Intelligence Led Policing - Essay Example

 Introduction In the context of the public safety organizations and law enforcement, intelligence is often attributed to be a potent and effective tool. Apt intelligence provides the law enforcement leaders a realistic and operational perspective of a public safety environment thereby allowing them to allocate and exploit the scarce resources in an optimal and result driven manner. Intelligence aids and allows the information and data analysts operational in law enforcement to come out with innovative and ingenious strategies to tackle the law and order related problems. Also, in case of the operators delving on investigations centring on specific targets, appropriate intelligence allows them to narrow their approaches on more plausible lines of investigation. Intelligence tends to be a three pronged law enforcement utility. It is a process, a product and a structure at one and the same time. It strengthens the law enforcement and public safety organizations by helping them better understand the environment they are assigned to police. However, while resorting to intelligence led policing, it is also an onus of the law enforcement organizations and officials to look to it that that it gets practiced within its legal boundaries. What is Intelligence? It is really interesting to note that the very mention of the word intelligence conjures up wrong images in the minds of many people (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 263). To the common people the word intelligence often sums up to be a clandestine or covet operation conducted by officers who tend to specialize in shady law enforcement activities, which to some extent tends to carry along with it a tinge of moral ambiguity (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 263). However, in the context of the crime intelligence analysts it stands to be a systematic, methodical and logical approach towards things that immensely aids the understanding of the criminal environment in which the law enforcement personnel are required to operate (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 263). However, there is no denying the fact that in the post 9/11, information saturated world, the nature and scope of intelligence is still ignored, misunderstood or unceremoniously sidelined. Yet, the things are sure changing for better. Many salient experts and opinion makers are of the view that the concept of intelligence led policing is now being widely recognized by the police services around the world as an essential aspect of the way they work and operate (Wardlaw & Boughton, 2006). The 3i Model The primary objective of the law enforcement analysts operating in any aspect is it the crime analysts or the law enforcement officers associated with collection and processing of the crime related intelligence, the essential and predominant objective is always to facilitate an understanding of the environment in which the criminals operate (Ratcliffe, 2003). The 3i model is a more proactive approach towards the treatment and processing of intelligence, which not merely waits for the intelligence to flow to the analysts, but rather insists on a pull driven approach towards data collection. Interpreting the Criminal Environment As already said, the primary objective of the criminal analysts and the law enforcement officers is to facilitate and assure an understanding of the environment in which the criminals operate. So the criminal analysts need to hold a proactive approach towards the retrieval and processing of the information from the environment in which the criminals operate (Ratcliffe, 2003). The analysts simply do not afford to be passive and wait for the information to flow to them in the due course. They should rather be proactive about the retrieval and processing of the information ensuing from the environment in which the criminals operate. Influencing Decision Makers This aspect of the 3i model gives due credence to the fact that most of the times the analysts in a law enforcement organization do not tend to be the primary decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2004 a). For the accrual and processing of the criminal intelligence, it is imperative that it gets promptly and systematically conveyed to the decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2004 a). So the intelligence analysts need to focus on the fact as to who are the best decision makers in the law enforcement organization they work and what is the best way to influence them. Impact on the Criminal Environment This is the final aspect of the 3i model. It holds that for a policing environment to be essentially intelligence led, it is a must that the decision makers in the law enforcement agencies exploit and use the information provided to them in a way that it tends to have a positive impact on the environment in which the criminals operate (Ratcliffe, 2004 b). A law enforcement organization could only be ascribed to be intelligence led when intelligence plays a central role in the organizational thinking and organizational decision making (Ratcliffe, 2004 b). Operational Aspect of CID Abu Dhabi The post 9/11 scenario had a far reaching impact on the overall concept of policing in the Middle East. The very fact that a majority of the 19 hijackers that rammed the passenger planes in the World Trade Centre and other landmarks in the US were from the Middle East, brought home the point that the policing in Abu Dhabi was not merely a local affair, but was also required to satisfy the aspirations of the International community looking towards the Gulf nations for terrorism oriented intelligence, assistance and collaboration. The very realization of the fact that the terrorist groups originating from the Gulf Nations do had the wherewithal and ability to wreck massive terror strikes around the world necessitated a change of perspective and approach in the Abu Dhabi law enforcement agencies. In the post 9/11 related developments, the Superintendent of Investigations at the Abu Dhabi Department of Criminal Investigations and the Department of Wanted Criminals commissioned and initiated a new program to refurbish and redesign the intelligence operations in Abu Dhabi. Being an officer in the Department of Criminal Investigations and the Department of Wanted Criminals I was closely in touch with the changes ensuing from such developments and had the first hand experience pertaining to them. At that time, the investigations and intelligence wing of the Department of Criminal Investigations and the Department of Wanted Criminals at Abu Dhabi was undergoing a large scale restructuring aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective departments. One essential aspect that was central to the overall restructuring objective was to upgrade the status of the intelligence function in the organization. Before, the restructuring project was unravelled, only a few select wings of the CID at Abu Dhabi were associated with the task of intelligence gathering and analysis. So the one primary focus of the initiative was to involve and engage officials employed at varied levels in the CID Abu Dhabi in the intelligence function in the organization. It was a firm belief of the authorities at the top that in order to safeguard the national way of life from the fundamentalist groups and to extend the requisite assistance and information to the international community and law enforcement agencies, it was imperative to revolutionize the way CID at Abu Dhabi collected and processed intelligence. Analysis of Abu Dhabi CID using 3i Model In the context of the rational decision making in any organization, raw data accruing from the unprocessed information happens to be a crucial input in the pivotal task of effective decision making (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 110). The information generated from the processed data not only comes handy in creating awareness, but also helps in extending a meaningful direction to the future activities and operations in the law enforcement agencies. When the data corrected from the grass root policing and the inputs extended by the informers and agents gets aptly processed and analyzed, it metamorphoses into an essential derivative, often called intelligence in the law enforcement organizations (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 111). So simply speaking, intelligence is the perspective obtained about the overall law enforcement and criminal environment through the analysis and synthesis of the available information and data. The CID at Abu Dhabi since its inception had retained an essential intelligence function within its day to day activities and investigations. To a great extent, the organization had been proactive towards the imperative of anticipating the ensuing changes in the local crime environment on the basis of the available intelligence. The very fact that the organization boasts of an effective Intelligence Bureau is an apt testimony to the fact that the CID Abu Dhabi had been aware of the relevance of intelligence led policing in its professional operations. However, over the decades, with the change in the magnitude and nature of the crime activities in the region, the CID Abu Dhabi augmented its capacity by creating the additional intelligence units. In the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict and the ensuing feedback and inputs from the Western agencies, the CID felt a need for better coordination and appropriate resource allocation towards the surveillance of the regional fundamentalist groups, and the Intelligence Bureau expanded its capacity to include a Terrorism Intelligence Unit. In the last decade, the detectives serving in the Intelligence Bureau of the Abu Dhabi CID geared themselves up for assisting the international agencies and friendly nations in the investigation of many high profile crimes. However, in the post 9/11 scenario, there was a realization dawning in the Abu Dhabi CID that the intelligence function already in place cannot cope with the demands ensuing from the new age challenges. So far as the task of an intelligence led interpretation of the criminal environment is concerned, there exist wide disparities regarding the focus, aims and objectives in the varied intelligence units. When it came to the task of intelligence sharing, there existed little cooperation between the diverse intelligence units in the organization. Even, when these units intended to share information and data, this task was immensely impeded by the stark absence of requisite mechanisms and procedures. It goes without saying that the need for putting in places the apt and common procedures for measuring outcomes, the need to make the policing more effective and reliable and a more problem oriented approach to policing in Abu Dhabi necessitated an integration of the existing best practices into the overall framework of policing at the Abu Dhabi CID (Laycock, 2001, p. 6). Besides, in the post 9/11 scenario, a great number of personnel in the Intelligence Bureau at the Abu Dhabi CID were failing to acknowledge the fact that in the new high risk international and regional environment, the organization was now supposed to act as a source of crime related information for a wider set of agencies and organizations than before and the objectives and prerogatives of the organization were more than ever being shaped and influenced by the external factors (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997, p. 5). Before, the organization’s intelligence operations and activities were required to deal with the organized local crime and political dissent. Consequently, this localized approach towards policing in a way restricted the sharing of information and created barriers to information within various units in the organization. However, the threats that the organization was required to deal with in the current environment had graduated from merely being confined to petty criminal activity, to international terrorism and manmade disasters. The very hazardous nature of these threats nudged the top policing leadership within the nation to broaden and widen the scope of its intelligence units and operations beyond the range of its traditional structures and the directions hitherto not thought of. Besides, the accompanying local and international developments like an enhanced interaction with the outer world courtesy the ever unravelling globalization, the rampant growth of the organized crime within and the augmenting collaboration of the local organized crime with the international terrorist groups, the avenues being ushered in by the information revolution making it more than ever possible for the police to manage and process information by using the information technology and digital platforms, was making it more than imperative to shift towards an intelligence led policing (Gill, 1998, p. 295). Yet, ironically, irrespective of the top leadership in the organization being aware of the new imperatives, the leadership at the lower level felt a dire need for a sense of direction ensuing from the top. The fundamental problem was not the lack availability of the requisite data and information, but rather a lack of existence of the suitable technology driven grids and platforms for facilitating a sharing of intelligence between the different units. This not only made the sharing of intelligence immensely slow and time confusing, but most of the time the things translated into too little made available too late, making it impossible for the organization to accrue practical gains made possible by the sharing and interpretation of the generated intelligence. Given the novelty of the concept of the intelligence led policing in the organization, many a times a number of seasoned and experienced officers simply failed to understand the significance and relevance of analyzing the available information in the much needed intelligence led police culture (Cope, 2004, p. 194). Yet, it goes without saying that a lot of the problems being faced by the organization were not impervious to the solutions being extended by the available technologies and possibilities. Strategies for Fixing the Issues Rampant at CID Abu Dhabi There is no denying the fact that a few salient changes in the framework and approach of the Abu Dhabi CID could make the organizational shift towards intelligent led policing more hassle free and seamless. Organizational Culture The imperative of shifting the organization towards intelligence led policing; relying on the apt analysis and interpretation of the generated data and information for understanding the environment in which the criminals operate necessitates a shift in the organizational culture backed by a discernable direction and firm commitment from the top. This cultural change needs to be amply backed by new systems and approaches towards personnel training and the commensurate reward and promotion systems (Dixon, 1997, p. 215). The resistance ensuing from varied intelligence units towards the need for sharing and interpretation of intelligence needs to be methodically and systematically dealt with by the senior officers and decision makers. Also, the accompanying legal procedures and formalities need to be synchronized to be in consonance with the new organizational culture oriented around intelligence generation and sharing (Hirschel & Wakefield, 1995, p. 99). National Intelligence Grid With the growth of the relevant technologies and the ongoing IT Revolution, the CID Abu Dhabi does afford to play a leading role in the management of policing information in the region to assure regional and international stability (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 436). Considering the growing levels of criminality in the region and the growing nexus between the regional criminal gangs and the international terrorist groups, the traditional methods of policing simply could not be relied on to yield results (Heaton, 2000, p. 342). Hence the configuration of a National Intelligence Grid will be a step in the right direction. It will not only allow for a real time and robust sharing of intelligence and information within the varied units, but will also strengthen the potential, scope and capabilities of the existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the nation. The scope of the National Intelligence Grid could be gradually widened to facilitate access to the intelligence personnel and agencies to a wide range of data bases like air travel agencies and airline companies operating in the region, visa and travel records, credit card transactions, income tax details, bank account details etc. The placement of a National Intelligence Grid will automatically obfuscate a plethora of formalities, in congruencies and red tapism existing in the organization and the affiliated intelligence units and will make the organization predominantly intelligence driven. Personnel Training As has become evident by now that a lot of the intelligence related issues at the CID Abu Dhabi could be dealt with by computerizing the system. However, this revolutionary initiative simply could not be executed without an appropriate training of the attached personnel. Time and again it has been observed that the intelligence networks operating in the region are most of the times able to generate the requisite data and information. However, a timely processing and sharing of the concomitant intelligence is often not possible owing to a lack of the requisite technologies and an inability on the part of the grassroots agents and informers to feed this information and data into the IT systems, even when they exist. Hence, a mere coming up with a National Intelligence Grid will serve no purpose if the personnel deployed at all levels are not trained to access and operate this grid. This necessitates a dedicated and continual training of the intelligence personnel serving the organization. An organized and institutionalized incorporation of the intelligence personnel into this IT supported network will also allow the organization to keep an eye over their activities, as it has been observed that many a times the terrorist networks have been able to infiltrate the organizational intelligence networks in the past (Halachmi, 1992, p. 539). Conclusion With the increasing incorporation of the Abu Dhabi into the international business, social and political networks made possible by the onset of globalization, the responsibilities of and expectations from its law enforcement agencies have manifold increased. This thrust was further pushed by the developments taking place after the 9/11 disaster. So, Abu Dhabi CID needs to urgently align its policing practices in consonance with the concomitant local, regional and international responsibilities and expectations. Currently, not only the culture within the organization is not conducive for a shift towards intelligence le policing, but the organization also lacks the requisite structures, practices and procedures. Much of these problems marring the organization could be solved by opting for IT driven platforms, grids and systems to facilitate the generation and sharing of intelligence at the local and international level. This certainly calls for a top leadership drive cultural shift and a commensurate training of the personnel deployed at all levels. References Cope, N. (2004). Intelligence led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence? Integrating Volume Crime Analysis in the Policing. Journal of Criminology, 44(2), 188-203. Dixon, David. (1997). Law in Policing: Legal Regulations and Police Practices. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ericson, RV & Haggerty, KD. (1997). Policing the Risk Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gill, P. (1998). Making Sense of Police Intelligence? The use of Cybernetic Model in Analysing Information and Power in Intelligence Processes. Policing an Society, 8(3), 289-314. Heaton, R. (2000). The Prospects of Intelligence Led Policing: Some Historical and Quantitative Considerations. Policing and Society, 9(4), 337-356. Hirschel, J David & Wakefield, Williams. (1995). Criminal Justice in England and the United States. Westport, CT: Praeger. Laycock, G. (2000). Research for Police: Who Needs it? Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 211, 6-15. Ratcliffe, Jerry H. (2003). Intelligence Led Policing. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 248, 1-6. Ratcliffe, Jerry H. (2004 a). Introduction to Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Sydney: Federation Press. Ratcliffe, Jerry H. (2004 b). Crime Mapping and the Training Needs of Law Enforcement. European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 65-83. Ratcliffe, Jerry H. (2005). 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