The Manslaughter Conviction for Jake - Essay Example

The Manslaughter conviction for Jake Jake is rightly accused of involuntary manslaughter, which occurs when the necessary mens rea or deliberate intent to kill may not be present, yet the result of the act or actrus reus is the death of the victim. Jake’s action in spiking Robin’s drink will make him liable under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, which makes it a criminal act to unlawfully inflict violence upon another person and sections 17 and 20, which are concerned with the causing of grievous bodily harm, in this case death. In Jake’s case it would be necessary to show that (a) the accused committed a dangerous act (b) the act was dangerous in that a reasonable person would have recognized the potential for harm inherent in the act (c) the act was the cause of death and (d) the accused intended to commit the act, even if he or she did not intend the consequence of the act.1 Apart from this, Jake will also be liable for manslaughter with subjective recklessness in regard to the risk of death or bodily harm. Applying this to the question of Jake’s liability, his action in spiking Robin’s drink with a drug was a dangerous act, which is also unlawful.2 Applying the standards of a reasonable person, the act of spiking another person’s drink with a drug such as LSD will be deemed to be a dangerous act, because of the recognition that it could cause some kind of physical harm3. He has therefore intended an unlawful act of spiking Robin’s drink which was likely to cause harm, and death resulted which was neither foreseen nor intended.4 The aggravated form of criminal damage with intent to endanger life is set out under Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act of 1971, according to which if the unlawful act actually causes death, the accused will be criminally liable. In the case of R v Dawson5, a petrol station attendant who had a weak heart died of heart failure when the appellant attempted robbery of the station. In arriving at a determination of whether the unlawful act was dangerous enough to so shock the victim that it causes him physical injury, the Court applied a test based on the average sober and reasonable bystander who would know that the use of a gun would terrify people and held the appellant to be guilty of causing death. In the same way, Jake has spiked Robin’s drink with drugs, which an average, reasonable person would realize as one that could potentially have a harmful effect, hence he will be liable. Another aspect that must be considered is whether Jake’s action was the substantial cause of death, as a result of which the question of causation must be examined. In the case of R v Dalby6 the defendant was a drug addict who was able to obtain drugs on the basis of his prescriptions. He gave some drugs to the victim who took a large quantity of them and also injected himself with other substances, later dying of a drug overdose. In this case, the defendant argued that his supply of the drug was not in itself a dangerous act, rather it was the action of the victim in taking too much of the drug. The appeal of the defendant was allowed on the basis that his supply of drugs was only an indirect cause of death, therefore there was a break in the direct chain link of causation. In the case of Robin, it must be noted that apart from the LSD, there was also a large amount of crack cocaine in his system, therefore on this basis, Jake may be able to argue that his supply of the drug was not the substantial cause of the death. Moreover, Robin also had an undiagnosed heart condition which Jake was not aware of. But Jake’s arguments may not be successful, because firstly, his act in spiking Robin’s drink was itself dangerous because a reasonable person is aware that not everyone reacts to drugs in the same manner. Secondly, when Robin became disoriented, this was in itself a sign of danger, and it is apparent that Jake recognized the danger because of his direct call to the NHS. He was specifically and strongly warned by the NHS that they could not predict and offer suggestions about drugs over the telephone and he was advised to bring in the patient immediately for examination. However, Jake chose to ignore this warning and chose to let Robin stay on his couch to sleep it off. Jake’s act of omission in not taking Robin to the hospital despite the existence of symptoms such as disorientation, would be an act of criminal negligence. In the case of R v Adomako7 the defendant was an anesthetist during an eye operation. During the course of the operation, the ventilator supplying oxygen to the patient became disconnected, the defendant failed to notice and six minutes later the patient died of a cardiac arrest. The defendant was held to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter through an act of criminal negligence and omission. He appealed, admitting that he had been negligent, but denying that it was an instance of criminal negligence, but the Court turned down his appeal. This kind of negligence was later clarified by the Law Commission as arising when “the accused is aware that her conduct involves a risk of causing death (or probably, serious injury) and she unreasonably takes that risk….”8 This same principle would also apply in the case of Jake. While he had himself been taking LSD without harmful consequences and may have therefore initially started out thinking that it would not harm another person either, yet the events of the evening were clear enough to provide him a strong indication that Robin was in danger. Not only did Robin react differently after taking the LSD, the NHS also warned Jake to bring him in to the hospital for treatment. Therefore, Jake was aware that there was a danger posed to Robin, yet he chose to go against medical advice and take the risk of keeping Robin away from the doctors, which amounts of an act of criminal negligence through omission and subjective recklessness. As pointed out by Card9, the charge of involuntary manslaughter by subjective recklessness has been upheld in several earlier cases, such as Gray v Barr.10 In the case of R v Seymour,11 the House of Lords also set out the basis for establishing mens rea in such cases of subjective recklessness, in that a serious risk must exist and the defendant realizing the risk, nevertheless chooses to take it without giving any thought to the existence of that risk. This may also be applied in the case of Jake, who was well aware that there was a serious risk in not taking Robin to the hospital and yet he decided to take that risk, without giving any thought to the consequences, which in this case were death. Therefore, Jake’s act in keeping Robin at his home despite the risk, may be established to be a direct cause of the victim’s death and Jake will be guilty of involuntary manslaughter by subjective recklessness. Jake’s liability will not be affected by whether or not Jake had invited Robin to take the drugs, because he will not be able to escape liability in that way. For example, in the case of R v Cato12 the accused and the victim agreed to inject each other with heroin, but the following morning the victim was found dead from the effects of the drug. The defendant was held liable under Section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, for maliciously administering a noxious substance to the victim. In the judgment on this case, Lord Widgery CJ, stated that the drug was known to be dangerous and likely to cause harm, yet the defendant had administered it; therefore the fact that he did it with the consent of the victim did not excuse his liability in any way. Jake will be similarly liable under the same section of the same Act for maliciously administering a harmful substance to Robin by injecting it into his drug. Although the LSD may not have caused any harm to Jake himself, this may not be held by the Courts to be a ground for Jake’s assumption that it will not harm others. Moreover, when Jake called the NHS, they strongly advised him to bring Robin over to the hospital right away, yet Jake chose to disregard this advice knowing full well that Robin was not reacting well to the drug and that it would be advisable to take him to the hospital immediately. Therefore, he will be held liable for manslaughter. Assuming that Jake had invited Robin to take the drugs, even then with the onset of symptoms of disorientation that Robin began too suffer, there would have been a duty of care due from Jake to immediately take Robin to the hospital. Jake’s failure to do is a strong aspect that works against him and makes it difficult for him to escape liability for Robin’s death. Bibliography * Card, Richard, 1995, “Card, Cross and Jones: Criminal law”, Butterworths * Law Commission Report, 1996. “Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter.” (Law Com No: 237) paras 2.27-2.27 Cases cited: * Gray v Barr (1971) 2 All ER 949 * R v Adomoko (1994) 3 All ER 79 * R v Cato (1976) 1 WLR 110 * R v Craemer (1966) 1 QB 72 * R v Dalby (1982) 1 WLR 425 * R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 * R v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163 * R v Larkin (1943) 1 All ER 217 * R v Mitchell (1983) 2 WLR 938 * R v Seymour (1983) 2 All ER 1058 * Stone and Dobinson (1977) QB 354 Read More