was unavoidable the Bris entitled to keep the prepaid freight [International Paper Co. v. The Schooner Gracie D. Chambers]. The Bris unloaded the cargo at New York because it could not legally leave New York without the license in a time of war, an exception provided for in section 4 of COGSA. The deviation was not unreasonable. Whistler International Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Harmony Hill) 1999 Whistler International timed-chartered the ship, Harmony Hill for two voyages across the Pacific Ocean via the Great Circle route. The ship captain did not comply and the arbitrators determined that the captain could not disregard the instructions in the charterparty. Due to extensive weather damage when taking that route before the ship captain followed another course, which caused the voyage to take longer. Whistler then deducted amounts to compensate for the extra days at sea even though there was no loss or damage to cargo [International Drilling Co. NV v M/V Doriels 291 F. Suppl 479] The arbitrators found that the ship Master could not disregard the route instructions on the bill of lading and prior bad experience on that route was not sufficient reason to deviate. The appellate court held that the obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch did not remove the Master’s right and responsibility regarding navigation. Decisions of navigation can be made before or after the vessel leaves port with Article IV Rule 2(a) allowing for anticipated weather in navigation changes. Nothing in the charterparty restricted the Master from freely selecting the course. This case could have easily gone the other way as the Marine Act clearly states conditions in the Change of Voyage (45) and Deviation (46) sections that void liability. In 45 (2) it states that an insurer is discharged from liability from the time the decision to change the voyage manifested, whether the actual change ever took place. Section 46 (2) states that there is a deviation from the voyage contemplated by the policy (a) where the course of the voyage was specifically stated and that course is departed from. There was no navigation error defense and nothing to indicate that there was a reason other than past experience that made the Master take the southern route against the charterparty specifications. The actions of the ship Master could have avoided a possible frustration of the contract where the Harmony Hill would have lost. Foreseeability of an event is relevant and a limitation in the frustration doctrine [Amalgamated Investment & Property Ltd v. John Walker & Sons Ltd 1976 3 All ER 509 CA]. Leduc & Co. v. Ward Court of Appeal (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 475 On a voyage from Fiume to Dunkirk a ship deviated to Glasgow and in route the ship sank with the cargo. The carrier, Ward, sought a perils of the sea defence to be released from liability and claimed that the charterer knew before the carriage contract was completed that the ship would sail to Glasgow, thus endorsing the deviation. The court of appeal upheld the decision that the pre-contract agreement did not bind the indorsee who took on bill of lading terms. The terms did not permit the deviation and the carrier was not protected by the perils at sea clause. The issue in this case was the bill of lading did not permit the deviation and since the captain of the ship had taken possession of the goods the bill of lading was to be taken as the contract under which the cargo was shipped [Fraser v. Telegraph Construction Co. LR 7 QB 566] In the nineteenth century it was common for English carriers to write exceptions into carriage contracts that would exclude them from most liability. This was known as the freedom of contract rule and such clauses were not accepted in the United States. Ward could have written enough detail into the bill of lading to have avoided liability, but did not and was liable for the lost cargo. To ease the legalities of international commerce the Hague Rules were adopted which were more extensive than the Harter Act passed in the US shortly before the Hague Rules. The US incorporated the Hague Rules in the COGSA of 1936. One main concern of the Hague Rules and COGSA is ensuring responsibility and liability in the carriage of goods. The Hague Rules have amendments knows as the Visby Admendments (Hague Visby Rules). Frustration Frustration is the destruction or unavailability of subject matter at the time of the contract-destruction or unavailability of the specific object essential for performance at the time of the contract will frustrate it. A prime example of the Frustration Doctrine is the Taylor v. Caldwell case of 1863 [Best & S. 826] The plaintiffs hired the use of Surrey Gardens and Music Hall for four days for concerts and entertainment, but one day before the scheduled events the music hall burned down. The plaintiffs sued for lost expenses in advertising the events and set up costs, but the court ruled that since the music hall was necessary for the fulfillment of the contract the defendants were not liable. The fire was the fault of neither party. “The court finds an implied condition that the music hall should continue to exist. Failure of this condition excuses the performance.” The Law Reform Act (Frustrated Contracts) of 1943 sought to temper the common law doctrine of frustration to allow a greater flexibility to legislation regarding the law of mistake (para 162). Odfjell Seachem A/S v. Continentale des Petroles et d’investissements, Societe Nationale de Commercialisation de Produits Petroliers EWHC 2929 2004 The Bow Cedar was chartered by Continentale des Petroles (CP) to carry a cargo of petroleum products for a lump sum freight. The charterers were unable to provide the cargo and released the vessel to find other employment. The breach was accepted by the ship owners who claimed a cancellation fee comprised of the lost freight and demurrage less the value of costs and bunkers saved. The first defense used by CP was frustration since the cargo was unavailable. This was entirely within their right since the cargo was not available at the time of contract performance[Taylor v. Caldwell] and would have released CP from liability, but their second defense was a time-bar based on Clause 20 of the standard BPVOY 4 form. The BPVOY 4 states that a claim in writing for deviation, demurrage or detention must be filed within 90 days or the charterers are released from all liability. The time limit for all other claims is 180 days. COGSA states that claims must be filed within 12 months of date of delivery. Maritime law defines delivery as the time the goods are unloaded on the pier and made available to the consignee. In the case of Seachem v. Continetale des Petroles, no goods were available for delivery, so the defendants stated the date should begin from the date the good would have been discharged, which conforms to COGSA, but in regards to lost goods. The court ruled that since the plaintiffs accepted the repudiatory breach that effectively ended the contract and Continetale was not entitled to recuperate loses. Prior to the acceptance of the breach the plaintiffs could have recovered damages. Petroships Pte Ltd of Singapore v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation of Vietnam Case nos 2001 Folio 121 and 339. On March 25, 1998 Petro ships and Petec signed a charterparty requiring the Petro Ranger to carry a cargo of gasoil and kerosene from Singapore to Ho Chi Minh City. The ship loaded the cargo at Singapore and sailed for Vietnam on April 16, 1998. The trip should have taken two days, but was hijacked by pirates not long after leaving Singapore. The crew was bound, threatened and the ship commandeered by the pirates who forced the vessel to deviate from the contracted route. The ship sailed three miles north into Chinese waters near the city of Haikou. The Petro Ranger was assumed missing as there was no contact per the instructions of the pirates who had painted over the name of the ship and replaced it with the name Wilby. False bills of lading and registration papers had also been created and placed on board. The fate of the ship was unknown until April 26 when the Chinese authorities found it unloading the remainder of its cargo into another vessel, the Jin Chao. The oil discharged before discovery of the Petro Ranger was never recovered. At first both ships were detained as being involved in smuggling and taken to Haikou where the defendants and the claimants sent representatives. The oil cargo on both ships was placed in shore tanks while the situation was being investigated, but was then auctioned off after the Petro Ranger was allowed to sail on May 28, 1998. Petec filed claim against Petroships for the cargo still on board the Petro Ranger and the Jin Chao when the Chinese authorities intervened. The piracy and the oil stolen before April 26 were not disputed. The tribunal awarded Petec the full amount and dismissed the counterclaim of Petroships for freight. Both parties chose arbitration over litigation with Petroships appealing the tribunal decision. The claim of frustration was considered by arbitration and on appeal with the exceptions of piracy, restraint of princes and breach of charterparty/failure to deliver. Piracy was not challenged up until detainment by the Chinese authorities. The frustration defense was considered after April 26, 1998, which the tribunal found unproven. Petroships claimed frustration not based on impossibility but a radical change in circumstances as found in Davis Contractors Ltd v. Fareham UDC. Lord Reid put the test for frustration in these terms. “The question is whether the contract which they did make is, on its true construction, wide enough to apply to the new situation.” In National Carriers Ltd v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd found that frustration of a contract occurs when an event supervenes without the fault of either party that significantly changes the contractual rights/obligations from what reasonably could have been contemplated at the time of execution. The main issue contended was whether the contract was still viable after the Petro Ranger was detained by the Chinese authorities. The piracy exception ended at that time, but Petroships claimed that the cargo was not under their control and thus it was not possible to fulfill the contract due to the government confiscation of the cargo. Petroships claimed that the Chinese government was aware of the piracy and in fact, arranged it. In the Hilton Oil Transport v Oil Transport Co (659 So, 2d 1141 (CA Fla 1995) the court found that there was no legal authority to support a defence of government seizure when not during times of war or anticipation of war. The oil cargo placed in the shore tanks from both vessels by the Chinese government was surrendered voluntarily by Petroships as part of a deal with authorities for release. Since the cargo was the responsibility of the Petro Ranger, the tribunal held that the contract was valid and enforceable. The cargo from the Jin Chao that was placed in the shore tanks was also at that time available to the Petro Ranger. The contract was not frustrated after April 26 since the cargo and ship was no longer in possession of the pirates and the situation with the Chinese authorities as described by Petroships was suspicious. Between April 26 and May 28 the Petro Ranger could have loaded the cargo and proceeded to the contracted destination, so Petroships was liable for the cargo and not entitled to a return of the freight charge. Lowber v. Bangs 69 US 728 1864 Bangs and Sons were owners of a ship then at sea, the Mary Bangs, which was on a passage from New York to Melbourne, Australia. The owners charterered her at Boston to Lowber who on site for a voyage from Calcutta to Philedelphia. The charter party dated June 4, 1958 stated the Mary Bangs was to proceed from Melbourne to Calcutta immediately from Melbourne and it was understood that the ship was still in route from New York. The owner was to use the most direct means of communicating the orders to the ship captain with a copy of the charter instructions to be followed from Lowber. If the ship arrived at Melbourne before the orders and the captain then engaged the ship before receiving them, then the charter was void. The Mary Bangs arrived in Melbourne on August 7, 1864 and was ready to sail by September 7, but waited until the 16th for the mail which was due on September 5, 1858. It did not arrive until October 14. The ship sailed to Manila instead of Calcutta arriving on November 16. If the Mary Bangs had proceeded directly to Calcutta it would have arrived there in the middle of November. The owner sent five letters on five different dates to Melbourne regarding the instructions to the ship captain. The ship did not arrive in Calcutta until February 26 1859, three months after the charterparty designated. Lowber had sent an agent to Calcutta on June 23 who arrived on August 25. When he found out that the Mary Bangs had not sailed directly from Melbourne he refused to load her [Ollive v. Booker]. Freight charges had fallen considerably since the charterparty signed in June 1858 and Lowber had engaged another vessel with the money provided for the Mary Bangs. Since the cargo was available to load the contract had not been frustrated by the delay of the vessel. The issue was not the conditions in Calcutta at the time of the Mary Bangs arrival since the court thought that the stipulation regarding the direct route from Melbourne to Calcutta was a warranty and not a representation [Behn v Burness]. If that were not so, the construction of the contract would be dependent on a future event which was not the intention of the charterparty. The court found for the It was not clear in the case exactly when the captain of the Mary Bangs received his orders, but the charter allowed for no other situation other than the ship be engaged for the charter to be void. The ship owners had no reason to believe that the Mary Bangs would not arrive at port in time for the mail and could not have foreseen the mail delay, thus they did not protect themselves sufficiently in the charterparty. SABO S.A. v. United Arab Shipping Company (UASC) Case no. 2003/1157 The plaintiff, SABO, hired UASC to carry three shipments in five months with a destination of Gioia Tauro, Italy from Germany and Greece. A certificate was issued detailing the ports of call and details of the vessel carrying the cargo. Transhipment was not permitted. With the certificate of transport it would be obvious if any deviation occurred. The only need for transhipment would be if there were a need for a feeder vessel running between a hub port and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the final destination. The defendant, UASC, is a carrier operating several lines that include one running from Northern Europe through the Mediterranean into the Persian Gulf and back, with no stop at Piraeus. The hub port in the Mediterranean is Gioia Tauro with feeder vessels running from that port to all others in the area. There is only one carrier going from Piraeus and Jeddah, MSC. UASC violated the carriage of goods contract by using a feeder ship, Carl Metz (not owned by UASC), to take the SABO cargo to Piraeus for transhipment to a UASC vessel, Al Sabahia. The Carl Metz stranded outside Gioia Tauro and took in sea water which damaged cargo and containers. The SABO insurance would not cover the loss as it had insured a voyage from Vassiliko to Jeddah on the Al Sabahia, not a third party vessel. The Marine Act 1906 Section 59 states that if cargo is damaged or lost while transhipment occurs and the vessel continues the voyage to the destination, the insurer remains liable, unless it is stipulated on the bill of lading that no transhipments are included. This was the case with the SABO bill of lading as it was stamped on the outside with “transhipment not allowed.” When the purchaser of the cargo, Makkah, discovered the incident they would not accept the bill of lading or the insurance policy. SABO replaced the lost shipment fearing that the entire contract was in jeopardy. The damaged cargo was not salvaged and UASC did not continue the voyage to Gioia Tauro. The salvors abandoned their lien with UASC after failed attempts to gain consent from SABO to dispose of the cargo and retrieve the containers. There was a frustration on the carriage of goods, but no claim was based on that doctrine. Taylor v. Caldwell had established that the destruction or unavailability of the specific object essential for performance of the contract will frustrate it. SABO was aware of the transhipment and the shipping documents were designed to mislead Makkah and the bankers, so there was no misrepresentation toward SABO. The claims against UASC were unfounded as SABO never presented a formal request to collect goods or an abandonment of voyage. Frustration may not have applied here as it involved the deliberate act or choice of one of the parties [Maritime National Fish v. Ocean Trawlers 1935 AC 524] when the decision was made to perform a transhipment. Conclusion The doctrine of Deviation were created before there were codified laws to protect the ocean transport industry. In common law any deviation deprived cargo of its insurance coverage. After The Hague Rules there were exceptions where deviations in attempting to save cargo or life or any reasonable deviation were not a breath of contract. COGSA section 4(5) states that neither carrier nor shipper be liable for more than $500 unless specified in the Bill of Lading. This stipulation was a response to the old “Liberty Clauses” which served to protect carriers by allowing them to deviate however they wished (Lennon 2003) Frustration can often be an immediate high-level matter as one party informs the other that it will not or cannot complete contractual obligations (Martin 1999). The two branches are Frustration without Fault and Frustration with Fault. In the former an unexpected event happens which is not covered by the charterparty and renders the performance either impossible or commercially impractical. The charter is cancelled without liability on either part. The latter involves the breach of one party’s obligation with the opposite party claiming the breach is substantial enough to be the essence of the contract and the charter is thus frustrated. Limitations prevent parties from eluding contracts simply because they made a bad deal [Tsakiroglou v Noblee Thorl (1961) 2 ALL ER 179.] A main difference between UK law and US law is in the United States there is a reluctance to place limitations on liability and each case is taken on its unique qualities. With the development of Charter party forms internationally, of which some are specific to certain needs, a greater uniformity is possible in maritime disputes, perhaps lessening the amount of cases based on frustration and deviation. References Force, Robert. (2004) ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law.’ Federal Judicial Center. Glenn, Robert S., Earle, George M., and Marling, Marc G. ‘Admiralty Law.’ Mercer Law Review. Retrieved June 5, 2006 from http://reiew.law.mercer.edu/articles/50410.htm Lennon, Margaret M. (June 2003) ‘Deviation then and now-when COGSA’s per package limitation is lost.’ St. John’s Law Review Spring. Martin, Pat. (January 1999) ‘Charter Parties.’ The Marine Advocate. Issue 6. Nunes, Tony. (2004) ‘Charter’s liabilities under the Ship Time Charter.’ Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 6 (3) pp 561+ Southerington, Tom. (n.d.) ‘Impossibility in English Law.’ Retrieved June 8, 2006 from http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisb/bliblie/southerington.html Table of Authorities Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) [1936] United States. Compagnie Commercial Andre S.A. v (First) Artibell Shipping Company Limited and (Second) The Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland. [1999] ScotCS 2 (7 January 1999). English Marine Insurance Act 1906, An Act to codify the law relating to marine insurance[ 21 December 1906] Hellenic Lines Ltd v Rhoditis, 398 US 306 (1970). Frank v.Wheeler. [1919] 248 U.S. 393, 248 U.S. 395, 248 U.S. 396. Leduc & Co. v Ward. 20 QBD 475 Court of Appeal [1888]. Lowber v Bangs. 69 U.S. 728 Supreme Court of the United States (December 1963). Odfjell Seachem A/S v Continentale des Petroles et d’investissments, Societe Nationale de Commercialisation de Produits Petroliers. [2004] EWXH 2929 Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court. Petroships Pte Ltd of Singapore v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation of Vietnam and Others. 2001 EWHC Commercial 418 (22 May 2001) Case nos. 2001 Folio 121 and 339. Vision Air Freight Service, Inc. v M/V National Pride, 155 F 3d 1165 (11th Cir 1998) SABO S.A. v United Arab Shipping Company. Neutral Citation Number: 2005 EWCH 307 (Comm) Case No. 2003/1157. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division. Taylor v Caldwell [1863] Best & S. 826. Queen’s Bench Whistler International Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The Harmony Hill) 1999. Court of Appeal Civil Division. 20 May 1999. Read More