Claims for Psychiatric Injury - Case Study Example

Claims for Psychiatric injury In the area of psychiatric injury, the law of recoveries is difficult and as acknowledged by Lord Steyn in the case ofFrost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police1 , case law in this area is “a patchwork quilt of distinctions which are difficult to justify.” While the Courts have allowed recoveries in some instances, they have not in others. This is largely due to the fact that the courts have followed a policy of doing justice to deserving victims, yet at the same time, they do not wish to open the floodgates to innumerable claims based upon the tort of negligence. Therefore, in cases where the claimant is a secondary victim, the general points taken into consideration, as established in the cases of Frost and Alcock2 may be listed as follows: (a) whether there was a strong bond between the claimant and the victim/s (b) whether the claimant was actually present at the site of the incident and (c) whether the injury to the claimant was caused from directly witnessing the incident. (d) whether the nature of the shock suffered was sudden or a more gradual sense of loss. In the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police2 the Court considered the various kinds of relationships which would qualify as close ties, and parent/child relationships and family ties including the spouse relationship were deemed to be strong enough to establish the close nature of the ties. By applying the (a) requirement, it may be noted that Roger, Thomas and Nicolas will have a claim on the basis of close ties to the victim. However, on the basis of criterion (b) it may be noted that Roger and Nicholas were not actually present at the site of the accident and neither had directly witnessed the accident. Therefore, they may not be eligible for recoveries. But Thomas will be entitled to claim damages on the basis of both proximity to the incident and the fact that the injured person is a loved one. Moreover, he would also be classified as a rescuer according to Chadwick v BRB3 and the Court has clearly stated in this case that rescuers who suffer psychiatric damages as a result of their rescue efforts will be eligible for recoveries. This was also upheld on appeal in the case of McLoughlin v O Brien4 that rescuers suffering from psychiatric illness will be eligible for damages. There is a strong case in Thomas’ favor in that he was directly at the site, the injured one was his own brother and the psychiatric illness he is suffering from now is directly attributable to the injury. The only factor that could possibly limit his recoveries to some extent could be the time that has passed since the accident, however if his anxiety attacks have commenced immediately after the accident and are continuing to date, he will certainly be eligible to make a claim. In the case of Roger and Nicholas, it is unlikely that Nicholas can make a claim at all, in spite of the fact that his son was severely injured. For one thing, he was not in close proximity to the incident, he did not witness it at all and he was told about his son in an e-mail, therefore the depression that he is suffering from can only be indirectly be attributed to the incident and his recoveries may be barred. But it is possible that Roger may be able to make a claim, although the success of it cannot be guaranteed. In the case of Hevican v Ruane5 the judge found in favor of a Plaintiff who had suffered shock after seeing his son’s dead body in the morgue, similarly in the case of McLoughlin v Obrain6 the claimant succeeded after seeing her husband and children’s horribly mutilated bodies. In both these cases, the claimants had not been in direct proximity to the incident, just like Roger, and both of them had seen their loved one’s body/ies in the morgue and suffered psychiatric illness thereafter. Although Hevican was overturned by Alcock in the High Court, where the Court held that the requirement of proximity to the accident would bar recoveries when such proximity could not be established, the claimant in Mcloughlin succeeded because of the very bad state of the victims and the fact that the claimant suffered in the immediate aftermath of the accident. In Roger’s case, while the fact that he was not in proximity to the incident may bar recovery, the illness could be grounds for claims in view of the close ties and the fact that his condition resulted in the immediate aftermath of the incident. Applying the criteria that were laid out in the above cases, it is also possible that Roger might have a claim since (a) the after effects of depression he suffers are every severe (b) the grave nature of what he saw – the horribly mutilated body of his brother who was a loved one and (c) the fact that he saw him in the morgue a short three and a half hours after the incident. Therefore his lack of proximity to the incident may not bar his claim. In the case of Quentin, the question that will arise is whether the claim can be attributed directly to the accident. For example in the case of Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd7 the parents of a child involved in an accident lost him after three days, but the claimants did not succeed in their claim because they had time to get used to the idea that they would lose him, while in the case of Frost the shock of the loss was sudden and the claimant succeeded because the Court held that a 36 hour period was short enough to qualify as a sudden loss. Moreover, in the case of Taylorson, the Court also noted that the cause of the psychiatric condition was the actual death resulting in the hospital and not directly caused by the accident and their proximity to it. It may be noted that this case will be relevant in the case of both Quentin and Robin, who were not directly present at the site of the accident, although the fact that they watched it on TV does put them in close proximity to it. Another ground on which both are disqualified from recoveries is the fact that their loved ones were not involved, however, this is unlikely to really be a bar to recoveries if other criteria as detailed below are satisfied. These two persons would be considered under the category of bystanders and the kind of recoveries for claimants qualifying as bystanders to an accident has been laid out in the case of Bourhill v Young8.. In this case, Lord Porter held that a normal bystander who happened to be on the site of an accident would usually be one who “has sufficient fortitude to endure....the noise of a collision and the sight of injury to others…”9 Therefore, on a preliminary basis, it could be stated that both of these men were bystanders who would be expected to have the normal fortitude when witnessing such an event. But when the case of Bourhill was appealed in Alcock, Lord Ackner pointed out that there could be some accidents “so horrific that the person of customary phlegm would be shocked by it”10 and in such an event, recoveries are possible. Therefore in the first instance, not all bystanders will be paid any compensation at all, however if the event is so horrific, compensation may be claimed. There is also a third alternative where it may be decided that in the circumstances of a particular case, recoveries may be permitted to bystanders. Therefore in this case, the Court will examine how horrifying the sight was that both Quentin and Robin had to witness and on that basis may decide on recoveries if a claim is filed.. Although the sight they witnessed was sufficiently horrifying the main factor in Robin’s case is the element of time – several months have passed since the incident and this passage of time may automatically bar recoveries, as the Court established in Taylorson. Although he is severely ill with depression, he does not satisfy any of the three criteria for recoveries to an adequate degree. The only criteria he does satisfy is that of being in proximity to the incident as a bystander, however the fact that so much time has elapsed since symptoms have been reported would make it difficult to secure recoveries, since there could be several reasons for Robin’s depression that may not be directly attributable to the incident. In the case of Quention, he is not only a bystander, he has been suffering from the psychiatric illness since long before the accident. In fact, he claims that it was that incident in which his depression culminated. This provides a clear indication that the cause for Quentin’s illness existed before the incident, and it is probable that the event only aggravated the condition. Therefore, his condition is only indirectly attributable to the incident and therefore, recoveries will not be possible. Charles, the train driver, would qualify as an “involuntary participant” in the incident – these are people who are unwittingly placed in a position where the negligent act is caused by someone else, however the involuntary participant begins to believe that he is cause of the accident. Charles will certainly be eligible for damages as an involuntary participant. In the case of Dooley v Cammell Laird Co Ltd11 the Court quoted from Alcock and said: “The fact that the defendants negligent conduct has foreseeably put the plaintiff in the position of being an unwilling participant in the event establishes of itself a sufficiently proximate relationship between then, and the principal question is whether, in the circumstances, injury of that type to that plaintiff was or was not reasonably foreseeable.”12 In the case of Dooley, the Court held that the claimant would be entitled to recover damages. In the case of Charles, the fact that he suffers from obsessive compulsive disorder may possibly reduce the damages, but the validity of his claim would not be affected, it is only the extent of recovery that may be moderated. Thus, in conclusion, it may be stated that there can be no recoveries for Nicholas and Quentin. Robin may recover damages but the chances are slim, however Roger’s chances of succeeding in his claim are much better. Charles and Thomas will definitely be successful in their claims. Bibliography * Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 * Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 * Chadwick v BRB [1967] 1 WLR 912 * Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1999) 2 AC 455 * Hevican v Ruane [1991] 4 All ER 907 * McLoughlin v OBrian [1983] 1 AC 410 * Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR 329 Read More