Is There a Responsibility to Protect in International Law - Essay Example

Is There a Responsibility to Protect in International Law? Introduction The responsibility to protect is founded on two underlying principles. First, state sovereignty necessarily infers that the state is responsible for protecting the people within its own territory. Secondly, where populations are exposed to grave harm and the relevant state is either unable or unwilling to either stop or prevent it, the concept of non-intervention is superseded by the responsibility to protect.1 Underlying these two principles is the UN’s founding premise to foster an international community where all states are equal and act for the collective goal of peace within the UN Charter.2 Efforts on the part of the UN to promote peace will always be tempered by the need to respect territorial sovereignty and the doctrine of non-intervention. This is so even in instances where the UN seeks to promote protection of the environment and development.3 As an emerging legal principle, there is a responsibility to protect in international law particularly since the latter is a reflection of the collective “interests of the international community.”4 International law follows from the needs and objectives of the international community.5 This paper will evaluate the responsibility to protect and how it reflects the collective interests of the international community thereby emerging as a principle of international law. It is argued that the responsibility to protect is defined by and limited by customary international law and as such is a tenet of customary international law. Overview of the Responsibility to Protect Historically, the UN has been predisposed to narrow state resort to unilateral action and for states to settle dispute by virtue of peaceful means.6 Similarly, there has long been a disposition toward tolerance of state intervention for democratic change. Clausewitz’s theory on the need for revolutionary change in Europe back in the early 1800s reflects this.7 In recent years international customary law has developed a concept of state responsibility promoting the idea that violations of international law on the part of one state can be the subject of international response.8 Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act bears this out. Under Article 4 not only are contracting states required to respect the sovereignty of other contracting states, they are also called upon to refrain from the use of force or threat and reserves the right to intervene in the event of war crimes and other acts of human atrocities.9 The UN adopted the framework for the Responsibility to Protect following a report published in 2001 by the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)10 The report challenged the international community to adopt an effective strategy for responding to humanitarian crises.11 A new cluster approach encapsulated within the ambit of the responsibility to protect was inevitable.12 The ICISS’s framework for the Responsibility to Protect was adopted at the 2005 World Summit by the United Nations General Assembly.13 The Responsibility to Protect introduces modified definition of sovereignty into international law. It is a responsibility which imposes on contracting states both a positive and collective duty to protect “populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crime against humanity.”14 Each of these factors are specific offences in international law and as a result it is certainly true that there is a responsibility to protect in International law. The ICISS explains that the responsibility to protect confers upon states a duty to make provision for “life-supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk.”15 The Responsibility to Protect references three specific goals and objectives. They are, the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. In order to understand how the Responsibility to Protect is a tenet at international law it is necessary to evaluate each of the subhead under the Responsibility to Protect. The Responsibility to Prevent The ICISS maintains that the responsibility to prevent is the most important duty under the Responsibility to Protect.16 The underlying character of the UN Charter is reflective of a peace objective predicated on the commitment to prevent conflict.17 In 1955, the UN General Assembly noted that the primary objective of the UN was the prevention and resolution of conflicts.18 The UN Charter’s Preamble states that its purpose is “saving future generations...from the scourge of war.”19 In this regard, the Responsibility to Prevent as part of the triple duties immersed in the Responsibility to Protect merely gives voice to a preexisting tenet of international law as enunciated by the UN Charter. It is hardly surprising that in light of incidents of humanitarian crises that this tenet of international law would gain momentum under the auspices of the Responsibility to Protect and more especially the Responsibility to Prevent. Specific attention was paid to the Responsibility to Prevent in 1997 at the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict where it was noted that the imposition of a duty to prevent conflict would cost substantially less than it would cost to intervene and rebuild.20 Despite the Carnegie Commission’s call for structured prevention, the UN’s prevention strategies remained ad hoc and was largely reliant on diplomatic approaches and crisis management through institutions and organizations falling under the UN’s various agencies and departments. These organizations did not subscribe to any form of structured conflict management and prevention scheme. Social and political science scholars have long maintained that the UN’s conflict prevention strategy is “preached” as opposed to “practiced.”21 Annan’s response to this kind of skepticism and criticism was calls for adopting measures that were designed to institutionalize conflict prevention and thereby fortifying the UN’s ability to prevent conflict. The UN published its intention to implement a conflict prevention strategy as well as its plans to allocate funds for preventing conflicts in its UN Development Programme.22 Annan’s 2001 reports followed this publication in his report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict.23 Security Council Resolution 1366, August 30th, 2001 followed and reiterated the importance placed by the UN on conflict prevention and provided for establishing regional conflict prevention strategies and a commitment to undertake all necessary and appropriate measures for effecting these strategies.24 Historically, the duty to prevent has always been a part of international law, specifically in relation to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.25 For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1952 provides that states are required not only to prevent but also to punish those who commit the offence of genocide.26 Similarly, states are also required to prevent and to punish those who conspire to commit the offence of genocide or procure or attempt genocide and those who are complicit in any offence of genocide.27 Crimes against humanity have also been a part of international law for a long time as they have been described by both tribunals and the International Criminal Courts.28 While international law does not specifically define the offence of ethnic cleansing it can be interpreted to arise under general crimes against humanity as well as genocide.29 The fact is, the realities of complex situations in modern times warrant a departure from the concept of non-intervention.30 The reality is, as an increasingly interconnected community of nations, national frameworks are no longer sufficient to deal with emerging issues as these issues, such as the environment, refugees and trade transcend specific border.31 State responsibility is therefore not merely a responsibility to one’s state, but a responsibility to the international community.32 In general, the entire ambit of the Responsibility to Protect falls comfortably within the realm of international criminal law and as such places a duty of care on contracting states to prevent, react and to rebuild in the face of these international crimes. It therefore follows that there is a Responsibility to Protect in international law since the responsibility to prevent, respond and rebuild can be interpreted and applied by reference to international criminal law. In the general context of the Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS defines the responsibility to prevent as the : single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.33 Even so, the ICISS goes on to state that both the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react requires the consideration of “less intrusive measures” before determining the utility of “more coercive and intrusive” measures.34 The responsibility to prevent subscribes to the notion that in fulfilling state obligations with respect to the responsibility to protect, the international community is fully engaged in the prevention of conflicts and minimizing, if not eliminating the risk of wide-scale atrocities. In this regard, the responsibility to prevent under the auspices of the Responsibility to Protect is already a significant part of international law as evidenced by the Non-Proliferation Treaty 1970 which was signed by 187 member states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has as its goal the prevention of the spread of nuclear arms and other chemical weapons.35 Like the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the Non-Proliferation Treaty has as its goal the prevention of human atrocities, a significant goal of the Responsibility to Prevent and the Responsibility to Protect in general. In this regard, the Responsibility to Protect and specifically, the Responsibility to Prevent are provided for in international law. The Responsibility to React The responsibility to arise where there is a pressing need to safeguard and protect human rights and perhaps more importantly human dignity.36 Luck explains that the Responsibility to React will arise where efforts to prevent have failed, or the target state is either unable or unwilling to effectively manage the crisis. The duty to React may include the implementation of measures inclusive of political coercion, judicial intervention and/or (in exemplary circumstances) military responses.37 Like the Responsibility to Prevent, the Responsibility to React is also linked to pre-existing legal duties under international law like the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Under the Genocide Convention, the international community always had a responsibility to react to genocide.38This responsibility as previously stated called for states to prevent and/or prosecute those who are guilty of actual genocide or complicit in genocide of either procured or conspired in genocide. Just like the Responsibility to Prevent restrains state sovereignty, so does the Responsibility to React. Further fortifying the position of the Responsibility to React in international law, is the application of the doctrine of just war, a firmly established principle of international law. Chesterman explains the theory of just war by identifying three prevailing features. First, war can only be justified if there are human rights abuses that are such that they shock the “conscience of mankind”.39 Secondly, there can be no “realistic peaceful alternative to intervention” and thirdly “collective action must have failed.”40 There is a third ground upon which war could be justified and that is the under the historical right of self-defence.41 The righ of self-defence following the September 11 terror attacks have been widened by virtue of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 which basically permits states to engage the right to self-defence in terms of unilateral force in “response to terror acts.”42 The doctrine of just war is entirely relevant to the Responsibility to React. The ICISS notes that the Responsibility to React militarily is only permissible when it can be justified under the doctrine of just war.43 In this regard, military intervention under the auspices of the Responsibility to React can only be justified if the harm is such that it is the wide-scale loss of life either in actuality or it is imminent or there is wide-scale ethnic cleansing whether actual or anticipated and conducted by actual killing, expulsion, terrorism or rape.44 The Responsibility to React is defined by further reference to international law by requiring that in reacting the intention and purpose must be characterized by a desire to end “human suffering.”45 Evans suggests that ensuring that those states that engage in Responsibility to React operations ensure that such action if military in nature is supported on a multi-party basis.46 This suggestion is indicative of the fact that the Responsibility to React is a part of international law, since customary international law is a reflection of the common interest of the international community. Arguably, global peace is a shared interest and concern of the international community and the Responsibility to Protect by virtue of the Responsibility to React is intended to ensure global peace by reacting to threats to global peace. Single state action will automatically raise questions as to the legality of the reaction to internal conflict in another state. However, multi-state reaction lends itself to the concept that the reaction is well within the ambit of international law. The Responsibility to React militarily is only permitted as a last resort. Resort to military action after all peaceful and non-military efforts have been attempted but failed. Military action must be proportional to the protection of human beings.47 In other words, any resort to military action must correspond with its purpose and must be consistent with the degree of the crisis. The target state’s political system must also be taken into account, ensuring that any military intervention does not, it at all possible, impact the political system beyond what is necessary to achieve the underlying goal of the intervention.48 Moreover, before resorting to military action, the source state must be satisfied that there are reasonable prospects of success in terms of averting human suffering.49 Also, military reaction cannot be justied if the intervening state does not have adequate authority.50 This authority should typically originate from the UN. Otherwise, the ad hoc system of prevention, protection and reaction is perpetuated. Evans suggests that if the Security Council is either unwilling or unable for whatever reasons to authorize military reaction, there are two possible means by which an intervening state may obtain the necessary authorization: The intervening state may take the matter up with the General Assembly in an Emergency Special Session under the ambit of “Uniting for Peace”, a successful approach taken with respect to military action in Korea in 1950, in Egypt in 1956 and the Congo in 1960.51 Security Council approval can be obtained after taking military action by the application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This measure was used with respect to West Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s.52 The ICISS indicated that in the event the Security Council fails to act itself: Other states can take the initiative, but may, in the absence of the UN’s authority, indicate that that the intervention is for disingenuous purposes, and may not have the appropriate commitment to the cause.53 On the other hand, other states may act and do so correctly.54 Essentially this was the approach taken by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with respect to military intervention in Kosovo.55 In the final analysis, the Responsibility to React is not only mandated by international law, it is adequately defined and regulated by customary international law. This is particularly so with respect to the constraints and requirements place on reactions that engage military action. The Responsibility to Rebuild The responsibility to Rebuild, like the Responsibility to React implies that the Responsibility to Protect obviates the necessity of remaining committed to the cause.56 At the very least the Responsibility to Rebuild forces the intervening state to take account of the costs involved in reacting and preventing human suffering in the target state. The result is, the measures taken by the intervening state in terms of preventing and/or reacting will necessarily involve contemplating the cost of rebuilding. The responsibility to rebuild is tantamount no different from stabilization and reconstruction operations that occur following conflicts and as such include measures for providing and building security, justice, reconciliation and development.57 The Responsibility to Rebuild is therefore not new to international law and its history dictates that it is in fact a part of international law. In its 1998 report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable and Sustainable Development in Africa, the UN’s Secretary-General defined the Responsibility to Rebuild and gave voice to the reasons for its existence.58 The UN Secretary-General explained: By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.59 In defining and mandating the responsibility to rebuild Paragraph 5, the ICIS laid out a framework for the responsibility to rebuild and called for post-conflict planning in advance of taking military action.60 The ICISS points out that in the event military intervention is used, the responsibility to rebuild is necessary because there is typically a: breakdown or abdication of a state’s own capacity and authority. It therefore follows that the responsibility to rebuild will encapsulate a commitment and a concerted effort to construct peace, promote “good governance and sustainable development.61 In order to ensure successful reconstruction and stabilization operations, adequate funds will have to be allocated and expended together with the allocation of “resources” and “close cooperation with local people.”62 The ICISS also noted that in the past and far too often, post conflict rebuilding has been the subject of poor management.63 Likewise: ...the commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying problems that produced the original intervention action.64 The intervening state is required to look upon military action as forming part of a broader goal. This broader goal is to “prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies” arising in the first place.65 The Responsibility to rebuild operates alongside the Responsibilities to Prevent and React by bringing the concepts together with the common objective of ascertaining that: ...the condition that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface.66 The ICISS identified three central issues that are intimately linked to the Responsibility to Rebuild. They are security, justice, reconciliation and development. The ICISS states that “basic security” and protection must be proportionate so that it takes account for each individual within the general population.67 In making provision for security, the intervening state is cautioned to be aware of the fact that frequently, in the aftermath of a conflict, there is a propensity for “revenge killings” and quite often “reverse ethnic cleansing” which can arise because those who were victimized can be compelled to “attack groups associated with their former oppressors.”68 In keeping within the legal framework applicable to the responsibility to Rebuild, the intervening state is advised to plan ahead for these kinds of “contingencies.”69 Ultimately, the Responsibility to Rebuild must remain a pivotal part of plans to take on the responsibilities to Prevent and React. In this way, each of the triple responsibilities are joint and severable and continues to remain the focus of attention when the intervening state is contemplating what the appropriate response to human suffering or the risk of human suffering should be. In taking the necessary security measures under the Responsibility to Rebuild, the ICISS also cautions that it is important to take into consideration, the fact that “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” with respect to the “local security forces” are among the most problematic operations following a conflict. 70 Until such time as reintegration is satisfactorily completed, the military intervention will not usually be regarded as completed.71 In providing security it is also important to take into consideration, the fact that the acquisition of acceptable levels of law and order are essential elements of rebuilding. There is always a danger that unless and until a “demobilized soldier” is reintegrated and earning an income, he or she will likely turn to either “armed crime or armed political opposition.”72 The military will also be required to act as police officers since in many instances, law and order is largely displaced and in a constant state of chaos. However, once the post-conflict atmosphere fizzles out, civilian police office can be introduced. The ICISS stated that: An essential part of pre-intervention planning has been identified by both political and military personnel as being an exit strategy (not the same thing as an exit timetable) for intervening troops. There is force in the argument that without such a strategy there are serious risks in mounting any military intervention at all, as an unplanned, let alone precipitate, exit could have disastrous, or at best unsettling, implications for the country, and could also serve to discredit even the positive aspects of the intervention itself.73 The ICISS also pointed out that in a majority of places in which there is a military conflict, there is either no stable judiciary or stable law enforcement system, and even if there were, they would have been disrupted and displaced prior to and/or during the conflict. Under the auspices of the Responsibility to Rebuild, the intervening state is required to ensure that both the judiciary and law enforcement are restored as expeditiously as possible in order to provide some measure of hope for the promotion and protection of human rights.74 The ICISS also puts the Responsibility to rebuild within the scope and range of international law by providing yet another standard of international norms in its description of development. To this end, development is described as the “final peace building responsibility” and requires of intervening states the duty to cultivate “economic growth” as well as to create “markets and sustainable development.”75 The ICISS emphasised that economic development is intricately connected to law and order with serious implications for the targeted country’s rehabilitation. The ICISS pointed out that: A consistent corollary of this objective must be for the intervening authorities to find a basis as soon as possible to end any coercive economic measures they may have applied to the country before or during the intervention, and not prolong comprehensive or punitive sanctions.76 The ICISS has obviously placed the Responsibility to Rebuild within the scope and range of international law by providing a robust and comprehensive regulatory regime. Even so, it can be argued that the Responsibility to Protect in general only uses international law to codify imperialism such as that experienced under the auspices of colonization. Wilde argues that the obligation to rebuild can be perceived as excessively intrusive and tantamount to colonization.77 Colonization is largely looked upon as entirely racist and discriminatory because it promoted clandestine civilization missions based on an entirely subjective definition of civilization. It basically permitted the appointment of guardians for people determined to be incapable of self-government.78 Wilde points out that, there are four significant elements that can distinguish the Responsibility to Rebuild from the concepts of colonization and imperialism, each of which place the Responsibility to Rebuild and by extension, the Responsibility to Protect within the reach of international law. Firstly, international law authorized the rebuilding process. Secondly, the policies and practices relevant to the Responsibility to Rebuild are built upon recognized and accepted principles of international law and as such remain universally feasible. Thirdly, the process of rebuilding typically engages the participation of international non-government organizations such as the Red Cross and other humanitarian groups, the UN’s organizations rather than individual states and are ultimately humanitarian as opposed to exploitive. Fourthly, the process of rebuilding is a temporary measure, fully intending to return the targeted state to self-governance.79 The ICISS does not impose upon international communities a general responsibility to rebuild nations whose population are subjected to or are in imminent danger of being subjected to human atrocities. The duty will only arise where a state intervenes.80 In this way the decision to intervene requires foresight of consequences in the context of the ensuing responsibility to rebuild. As Day and Freeman maintain, the duty is to the population rather than the state and as a result the idea of sovereignty within the context of the responsibility to rebuild belongs to the population.81 Conclusion Theoretically, the Responsibility to Protect should pull the international community together so that multinational cooperation is necessary for compliance with the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild. Each of the triple responsibilities under the Responsibility to Protect places an onerous burden on the intervening states, so that the responsibility is far too onerous for one nation to carry alone. These burdens together with the requirement of multi-state cooperation and coordination speak to the fact that the Responsibility to Protect is a part of international law. Not only is it regulated by norms of customary international law, the Responsibility to Protect can be traced to recognized principles and practices of international law such as the laws relating to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the Responsibility to protect is well within the UN’s Charter for sustaining and promoting world peace. In practice however, the responsibility to protect is not entirely practical. Developments following the war against terror and subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan together with piracy off the coast of Somalia suggest that defining and identifying targeted states is entirely difficult. Rather than targeted states, the international community is now confronted with international organizations. While Iraq and Afghanistan were targeted states, they were not targeted merely for their suspected support of international terrorist organizations. The US and its coalition of allies from among the international community did not initially invoke the responsibility to protect when it made the decision to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan. The stated purpose was for hunting and capturing international terrorist. In the process “rogue regimes” were dismantled and the responsibility to rebuild within the responsibility to protect was invoked. Several years later, having lost many lives and spent billions of dollars there is no definite end date for the completion of the rebuilding process in Iraq and Afghanistan. This necessarily draws attention to the human, social and political costs of subscribing to the responsibility to protect. First and foremost, the question of intervention challenges the justification for intervention and whether or not one state may intervene militarily in the affairs of another on the grounds that the targeted state facilitates international terrorism who threaten the safety and security of the intervening state.82 Even if this kind of intervention could be authorized under the responsibility to protect, the anticipated costs, having regard to the current rebuilding processes in Iraq and Afghanistan may serve to discourage cooperation among the international community. In other words, the responsibility to protect requires that intervention automatically engage efforts to rebuild. The reality is however, rebuilding may be far too costly to expect realistic compliance with the triple responsibilities entrenched in the responsibility to protect in its entirety. If we have learned nothing else, we have learned this much from the rebuilding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bibliography Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? (Oxford University Press, 2003). Dinstein, Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Dixon, M. Textbook on International Law. (Oxford University Press 2007). Dixon, M. and McCorqoudale, R. Cases and Materials on International Law. (Oxford University Press, 4th Edition 2003). Herberg-Rothe, A. Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War. (Oxford University Press, 2007). Malanczuk, P. and Akehurst, M. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. (Routledge 1997). Mertus, J. and Helsing, J. Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding. (US Institute of Peace Press,2006). Mingst , K.and Karns, M. The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era. (Westview Press, 2000). Ramsbotham, O.; Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. (Oxford: Polity, 2006). Roberts, A. and Kingsbury, B. United Nations, Divided World. (Oxford University Press, 1993). Shaw, M. International Law. (Cambridge University Press, 6th Edition, 2008). Singh, N; Pathak, R. and Dhokalia, R. International Law in Transition: Essays in Memory of Judge Nagendra Singh. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). Thakur, R. The United Nations, Peace and Security. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). Weiss, T. Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanity Crises and the Responsibility to Protect. (Rowan and Littlefield, 2nd Ed. 2004). Wilde, R. International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away. (Oxford University Press 2008). Articles and Journals Annan, K. “Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General.” A/55/986-S/2001/574. Barbour, B and Gorlick, B. “Embracing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims.” (2008) 20 (4) International Journal of Refugee Law, 553-566. Brown, A. “Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?” (2008) Research Paper 08/55, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library. Canadian Council on International Law. “The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law. (Kluwer Law International, 2004). Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.(1997) “Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report.” (Washington, D.C .1997). Day, G. and Freeman, C. “From Policekeeping to Peace: Intervention, Transitional Administration and the Responsibility to Do it Right.” (2003) Working Paper. Evans, G. “The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come...and Gone?” (2008) 22(3) International Relations. 283-298. Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. "Introduction: Making Conflict Prevention a Priority," Cited Hampson, F. O. and Malone, D.M. (eds) From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). Luck, E. “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect.” (August 2008) Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation. Molier. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect After 9/11’. (2006) 53(1) Netherlands Internationall Law Review, 37-62. Thakur, R. “Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experience from ICISS.” (2002) 33(2) Security Dialogue. 323-340. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”. December 2001, ICISS. UN General Assembly. (Sept. 1955) "Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization," September 1955, General Assembly, A/2911. UN Secretary-General. “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development In Africa.” (April 1998) Report of the UN Secretary-General. Weiss, T. “R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit.” (2006) 24(3) Wisconsin International Law Journal. 741-760. Welsh, J.; Thielaking, C. and MacFarlance, N. (2002) “The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Iintervention and State Sovereignty.” (2001) 57(4) International Journal 489-512. Table of Statutes Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. UN Charter Read More